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"Why, look you now how unworthily think you make of me. You would play 
upon me, you would seem to know my stops. You would pluck out the heart 
of my mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my 
compass, and there is much music excellent voice in this little organ, 
yet you cannot make it speak. 
'Sblood, do you think I am easier to be played on than a pipe? Call 
what instrument you will though, you cannot fret me, yet you cannot 
play upon me" 
Hamlet Act 3 Scene 2 Shakespeare 
SUMMARY 
In this work we investigate theoretically and experimentally the 
explanations for the Ellsberg Paradox. We review the normative and 
descriptive models of the explanations of the paradox and the 
experimental evidences. In chapter III, we present the result of an 
experiment which explores possible explanations of the Ellsberg paradox 
and test some of the existing explanations of it. Subjects were asked 
to evaluate 21 different lotteries. The lotteries were designed in such 
a way that they would be evaluated the same by an expected utility 
subject. Different theories however predict different representations 
of the ambiguous lotteries by non-EU subjects. The experiment showed a 
consistent replication of the Ellsberg paradox. However, no theory 
seems able to explain entirely their behaviour. Moreover, subjects seem 
to have evaluated lotteries according to different explanations in 
different contexts, which suggests that ambiguity can be perceived in 
different ways in different environments. In chapter IV, we present the 
results of an experiment in which we test the theories which explain 
the Ellsberg paradox but in an insurance context. We build two 
experimental markets to examine individual evaluations of risk 
reductions with two different risk-management tools: self-insurance and 
self-protection. First, we do not find any evidence that the 
risk-reduction mechanism matters. Second, we find that the presence of 
ambiguity matters to the valuation of self-insurance and 
self-protection, although changes in the representation of ambiguity do 
not alter valuation. Finally, our findings do not provide strong 
support for the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity model. 
In the last two chapters, we investigate alternative explanations to 
our experimental results. In particular, in chapter V we investigate 
the possible criteria to be used to define different degree of 
ambiguity when ambiguity is expressed by a second order probability 
distribution. While in chapter VI we analyze how choices can be context 
dependent and consequently how the preferences elicited in the 
experiments may reflect the mental process used in the particular 
elicitation context. 
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PREFACE AND PREVIEW 
Since the middle of the 1950's decision theory has become a very 
active research topic in the areas of economics, psychology, 
mathematics, statistics and philosophy. Of course different discipline 
deal with different problems and use different instruments, hence we 
have a quite heterogeneous field of research. Within decision theory, 
since the beginning of the 80's decision theory under uncertainty has 
become a major topic of research. The distinction between risk and 
uncertainty goes back to Knight (1921) who referred to risk when a 
situation can be represented through numerical probabilities and to 
uncertainty when the situation cannot be represented by numerical 
probabilities. This distinction makes no sense in the standard theories 
of decision making under risk and uncertainty: Expected Utility Theory 
and Subjective Utility Theory. Individuals are assumed either to know 
the probabilities over the occurrence of events or to be able to assess 
them subjectively. However, the Ellsberg paradox shows that beliefs 
about uncertainty cannot be reduces to the single dimension of 
probability and that what people know about a state's probability does 
influence their willingness to bet on that state. 
Since the seminal work of Ellsberg (1961) economists, 
psychologists, philosophers, mathematicians, that is to say decision 
theorists, have investigated the individual decision processes under 
of uncertainty. In addition they have developed theories which try to 
accommodate the paradox within the general framework of the theory of 
rational choice. As In the general field of decision making the 
contribution of the different disciplines are quite heterogeneous and 
not always the achievements reached in one discipline spread over to 
the others. 
What we want to do in this work is to contribute to this stream of 
research. On one hand, we want to verify which is the state of art on 
the subject, and in doing so we want to analyze contribution from all 
the disciplines mentioned above. On the other hand, we want to 
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investigate ourselves how people behave and reason when facing 
uncertainty. We choose to carry our investigation mainly through 
experimental methods, in the conviction that this methodology can help 
us not only to test theories of decision making, but to give insights 
into people's mental processes and strategies. In addition, we try to 
develop our contribution and we interpret our results in the light of 
the economic as well as the psychology literature. Uncertainty is a 
pervasive phenomenon in life and consequently, we believe that the 
increased knowledge in decision making under uncertainty can give us a 
better understanding of how people act and how they solve economic 
problems. 
Our research consequently takes three main directions; first, we 
investigate and test some theories of individual decision making under 
uncertainty; second, we carry over this investigation in a insurance 
context, dealing with the same decision problems in a economic context; 
third, we interpret the results obtained in the light of the new 
developments of behavioural decision making. As any research, our 
research too, in the attempt to give answers, ends up raising new 
questions. This fact should not be taken as the sign of the 
impossibility of giving an answer but simply as a sign of how long is 
the journey of which our work is just a stop. 
The thesis is organized as follows; in the first chapter we review 
the theoretical models on the Ellsberg paradox. In particular in our 
review we try to focus on the intuition of the theories which are often 
very technical, trying to convey the message and the novelty of each 
theory. Moreover, we underlie all the possible links between the 
various models, that as we have already said, belong to different 
disciplines. Being aware that, very often, how decision making under 
uncertainty is tackled depends on what we intend for uncertainty, we 
try to show, in each theory, the connection between the explanation 
adopted and the particular source of uncertainty identified. We try to 
show consequently how the different solutions, and the various 
decision criteria adopted in the different theories depend heavely upon 
their assumptions about the characteristics of uncertainty. It is 
however important to note that while some of the models analyzed simply 
try to describe individual behaviour in face of uncertainty others try 
to insert this behaviour in the general framework of the rational 
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theory of choice. 
In the second chapter, we review some of the experimental work on 
the Ellsberg paradox. Our aim is that of underlying some aspects of 
this work that constitute the background for our experimental 
investigation. Many of the works discussed are by psychologists and are 
related more to the investigations of the possible sources of 
uncertainty than to tests of new or existing theories of the Ellsberg 
paradox. This shows how contribution developed in other discipline can 
enrich our own research. 
In the third chapter, we presents the result of an experiment 
which explores possible explanations of the Ellsberg paradox and tests 
some of the existing explanations of it, in a lottery context. Subjects 
were asked to evaluate 21 different lotteries. The lotteries were 
designed in such a way that they would be evaluated the same (except 
two or four depending on the personal beliefs of the subjects) by an 
Expected Utility subject. Different theories, however, predict 
different evaluations by non-EU subjects. There are lotteries designed 
to verify the models of Raiffa (1961), Segal (1987), Kadane (1991), 
Schmeidler (1989), and Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982,83). 
The experiment showed a consistent replication of the Ellsberg 
paradox. Most subjects value the different representations of the 
ambiguous lotteries less than the unambiguous one. However, no theory 
seem able to explain entirely their behaviour. Some theories, however, 
Schmeidler (1989) and Gardenfors and Sahlin (1983) for example, receive 
more support then others. Moreover, subjects seem to have evaluated 
lotteries according to diffeerent explanations in different contexts, 
which suggests that ambiguity can be perceived in different ways in 
different environments. The evaluation of the lotteries seems to 
proceed in stages, and the focus of attention was on different elements 
at different stages of the process. 
In the fourth chapter, we test some theories of decision making 
under uncertainty in an insurance context. The outcome of the decision 
problem are consequently losses and not gains as in the previous 
chapter. We examine individual evaluations of risk reductions with two 
different risk-management tools: self-insurance and self-protection and 
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under two different conditions: risk and uncertainty. To do so we 
construct two experimental markets one for self insurance and one for 
self protection. First, we do not find any evidence that the 
risk-reduction mechanism matters. Second, we find that the presence of 
ambiguity matters to the valuation of self-insurance and 
self-protection, although changes in the representation of ambiguity do 
not alter valuation. Our findings do not provide strong support either 
for the Expected utility theory nor for Gardenfors and Sahlin nor for 
the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity models. In the case of losses the 
individual behaviour seems to respond to less clear rules both in case 
of risk as well as in case of uncertainty. As far as the single models 
are concerned only from the analysis based on individual data we can 
say that a sizable portion of our sample switched from ambiguity 
aversion to ambiguity preference as the probability of loss changed 
from low to high values yielding some support to the Einhorn and 
Hogarth model. However, the mean ratio as well as the mean of the 
differences between ambiguous and risky prices do not show the 
monotonically decreasing pattern predicted by the model. 
In the fifth chapter we suggest two possible criteria 
according to which a second order distribution can be considered more 
ambiguous than another second order distributions and we design an 
experimental test between the two decision rules. We do this in the 
attempt to explain some of our experimental results, which cannot be 
explained within the existing framework. In doing this we also suggest 
some possible paths for further theoretical research when ambiguity is 
expressed as a second order probability distribution. 
In our sixth and concluding chapter, we link the interpretation of 
our experimental work with the psychological models of constructive 
preferences. These psychological models may not only explain some 
experimental results that cannot be explained otherwise, but they 
constitute a real challenge not only to the standard theories of 
decision making but also to most of the alternative and more recent 
ones. 
The fact that preferences can be constructed in the elicitation process 
or depend on the choice set may be disturbing not only to decision 
theorists but also to economists. 
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"And why do you pity us, Patominos" the Sovereign asked. 
"For many reasons " the eunuch answered, "but above all because men 
are subject to the law of change. It is a deceitful law, because no 
change does exist. " 
"Do you mean that for the sake of seeking this particular change, I 
should go to some place? " 
"Yes, my Lord, " answered Patominos, "So as to be persuaded that 
there is not any change" 
"And would be this enough to cure me? " 
"Not the persuasion, my Lord, but the experiences that are 
necessary to reach this persuasion". Die Geschichte 1002. Nacht, 
Joseph Roth 
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CHAPTER I 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL MODELS ON THE ELLSBERG 
PARADOX. 
I. 1 Introduction 
The concept of ambiguity was articulated for the first time in the 
seminal article of Ellsberg. In order to define the concept of 
ambiguity, Ellsberg started by analysing the definition of uncertainty 
given by Knight (1921): measurable uncertainty or risk is that which 
can be represented by numerical probability, whereas "unmeasurable 
uncertainty" that which cannot be represented by numerical 
probabilities. This latter situation can occur, according to Knight, 
when the decision maker is ignorant about statistical frequencies of 
the event relevant to his decision, when relevant calculations are 
impossible, when the event is unique, or when an important 
once-and-for-all decision is concerned. 
These kind of distinctions make no sense within the framework of the 
two leading theories of choices In economics and psychology, namely the 
Expected Utility Theory (EU) of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and 
the Subjective Utility Theory (SEU) of Savage (1954). 
EU assumes that the probabilities of the outcomes are known. If the 
individual preferences specified over prospects follow a set of axioms, 
they can be represented by a real-valued function (in which the 
preferred choices have higher utility numbers) and the utility of a 
choice is the expected utility of its possible outcomes. Recently the 
debate on EU had focused, on the one hand, on alternative underlying 
axioms and their implications for the utility function, and, on the 
other hand, on the empirical investigation on the violation of the 
various axioms. However, it is not an object of this review to 
describe and analyse any of these theories (see for example Machina 
(1987), Fishburn (1988) or Weber and Camerer (1987) for the empirical 
evidence). 
The standard implication of SEU Is instead that people behave "as 
though" they assign numerical probabilities, or degrees of belief, to 
each event and state of the world (probabilities are not known but 
people are assumed to have subjective probabilities over the states). 
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Moreover, the basic idea is that it is possible to infer these 
probabilities or degrees or belief on the likelihood of an event 
through the willingness of the subject to bet. That is, it is people's 
willingness to bet on an event which reveals their degree of belief in 
that event. From the subject's preferences over bets, it is possible to 
infer the subject's subjective probabilities over the events (our 
actual choices reveal our beliefs) and, if this ordering satisfies 
certain axioms, all uncertainty can be reduced to risk. On the other 
hand, since also utilities are derived from preferences, if these 
preferences satisfy some axioms then preferences can be represented by 
expected utility. Consequently the Savage approach combines the idea of 
subjective probability of De Finetti with the theory of EU of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern. 
The distinction between uncertainty (or ambiguity) and risk 
challenges this kind of reasoning. In fact, the Ellsberg paradox 
suggests that there are situations in which people do not behave as if 
they are able to assign numerical probabilities to events. When this 
happens and why, how pervasive is this phenomenon, and what people do 
instead of "assigning numerical probabilities", has been one of the 
main topics of research and investigation in decision theory in the 
last ten years. 
In this review we try to critically analyse and investigate the 
possible explanations of the Ellsberg paradox. Our main object is to 
investigate that part of the literature which has been developing 
alternative formulations of axioms, decision rules and descriptive 
behavior to SEU. We will try, however, to analyse also the possible 
links with other streams of thoughts which tackle the problem of 
decision making under uncertainty. Since our main goal is review the 
recent theoretical explanations of the Ellsberg paradox we will not 
review in this chapter any empirical or experimental evidence of the 
Ellsberg paradox; nor are we going to review generalizations of EU. 
Moreover, we will limit our analysis to individual decision making, and 
consequently we will not consider organizational choice under ambiguity 
(March and Olsen (1976)). Furthermore, we are not going to review some 
literature which can be considered related to the problem shown by the 
Ellsberg paradox: ambiguity tolerance as a personality trait, 
linguistic ambiguity, and the literature on probability elicitation. 
Neither are we going to review theories of those authors who tackle the 
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problem of uncertainty considering alternative uncertainty variables 
like possibility (fuzzy set theory, Zadeh (1978)) and potential 
surprise (Shackle (1954) or the belief functions of Shafer (1976). This 
choice has been determined by our main objective (try to confine our 
analysis to theoretical explanations of the Ellsberg paradox) and not 
by judgment of value. We think, for example, that Shackle's theory of 
potential surprise, as well as the fuzzy set theory, can be considered 
alternative ways of approaching decision making under uncertainty. We 
also choose not to give any any specific account of the thought of 
Keynes (1921). However since the literature on ambiguity makes 
explicit and continuous references to this author, we will refer to his 
ideas when necessary. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, we will 
briefly review SEU and the Anscombe-Aumann' (1963) version of it 
(A-A). In the second section we will describe the Ellsberg paradox and 
explain why it violates Savage axioms. In the third section, there will 
be a guide to the literature. The review will follow and theories will 
be grouped according to the guidelines. In the final section 
conclusions will be drawn. 
1.2 Decision making under uncertainty: Subjective Expected Utility. 
Subjective Expected Utility was developed first by Savage (1954) and 
then derived in a different way by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Both 
developments are relevant in describing generalizations of SEU. 
1.2.1 Savage's approach. 
A decision problem under uncertainty is usually formalized through 
the notions of states, acts and consequences. When a decision is to be 
taken this means that one or more acts have to be chosen. In deciding 
on an act, account must be taken of the possible states of the world, 
and also of the consequences implicit in each act for each possible 
state of the world, since the consequence, c, of an act depends on 
which state of the world, s, will occur (with the term consequence 
Savage intended anything that can happen to a person). According to 
Savage, if two different acts have the same consequences in every state 
of the world, there is no point considering them two different acts at 
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all. An act may therefore be identified with its possible consequences. 
More formally: 
S is the set of all possible states of the world. It is the universal 
event which is the event having every state of the world as its 
element. 
s is the generic symbol for a state of the world. 
A, B, C, are generic symbols for events. An event is a set of states. 
A, B, C are subsets of S. 
F is the set of all acts and f and g are single acts. 
C is the set of all consequences and c is a single consequence. 
X is the set of all prizes or outcomes and x is a single prize or 
outcome. 
Formally an act f is a function attaching a consequence to each state 
of the world, that is to say ci --f (s i 
). In Savage, however, the set of 
consequences coincides with the set of outcomes, C=X and consequently 
we can consider xi =f (s i 
). Let us consider for example a football match: 
X is the set of monetary losses or gains. Each team corresponds to a 
state of the world and an act f: S-º X is a bet resulting in the amount 
f(s) if the team corresponding to the state s wins the championship. 
Furthermore, if we indicate with pt (s ) the subjective probability of 
the occurence of an event then an act, f, can be also described as a 
vector (x(s ), p(s );.....; x(s ), p(s )) (this notation will be used 
iinn 
later). 
In Savage's framework individuals are assumed to have preferences 
over acts. So if we indicate with f and g two acts, with f-g we will 
indicate that the act f is indifferent to the act g (for a particular 
individual), while with g >. f we will indicate that f is at least as 
preferred as g. The object of SEU is to make possible the description 
of these preferences by a numerical representation, and a way to obtain 
such representation is to impose on the preferences plausible 
conditions or axioms and to show that these axioms imply a real valued 
functional V: F-9 Pt such that V(f) it (is at least as big as) V(g), if and 
only if f >- g (f is at least as preferred as g). In particular, SEU 
represents preferences over acts by a numerical utility index u and a 
probability measure on states p, such that an act f is preferred to an 
act g if and only if the Subjective Expected Utility of f is bigger 
than the Subjective Expected Utility of g. 
The Subjective Expected Utility of f is defined as 
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SEU(f)= E u(x(s)) p(s) (I. 1) 
SES 
(1.1) is subjective expected utility representation of the weak order >- 
on F (-, F), p is a unique, finitely additive probability measure on the 
set of the subsets of S and u: XiR is a bounded utility function unique 
up to a positive and affine transformation. This uniqueness gives a 
cardinal utility on the outcome space derived from ordinal preferences 
among acts. 
To obtain this representation the preferences over acts should satisfy 
the following axioms: 
P1 The relation » on F is a simple ordering (or a weak order). 
Hence a relation among a set of acts f, g, and h is defined as a simple 
ordering if and only if for every f, g and h EF 
a) Either f}g or g >- f (preferences are complete: completeness) 
b) If f- g and grha f} h (preferences are transitive: 
transitivity). 
Consider now the event AeS: with -A we will indicate the event having 
every state of the world as its element except the states belonging to 
A (- A can also be denoted by with S/A or A°or A). 
P2 If f and g are such that 
a) In -A f agree with' g and f' with g', 
b) In Af agree with f' and g with g' 
c) f >- g then f'» g'. 
Consider the following acts where the event A is defined as a red ball 
is drawn from a bag. 
1 Saying that f "agree with" means that when -A occurs, under the acts 
f and g the same consequence c is obtained. 
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Figure I. I. Illustration of the sure thing principle. 
A 3 
1 A 
A 3 
0 A 
A 2 
S 
1 A 
A 2 
0 A 
The same can be also express using a matrix form as follows: 
f 
S 
f' 
8ý 
A -A 
3 1 
2 1 
3 0 
2 0 
P2 is also called the sure thing principle and it states that if f >- g 
also f' >- g'. Since f and g and f' and g' differ only when the event A 
takes place, the decision maker should not take into any account what 
happen when A does not occur in defining his or her preferences over 
acts. 
In order to define P3 we need some other concepts and definitions. 
A null event: 
AcS is null if f is indifferent to g, given A2, for every f and gC 
F. According to Savage this is like to say that a person consider A 
virtually impossible, or in Kreps' words, the event A has probability 0. 
"If A is null in this sense then the values acts take on elements of A 
are irrelevant to all decisions". Savage (1954), p 24. 
2Given A means once A has occurred. 
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A constant act: Savage defines as constant acts the acts whose 
consequence are independent of the state of the world. They are 
important since they lead to 
"a natural definition of preference among consequences in terms of 
preference among acts". Savage (1954), p 25. 
Let us define following Savage facI, f is identically cl, that is to 
say for every state of the world s, f(s) = cl. Now a preference among 
consequence can be defined in the following way: For any consequences 
cl and c2, cl >- c2; if and only if when fr-c2and f'=-c2, f» f' 
P3 If f=m, f'=c2 and A is not null; then f» f' given A if and only if 
c}c. 1-2 
Consider the following case : 
Figure 1.2 Illustration of P3 
SSS 
123 
f111 
V000 
Where A is equal to (si, s2, s3). Hence, the axiom states that given A. I 
should prefer f to f' if and only if I prefer 1 to 0. In particular, 
the axiom states that 
"the knowledge of an event cannot establish a new preference among 
consequences or reverse the old one", but also assert that, "if the 
event is not null, no preference among consequences can be reduced to 
indifference by knowledge of an event" Savage (1954), p 26. 
Let us indicate, following Savage, that to offer a prize in case A 
obtains means to make available to a person an act fA' such that: 
fA(s) = xl for s eA 
fA(s) = x2 for s e-A 
Where x1 - x2. 
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P4 If xl, x2, y1, y2; A, B; fA' fB, gA, gB are such that 
1: xl)- x2, Yi } y2 
2a fA(s)= xl gA (s)=y1 for s eA 
A(s)= x2 gA(s)=y2 
2b 1B(s)= x1 gB(s)= yl 
fB(s)= x2 gB(s)= y2 
3 fA} fB 
then gA } gB. 
for s E-A 
for sEB 
forsE -B 
In Savage words this postulate assumes that on which of two events a 
person will choose to stake a given prize does not depend on the prize 
itself. 
In the light of this P4 Savage says that A can be defined as being as 
least as probable as B, AzB if and only if when xlr x2 and fA' fB 
are such that 
fA(s)= xl 
fB(s)= xl 
for sEA 
for seB 
fA(s)= x2 
fB(s)= x2 
for s e-A 
Then fAt fB 
Let us consider the axiom in the matrix form: 
for s E-B 
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Figure 1.3 Illustation of P4 
A -A 
fxx 
A12 
gA y1 y2 
B -B 
fg xl x2 
9B y1 y2 
If we recall now that an act f can be described as a vector 
WS p(s..... ; x(s ), p(ss)), in our case fA can described as 
(xI(A), p (A); x2(A), p(-A)) and f13 by (xI(B), p(-B); x2(B), p(-B)). 
The preferences between fA and fH can depend only on the fact that the 
event A is considered more probable that the event B (given that xl>- 
x2). But if A is considered more probable than B than the axiom states 
that we also have to prefer gA to gH even if we got different prizes, 
provided that yl» y2(in both case we got the best prize under the same 
event). 
P5 There is at least one pair of consequences xIand x2such that x1» x2. 
(which means that there must at least a worth-while prize; this axiom 
is also called not-triviality) 
The axioms Pl-P5 have the following important implication which is the 
derivation of probability from preferences. 
Savage defines a relation it. as qualitative probability if and only if 
for all events B, C, D, 
1. Lt. is a simple ordering 
2BZ. C if and only if BuD Z. CvD. provided that BnD and CnD=O 
3BZ. 0 and S >. 0 
Theorem 1 The relation at. as applied to events is a qualitative 
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probability. 
Postulate P6' and P6 are used by Savage to assign a numerical 
probability to each event and consequently not having to use the 
concept of qualitative probability. 
Now we define the concept of probability measure: 
a probability measure on a set S is a function p(B) attaching to 
each BcS a real number such that 
1 p(B) z0 for every B 
2 If BnC =0, p(BuC) = p(B) + p(C) 
3 p(S) =1 
P6' if C >- B there is a partition of S the union of each element of 
which with C is more probable than B. 
This last axiom implies that the agreement between qualitative and 
numerical probability is strict and it is necessary to define as we 
already said probability measures over events. A stronger version of 
the axiom is given by P6 and this axiom extend the same kind of 
requirement, not only to those special acts by which probability is 
defined, but to acts in general. 
P6 If h >- g and x is any consequence; then there exist a partition of S 
such that if g and h are so modified on any one element of the 
partition so as to take the value x at every s there, other values 
being unchanged: then the modified g remains less then h or g remain 
less then the modified h, as the case may require. (These modifications 
cannot change our pattern of preferences, the axioms is stated 
following Savage). 
This axiom has mainly a technical meaning and can be compared with the 
Archimedean axiom or the continuity axiom. It is to some extent a 
restriction on how good or how bad an outcome can be. The axiom, for 
example, fails if there exist an outcome so good that any positive 
probability of getting it will make the act that contains it better 
than some other act. This axiom moreover implies that the partition in 
which S is divided is finite or that S can be divided into finitely 
many pieces, and implies in connection with the other axioms that the 
state space must be infinite. The approach of Anscombe and Aumann does, 
as we shall see later, not require this property of the state space. 
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P7 For all AS 
Urýf ýýý 
OF YOR 
(IB K f >- g(s) given A for all s¬A implies f >- g given A RARY 
g(s) >- f given A for all seA implies grf given A. 
P7 is a dominance condition (or sure thing or independence condition) 
and it is not required to derive probability from preferences. Fishburn 
gives a weaker version of the Savage axiom substituting } for ». 
Fishburn (1970) p 192. 
I. 2.2 Anscombe-Aumann's (1963) approach. 
The other main approach that has been widely used in the models 
which allow for the behaviour revealed by the Ellsberg paradox is that 
of Anscombe-Aumann (1963) (A-A). In the Savage set up there is no 
distinction between objective and subjective probabilities: all the 
probabilities are subjective. To obtain the representation (see (1.1) 
of section I. 2.1)ß however, is quite complicated. What A-A do is to 
infer subjective probabilities through the use of objective random 
devices. In their own words 
"The purpose of this note is to define the person's probabilities in 
terms of chances by an extension of the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
theory. " Anscombe-Aumann (1963) p 200. 
What they do in practice Is to enrich the choice set with imaginary 
objects which are compound lotteries and to construct preferences over 
them. They moreover Introduce the distinction between two kind of 
lotteries: roulette lotteries in which an uncertain event is associated 
with a known chance; and horse lotteries in which either chance cannot 
be associated with the uncertain events in questions or they are 
unknown (as if we were observing a horse race). Compound lotteries are 
just lotteries the outcome of which are simple lotteries; they are 
constructed by iteration from simple lotteries. 
In Anscombe-Aumann's model, we consequently have: 
Sa finite set of states of the worlds (while In Savage S must be 
infinite) 
Xa set of prizes 
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P(X) is the set of all probability measures with the finite support on 
the outcome space X(s) as the set of consequences. These consequences 
are pure risky lotteries. Hence an act assigns to each state sa 
lottery f(s)eP(X). (While in Savage an act is a function that assigns 
to each state a consequence or a prize , f(s) = x, in A-A, f(s) is a 
risky lottery, so what Savage call acts are in fact consequences in the 
A-A framework). A-A assume that the decision maker has preferences over 
these acts which are called lottery acts. 
H is the choice space and it is the set of all functions from outcome 
(lottery acts) of the horse lottery to probability distributions over 
prizes (acts in Savage). 
In practice aheH is 
"a betting ticket which specifies, for each possible outcome of the 
horse race, a roulette wheel lottery that is won by the holder of the 
betting ticket" Kreps (1988) p 4. 
The representation theorem (using Kreps's notation) is given by: 
there exist functions p: Si[O, ll with LES p(s)=1 and u: X-PR such that 
fýf'iff 
LES 
p(s)L 
EXf 
(s)(X)u(x)) > 
LES 
P(S) ILXEXf 
is)(X)U(X)l 
(1.2) 
where f(s) is a probability distribution on X so f(s)(x) is the 
probability that f(s) give the prize x. Where each f(s) give some 
prizes with certainty then we get exactly the Savage representation 
with f(s) = x. 
To reach the above representation theorem the following axioms must 
hold: 
Al >- over H is a preference relation (this axiom is comparable with 
Savage's P1) 
Individuals have preferences over the horse lotteries. These 
preferences are complete and transitive (as the preferences over acts 
of Savage). 
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A2 h >- h' and ae (0,1] imply that ah + (1-a)g >- ah' + (1-a)g 
(which is comparable with P2 or the sure thing principle) mixture 
independence. 
Given the preference relation between the two horse lotteries h and h' 
and a probability measure a, the mixed lottery which gives h with 
probability a and g with probability (1-a) will be preferred to the 
mixed lottery which gives h' with probability a and g with probability 
(1-a). In practice, our preferences between these mixed lotteries 
should not be conditioned by what is the constant factor g. 
A3 h >- h'r h" imply there exist a, ße (0,1) such that 
ah+(1-a)h">- h' >- 13h+(1-ß)h". (This is comparable with P6 or 
archimedean axiom) 
The axiom states that there will be no horse lottery h so good that for 
h'>- h", a small probability ß of h and a large probability of (1-13) of 
h" is always better that h'. And that there is no horse lottery h" so 
bad that for h >- h", a large probability a of h and a small 
probability (1-a) of h" is always worse than h'. 
Stated in this way, with horse lotteries the axiom lacks intuitive 
appeal. Let us consider the case in which h, h' and h" instead of 
being horse lotteries are goods (or bads). Consider the case for 
example that h is going to Paris for the weekend, h' is staying at home 
and h" dying. The axiom states that if h is preferred to h' (I prefer 
to go to Paris than staying at home) a mixture of h and h"(dying by a 
flight accident) will not change the preference relation between h and 
h'( provided that the probability is small enough). In practice I 
prefer to go Paris even if in order to go to Paris I will take the 
plane. 
Until now we have confined our discussion to the presentation of 
Savage's and Anscombe-Aumann's models and axioms. There are, however, 
other two axioms or requirements that preferences should satisfied 
which are implicit in both frameworks, but that are not separately 
stated, but which are important because they can be specifically 
relaxed by some generalizations of or alternative theories to SEU: the 
invariance principle and the reduction principle. 
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The Invariance Principle: 
The evaluation of prospects does not depend on how the decision problem 
is presented or described to the decision maker. 
This means that different representations of the same problem should 
yield the same preferences. 
"Invariance encompasses two requirements: description invariance and 
procedure invariance. Description invariance demand that preferences 
among options should not depend on the manner in which they are 
represented or displayed. Two representations that the decision makers, 
on reflection, would view as equivalent descriptions of the problem 
should lead to the same choice-even without the benefit of reflection. 
Procedure invariance demands that strategically equivalents methods of 
elicitation will give rise to the same preference order. For example, 
the standard theory assumes that an individual's preference order can 
be established either by offering that individual a direct choice 
between the two options under study, or by comparing their reservation 
prices. Furthermore, the theory assumes that the two procedures yield 
the same order. " Amos Tversky (1993) p 3. 
Reduction of the compound lotteries axiom: 
We will indicate with L1a compound lottery, with f1a simple lottery 
with ptthe probabilities of the outcomes xt of the simple lotteries, 
and with P, the probabilities of the simple lotteries f1 which are the 
outcome of the compound lotteries L1. 
Let us consider lottery L1 (f1P1;. fm Pm) and let ft 
I= (x1pi'".; x1pni) with i= 1,.., m The reduction of compound lottery 
axiom states that a two stage lottery is reduced to a single stage 
lottery using the usual rule: 
(f P ;... f P )-( x1p1P1 ;...; xl pi Pi ;.,; xm pmPm ;...; xm p "'Pm) 11mm11 n1 nl 11 nm nm 
The axiom states that the decision maker is indifferent between a 
two-stage lottery and its equivalent one-stage lottery, where all 
uncertainty is resolved in the first stage. That is to say that the 
decision maker is indifferent about the way in which uncertainty is 
resolved and he or she cares only about the probabilities of the final 
outcome. 
As we will see in the next section the Ellsberg paradox suggests 
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the presence of individual behaviour that systematically violates two 
of the main axioms or requirements stated above: the sure thing 
principle and the additivity of probabilities3. Hence most of the 
models which accommodate the paradox weaken one or more of the axioms 
described above. We will consequently use the Savage and the 
Anscombe-Aumann models as benchmarks for our description of the models 
on ambiguity. 
1.3 The Ellsberg paradox. 
Ellsberg started from the observation that there are circumstances 
under which "people do not always assign, or act as though" they 
assigned, probabilities to uncertain events. The factor which explains 
the non capability of assigning probabilities to events is the presence 
of uncertainty. Hence, according to Ellsberg, if we observe that, with 
respect to certain events, people 
"did not obey, nor did wish to obey - even on reflection - Savage's 
postulates or equivalent rules " Ellsberg (1%1) p 646, 
we can conclude that we are in presence of uncertainty. The presence of 
uncertainty is, thus, revealed to us by people's inability to assign 
probabilities to events. 
If this is true, Ellsberg concludes, there is simply no way to infer 
meaningful probabilities for events from people's choices. Hence, 
theories that describe uncertainty in terms of probabilities cannot be 
applied, unless it is possible to devise different operations to 
measure probability. Moreover, in this case, people cannot be described 
as expected utility maximizers on the basis of numerical probabilities 
that they assign to events. In addition, it would be impossible to 
derive a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function from their 
choices among gambles involving those events. 
Let us now describe the kind of choices which according to Ellsberg 
violate the Savage axioms and why. We will follow Ellsberg (1961) in 
3 Ellsberg interprets his paradox also as a possible violation of the 
ordering axiom Pl or Al. However the following literature on ambiguity 
mostly explains the paradox as a violation of P2. Probably this is due 
to the fact that the normative consequences of a violation of P1 are 
more serious than the one due to a weakening of P2. 
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the account below. 
1.3.1 The two-colour example. 
We have two urns, urn I and urn II, both of them containing black 
and red balls; from one of the two urns a ball is drawn at random and 
we can bet on red or on black. 
Betting on red, we will receive a prize of $100 if we draw a red ball 
(if red occurs), while we will receive no prize if we draw a black ball 
(non red occurs). 
Consider the two choice problem: 
Table 1.1 Two-colour Ellsberg Paradox 
100 
R B 
Urn I RI $100 $0 
BI $0 $100 
R(50) B(50) 
Urn II RII $100 $0 
BII $0 $100 
We have the following information: 
Urn I contains 100 red and black balls but we do not know their ratio; 
Urn II contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls. 
Suppose that we are asked our preferences over the above pairs of 
gambles with the aim of inferring from our preferences our subjective 
probabilities over the various events. 
We can be asked 
1. whether we prefer RI or BI 
4 
2. whether we prefer RII or BII 
3. whether we prefer RI or RII 
4. whether we prefer BI or BII 
Ellsberg considers the case when we are indifferent between RI and BI 
4 From here ahead the bet "betting on red in the first urn" will be 
called RI while betting on red in the second urn will be indicated by 
RII, BI and BII are defined analogously. 
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and between RII and BII (we do not have preference over colour). 
As far as questions 3 and 4 are concerned 
a. we can be indifferent within each pair of options, that is to say we 
are indifferent between urn 1 and urn 2 or 
b. we prefer to bet on Urn 2 then RII is preferred to RI and BII is 
preferred to BI or 
c. we prefer to bet on Urn 1 then RI is preferred to RII and BI is 
preferred to BII 
If our preferences are like the ones in group b or c we are violating 
the Savage axioms. 
Violation of the complete ordering axiom and of the sure thing 
principle. The complete ordering axiom, P1, states that preference 
should be complete and transitive. If the complete ordering axiom 
holds, it is possible to perform certain transformations on the 
considered choices without affecting the preference ordering. In 
particular it is possible to substitute for one choice another one 
which is indifferent to the first one: that is to say if f-g and g-c 
then f-c. 5 
5 In this way we are applying transitivity to an indifference relation. 
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The sure thing principle, P2, states that 
"the choice between two actions must be unaffected by the value of the 
payoffs corresponding to events for which both actions have the same 
payoff. (i. e. by the value of the payoffs in a constant column) 
Ellsberg (1961) page 649. 
If the axiom holds, we can replace the constant column with another 
constant column and this operation would not change our preference 
ordering. 
To show this Ellsberg considers the case of an individual who prefers 
RII to RI. 
To show why the paradox implies the violation of the sure thing 
principle and of the complete ordering axiom, Ellsberg slightly 
modifies the two choice problems described in Table I. 1. 
Let us assume that the balls in urn 1 are marked with number 1 and that 
the balls in urn 2 are marked with the number 2. Let us now consider 
the case in which the content of the two urns is dropped In a single 
urn. Now this urn contains 100 black and red balls marked with the 
number 1 but in an unknown proportion and 50 red balls marked with the 
number 2 and 50 black balls marked with the number 2. 
Table 11.2 The modified Ellsberg example 
100 50 50 
RI RI RII a11 
Act 1 $100 $0 $0 $0 
Act 2 $0 $100 $0 $0 
Act 3 $0 $0 $100 $0 
Act 4 $0 $0 $0 $100 
Let us define other two choices: 5, which corresponds to choose RI or 
BI (RI or BI, I choose the balls marked with one) and 6, which 
corresponds to choose RII or BII. 
5 $100 $100 $0 $0 
6 $0 $0 $100 $100 
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Ellsberg considers the case of an individual who is indifferent between 
1 and 2, between 3 and 4and between 5 and 6. 
The same individual however is supposed to prefer 1 to 3. 
6 
1 $100 $0 $0 $0 
3 $0 $0 $100 $0 
We apply the sure thing principle between 1 and 3 and substitute the 
last constant column and we obtain (the superscript will always 
indicate the new choice obtained from applying either P1 or P2. ) 
1' $100 $0 $0 $100 
3' $0 $0 $100 $100 
and 1' should be preferred to 3'. 
Applying the complete ordering axiom, since 3' is 6, and 6 is 
indifferent to 5, we can substitute 5 for 6. 
1' p $100 $0 $0 $100 
3" $100 $100 $0 $0 
Applying the sure thing principle to the first column we obtain 
1' $0 $0 $0 $100 
3"' $0 $100 $0 $0 
Applying the complete ordering axiom, since 1"' is equal to 4, and 3 
is indifferent to 41 substitute 1"' with 3. Since 3"' is equal to 2 
6 Our individual is indifferent between betting on RI or BI, on RII or 
BII, is indifferent in betting on RI and BI and RII and BII. However he 
prefers to bet on RI than on RII. 
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and 2 is indifferent to 1,1 substitute 3"' with 1. 
3 $0 $0 $100 $0 
1 $100 $0 $0 $0 
Hence, if our preference order should be the same in spite of the 
applied transformation our individual should prefer 3 to 1 which is in 
contradiction with the starting assumption that he prefers 1 to 3. 
Violation of Additivity in Probabilities. Let us now consider the 
previous case of the two urns and consider an individual who prefers 
RII to RI. From this choice an external observer can infer that the 
individual regards the probability of red in urn 2 greater than the 
probability of red in urn 1, that to say p(RII)>p(RI). Let us, 
moreover, consider the case in which the external observer also sees 
that our individual prefers BII to BI. From the choices of the 
individual, it is possible to conclude that our individual not only 
regards red in the second urn as more probable that red in the first 
urn; he also regards not-red in the second urn as more probable than 
not-red in the first urn that is to say p(BII)>p(BI). We know that BI 
and RI being disjoint events the p(RIuBI) = p(RI)+ p(BI) = 1, the same 
holds for RII and BII, hence p(RIIvBII) = p(RII)+ p(BII) =1 according 
to the probability laws. However the Ellsberg paradox shows that people 
behave as if p(RII)+p(BII) > p(RI)+ p(BI) which Is incompatible with 
additivity in probabilities. 
Ellsberg's conclusion is that, in this case, the choices are not 
revealing judgments of probability at all and so as far as the events 
above described are concerned, it is not possible to Infer 
probabilities from the choices since some of the Savage axioms are 
violated. 
1.3.2 Three colour example 
This first example of the Ellsberg paradox can be criticized on the 
grounds that people rarely face situations in which they are completely 
ignorant. As far as Urn I is concerned, we do not know anything about 
the proportion of red and black and hence any proportion can be 
considered equally likely. To avoid the above criticism Ellsberg 
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considered another example. Consider an urn, urn 3, containing 90 
balls; 30 are red and 60 are black and yellow, but in an unknown 
proportion. One ball is to be drawn from the urn. In this case we are 
not completely ignorant about the composition of the balls in the urn. 
We know that there are 30 red balls; what we do not know is the 
proportion of yellow and black balls. 
Consider now the following choices: 
Table 1.3 Three colour example 
First choice 60 
R(30) BY 
R $100 $0 $0 
B $0 $100 $0 
Second choice 
60 
R(30) BY 
RY $100 $0 $100 
BY $0 $100 $100 
RY is bet on red or yellow and BY is bet on black or yellow. 
We can ask the usual question about which choices we prefer. If 
we prefer R to B (betting on red is preferred to betting on black) in 
the and BY to RY (betting on black or yellow is preferred to betting on 
red or yellow) we are committing the Ellsberg paradox. This kind of 
pattern violates P1 (if you prefer R to B you should prefer RY to BY); 
the two pairs of choices in fact differ just for the constant column. 
Preferring R to B and BY to RY implies again violation of the 
additivity property of probabilities. The above pattern of preferences 
shows an individual who prefers to bet on red than to bet on black but, 
at the same time, he or she prefers to bet against red than against 
black. This means that the individual thinks red more likely than black 
and, at the same time, he or she thinks also that not red Is more 
likely than not-black. 
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1.4 Ellsberg's definition of ambiguity. 
As we have previously said, Ellsberg identified the presence of 
ambiguity with the fact that people are not acting as though they 
assign numerical or even qualitative probabilities to the events in 
question. 
If we define ambiguity in this way, we must also define the following 
two concepts: 
a. what is the quality that makes this kind of uncertainty different 
from others ? 
b. which decision rule are people following when displaying Ellsberg 
paradox behaviour ?. 
Ellsberg answered question (a) by saying that 
"what is at issue might be called the ambiguity of [the relevant] 
information, a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability and 
'unanimity' of information, and giving rise to one's degree of 
'confidence' in estimate of relative likelihoods". Ellsberg (1961) p 
657. 
Consequently, in the presence of ambiguity, according to Ellsberg, how 
people actually behave or act can 
"depend on another sort of judgment, about the reliability, 
credibility, or adequacy of his information (including his relevant 
experiences, advice and intuition) as a whole: not about the relative 
support he may give to any hypothesis as opposed to another, but about 
his ability to lend support to any hypothesis at all" Ellsberg (1961) p 
659 
The lack of reliability in the information makes choices depend on 
other factors, according to Ellsberg. This can happen, even if we 
assume, as Ellsberg does, that people can always assign a relative 
likelihood to a state of nature, reflecting the support that 
experience, intuition and information can give to different hypotheses. 
As we will see later, it is in the relation between the ability to 
assign relative likelihoods to an event and people's action that we can 
make a distinction between different positions in the literature. Even 
in the eventuality that people might be able to assign relative 
likelihoods to events. in the presence of ambiguity, their actions may 
depend on some other part of their judgment. In this case, it is 
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important to define what is this other part of their judgment. This 
other part of their judgment can be weights to attach to 
probabilities, or be represented in other ways (for example the weight 
of evidence in Keynes or the competence effect in Heath and Tversky 
(1991)). 
The consequence is that people can assign the same likelihood to an 
event, or have a given degree of belief, but can act differently, 
accordingly to other criteria, because what is different is the 
perception that he or she has of this degree of belief. 
In Ellsberg's paper, either the concept of weight or the concept of 
confidence in one's own judgment characterizes quite explicitly the 
presence of ambiguity. This, it seems to us, is a consequence of the 
fact that Ellsberg considers ambiguous a situation where available 
information is scanty or unreliable, or highly conflicting, or when 
expectations of different individuals differ widely, or where expressed 
confidence tends to be low. Moreover if we are in presence of 
conflicting opinions or evidences, even if the amount of information is 
high, ambiguity can be high (and the confidence in any particular 
estimated probability low). 
We will illustrate the characterization of ambiguity through the 
lack of reliability in one's information with the following example 
taken from Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982). 
Miss Julie is invited to bet on the outcome of three different tennis 
matches. As far as match A is concerned, she is very well informed 
about the two players, their physical condition, previous matches and 
so on. Given all this information, Julie thinks that the match will be 
even, and consequently that it will be decided by mere chance. As far 
as the second match B is concerned, she does not know anything of the 
relative strength of the two competitors, and so, having no information 
at all, she cannot predict the winner of the match. For match C. the 
situation is quite similar to that of match B, except for the fact that 
Julie knows that one of the player is excellent and that the other one 
is an amateur, so that everybody considers the outcome of the match a 
forgone conclusion, but she does not know which is which. 
It is clear that the willingness of Miss Julie to bet on each of 
the three matches is probably not the same. The first match is not 
ambiguous, in the second one Miss Julie does not have any information 
at all, whereas as far as the third match is concerned, the situation 
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is ambiguous (Miss Julie has some information but this information is 
unreliable). In this case, what is different is not just the quantity 
of information but also the quality. This last aspect, the quality of 
information, is not really present in the urns examples considered by 
Ellsberg, however it seems to me to show more precisely what 
constitutes Ellsberg's definition of ambiguity. 
To sum up it would appear to be the case that ambiguity can be 
defined either as: 
a) missing information 
b) unreliable information (not sure or conflicting)7. 
Both the concepts are present in the literature, and as we will see, 
each author adopts a particular concept as well as a particular source 
of ambiguity. For this reason, we will adopt a more operational and 
general definition of ambiguity. 
We will define a risky choice a choice based on known probability and 
we will define an ambiguous choice a choice based on unknown 
probability. 
With known probability we will indicate probabilities which are 
specified or which are the outcome of a well known random process. 
With "unknown probability" we will refer to probabilities which are not 
exactly specified, or are more than one, or are referred to the 
occurence of an event (which are called judgmental probabilities). We 
decided to use this broad definition in order to be consistent with 
most of the models analysed in the next section. However is is 
importance to notice that for the competence model of Heath and Tversky 
(1991) people may prefer to bet on a judgmental probability than on an 
equivalent chance, even if the judgmental probability is more 
ambiguous. According to this theory the source of uncertainty is not 
the judgment over the occurrence of an event but the relative knowledge 
of the subject of the elements necessary to form such a judgment. 
7 In this case what is important is not just the quantity of 
information but the quality. 
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Figure 1.5 Risky and ambiguous choices 
Risky 
0.5 £10 
0.5 
£0 
Heads 
2 
X10 ýLo 
Tails 
Ambiguous 
0-0.5 X10 
a I- to 
0.5-1 
p1(0.2 or 0.4)£10 
bI £0 
p2(0.8 or o. 6) 
Milan will win the Italian League In 1995 
p(E) f10 
cý Lo 
p(-E) 
Milan will non win the Italian League In 1995 
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1.5 Theoretical models of explanations for the Ellsberg paradox: 
guidelines. 
In the theoretical literature which tries to devise alternative 
models which allow for Ellsberg kind of behaviour or which try to 
respond to the experimental evidence of violation of SEU, we may 
distinguish four main groups. 
a) Models which simply deny the importance of the violation. People do 
commit mistakes and consequently the violation of the axioms of SEU is 
simply a mistake. 
b) Models which recognize the existence of behaviour not consistent 
with SEU (I). These models try to explain the Ellsberg Paradox through 
a change in the utility of an outcome. For example, the utility of an 
outcome is modified to reflect a sort of regret, or is discounted when 
probabilities are unknown. 
c) Models which recognize the existence of behaviour non consistent 
with SEU (II). In these models the presence of ambiguity is identified 
with the existence of more than one probability measure, an unknown 
probability, an interval of probability, the existence of a decision 
weight associated with a probability, or a different form of 
probability with different characteristics. 
d) Behavioural models which are based on the fact that "individual do 
not posses preferences but mental processes" (Tversky (1993) talk at 
the meeting of the International Economic Association held in Turin 
Italy in October (1993)). The mental processes explain behaviours 
consistent with the Ellsberg Paradox. It is not possible to have 
normative theory of decision theory. We can just have a descriptive 
theory of such a kind of behaviour. 
In the following review we will organize the discussion according 
to the four groups mentioned above. We will give a short account of 
groups a) and d) mainly to introduce concepts developed in chapters III 
and V. Most of the formal models of ambiguity can be grouped in b) and 
c). We will consequently give a more detailed account of these models. 
Table I. 4 is a summary of the analysed models according to the 
guidelines. 
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Table I. 4 Summary of the review of the Ieterature according to 
the guidelines 
Models that deny the importance of the violation 
RaIf fa ( 1961) 
Models that explain the Ellsberg paradox through 
the modification of the utility 
Smith (1969) Winkler (1991) Sarin and Winkler (1992) 
F1 shburn (1994 ) 
Models which modify the probability 
-Models with set of probability measures 
E ll sber g (196 1) Gardenfors and Sahlin ( 1982,83) 
Levi (1974,86) Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) 
-Models with a second order distribution 
Segal ( 1987) 
-Models with adjusted probabilities 
Fel lner (1961 ) Einhorn and Hogarth (1985,86,90) 
-Models with non-additive probabilities 
Schmeld ler (1 982,89) Gilboa (1987) Nakamura (1990) 
Sarin and Wakker (1992.94) Oginuma (1994) 
-Models with decision weights 
Hazen ( 1987) , Kahn and Sarin ( 1988) Becker and Sarin (1990) 
Hazen and Lee (1991) Tversky and Kahaneman (1992) 
Wakker and Tversky (1993) 
Psychological Models 
Heath and Tversky (1991) 
1.5.1 The mtstake interpretation of the Ellsberg Paradox. 
"Some researchers are uncomfortable because the normative theory is not 
a good descriptive theory of decision making. They would like to 
consider what is currently observed in some decision-making situations 
as 'O. K' rather as mistake In term of the normative theory. I believe 
that just as for me in the case of hydrostatics, the answer lies in 
education rather than in changing the rules of the game. " Howard 
(1992) p 40. 
I. 5.1.1 Raiffa's model (1961) 
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In his note in response to Ellsberg's article Raiffa (1961) 
suggested the following interpretation of the paradox. People, when 
analyzing the unknown urn (urn I), do not like it; they are suspicious 
about it. Hence they evaluate it less than urn II, the one with a known 
proportion of black and red. This happens because they do not 
understand the process which generates the data. The subjects do not 
know in which way the probabilities of the two colours will be defined. 
The kind of reasoning that can be adopted by an ambiguity averse 
subject facing urn I can be simplified as follow: "let me consider the 
unknown urn, I do not understand how the probabilities can be decided, 
I do not have any insight into the process, so I simply dislike it". 
In fact Raiffa writes: 
"Immediately I observed what I shall call the two-shift effect. I found 
that, when relative frequencies or so called objective probabilities 
were given in numerical form as a data of a decision problem, then 
these were often used in computing various indices (e. g. expected and 
actuarial values) which served as a guide to action. But, if certain 
uncertainties in the problem were in cloudy or fuzzy form, then very 
often there was a shifting of gears and no effort at all was made to 
think deliberately and reflectively about the problem ". Raiffa (1961) 
p 691. 
Raiffa's idea is that if we make people reflect on the problem and 
we explain how the probabilities can be generated, then the violation 
will disappear. For example, in urn I, the probabilities can be 
generated by a uniform distribution with a mean value of 1/2 which is 
exactly the value of the probability of the two colours in urn II. 
Another way can be to teach people that if they randomize the choice of 
the two colours than the probabilities of the two colours are again 
reduced to 1/2. Let us consider the case of drawing a ball from urn I 
but we do not look at the colour. Now we throw a coin, If tails we will 
bet on black, if heads we will bet on red. In this way, we randomize 
our choice using an "objective probability". The probability of red and 
the probability of black Is again 1/2. According to Raiffa, once told, 
people would realize that calling the colour before or afterwards the 
drawing is not going to change the problem. 
This reasoning is quite simple, however it implicitly assumes that 
a person can know (or learn) what is a random process and that "all 
uncertainties" can be reduce to a random process. Is that always 
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possible? In our opinion, if It is possible to teach an individual that 
given the law of large numbers the probability of head or tails is 
always 1/2, this is not possible for more complicated random process8. 
Moreover we doubt that all uncertainties can be reduced to random 
processes. Moreover, experimental evidences show that even if there 
would be the "need for education to guide choices" (Howard (1990) page 
49), people do not always conform to what they are taught. For example, 
in an experiment done with the three-colour example of the Ellsberg 
Paradox, Slovic and Tversky (1974) show that people can be immune to 
persuasion. Immunity to persuasion has been found also by Curley, Yates 
and Abrams (1986). Immunity to persuasion can maybe be disregarded as 
evidence of the non-adequacy of the SEU as a descriptive an normative 
theory of rational choice by people supporting the mistake model. But 
the fact the people persistently violate the axioms show at least that 
our arguments in favour are not so compelling. 
1.5.2 Models which expiatn the Ellsberg paradox through a 
modtftcatton of the uttitttes. 
" Although ambiguity about probabilities is the ambiguity of concern in 
this article, I would argue that the influence of this ambiguity on 
decision-making behaviour generally operate through preferences. Thus 
attention should be focused on the preference side of modeling rather 
than on probabilities. The preferences side involve the consequences in 
the decision model and the value function or the utility function over 
those consequences" Winkler (1991) page 189. 
Let us consider a bet A which gives a payoff of x if an event E 
happens and a payoff y if the event E does not happen and assume that x 
>- Y. 
The value of A can be represented by 
V(A) = u(x) . p(E) + u(y) . p(-E) (I. 3) 
In the approaches described below the ambiguity of the bet is 
8 In the experiment described in chapter III, for example, when the 
random process was expressed with a toss of a coin it was understood by 
more subjects than when it was expressed by a draw of a number from a 
bag containing numbers from 1 to 13. 
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expressed through a change in u(x) and u(y) which imply a change in 
V(A). If we allow the utility of winning a bet be different in the case 
of ambiguous and unambiguous events, then ambiguity aversion can be in 
some way consistent with utility maximization. Smith (1969), Franke 
(1978), Sarin and Winkler (1992), Fishburn (1994) use an utility based 
approach to the Ellsberg paradox. According to Camerer and Weber (1992) 
modeling ambiguity aversion through a modification in utilities, or 
through a modification in the decision weight, or in the probabilities 
can be seen as a matter of taste. In general a modification on the 
preference side will suit more the authors who are reluctant to modify 
the properties of a probability measure . 
An analysis of the Smith (1969) Sarin and Winkler (1992), Fishburn 
(1994) papers follows. 
1.5.2.1 Smith's (1969) model 
Smith's interpretation of the Eilsberg paradox. According to 
Smith (1969) when people have to express their probability judgment 
about 'nonstandard' process, the stock price for example, they suffer a 
sort of utility loss relative to what they experience when they have to 
express their judgment about more standard processes such as dice 
games. What makes a probability judgment more demanding in the first 
case is that there may be real or imagined elements of skill which 
increase or reduce the subjective value of the outcomes "lose or win". 
In practice, according to Smith, if the Individual loses in a game of 
9 "In all such cases, we are simply saying that the utility of money or 
other rewards is not independent of the circumstances under which is 
obtained. The utilities in the payoff matrix may have arguments rather 
than what appear to be in the 'objective' reward. "Smith (1969) p 325. 
In a recent work, Heath and Tversky (1991) also suggest an 
interpretation of the phenomenon of ambiguity in this direction. The 
experiment run by them shows that people prefer betting on their own 
judgment over an equiprobable chance event when they consider 
themselves knowledgeable but not otherwise. Since judgmental 
probabilities are more ambiguous than chance events the behaviour 
described may not be explained by ambiguity aversion. The authors 
suggest an explanation in terms of the attribution of credit and blame 
which is very similar to the one of Smith. However, while the Smith 
explanation is related to the influence of ambiguity on the utility 
function of the subjects, the one of Heath and Tversky is related to 
the perception of probability of the subjects and its link with their 
system of beliefs. 
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chance he can consider himself a victim of bad luck, but if he makes an 
incorrect prediction of the rise of a stock price, he can think that he 
can be blamed by his colleagues for that. 
"he may perceive that his colleagues feel that he should have known 
better, that he is not so smart after all, that they are glad to see 
his "ignorance" revealed, and so on. Or if he knows nothing about the 
stock market, then the mysteries and ambiguities in the Dow-Jones may 
generate special discomfort anxieties when he gamble on such 
contingencies. " (Smith, l961) p 325. 
Of course, this is as to say that the utility of money does not depend 
just on the money itself but on something else; it can depend on the 
blame or credit of other people, or it can depend on the existence of 
particular feelings associated with the presence of ambiguity (anxiety 
or discomfort). 
Smith's analyses of the Ellsberg paradox. Let us now recall the two 
colour Ellsberg example (Table I. 1): 
In the Urn I we have: 
RI : $100 if red, 0 otherwise and p probability of red, is unknown 
BI: 0 if red, $100 otherwise and q, probability of black is unknown 
In urn II we have: 
RII: 100 if red, 0 otherwise, p2 1/2 
BII: 0 if red, 100 otherwise, q2=1/2 
Moreover in Urn I urn pl is unknown but we can assume It to be 
equal to n /100. In the say way qi can be assumed to be equal to 
(100-n)/100. Moreover, we know that p1+ q1= n/100 + (100-n)/100 =1 
Let us now assume that the utility of a choice depends on the monetary 
outcome x, and on the circumstances under which this monetary outcome x 
is won. Let us call ul and u2 the utility of the outcome x ($100) in 
urn I and urn II respectively. 
The fact that we are indifferent between RI and BI implies that 
E(U(RI))= Pl ul(100)+g1u1(0)- 
EfU(BI)l= pl ul(0) + q1 u1(100), 
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The indifference between RI and BI implies that pl and ql are 
10 
equally 
probable but since p1+q1=1 then q1 and p1 are equal to 1/2. 
RII and BII are also indifferent hence implying 
E[U(RII)] = p2u2(100) + g2u2(0) _ 
E[U(BII)] = p2u2(0) + g2u2(100), 
and moreover p2 q2 1/2. 
However the Ellsberg kind of preferences RII>RI imply 
E[U(RII)]= p2u2(100) + g2u2(0) > E[U(RI)]= p1u1(100) + glul(0) 
However, from the above reasoning we know that p1=q1=q1=p1 = 1/2. 
In this is true then the Ellsberg kind of preferences implies the 
following inequality u2(100)+ u2(0)> u1(100)+ u1(0). 
These preferences are consistent only if u2(x) > ul(x). 
In practice, the utility of a outcome depends on the circumstances 
under which the outcome is obtained. Smith expresses this monetary loss 
in the following additive way: u2(x)=u1(x)+ A(x) where A(x) is the 
utility loss due to ambiguity. Given a N-M utility function u2(x) for 
the standard process, it is possible to derive ui (x) and a(x) finding 
the ambiguity premium x(x)>o for each x>O in a way to make the subjects 
indifferent between RII and RIII 
At this point is important to know that for Smith this utility 
loss is not confined to the unknown probabilities or judgmental 
probabilities. Smith suggests that even in presence of a standard 
process (with known probabilities) there will be a sort of utility 
loss. To show this, Smith suggests that we should represent the 
lottery in urn I as a 50-50 compound gamble by guaranteeing to the 
subjects that the number of the red balls In urn I will be determined 
by a random draw from the Integers 0-100. Smith's hypothesis Is that 
probably the preference for urn II gambles over urn I gambles would be 
changed just a little for many subjects. According to Smith, knowing 
the data generating process will transform the ambiguity into risk but 
10 As long as u1(100) * u1(0). 
11 This has been done in various experimental settings. See the review 
in chapter II. 
46 
will probably not change the preferences of the subjects over the two 
pairs of gambles. What Smith suggests is that even if we confine 
ambiguity to a second order distribution and in particular to a uniform 
second order distribution we will observe ambiguity averse behaviour. 
In fact this phenomenon has been observed experimentally many times 
(see Schoemaker (1991)) since this is one of the most common way of 
expressing ambiguity in a lottery set up experiment. (See also the 
discussion in chapters III, IV, and V). 
1.5.2.2 Sarin and Winkler's model (1992) 
Sarin and Winkler develop a more general model of the Smith one in 
which separation between probabilities and utilities is preserved. In 
their model the utility loss due to the presence of ambiguity is 
clearer than in the Smith model since the utilities are made directly 
dependent on the consequences and on the regret (or rejoicing) due to 
the consequence that could have been received. 
Let us consider a bet A which gives aa payoff of x if an event E 
happens and a payoff y if the event E (denoted by xEy) does not happen 
and assume that x>y and in this way we define E as the event associated 
with x. 
The value of A can be represented using a form of SEU by 
V(A) = u(x) . p(E) + u(y) . p(-E) (1.4) 
The subject is assumed to express his subjective probability p(E)=p but 
his or her reaction to the presence of ambiguity is incorporated into 
the functional form through a modification of the utilities. The 
modification of the utility will depend on the level of ambiguity and 
on the difference in the levels of the two payoffs. 
If we indicate with v(x/y) the modified u(x) and with v(y/x) the 
modified u(y) we will have the following functional form: 
V(A) = v(x/y) .p+ v(y/x) . (1-p) (I. 5) 
As we see the utility of a payoff will depend not only on the payoff 
that will be received but also on the payoff that will not be received 
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(disappointment). When x-y approaches 0 then v(x/y) + u(x) and the same 
is true for v(y/x). That is to say that when the payoffs are very close 
the feeling of regret will be very weak. The modification in the 
utilities depend also on the level of ambiguity; for the same reason we 
will have that a individual will experience less regret if put in front 
to a less ambiguous situation12. 
Sarin and Winkler specified different sets of assumptions about 
preferences which lead to different modifications of utilities. We will 
here illustrate the additive representation (they also give a bilinear 
and a ratio form). 
To compare ambiguous and unambiguous lotteries they assume the 
existence of external devices such as roulette lotteries. 
Denoting as before xEy an event lottery which yields x if E and y if -E 
and with (x, p, y) a risky lottery which yields x with probability p 
and y with probability 1-p 
The first assumption of the model is the following one. 
Assumption 1 
If (xEy)-(x, p, y) for some x>y, then (x'Ey')-(x', p, y') for any such x' 
and y' such that u(x)-u(y) =u (x')-u(y') 
This assumption state that the probability premium that is associated 
with an ambiguous choice stays the same if the amount of the outcome is 
changed in a way to preserve the difference in utility. 
Let us assume that u(x) =x 
If $10 if rains and $2 if it does not rain is indifferent to $10 with 
probability 0.4 and $2 with probability 0.6. Assuming that p(E) = 0.5 
my probability premium is 0.1 If the payoffs become $30 and $22 my 
ambiguity premium should remain unchanged. In practice our attitude to 
ambiguity, that we elicit through the ambiguity premium we express, is 
not affected by a change in the outcomes provided the difference 
between the outcomes does not increase. This is to say that an increase 
in the difference in the outcomes will affect our feelings of regret or 
rejoicing. Being the Sarin and Winkler's model based on these feelings 
12 This kind of reasoning however does not say if the level of 
ambiguity is objective or subjective. For example an equal difference 
x-y between the two payoffs and an equal interval in the probability 
seem to imply an equal feeling of regret. 
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we find quite intuitive that these feelings will be stronger when the 
occurence or the non occurence of an events leads to two very different 
outcomes. 
If assumption one is true then 
v(x/y) = u(x) +f [u(x)-u(y)] 
v(y/x) = u(y) +f [u(y)-u(x)] 
with f(0) =0 
if f(. ) is linear 
f [u(x)-u(y)] =c [u(x)-u(y)l 
f [u(y)-u(x)] =d [u(y)-u(x)] 
and then linearity implies the following stronger assumption 2 
If (xEy)-(x, p, y) for some x>y, then (xEy)-(x, p, y) for all x>y 
which also implies that the probability premium does not 
depend on the payoffs. 
Moreover assumption 2 implies a value function of the following form: 
V(A) = u(x) .p+ u(y) . (1-p) + [pc-(1-p)d) [u(x)-u(y)J (I. 6) 
With different sets of assumptions (bilinear for example) they allow 
for the probability premium to depend on the payoffs; moreover 
different assumptions leads to different specifications of the v(. /. ). 
This model seems to have some intuitive appeal, especially in its 
general form, where the modification in the utility depends on the 
level of ambiguity and on the difference of the payoffs. Its validity 
is however confined to a single event situation. Moreover, the model 
does not say if aversion of ambiguity depends on some psychological 
factor or on objective characteristics. If the latter case some 
specification or extension about how to incorporate different degree of 
ambiguity would be appropriate. 
1.5.2.3 Variabilities of utilities across states. 
In this work Fishburn (1994) introduces an interpretation of the 
Ellsberg paradox which retains the concept of additive subjective 
probability as in the case of Smith (1969), Sarin and Winkler (1992), 
but which departs from SEU because it introduces a factor in the value 
function which allows for variability of utility across states. In this 
sense ambiguity aversion can be interpreted as an aversion to 
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variability. 
To do so he constructs a model in the framework of A-A, in which 
preferences are defined over lottery acts H. In order to Justify his 
concept of variability of utility across states, he introduces a 
distinction between epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty: 
epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge) is associated with the 
occurence of the states, while aleatory uncertainty (chance) is 
associated with lottery probabilities (prospects). The definition 
mimics definition already present in the literature (A-A for example) 
but he gives a different interpretation 
13. To insert his definition in 
the Ellsberg context, for Fishburn the composition of the urn is 
related to epistemic uncertainty, while the draw of a coloured ball is 
related to aleatory uncertainty. 
We will now depict briefly the model and its properties. 
The cav model. As we have already said Fishburn uses an A-A set 
up. Preferences >- are applied to the set H of all functions h from S 
into the set P of all finite support probability distributions p, q on 
X; where members of H are lottery acts and members of P are lotteries. 
If we denote with n(s) the subjective probability (relative to the 
occurence) of s (as in Savage) then the value function of a lottery act 
h will be given by: 
V(h) =u (h, ir) -ic (hei[) (1.7) 
u 
where 
n 
u (h, n)= ic(s1) u(p ý=l 
r 2ý 1/2 
cu(h, w) =i 
nlc(sI)[u(pl) 
-u (h, w)] } (L 
1L1 
9) 
consequently 
13 In particular he considers epistemic uncertainty something that 
could be known but it is not. He in practice gives a time 
interpretation to the distinction. 
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h >- h' iff V(h) at V(h') 
In (1.7) z represents the coefficient of aversion to variability; if t 
=0 then the cav model reduces to A-A representation form of SEU. 
Letting u($100) =1 and u($0) =0 the following table represents the 
Fishburn's model with a revised version of the two colour Ellsberg 
example in which the urn contains just two balls. 
Table 1.5 Fishburn's application of cav to the Ellsberg paradox 
number of black in urn I 
012 
W(O) n(1) ir(2) 
BI 0 1 /2 1 
RI 1 1/2 0 
BII 1/2 1/2 1/2 
RII 1/2 1/2 1/2 
0 is equal to u (p ) 
which is the utility 
of the lottery which 
(B, O; R, 1) 
If a(0) = n(2) =a and n(1) = 1-2a 
If we apply I. 7 to BI and RI in the above matrix we obtain: 
U (BI) = U(RI) 2 1/2 
= 1/2 -z 
[OX [o_1/2) 
+ (1-2a) (1/2-1/2)2 +a 
(1_v2) 1 
(1.10) 
= 1/2 -T4 a/22 
While 
U(BII) = U(RII) = 1/2 
If we Indicate with 
A= 1/2 - TT-Z72- 
according to Fishburn we can say that an individual will be Indifferent 
between BI and the constant lottery act which has the probability A for 
$100 and nothing otherwise for each state of the world. In a matrix 
for: 
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Table 1.6 Fishburn's definition of indifference 
BI-CI 
number of black in urn I 
012 
w (0) n(1) n(2) 
BI 0 1/2 1 
Cl ($100, x; $0,1-A) ($100, x; $0,1-A) ($100, X; $0,1-A) 
More generally Fishburn shows the existence of a unique u on P 
which is a von N-M utility function. The preferences r on P satisfy all 
the N-M axioms. Fishburn moreover show the uniqueness of n and T. 
As far as A is concerned Fishburn shows that for each event A such 
that 0cAcS there is a unique probability AAE (0,1) such that the 
lottery act (x if A and y if Ac) is indifferent to the constant lottery 
act that has (x with probability AAand y with probability 1-AA) in 
every state (like in Table 1.6). 
Given two disjoint events A and A°, AAas well as AAc are non 
necessarily additive subjective probabilities (as the Schmeidler (1989) 
capacities). While n(A) and n(Ac) are shown to be additive. 
Fishburn also provides a system of axioms which preferences upon H must 
satisfy in order to obtain the representation (1.7). His 
axiomatisation is however not complete since it is valid just for 
binary choices. In particular the preferences over binary lottery acts 
satisfies weak order, continuity and mixture independence as In the A-A 
model. The only axiom which differs from the A-A model is the 
comparative independence condition which is equivalent to Savage's P4, 
A4 h(s)=p and h'(s) =q for all s eA and h(s)-h'(s) for all seA° 
then h} h' wp}q 
Two other axioms are needed on the probability A to assure unicity and 
additivity of n. 
Fishburn's idea of linking the attitude to ambiguity to variability of 
utilities across state is quite interesting and has intuitive appeal. A 
form of reaction to variability in utilities even if in a complete 
different way is also expressed by the models that operationalize 
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ambiguity through a set of probability measures. In these models, the 
variability in the utility depends from the fact that we are in front 
of more utilities according to the different distributions. However the 
models become quite complicated in order to retain additivity in the 
probabilities. Moreover, to maintain additivity in the state 
probabilities Fishburn Is forced to introduce A which is the 
probability of a constant lottery act (xa 0 1-A) indifferent to the 
corresponding lottery act (x A; 0 Ac). It is consequently necessary to 
introduce a sort of "subjective elicited probability" to allow for non 
additivity. 
1.5.3. Ambiguity expressed as a set of probabtitty measures 
As we mentioned briefly in the introduction, some of the formal 
models, starting with that of Ellsberg, represent ambiguity as a set of 
probability measures (SPM). The idea is quite simple: the individual 
does not have enough information to reach a precise judgment on the 
occurrence of some event. In fact, he or she possesses an entire class 
of judgments. The problem become consequently that of establishing a 
decision rule in order to decide which action to take if this is the 
case. In this situation, In fact, the simple use of EU does not answer 
the question since we will have different expected utilities 
corresponding to the different probability estimates. 
Here we will present four models which share the representation of 
ambiguity as a SPM. However, these four models, Ellsberg (1961), 
Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982,83), Levi, (1974,87), and Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989) differ in their structure as well as in the proposed 
decision rule. However, they have in common the use of a maximin 
criterion at one stage of the evaluation process even if with different 
emphasis and motivation. 
1.5.3.1 Ellsberg's decision criterion under ambiguity. 
According to Ellsberg, there are two elements which characterize 
the presence of ambiguity: 
1) either an individual has many probability judgments (urns example) 
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or 
2) these probability judgments are vague or unsure (Miss Julie 
example). 
As a consequence, in this situation an individual's confidence in his 
or her assignment of probabilities is very low. 
In such a case: 
"the judgment of the ambiguity of one's information, of the overall 
credibility of one's composite estimates, of one's confidence in them, 
cannot be expressed in terms of relative likelihood or events. (If it 
could, it would simply affect the final compound probability)" Ellsberg 
(1961) p 659 
Let assume that an individual has to choose between different actions, 
each of these actions lead to different consequences characterized by 
different utilities. In this case, ambiguity can be expressed by the 
fact that the individual possesses an entire set of probability 
judgments II on the occurrence of an event. Each of these judgments is 
characterized by a different degree of reliability. 
To compound an overall probability judgment, an individual has to 
perform the following operations: 
1) He or she possibly restricts the entire set Ti to some more limited 
set II* in order to consider just the more reliable probability 
measures. 
2) He or she is able to express his or her most reliable (best guess) 
probability measure s" (which can be expressed with a different level 
of confidence). 
3) He or she has to apply a decision rule which allows for weighting 
the existence of more than a probability measure with the best guess 
probability estimate. 
In this way, for example, on the one hand the Individual evaluates the 
situation according to his or her best guess, but at the same time he 
or she also considers what can possibly happen in the worst case. 
Ellsberg's dectston rule. Let us assume that an individual has a set of 
probability measures if (all the possible reliable x) over the 
occurrences of some events. With the information he has, he can 
eliminate some of the probability distributions, hence he reduces IT 
to II" (the most reliable n 1). 
Moreover between the n1 he or she is able 
to form a best guess on the occurrence of the considered events. 
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Let us consider as an example the first Ellsberg example. 
TI is constituted by all the n(RI) and n(BI) on the range 0 to 100. Let 
us now assume that for some reason our individual can reduce the set IT 
to II*, which contains just three distributions, (0,1), (1/2,1/2), 
(1,0). The best guess of our individual is given by n"= (1/2,1/2) 
14 
Ellsberg proposes the following decision rule: 
If we indicate with: 
p= degree of confidence in n' 
x= consequence 
n* = my best guess 
A is an act 
IT" = the set which contains all the probability distribution which are 
still reasonable. 
Min EU (A) = minimum expected utility of an act calculated over the 
entire set IA" 
E* U(A)= expected utility to an act A calculated considering just the 
best guess distribution n* 
According to Ellsberg's theory the value of an action A is given by: 
V(A) =p. E"U(A) + (1-p) . Min E U(A) (I. 11) 
Give two actions A and B an individual will choose the action with the 
highest V(. ) 
A>-B iff V(A) > V(B) 
As we can see from the model, Ellsberg proposes a linear combination of 
expected utility and maximin, weighted by the "confidence factor" p. 
The following example will indicate the application of the Ellsberg 
model to the two colour Ellsberg problem. 
If we indicate with: 
p= degree of confidence in n*, assuming 1/4 
n" = my best guess -(1/2,1/2) 
The act that we consider is betting on black in the first urn = BI 
Ii* = (0,1), (1/2,1/2), (1,0). 
14 For best guess Ellsberg seems to intend the better subjective 
probability estimate of our individual. 
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Min EU (BI) =0 
E*U (BI)= 50 
V(BI) =p. E*U(BI) + (1-p) . Min EU (BI) = 
= 1/4 u(50) + 3/4 u(O) (1.12) 
If we consider as an action BII (betting on black in the second urn) we 
will have 
V(BII) =p. E*(BII) * (1-p) . Min E 
(BID = 
=u (50) (I. 13) 
Hence V(BI) < V(BII) so BII » BI 
The same is true also for RI and RII. 
In the Ellsberg model, p, the level of confidence, depends on the 
level of information but also on the psychological attitude of the 
individual. From his account, it seems that, with the same level of 
information, different individuals can have different level of 
confidence. If p equals 1, the individual will have just a probability 
judgment and so he will follow EU. The passage from the bigger IT to 
the smaller II" is also determined by the individual's set of 
information, but Ellsberg does not explain the rules of this reduction. 
In the original version with Min EU, the Ellsberg decision rule is a 
sort of conservative rulels (Ellsberg prefers this word to the word 
pessimism). According to Ellsberg, In a situation of ambiguity such 
kind of criterion may appeal to a conservative person since it can 
guarantee a sort of "security" level. This criterion, is a sort of 
second order criterion, since, if used alone, it implies that people 
15 The idea underlying his model however is not the one of assuming that 
the individual is pessimistic, as the one of assuming that the 
individual are conservative: This means that "our subject does not 
expect the worst, but he choose to act 'as though' the worst were 
somewhat more likely than his best estimates of likelihood would 
indicate. ". Ellsberg 1961 page 667. 
The subject distorts his estimate of probability in the direction of 
putting more emphasis on the less favourable outcomes and in a degree 
which is in relation with his level of confidence in his best estimate, 
that is p, the level of ambiguity. 
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would not consider at all those probability judgments for which there 
is evidence. 
According to Ellsberg, this kind of rule will, other things being 
equal, favour the choice whose expected value is less sensitive to 
variation of probability distribution within the range of ambiguity. 
Hence this criterion will favour status quo or present behavior 
strategies. For these p may be high and the range of TI* small. 
16 If the 
confidence of our subject in his estimate is high, he will conform to 
the Savage axioms and it would be possible to infer the estimated 
probabilities from the observed choices. 
17 
However, the model can also be suitable to represent cases of optimism 
if we substitute Min EU for Max EU (we consider the probability vector 
which corresponds to the maximum expected utility instead of the 
minimum one) 
1.5.3.2 Gärdenfors and Sahlin's model. 
Like Ellsberg, Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982,83) represent ambiguity 
as a SPM. However, in their model, Gärdenfors and Sahlin emphasized 
what determines this kind of representation: that is to say the amount 
and the quality of information in the possession to the agent. 
In the "Miss Julie example" reported in section 1.4 they write: 
"If pressed to evaluate the probabilities of the various possible 
outcomes of the matches , Miss Julie would say that in all three 
matches, given the information she has, each of the players has a 50 
percent chance of winning. In this situation a strict Bayesian would 
say that Miss Julie should be willing to bet at equal odds on one of 
the players winning in one of the matches if and only if she is willing 
to place similar bets in the two other matches. It seems however 
perfectly rational if Miss Julie decides to bet on match A, but not on 
B or C, for the reason that a bet on match A Is more reliable then a 
bet on the other. Furthermore she would be very suspicious of anyone 
offering her a bet at equal odds on match C, even if she could decide 
for herself which player to back ." Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982) p 314. 
16 The idea is that for the status quo the degree of confidence p in my 
bet estimated probability is high. At the same time, the set of other 
still reasonable probability distributions II" is narrow, since not only 
I am very confident in my estimate but also my estimate is more 
precise. If we consider the set Ii* as an interval of probability the 
interval will be narrower. 
17 This happens when p is equal to 1 and there is just R* in the set IT" 
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What make the difference in the three probability estimate of Miss 
Julie is their epistemic reliability. This epistemic reliability plays 
the same role as the level on confidence in Ellsberg's model. 
Their model is characterized by two elements: 
1) the assumption that people possess a class of probability measures 
and not just a single probability measure. 
2) a new index p which is designed to take account of the different 
reliabilities of the information in the agent's possession. 
The process of decision is very similar to that of Ellsberg, but is 
simpler: 
a) first the decision maker has to select a class of probability 
measures with an acceptable degree of reliability on which to base 
their decision. 
b) relative to this class, our decision maker computes for each act the 
expected utility 
c) he or she chooses finally the act which has the largest minimal 
expected utility. 
The model. As in a Savage's framework, S represent the set of all 
the states of the world, F the set of all prospects or acts, X is the 
set of all the consequences or prizes. Gardenfors and Sahlin assume, 
moreover, that there exists a utility function u(. ) mirroring the 
agent's evaluation of possible outcomes. 
What they relax is the assumption that the agent's state of belief, 
concerning which state is true, can be represented by a unique 
probability measure. On the contrary, the agent's knowledge and beliefs 
about the relevant states are represent by a class II of probability 
measures defined as the class of all epistemically1s possible 
probability measures. The implication of this is that, in the extreme 
case of complete ignorance, (there is no information at all). all the 
probability distributions are epistemically possible19. On the contrary, 
in case of perfect information, just one distribution is epistemically 
18 By epistemically possible they intend all those measure which do not 
contradict the knowledge possessed by the agent. 
19 Epistemically means based on our knowledge; hence is like to say all 
the probability distribution which are reliable according to our 
knowledge. 
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reliable and consequently the situation becomes that depicted by the 
standard Bayesian story. 
To each state of the nature there is associated a set of values 
n(si) where hell (It is also assumed that the probability of the 
outcomes x1 j are 
independent of which alternative is chosen, so that 
n(x.. )=rr(si ) for all xe17 and all acts fi. 
At this point a second order probability measure p(. ) is introduced. 
This probability measure is called a measure of epistemically 
reliability and it is defined over the set II of epistemic possible 
probability measures20. 
But what are the properties of p?. 
According to Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982) the only property that p need 
have is that the probability distributions in ü can be ordered with 
respect to their degree of epistemic reliability. Moreover, it is 
possible, according to the authors to postulate that p can have an 
upper bound representing the case when the agent has complete 
information about a probability distribution and a lower bound when the 
agent has no information about all the probability distributions. 
One possible way of considering p is as a second order probability 
measure, that is to say a probability measure defined over the set iI of 
epistemically possible probability measures. And this is the way in 
which p is considered in Sahlin (1983). However, in Gardenfors and 
Sahlin (1982) the authors point out that it can also be considered a 
non-standard probability measure. What is important is that, to rule 
out some of the probability distributions included in IT, we need a 
second measure which is related with the degree of our knowledge. 
This distinction between the various degrees of epistemic reliability 
cannot be made just with the use of a probability measure. We need to 
20 "Even though several probability distributions are considered to be 
epistemically possible some of them are more reliable than others. 
Some distribution are, for example, backed up by more information then 
others. This measure of epistemic reliability thus reflects how 
complete or adequate the knowledge is assessed to be upon which one's 
first order probability is based". Nils-Eric Sahlin (1983) p 98 
"We believe that not all of an agent's beliefs about the states of 
nature relevant to a decision situation can be captured by a set 11 of 
probability measures. As a second element describing the beliefs 
relevant to a decision situation, we introduce a (real valued) measure 
p of the epistemic reliability of the probability measures in 1T". 
Gärdenofors and Sahlin (1982) p 318. 
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use a different kind of measure, that is to say p, which measures the 
level of epistemic reliability of a probability measure. 
21 
The decision process. Gardenfors and Sahlin assume that the 
individual: 
a) first reduces the set of all possible epistemic probability 
distributions of the two alternatives TI to the set II/po, where pis a 
level of epistemic reliability that he or she finds satisfactory, that 
is to say for all ne 1, p(R)Zp0 
b) secondly, he or she computes the expected utility for each 
alternative f1 and f2 and for each distribution n in lI/p0. 
c) Hence he or she determines the minimal expected utility for each 
alternative. 
d) Then he or she selects the alternative which has the largest minimal 
expected utility. 
More formally if xif f(si) is the outcome associated to the occurence 
of the state si if the act f is chosen, and xlf, = f' (s1) is the 
outcome associated to the occurence of the state si if the act f' Is 
chosen, and if the utility of an outcome is indicated with u(. ), then 
an individual evaluating the various acts according to Gardenfors and 
Sahlin's model will prefer f to f' if and only if 
min E u(f(si)) nli > min E u(f(s1)) all (1.14) 
If we apply the above decision rule to the two-colour Ellsberg example 
21 The idea of adding, in order to measure the likelihood of an event or 
of a statement, to a probability measure another measure or weight can 
be found, as we can see later, In Keynes work. Also Keynes concept of 
"weight of evidence" is related to the information we have about an 
event or a statement. However while in Keynes the concept of weight 
seems to be more related to the amount of information, in Gärdenfors 
and Sahlin (1982) the concept of epistemic reliability seems to be more 
linked to the concept of the quality of the information. The link 
between Gärdenfors and Sahlin's concept of epistemic reliability and 
Keynes's concept of weight is clear to them. In their work they quote 
the following sentence from Keynes. " As the relevant evidence at our 
disposal increases, the magnitude of the probability of an argument may 
either decrease or increase, according as the new knowledge strengthens 
the unfavourable or favourable evidence; but something seems to have 
increased in either case - we have a more substantial basis upon which 
to rest our conclusion. I express this to say that an accession of new 
evidence increases the weight of an argument. New evidence will 
sometimes decrease the probability of an argument but it will always 
increase the "weight". Keynes 1921 p 7. 
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we will have: 
II/p0 = TI (we do not know anything about the proportion of B and R, 
that is to say in IT there are all the distributions which vary from 0 
to 100 (p=0). 
If this is true than our individual will prefer BII to BI and RII to 
RI. 22 
For the agent it is consequently important to choose the desired level 
of epistemic reliability. According to Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982), 
this level of epistemic reliability depends on how large is the risk 
that he or she is willing to take. If the agent is risk averse he will 
take a low level of epistemic reliability (he will rule out just a few 
distributions) if the agent is not risk averse he will take a high 
level of epistemic reliability. 
23 
22 In this case, the minimum the minimum expected utility of BI is u(O) 
(corresponding to a n=0, while the minimum expected utility of BII is 
u($50), since i r=1/2. 
If people choose an other level of reliability then the recommended 
ranking preference would be different. If however we consider 
(1/2,1/2) the only epistemic reliable distribution then the agent 
should be indifferent between B1 and BII, and RI and RII as predicted 
by Expected Utility Theory. 
23 Sahlin defines an agent who takes all possible measures into 
consideration as a completely epistemic risk averse agent. According to 
Sahlin we can distinguish between perceived epistemic risk and 
preferred epistemic risk. The perceived epistemic risk concern the 
restriction of the set of all epistemic possible probability measures II 
to the set of reasonable reliable measures II/po. If I take all 
epistemically possible measures before take any decision I do not take 
any risk at all. If some of the distribution with p<p0 are discharged 
this means that I take some risk. A proposed measure of this risk can 
be R(p 
0)= 
(1-p) (II/p0 )/p(II)(1). 
Hence two agents can can be in a identical epistemic situations, 
identified by IT and p(. ) thus according to (I) they can have the same 
view of perceived epistemic risk and yet have entirely different risk 
preferences. (I can for example choose a higher level of p0) Let us 
consider the first example of the Ellsberg paradox. Assume that there 
are two agents A and B which are identical In their epistemic state. 
Both of them consider II to be the class of distribution 
(1/3,1/3-x, 1/3+x) where 0 sxsl/3. Both the agent assign the same 
epistemic reliability to each of the distributions in II so that 
pA(. )=pB(. ). If A prefer a lower degree of risk he can choose II/p0=II. B 
may prefer a higher level of risk and choose II/pom (1/3,1/3,1/3) (p0 = 
equiprobable). In this case A will behave as shown by the Ellsberg 
paradox while B will behave as an utility maximizer. 
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The two limiting cases of no information or complete information 
can also be explained by the model of Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982). In 
the former case, all the probability distributions over the states are 
epistemically possible and they have equal epistemic reliability. In 
this case the minimal expected utility of an alternative is obtained 
from the distribution which attaches probability one to the worst 
alternative (in this case the decision criterion is the same as the 
classical maximin rule). In the latter case, having full information 
about all the possible states of the world, we will rule out all 
probability distributions but one, the only one which is epistemically 
reliable (in this case the decision criterion collapses to that of 
maximizing expected utility. ) 
1.5.3.3 Levi's decision theory 
In an article in 1987, Levi applies his theory of rational choice 
to the Ellsberg paradox. For Levi (1974) too, there are situations in 
which the agent, even when using EU, is not able to reach a final 
decision since he cannot have a determinate and unique probability 
Judgment. In this case, the Individual will possess a set of 
probability distributions which, according to Levi, contains all the 
information possessed by the individual. We can call this set IT. Such a 
set, according to Levi, Is determined by the information possessed at a 
given time, but this set is not characterized by any risk attitude or 
confidence parameters as the preceding models. Moreover, Levi specifies 
some attributes that must be possessed by II. In particular, IT must be 
non-empty and convex and all the it E Ti must be finitely additive 
probability measures. In Levi's words any individual at a given time t 
possesses a set of probability distributions which represent his 
"credal state" (beliefs) over the state of nature; and these beliefs 
are linked with his level of knowledge. 
Moreover, Levi assumes the existence of a class G of "permissible" 
utility measures such that not all these measure need to be linear 
transformations of another. We will denote these measures by u(. ). 
In order to be chosen, an act f should posses some characteristics 
(in fact there are three criteria to be followed in the choice; the 
application of them follows a lexicographic order): 
A) First f should be E-admissible 
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An action is considered E-admissible if and only if there is some 
probability distribution it in TI and some utility function in G such 
that the expected utility of f relative to it and u is maximal along 
all the available alternatives. 
B) To be chosen between all the E-admissible acts f must be 
P-admissible. 
An act is considered P admissible if is E-admtssible and 'best' with 
respect to E-admissible option preservation among all E-admissible 
options. 
24 
C) Between all the P admissible acts to be chosen an act should be 
S-admissible. 
Definition: A P-admissible alternative is security optimal to an 
utility function u if and only if the minimum u-value assigned to some 
possible outcomes of f is at least great as the minimal u-value 
assigned to any other P-admissible alternative. 
An act is S-admissible if is P-admissible and security optimal 
relative to some utility function in G25. 
If there is no opportunity to defer the choice, according to Levi, the 
principle of maximizing expected utility theory can be invoked. If all 
the acts are E-admissible, and all P-admissible, then we have to find 
another criterion to choose among them. 
According to Levi, 
"the proposed decision theory identifies situations where the 
well-known maximin criterion is applied legitimately. Customarily 
maximin is used to select that option from among all the feasible 
options which maximizing the minimum gain. This recommendations is 
legitimate, according to my theory, provided (1) G contains all and 
only u-functions that are positive affine transformations of one 
another, and (2) all feasible option are P-admissible. But even if 
condition (1) is satisfied, it can be the case that the maximin 
solution from among all the feasible options is not itself E-admissible 
24 Levi does not provide an adequate explanation of what he intends for 
"best" with respect to E-admissible option preservation among all 
E-admissible options. What it seems is that, since in the E-admissible 
option is included the option of deferring the decision, then the 
P-admissible option are the E-admissible options superior to deferring 
the decision. It seem just a criterion to eliminate the possible 
option of keeping the status quo. 
Z5 According to Levi in case that there are more then one S-admissible 
alternatives for the final choice it is possible to assume that the 
final choice is determined by some random device. 
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and so cannot be considered to be S-admissible". Levi (1974) p 307. 
Let us consider the two-colour Ellsberg example: we know that for 
Urn I we can have any number of black and red balls between 0 and 100. 
So we have 101 possible distributions. Hence we compute the expected 
value relative to each option BI and RI for each probability 
distribution. (In case of BII we have just one distribution (1/2, 
1/2)). Moreover BI and RI are E-admissible. In fact the expected value 
of both of them reach a maximum relatively to some distributions. For 
choosing between them we have consequently to adopt a second order 
criterion and the one suggested by Levi is the maximin criterion. If we 
compute for each distribution the expected value of an option 
conditional on the truth of that case we can then assess the 
corresponding security level. In the case of BII the expected value is 
100/2; thus this value can be regarded as the security level since it 
is the worst possible payoff. As far as BI is concerned the expected 
value declines from 100 to 0 according to which distribution we 
consider. Hence if we use this method of computing the expected value 
(proposed by Wald) the security level associated with BII is higher and 
consequently the option BII becomes uniquely admissible 
26 (The same 
reasoning applies if we consider the act RII). According to Levi, it is 
not possible to order the different options according to expected 
utility considerations. because they are simply not comparable. What is 
true is that the use of Wald criterion leads to choosing an option 
which is the best according to one sub class of permissible 
distributions. 
An Illustrative example27. Let us consider the following example 
with two states of the world and two acts to show how the models 
described above can give a different ranking of acts even if they all 
use a maximin criterion. 
Let us consider the following example with two states of the world and 
three acts 
26 According to Levi it is not necessary to use the Wald method of 
computing the maximin, any method could be considered rational because 
the various subjects can differ in term of their concern for security. 
27The 
example is partially taken by Gardenfors and Sahlin(1982). 
28 Outcome are already denominated in utilities. 
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Figure 1.5 Illustration of Gärdenfors and Levi's models 
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Let us assume that If of Levi 11/p of Gardenfors and TI of Ellsberg are 
the same II = ((0.4,0.6); (0.6,0.4) 
If we apply Gardenfors and Sahlin we will have that the minimum 
expected utility min EU (al) = -1.2, min EU (a2)=-1.0, min EU (a3)= 0. 
Hence, according to MEUT, a3» a2» al. 
According to Levi ai and az are the only E-admissible choice since 
their EU is maximum respect to some distributions (a3 as always an 
expected utility of 0, so is never the maximum expected utility and 
consequently is eliminated as admissible option; ai has the maximum 
expected utility (3.2) relative to the distribution (0.4 0.6), while a2 
has the maximum expected utility (relative to the distribution (0.6 
0.4)); and between the two E-admissible choices, the S-admissible 
choice is az, since the minimum expected utility is -1. 
Let us now consider Ellsberg. To apply the model of Ellsberg we 
have to assume, for example, that for our individual p= 1/2 (he has 
the same confidence in each distribution) but his best guess is for 
some reason (0.4,0.6). 
Figure 1.6 Illustration of Ellsberg's maximin 
MInEU E"U 
al -1.2 4.2 
a2 
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-1.0 -1.4 
a3 00 
The Ellsberg index will be ai = 1.5 a2 = -1.2 a3 =0 and consequently 
29 
ai>- a3 >- a2. 
29 The rank can change if we choose a different best guess as well as 
different p. However these are individual parameters. The actual value 
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1.5.3.4 Maximin Expected Utility with a non-unique prior. 
Gilboa and Schmeidler's model is an axiomatic model in which the 
Ellsberg paradox is the result of the fact that, not having enough 
information on the composition of the urn, the subjects are not able to 
form an unique prior. Their model is consequently the application of EU 
in the case of multiple priors; that to say, the subjects possess an 
an entire set of priors. Moreover, being uncertainty averse, also in 
Gilboa and Schmeidler the subject adopts a maximin strategy when 
evaluating the bet. In practice their model can be seen as an axiomatic 
foundation of the maximin rule. 
They use an Anscombe-Aumann framework. In order to allow for 
uncertainty aversion, their model differ from the A-A in respect to two 
key axioms: Certainty independence (which plays the role of Savage's 
P2) and Uncertainty aversion which has no correspondence in A-A. 
To illustrate the two key axioms we need to remember the reader of some 
definitions: 
S is the set of the states of the world, F is the set of all the random 
lotteries, H is the set of all horse lottery or lottery acts. X is the 
set of all deterministic outcomes (prizes). 
X and S are assumed to be non-empty. H0is the set of all E measurable 
finite step function from S to X and Hc are all the constant functions 
in Ho. Moreover L is assumed to a convex subset on FSwhich includes Hc. 
The preferences are defined over H and they satisfy weak order, 
continuity monotonicity and non degeneracy. 
Certainty Independence: 
For all f, g in F and h in Hcand for all a in )O, 1[: 
f>g iff of +(1-a)h > ag + (1-a)h. 
was chosen just for illustrative purpose. 
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Figure 1.7 Illustration of the certainty independence axiom. 
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This axiom is a weak version of the independence axiom. The mixture of 
f and g are in fact given in respect of a constant lottery (not a 
roulette lottery). The idea is that it is much easier for an individual 
make comparisons with a constant h than with lottery. Hence he will be 
less likely to reverse his preferences (we have found a very similar 
axiom in Fishburn (1994)) 
Uncertainty aversion 
For all f. geH and aE ]0,1[: f-g of+(1-a)g zg 
The axiom states that, assuming that two horse lotteries are 
indifferent, for an uncertainty averse person a random mixture of the 
two will be at least as preferred as each of the original lotteries. 
Let us, for example, consider the following bet: 
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Figure 1.8 Illustration of the uncertainty aversion axiom 
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of+(1-a) gag where a can be any value in the interval (0.1) 
What the axiom seems to convey is the idea that, if uncertainty averse, 
the decision maker does not want to commit himself to a particular 
answer so he prefers a random device to decide. (To some extent this 
axiom capture the same idea as that of a non-additive probability 
measure. Non-additivity allows the decision maker not to commit himself 
in his probability judgment to the occurrence of an event and to the 
occurrence of the complement event with the same Intensity). It is 
important to note that in Gilboa and Schmeidler's model A(. ) Is an 
additive probability measure. 
If the usual axioms hold, plus these last two, Gilboa and Schmeidler 
obtain the following representation theorem: 
There exists an affine function u: F--> and a non empty, closed and 
convex set C of finitely additive probability measures on E such that: 
fLg iff min 
Ju f dII min 
fug dII (for all f and gE L) (I. 15) 
EEC IIEC 
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T(fair coin) 
Furthermore the function u is unique up to a positive linear 
transformation. Moreover the set C is unique if non degeneracy is 
assumed. 
According to Gilboa and Schmeidler, one interpretation of their 
result is an extension of the neo Bayesian paradigm which leads to a 
set of priors instead of a unique one. However, if the set C is 
interpreted as the set of all possible distributions then the model can 
be seen as a personalistic interpretation of the minimax loss criterion 
of Wald. 
"A minimax solution seems, in general, to be a reasonable solution of 
the decision problem when aa priori distribution in i2 does not exist 
or is unknown to the experimenter. " Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) p 143. 
As we can see the model of Gilboa and Schmeidler seems very 
similar to that of Gardenfors and Sahlin and Levi. Also in Gardenfors 
and Sahlin's model in fact we have a set of probability distributions 
and consequently the criterion of choice is a mixture of expected 
utility and maximin. 
69 
I. 5.4 Ambiguity aversion as aversion to second order distribution (SOP) 
One way to explain aversion to ambiguity is assuming that 
ambiguity can be represented by the existence of a unique second order 
distribution. An ambiguity averse person is consequently a person who 
exhibits "risk aversion" towards this second order distribution. 
Segal's (1987,91) model adopts this view to explain the Ellsberg 
paradox. To do so he relaxes the compound lottery axioms and adopts a 
rank dependent approach in which the probabilities of an event are 
weighted nonlinearly. Let us now analyze the model in detail. 
1.5.4.1 The model 
In Segal (1987), Segal suggested that the Ellsberg paradox depends 
on how people perceive the unknown urn. In particular 
" the paper suggests that the ambiguous lottery (x, S; O, -S) (ambiguous 
in the sense that the decision maker does does not know the probability 
of S) should be considered a two stage lottery, where the first, 
imaginary, stage, is over the possible values of the probability of S". 
Segal (1987) p 177. 
Let us consider a lottery defined by the outcomes x and 0 and the 
corresponding two states of the world S and NS. Let us consider the 
case in which we do not know the probability of S. In this case the 
lottery is defined as an ambiguous lottery, in Segal's interpretation. 
According to Segal, when confronted with an ambiguous lottery of this 
kind, a decision maker will consider the lottery as a two stage 
lottery; the first stage Is over over the possible values of the 
probability of S (over the random variable p, whose outcome is defined 
by p and its mean value by p). In the second stage the decision maker 
participates in the lottery (x, p, 0,1-p) The decision maker does not 
know the value of p but Segal assumes that he or she has a subjective 
probability distribution over Its possible values. 
The decision maker can for example think that p=1 p=1/2, p=0, where the 
probability of P(p=1) = P(p=1/2) = P(0) = 1/3. The expected value of 
the distribution of p is 1/2 and we can call it p. The distribution is 
assumed to be symmetric around the mean. 
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See for example figure I. 9 
Figure 1.9 Illustration of Segal's model 
Pi=1/3 p2_Ö x where pi=p 
pi=1/2 
0 and p2=1-p 
P2=1/3 
p2=1/2 
P3=1/3 p? 0 
0 
x _ 
It is important to note that if the decision maker uses the 
reduction principle, if he or she calculates the simple probability of 
winning x or 0 using the usual probabilities rules, then the lottery of 
the previous example reduces to the simple lottery (x, 1/2; 0, W). In 
fact Segal argues, 
"It is therefore an essential assumption of the approach developed in 
this paper that the decision maker does not use this reduction 
assumption. " p 177. 
The main consequence of not using the reduction of compound lottery 
axiom is that is not possible to use Expected Utility Theory, since it 
assumes this axiom. Instead of using Expected Utility Theory, Segal 
uses anticipated utility theory 
30, 
The explanation of the Ellsberg Paradox suggested by Segal is 
composed of three different elements: 
a- The way in which people perceive the unknown lottery (as a two 
stage lottery). 
b- The fact that the decision maker does not apply the reduction of 
compound lottery axiom. 
c- The use of anticipated utility theory to evaluate the lotteries. 
30 "It should be empathized that modeling the Ellsberg paradox as a two 
stage lottery does not depend on the anticipated utility theory. but on 
the existence of a theory that does not necessarily satisfy the 
reduction of compound lottery axiom. " Segal (1987) p 178. 
The point is that with EU we obtain the same result even using the 
certainty equivalent method. 
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And each of these three elements is crucial to Segal's explanation of 
the Ellsberg Paradox. 
Having analyzed the first two elements it is now important to see how 
Segal applies anticipated utility theory to a two-stage lottery. 
Let us consider the following simple stage lottery A 
A= (xl, pl' " .' xn' pn), where 
Epi=1. p1 z 0, which yields the outcome 
xi with probability pi, with xie X and i=1,.., n. Moreover it is assumed 
that xIsx2: S ... sxn. 
According to anticipated utility theory the evaluation of the lottery 
takes one of the following forms31: 
V (xl, p1;... ; xn. pn) = 
rr1 
u(xn) f (p 
n) 
+ 
n-i 
u (x 
n 
i) I 
rf 
Ipn 
l- 
fI p)= 
i=1 1, l j=i i) lE j=i+1 
u(x1)f(P1)+ 
=2[u(xi)-u(xi-1), 
f 
(= 
iP 
, 
(I. 16) ý j 
where the decision weight function F: [0,1] ->[0,1] satisfies f(0)=0, 
f(1)=1. 
Now let L be a compound lottery, L=(A1, P1;.. ; AnPn), 
where E Pi = 1, Pla 0. 
With CE(AI) we indicate the certainty equivalent of the lottery Ai, 
where the (CE(Ai), 1) - Ai. If the preference relation satisfy the 
independence axiom then 
(A1, P1;...; AnPn)- (CE(AI), P1;...; CE(An), Pn). (1.17) 
If the preference relation is represented by a anticipated utility 
function then the CE(AI) = U-1 MA I )). Assuming that 
CE(AI)sCE(A2)s... sCE(An) then (1.17) implies that 
(A1, P1;...; AnPn)- (u 1(V(A1)). P1;.. ...; n 
1(V(An)). Pn) (1.18) 
31 They are the same. 
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If the preference relation satisfies the independence axiom32 and is 
represented by (1.16) then by (1.18)) we will have that the value of 
the two stage lottery can be represented by 
V(A1X 1;...; AnPn)=V(Al)+Li=2[V(Ai)-V(Ai-1)]f 
("P 
(I. 19) 
Let F* be the distribution function over the possible values of the 
probability of S in the lottery (x, S; O, -S) and if the range of F" is 
finite such that the probability of S are a*=p1s... spn ß*, then by 
(1.15) the value of the ambiguous lottery (x, S; O, -S) can be expressed 
equivalently by33 
nn 
u(x) f(p1) + u(x) L=2( f(pi)-f(p1-1)l f(E j=iP(pj) 
(1.20) 
where f(. ) is a decision weight function f; [0,1) a* [0,1] where f(0)=0 
and f(1)=1. 
P(pi) are the probabilities of the first branch of the two-stage 
lotteries, while pi are the probabilities in the second branch of the 
two stage lottery. 
According to Segal, to account for ambiguity aversion f(. ) should 
be convex in the whole range and it has to satisfy other requirements. 
Theorem 4.2 is the one relevant to this point since it states the 
conditions to be satisfied in order to have ambiguity aversion. The 
theorem states: 
Theorem 4.2. Let F* be a distribution function over the possible values 
Go 
32 According to Segal V(a)=f u(x) dFA(x) and V(x1p1'" xnpn) = 
piu(xi) 
are the only continuous functions satisfying the Reduction of 
Compound Lotteries Axiom and the Independence Axiom. Anticipated 
Utility is compatible with RCLA or IA. Some empirical evidence 
concerning two-stage lotteries suggests that decision maker accept IA, 
but not necessarily RCLA. " Segal (1987) p 182. 
33 See appendix A for an example of the fact that (I. 16) applied to a 
two stage lottery is equivalent to the direct application of (I. 20). 
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of the probability of S in the ambiguous lottery (x, S; O, -S). Assume 
that Fe is symmetric around p. If f is convex, if its elasticity is non 
decreasing, and if the elasticity of f is non increasing, then (x, p, 
0,1-p) is preferred to (x, S; O, -S). 
34 
Moreover Segal indicates two functions which satisfy all the conditions 
of Theorem 4.2; these functions are: 
f(P)=-ePe_1-- and f(p)=ptwith t>l. 
Having defined the condition for ambiguity aversion Segal also defines 
the conditions according to which one distribution can be consider more 
ambiguous than another. 
Theorem 6.1 defines how an ambiguity averse agent (defined by Theorem 
4.2) can rank second order distributions according to their degrees of 
ambiguity. In order to define theorem 6.1 we need two definitions. 
Definition 1 
Let F* and G* be two distribution functions on [0,11. G* is more 
ambiguous than F* (G* a AF*) iff G* is a star-shaped spreading of F*, 
that is to say 
a) F* and G* have the same mean value p. 
b) GO(p) a F*(p) for p5 and G* s F* for pap. 
Definition 2 
Let 0<p<1. H* is the uniform distribution on [0,2p1 when ps 1/2 and the p 
uniform distribution on [2p-1, llwhen pa 1/2 
Theorem 6.1 
Let GO and Fe be symmetric around p such that He at Got. If f is A 
convex, if its elasticity is non decreasing, and if the elasticity of f 
is non increasing, then the value of the ambiguous lottery (x, S; O, -S) 
under Fe is greater than its value under Ge. 
34 f(p) = 1-f(1-p). 
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The same two functions satisfies all three condition of theorem 6.1 
As we will see these two theorems will play an important in the 
interpretation of the results of the experiment described in chapter 
III. In particular Theorem 6.1 states conditions of different degrees 
of ambiguity aversion which try to mimic the conditions for risk 
aversion. This is consistent with the general idea of Segal, who sees 
ambiguity as another face of risk. However, in chapter V we will 
discuss these conditions, which are very difficult to observe. As it is 
possible to see from the analysis in chapter II too, the links between 
ambiguity attitude and risk attitude have been explored also by the 
empirical work. To draw a comparison between risk and uncertainty has 
for sure some intuitive appeal, especially when ambiguity is 
operationalized with a second order probability distribution. 
I. 5.5 Models with adjusted probabilities. 
Some of the formal models of ambiguity do not allow either for the 
presence of second order distributions or for a set of probabilities. 
In these models the decision maker is supposed to be able to form a 
unique probability measure which is adjusted in some way to take into 
account the fact that she or he is not sure about her or his estimate. 
Different models depict in different ways how this process of 
adjustment is made. We will present here three of these models, the one 
of Fellner (1961) and two of Einhorn and Hogarth (1985,86,90). 
Some of the models of adjusted probabilities allow also for the 
existence of non additive probability measures, even if this is not the 
main feature of these models. In this section, we underline the 
existence of the adjustment process. In fact these models can be 
characterized also by the fact that the decision maker, in order to 
evaluate an act, does not use probabilities but decision weights. As 
we will see in the following sections, other models use decision 
weights in the process of evaluation but the subject does not perform 
any process of adjustment. 
1.5.5.1 Fellner's model 
Fellner recognizes the existence of two different situations 
(reproducing Knight's distinction) the evaluation of risky prospects 
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and the evaluation of uncertain prospects). The risky prospect (a 
"standard process" in Fellner's words) is characterized by the 
existence of "objective" probabilities or frequencies, 
35 
while the 
uncertain prospect is defined by the absence of this objective 
frequency. As a consequence the probability judgments relative to the 
two different situations are not comparable. 
Let us consider the following example; a person states that he or 
she assigns equal subjective probabilities to the occurrence of an 
event (E) and to the non-occurrence of the same event (-E). Assuming 
that this probability judgment has been known asking to the subject to 
choose whether he or she prefers to receive a specific prize if the 
event does happen, or if he or she prefer receive a prize if the event 
does not happen, and then asking to the same subjects whether, for a 
small additional, amount he or she would change his or her answer. In 
case of a negative response, it is possible to conclude that he or she 
regards the probability of the event E to be equal to the probability 
of its complement -E , n(E) = a(-E). 
For Fellner there are important elements which characterize these 
two probability judgments. 
a) These probability judgment may not be additive: for example n(E) _ 
A(-E) = 0.3. 
b) The probability judgment cannot be compared with probability 
judgments of equal value given to a risky prospects. (Assuming that R(E) 
= i[(-E)= 0.5, this is not like to say that the probability of a head or 
tail in tossing a fair coin is equal to O. S. Take, for example the 
two-colour Ellsberg example. According to Fellner an individual can 
estimate n(BI) =x (BID = 0.5 and yet still avoid betting on BI. This 
non commitment to bet reveals according to Fellner the presence of 
uncertainty. In this case, the subject feels not sure about his 
judgment and in order to bet on BI he will probably need a R(BI) - 0.6 
c) These probability judgments are determined by the fact he knows that 
the individual is ignorant of much potentially available information 
(as we can see also for Fellner it is the lack of information which 
characterizes the presence of ambiguity). 
3S The toss of a fair coin is for Feltner a standard process. The 
distinction between standard process and non standard process is very 
similar to the distinction between ambiguous event and non ambiguous 
event in Sarin and Wakker (1993) for example. 
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Since in a non-standard process our probabilities are biased, to 
compare these probabilities with those of a standard process, we have 
to correct or adjust the probabilities. However the "degree" of 
adjustment will be different for different non standard processes and 
it will depend on the magnitude of the prizes used to elicit subjective 
probabilities. 
In case of these subjective probability the kind of reasoning process 
of the individual can be the following: 
" the probability of E may be anywhere between 0.3 and 0.7, as is the 
probability as -E. If a person reasons in this way it is possible that 
he acts in a way according to which it is possible to be induced to 
infer that he assigns a probability of 0.5 to E and its complement; 
that is he will show indifference between the two events in a 
probability test. But this indifference which reflects just the fact 
that the estimated probability is an interval, need not imply that the 
individual is equally willing to say "the range 0.7 0.3 can be 
represented by the figure 0.5, " as he to say "red or black from an 
unbiased deck is 0.5" Fellner (1961) p 662. 
To restore comparability of these subjective probabilities with 
the objective ones, Fellner suggests an index of correction; this index 
of correction solve the main purpose of reintroducing additivity for 
the subjective probability and in the meanwhile it maintains the same 
proportion between the commitment given to E and the one given to -E. 
Consider the case that n(E) = w(-E) = 0.3. If we multiply the two 
probabilities for 3/5 we obtain the following "corrected" (in Fellner 
words) probabilities x(E) = id-E) = 0.5; these probabilities have the 
characteristics of being additive and of preserving the same weight. 
The ratio between the two probabilities is maintained (ratio 0.3/0.3 = 
0.5/0.5) 
What happen with "incorrect" probabilities like x(E) = id-E) = 0.3 is 
that the individual adjusts (bias downward) his probability judgment 
when a prize is staked on E and when is staked on -E. Hence to find the 
unbiased probabilities we have to adjust them upwards. 
Fellner's suggestion is to look at these "incorrect" probabilities 
more as psychological weights than "true" probabilities. Moreover, 
since individuals are not using corrected probabilities we cannot, 
according to Fellner, postulate that they are maximizing mathematical 
expectations of the utility of wealth. They are maximizing something 
that is similar to the mathematical expectation of utility of wealth 
but which is based on psychological weights which are represented by 
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distorted probabilities. What Fellner seems to suggest is that the 
uncorrected probabilities measure a psychological reaction to 
uncertainty. This means that for an individual an objective probability 
is psychologically equivalent to a higher subjective probability 
(uncorrected one) . 
Fellner says that, in fact, individuals can underestimate their 
subjective probabilities even in standard process; but, if this is 
true, it makes no real difference, since, in any case, uncorrected 
probabilities are defined relative to the corrected ones. The problem 
is that the individuals seem to distort more their probabilities when 
they have to face processes in which they have just a tentative 
probability judgment. According to Fellner this depends on the fact 
that while some processes are simple enough and consequently 
understandable to allow the derivation of significant clues from what 
is happening in individual instances, in other cases, we face events 
which, to some extent, are unique. What makes people distort more their 
probability is the presence of uncertainty and it is for this reason 
that the slanting inclination is likely to be more for uncertain 
judgment that for standard process. 
I. 5.5.2 The anchoring and adjustment model of Einhorn and Hogarth. 
In the Einhorn and Hogarth (1985), (1986), the authors develop a 
formal model of ambiguity in which is used the concept of adjusted 
probability. The innovations of this model are threefold: 
a) The model tries to give a psychological foundation to the adjustment 
process; 
b) It allows for dependence between probabilities and payoffs. 
c) It allows for ambiguity preference behaviour. To illustrate a 
possible case of ambiguity preference behaviour let us consider the 
following example taken from Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) 
Let us consider two urns each containing 1000 balls. In the first urn 
every ball is numbered from 1 to 1000 and the probability to draw any 
number is . 001, whereas in the second urn there are still 1000 numbered 
balls but we do not know with which proportion any number is 
represented. If there is a prize for drawing the number 687 on which 
urn would you bet? In urn 1 the probability to draw 687 is . 001; in urn 
2 the probability of drawing a ball with the same number can vary from 
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0 to 1000;. thus urn 2 involves ignorance and any probability would be 
equally likely (assuming that there is no preference over number). 
Einhorn and Hogarth's suggestion is that, in this case, many people 
would prefer to bet on urn 2 thinking that maybe the probability to 
have 687 could be higher then . 001. That they suggest that people can 
show aversion to ambiguity for higher probability values and that they 
can be ambiguity seeking for lower probability values. 
Einhorn and Hogarth's model. Einhorn and Hogarth develop a model 
which tries to explain the behaviour implied in the Ellsberg paradox 
allowing for sub and super-additive probability, specifying, in the 
meanwhile, under which conditions the subjects are supposed to avoid or 
to seek ambiguity. 
The model is based on the psychological intuition that people use 
anchoring and adjustment strategy in which the initial probability Is 
used as a starting point (anchor); then, an adjustment is made to take 
the idea of ambiguity into account The anchor probability can come 
from different kinds of sources (a probability salient in memory, the 
best guess of expert or any other available probabilities). 
If the anchor is p the probability which comes out of the adjustment 
process is s(p) 
s(p)=p+k (I. 21) 
where k is the net effect of the adjustment process. 
This adjustment process is a sort of mental simulation by which the 
individual imagines higher and lower values of p36; since p can come 
from any distribution that this kind of simulation can allow one to 
evaluate which, among the possible distributions, are the more 
plausible. 
The net effect of the adjustment, k, is assumed to be function of three 
factors: 
36 Einhorn and Hogarth suggest that people engage mental simulation in 
which" other values of p are considered by imagining how well they 
express one's uncertainty". The simulated values are thus" incorporated 
into the adjustment term, thereby allowing people to maintain 
sensitivity to both uncertainty and ambiguity" Einhorn and Hogarth 
(1985) p 436. Speaking about decision under ambiguity the authors 
distinguish between two kind of uncertainty: uncertainty towards the 
outcome (we do not know which of the outcome will come out) and 
uncertainty about the probabilities (ambiguity). 
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a. the level of the anchor p: Since s(p) lies between 0 and 1, k must 
lie in the interval -p sks 1-p 
b. the level of ambiguity:. The greater is the level of ambiguity the 
greater is the level of simulation needed by the process. The level of 
ambiguity is indicated by the parameter 0 where Os 6s1. 
c. The person's attitude to ambiguity. For attitude to ambiguity it is 
meant the relative weight of the imagined probabilities which can be 
higher or lower then the anchor. 13z0 Is the parameter reflecting the 
relative weight. If one gives more weight to higher probabilities then 
this results in an upward adjustments to the anchor or vice versa. 
Hence the sign of k is determined by p and 
Let k= kg-ks (1.22) 
where ks is denotes the effects of imagining smaller value while kg 
denotes the effect of imagining greater values. 
The size of the simulation however depends on the amount of ambiguity 
0. 
They assume that kg and ks can be represented as a proportion of the 
maximum adjustment where 6 is the constant of proportionality that is 
kt=6(1-p) 
ks----Op (1.23) 
if 0=0 then ks and ks are equal to 0. 
Since ß represents the relative weighting of higher versus lower 
probabilities, only ks or kg has to be weighted to affect k. They 
suppose that ks is weighted by ß in this way 
ks=6pß (1.24) 
by substituting (I. 23) and (1.24) into (1.22) then we obtain 
k=p+6(l-p-pß) (1.25) 
and substituting into (1.21) we obtain 
s(p)=p+ß(1-p-pß) (1.26) 
s(p)= (1-ß)p+ß(1-pß) (1.27) 
which implies that the judged ambiguous probability is a weighted 
average of p and 1-pß where the weights reflects the amount of 
ambiguity 
37 
ß. 
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0 affects the absolute size of the adjustment factor. When $=0, that 
is to say there is no ambiguity then s(p)=p. "Thus 0 can be thought of 
as having a magnifying or dampening effect on one's attitude towards 
ambiguity in the circumstances, (ß). For example if perceived ambiguity 
is small, the tendency to weight different values of probability above 
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What are the implications of the model? 
s(p) is regressive with respect to p which means then keeping 6 
constant, how much of the range of s(p) is weighted more or less of the 
anchor depends on the value of P. 
If 0<13<1, probabilities lower then the anchor are weighted more heavily 
then those above the anchor. If ß>l the probabilities higher than the 
anchor are weighted more heavily and if 18=1 the imagined probability 
are equally weighted. Moreover complementary probabilities are additive 
if p=1 or 0,0=0 or 18=1 the probabilities add to one, if ß>l means 
superadditivity and 13<1 subadditivity. 
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According to the value of ß when 0>0 it is possible to explain 
ambiguity seeking and ambiguity avoidance behavior. 
Hence the model has two parameters which are both functions of 
individual and situational factors. The parameter 0 reflects the 
perceived ambiguity and the degree to which one simulates values of p 
that might be possible. On the other hand, 0 can reflect also 
situational factors such as the absolute amount of evidence, the 
reliability of the source of information and the lack of knowledge 
regarding the process generating the outcomes. On the other hand, the 
parameter ß reflects the extent to which one differentially weights in 
imagination possible values of probabilities which are higher or lower 
then the anchor p. In this way according to Hogarth and Einhorn ß can 
also reflect the pessimistic or optimistic view of the individual. 
However ß can also depend on variables like the size and the sign of 
the payoffs. 
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and below p is of little consequences". Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) p439 
Let us consider s(p) and the complementary probability s(1-p) we will 
have s(p)+s(l-p) p+$(1-p-pß)+(1-p)4[1-(1-p)-(l-pß)]= 
1-9[1-pß-(1-p)] 
39 For example if the general effect of ambiguity is to induce caution 
rather then riskiness, the prospect of an undesirable outcome (et: 
monetary losses) would induce people to pay more attention in 
imagination of values of p (loss) than that larger than p; similarly 
the prospect of a gain would focus attention on smaller values of p 
(gain). Hogarth and Einhorn (1986), p 449-50. Thus one of the 
advantages of Einhorn and Hogarth's model is that it tries to explain 
the behavior of people in making decision in situation of ambiguity by 
a general psychological model, which, in addition, allows for 
differences in individual behavior via particular parameters. 
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Presence of ambiguity and the role of information. One of the 
characteristics of the Einhorn and Hogarth model is the fact that the 
adjustment that people make about probabilities Is based on a mental 
simulation in which "what might be" or "what might have been" is 
combined with "what is" (the anchor). According to Einhorn and Hogarth, 
the size of the adjustment to the anchor depends crucially on the 
quality and reliability of the information. 
The role of the quality and reliability of information in the Einhorn 
and Hogarth model is better analyzed if we consider the structure of 
the following experiment on inference (Einhorn and Hogarth (1985)). 
In this experiment about inference people were asked to make 
probability judgments on the basis of number of reports from a source 
of limited reliability. 
The structure of the problem was the following one: 
1 An event occurs 
2 The event is observed by witnesses. 
3 The witnesses make a report. 
Let us consider now two events A and B and A' and B' are the 
reports of the events A and B. Since there are n witnesses we will have 
n reports reports can also be seen as the outcomes of n observers 
reporting on a single trial). The person who has to judge receive f 
reports in favor of A and c report in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis B, so that f+c=n and p is equal to f/n. 
There are three factors which might have an influence on the evidences 
and consequently on the level of ambiguity. 
a) the dissimilarities between the events A and B. 
b) the credibilities of the sources. 
c) the numbers of reports or the sample size, n40 . 
To take account of the relevance of the information in the adjustment 
40 If n is small ambiguity will be high because few distribution will be 
ruled out. "It is important to note that the judge's assessment of the 
likelihood of A depends both on the reports observed (p=f/n) and his or 
her knowledge of the situation. The latter it should be recalled, can 
be represented by the possible distributions over A that the judge has 
not been able to eliminate from consideration and that affect the 
mental simulation process. Thus, in a highly ambiguous situation, the 
information about the credibility of the source, the dissimilarity of 
the signal, and the size of the sample does not rule out many 
distribution". Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) p 440. 
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model they modified the model 
41 in the following way: 
S(f: c) =p + 9'/n (1-p-pß). (I. 28) 
where S(f: c) is the judged probability based on f reports for and c 
reports against; p is equal to f/n; n is the sample size; O'/n is equal 
to 0 the level of ambiguity. According to this version of the model 
people are supposed to anchor on f/n and then adjust for the 
unreliability of the source and the amount of information or date. It 
must be noted that as n->w S(f: c)->p. 
Conditional on a given value of 0', the model implies that there is a 
trade off between p and f in determining judged likelihood. One may 
find the evidence in favor of some hypothesis to be more convincing on 
the basis of 9: 1 than 2: 0, however since s(p) asymptotes at p trade off 
between p and n will occur only at small values of n. 
Because 9=$'/n, n also affects the conditions underlying the additively 
of complementary probabilities. 
Specifically 
s(c: f)+s(f: c)= 1+ (O'/n)[1-pß-(1-pß)) (I. 29) 
where s(c: f) is the judged likelihood of the alternative hypothesis 
based on the same data. As n->co additively will hold regardless of 0', 
ß or p. Of course when the evidences are meager we allow for non 
additive probabilities. The model to some extent provides a 
psychological link to concerns expressed by others regarding the 
appropriateness of additivity when evidence is meager. In fact the 
model predicts that the largest adjustment to the anchor occurs when 
evidence is meager. In addition as n increases, s(f: c) approaches to p 
and consequently the weights for what has happened dominates the weight 
of what might have been; as the absolute amount of evidence increases, 
the effect of the increasing n is to reduce the amount of non 
additivity of the complementary probabilities. ' Moreover the fact that 
non additivity results from a shift in the direction of the adjustment 
process is consistent with other effects due to the use of the 
41The 
modification of the model is made to take into account two factors 
the role of evidence/information and the fact that S(f: c) can be a 
judged decision weight or probability. They actually used this version 
of the model in the experiment in which they tested ambiguity in 
presence of judgmental probabilities in non gamble situations. 
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anchoring and adjustment process, that is to say that the anchor Is 
weighted more than the adjustment. 
In Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) the model is enlarged to take into 
account the acquisition of new information, when it is supposed that 
new information change the level of ambiguity without changing the 
anchor probability (the balance between positive and negative evidence 
remain stable). 
Let us call v the amount of new information acquired at time t; let 
the judged ambiguous probability after time period t be s(p) t 
be 
s(P)t= p+ 0/v (1-p-pß). (I. 30) 
If v increases the effects on the adjustment process due to ambiguity 
decreases; if v is very large s(p)t-> p and the complementary 
probability will approach to additivity as v increases. 
However it is not very clear from the model what happens when the 
balance between positive and negative information does not remain 
stable. 
Let us consider the equation (I. 30) and put p--f/n with f numbers of 
observations (evidences) in favour the considered event. As in equation 
(1.29) c is the number of observations (evidences) which are against 
the considered event and f+c=n, n is the total amount of information. 
Equation (1.30) becomes 
s(p)= f/n + 0/n [1- f/n - (f/n)ß] 
Let us now consider three cases: 
1 We acquire two new pieces of information and one of these information 
is in favour of our event while the other is against. 
2 We acquire two new pieces of information and the two of them are in 
favor. 
3 We acquire two pieces of information and the two are against. 
In the first case the anchor will remain the same (this in reality is 
true only if we start with the same amount of evidence in favour or 
against), while 8/n will decrease hence the adjustment due to the 
presence of ambiguity will decrease. 
In the second case. the anchor will increase while both the two terms 
of the second part of the equation will decrease and consequently the 
overall adjustment due to the level of ambiguity will diminish. 
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The third case is more ambiguous. The anchor will decrease but while 
the term 6/n will decrease the [1-f/n-(f/n)] will decrease. 
Consequently the level of the adjustment will be more or less depending 
on the relative increase or decrease of the two terms. While it is 
quite sensible that the anchor will decrease if the evidence acquired 
are all against the event considered is not clear that the level of 
adjustment due to ambiguity should increase if we possess more 
information. 
Venture theory. Using the model developed before, Hogarth and 
Einhorn (1990) develop a theory of decision weights in which, while 
people evaluate outcomes according to prospect theory (Khaneman and 
Tversky, 1979), they replace probability with decision weights. 
As in the model presented above, they first anchor on a stated 
probability and then adjust their probability by mentally simulating 
other values. The amount of the simulation depends on the absolute size 
of the payoffs, on the extent to which the anchor deviates from the 
extreme 0 and 1, and on the level of perceived ambiguity concerning the 
relevant probability. Of course the net adjustment will depend on the 
weights that are given in imagination to values above as opposed to 
below the anchor In imagination. As in the previous version of the 
model, the net effect of the adjustment depends on individual and 
situational variables, from the sign and the size of the payoffs. 
The process of formation of the decision weights is represented by the 
equation (I. 21). However ks and kg are differently specified with 
respect to the previous model. In particular 
kg f(c, 9, p, v(x)) and (1.32) 
kS f(c, O, p, v(x)) (I. 33) 
where ks and kg are increasing functions of outcome uncertainty or and 
of perceived ambiguity 6, while kg is a decreasing function of p and 
ksis an increasing function of p. The absolute value of v(x) increase 
both ksand kg together with the sign, and determines how much weight is 
given in imagination to values above and below the anchor. 
In general, according to Hogarth and Einhorn, the venture function 
starts with overweighting, then there is a cross point and then an 
under weighting. The position of the crossover point depends on the 
relative weight given to value above or below the anchor; this depends, 
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in turn, on the sign and the size of the payoff. For positive payoff 
the crossover point is smaller than 0.5 and is smaller for large 
payoffs. The contrary happens in the domain of losses. How much the 
decision weight deviates from the probability depends on the outcome 
uncertainty and on the level of ambiguity and the size of the payoffs. 
In a multiple gamble, in which there is no ambiguity, also the outcome 
uncertainty will be reduced and the decision weight will tend to the 
probability, This, of course, does not happen in the presence of 
ambiguity. Since the decision weights are non-linear in the 
probabilities, this means that the complementary probabilities will not 
necessarily sum to one. The model is then used to make some predictions 
about the behaviour of the subjects towards risk and ambiguity since it 
is assumed that the individual will have the same attitude of "caution" 
in face of risk and ambiguity. In particular as far as ambiguity is 
concerned they predict that the proportion of ambiguity averse choices 
will increase as the probability increases, and as payoff increases; 
the effect of payoffs on ambiguity will be larger at medium as opposed 
to larger probabilities in the domain of gains. In the domain of losses 
the proportion of ambiguity averse choices will decreases as 
probability increases; it will increase as the size of payoffs 
increases and the effects of payoffs on ambiguity aversion will be 
larger for medium as opposed to low probabilities. 
Einhorn and Hogarth run 4 experiments to test their theory and in 
fact all the prediction about the behavior in face of ambiguity were 
valid but the one relative to the probability and payoff interaction 
were not confirmed, this in the domain of losses as well as in the 
domain of gain. 
The experimental evidence seem consequently to give some support to 
venture theory as a descriptive theory of decision making under 
uncertainty. The main advantage of the theory is that can combine 
cognitive and motivational factors to the explain people behavior. 
However the model presents some problems. In particular the theory does 
not clarify which is the process through which people assess the anchor 
probability. Moreover it is not clear how in the decision weight 
function the evaluation and the updating of Information is included. 
New information as we have seen can in fact not only modify the level 
of adjustment due to ambiguity but can also has an influence in the 
process of formation of the anchor. 
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1.5.6 Models with non additive probabilities. 
As we have said, the Ellsberg Paradox constitutes a violation of 
the sure thing principle or of the additivity of the probabilities. The 
formal models which are presented in this section allow for 
non-additivity in the probabilities and generally weaken the sure thing 
principle to a more limited sets of acts. 
Let us remind the reader of the two colour Ellsberg example. In the 
first urn, (Urn I) we do not know the proportion of red and black balls 
while in the second urn (Urn II) there are 50 black and 50 red balls. 
Si S2 
RB 
RI $100 0 
BI 0 $100 
RII $100 0 
BII 0 $100 
The preferences shown by people who commit the Ellsberg paradox are 
given by BI-RI, BII'RII but BI < BII and RI<RII ; (BIvRI) gives the 
certain event and so p(BIvRI)=1, on the other hand (BIIvRII) also give 
the certain event and consequently p(BIIvRII)=1; but from the above 
preference relation we can infer that p(BI) + p(RI)< p(BII) + p(RII). 
This means that either p(BIuRI) is different from p(BI) + p(RI) or that 
p(BIIvRII) is different from p(BII) + p(RII). Since we know that p(BII) 
= p(RII) = 1/2 then this mean that p(BI) + p(RI)<l. Models with non 
additive probabilities, allow for p(BI) + p(RI) be less than I. 
In Schmeidler words 
" In the example above, If each of the symmetric and complementary 
uncertain events is assigned an index 3/7, the number 1/7,1/7 = 1- 
(3/7 + 3/7), would indicate the decision maker's confidence in the 
probability assessment. Thus, allowing non additive (not necessarily 
additive) probabilities enables transmission or recording of 
information that additive probability cannot represent". Schmeidler 
(1989) p 572. 
Consequently, Expected Utility with non additive probabilities 
generalizes SEU allowing the kind of behavior described above. Besides 
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Cumulative Prospect Theory which will be described in section 1.5.7.2, 
in this group of models we have the models of Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler 
(1982,89), Wakker (1989), Nakamura (1990), Sarin and Wakker (1992,94) 
and Oginuma (1994). We are not going to give a complete account of all 
the models here. Instead, we will try to explain briefly the 
similarities and the differences between them. We will give a more 
detailed account of Schmeidler (1982,89) and Sarin and Wakker (1994)42 
In the table 1.7 below (update from Gilboa 1987) the main 
differences in the various approaches are summarized as far as the 
general framework is concerned. Wakker (1989) and Nakamura (1990) 
differ from the approaches described above because they assume some 
richer structure on the consequences instead of on the states. 
Nakamura (1990) extends Gilboa (1987) assuming a fine S and an infinite 
set X of consequences. Wakker (1989) is an extension of Schmeidler 
(1984) in which the same representation is reached but the assumption 
of the availability of lotteries (the set of consequences contains also 
all the simple lotteries) is replaced by the assumption of continuity 
of utility. 
Sarin and Wakker (1992) can be considered intermediate between Gilboa 
and Schmeidler, because they do not need to assume extraneous 
probabilities as in Schmeidler, however they need to assume ambiguous 
and unambiguous events. Moreover, they use probabilities of the 
unambiguous events to calibrate probabilities of the ambiguous events. 
Oginuma (1994) gives another formulation of a model of expected utility 
with non additive probability building on Savage and Schmeidler's work. 
The key characteristic of the paper is the formulation of a new 
probability concept call I-non additivity probability. Such a kind of 
probability is partially additive and partially non-additive. Using the 
concept of I-non additive probability and I-monotonic acts Oginuma 
(1994) reformulates Schmeldler's and Savage's framework to arrive to a 
very similar formulation of a non-additive expected utility 
representation in which I-probability can be defined in a way to be 
additive or not additive just for I-monotonicy acts. 
42 In general these models allow for sub additive probability 
measure explaining ambiguity aversion. 
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Table 1.7 Scheme of the models with non additive probabilities 
Objective and sub) active Only Subjective 
probabilities 
Additive Anscombe-Aumann (1963) Savage 
(1954) 
probabilities 
Oginuma (1994) 
Non necessor I ly SchmeId1ar ( 1982) Gilboa 
(1987) 
additive 
We will now describe the models of Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin and 
Wakker (1992). Both models allow for non-additive probability measures 
and adopt a preference functional which is called Choquet Expected 
Utility and is considered a generalization of expected utility to the 
case of uncertainty. 
We now define the concept of capacity or non-necessarily additive 
probability, and then the Choquet Expected Utility functional form 
which is common to both the models. Then we well discuss how ambiguous 
probabilities are derived and the axioms needed to reach the CEU 
representation. The two models in fact adopt different derivations and 
a different set of axioms. 
Let A denote a subset of S. A contains S and 0. The elements of A are 
called events. Non-necessarily-additive subjective probabilities, 
called capacities, are assigned to A. Moreover an event A is said to 
occur if A contains the true state. 
Definition: A function v: A -º [0,1] is a capacity if v(0) = 0, v(S) = 1 
and v is monotonic with respect to set inclusion i. e. AB -* v(A) at 
v(B). The capacity v is (finitely additive) probability measure if, in 
addition, v is additive ie. 
v(AuB) = v(A) + v(B) 
for all disjoint A and B, capacity is convex ranged if for every A C 
and every µ between v(A) and v (C) there exist Aa BD C such that v(B) 
=µ 
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The preference relation r is said to maximize Choquet Expected Utility 
(CEU) if there exists a capacity v over A and a measurable utility 
function u: X -º P such that the preference relation } is represented 
by f-# Ju(f(s))dv; the latter is called the Choquet Expected Utility of 
f. 
If we assume that there are n states of the world si..... sn. Moreover 
u(f(si)) s ....... s u(f(sn)). Then43 
n-1 
n 
CEU(f)=u(f(si)) + 
U 
u(f(si))-u(f(si-i))I v(U sj) (1.34) 
J=1 
Schmeidler (1989) arrives at the above representation in a 
Anscombe-Aumann framework in which "physical" (extraneous) 
probabilities are introduced. Within this model, to each state, an 
objective lottery over deterministic outcomes is assigned, and the 
uncertainty is referred to which of the state will prevail. The main 
difference in the axioms between Anscombe- Aumann model and the 
43The 
representation (I. 34) is expressed in term of a measure rather 
than a transformation of probabilities, but is the same as the (I. 16) 
rank dependent representation is section 1.5.4. If we rewrite 1.34 as 
CEU (f) = u(f(si)). v(si)++n 
( 
u(f(sO-u(f(st-l)) v( UI_lst) (1.35) 
Hence 1=2l 
n 1-1 
CEU (f) = u(f(si)). v(si)+E u(f(si)( v( Ui=1)- v( UI=1si) 
) 
(1.36) 
1=2 l) 
Then the equation 1.34 can be interpreted regarding the non additive 
measure v as a weighting function; and the weight of the state I is the 
difference between the total weight of all the states up to i and the 
total weight of all the states more than I. 
Consider now the case of the events black and red of the two colour 
Ellsberg example. Applying 1.34 rewritten as in 1.36 we will have 
u(O) . v(R)+ u(10) (v(RuB)-v(R)). 
Considering now the case of non ambiguous events (urn II for example). 
In this case according to Schmeidler v is additive then v (RuB) = 
v(R)+v(B). Then if v Is additive applying again the 1.36 we will have 
u(O) . v(R)+ u(10) (v(R) + v(B) -v(R))= u(O) . v(R) + u(10) v (B), which 
shows why CEU reduces to SEU when capacities are additive. 
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Schmeidler one is the weakening of the mixture independence. The new 
version of the independence axiom is called comonotonic independence. 
Defining comonotonicity. Two acts f and g are said to be 
comonotonic if for no s and teS, f(s) > f(t) and g(t) > g(s). 
Intuitively this means that the outcomes of the two acts under each 
state of the worlds s and t must move in the same direction. (The best 
outcome for both acts happen under the same state). The fact that the 
outcomes move in the same directions makes the two acts "more easily 
comparable" and consequence the preferences over them can satisfy 
independence. If the two acts are not comonotonic then they are more 
difficult to compare and consequently independence can be violated. 
Let us consider the following example: 
Table I. 8 Two comonotonic acts 
S t 
f 
S 
4 
1 
2 
0 
In particular if X is a set of numbers and preferences respect the 
usual order on numbers, then any two X valued functions g and f are 
comonotonic If and only if 
(f(s)-f(t)) (g(s)-g(t)) z 0. 
Let us consider the two colour Ellsberg example 
st 
RB 
f=RI f(s)=$100 f(t)=0 
g=BI g(s)=0 g(t)=$100 
Hence 
(f(s)-f(t)) (g(s)-g(t)) = (100-0) (0-100) s 0. 
Then BI and RI are not comonotonic: the two acts are difficult to 
compare and consequently Schmeidler's model allow for violation of 
independence. 
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At this point Schmeidler substitutes the axiom of comonotonic 
independence for the axiom of mixture independence. 
Comonotonic independence. 
For all pair wise comonotonic acts f, g, h in H44, and for all a in 
)0,1(: f>g implies 
of + (1-a) h> ag + (1-a) h. 
Comonotonic independence is of course a weaker axiom than independence 
since it confines the validity of the independence axiom to comonotonic 
acts. All the other axioms assumed by Schmeidler are the usual ones, 
weak order, continuity non degeneracy plus two versions of state 
independence. 
Gtiboa's (1987) estenston. As we can see from the table at the 
beginning of this section, Gilboa (1987)'s model extends the result of 
Schmeidler's to a Savage framework, that is without the necessity of 
extraneous probabilities. Gilboa's axioms are less intuitive and less 
clear than Schmeidler's axioms. 
Using the Savage framework, Gilboa's definitions arrive at the same 
representation of preference by a Choquet Expected Utility Functional 
form. Gilboa's system of axioms is very similar to the Savage ones; as 
in Schmeidler the main change is a weakening of the sure thing 
principle to a form which is valid just for comonotonic acts.. 
Before stating Gilboa P2 we need some definitions. 
Let S be the set of the states of the word, X the set of consequences 
and F=(f: S->X) the sets of acts. Subsets of S are called events. For f, 
geF and AcS he defines fj pg to be an element of F satisfying 
fIÄ (s) =f(s) V sEAc and f1 At =g(s) V sEA. 
For xeX Gilboa defines x eF to be the constant act x(t)=x dxES. 
a will denote a binary relation over F; zc FxF is a preference 
relation. 
P2 (Gilboa). 
For all f It 
f 
2, gl g2 eF and A, BcS and xl, x2, y1, y2 eX such that 
xI<y1, y2>x2 , if 
44L is a convex subset of YSwhich Includes Lc, the constant function in 
Lo, which is set of all Eneasurable finite valued function from S to Y. 
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a) f1 IÄl, f 1IÄ, 81 
1 
Ax 
2 
gl I A2are pair wise comonotonic and so are 
2 
92 1 B2 and f21 
B1, f2 I B, g2 
18 
b) f1 Ä1f2 1 B1ý81 Ä2- 82 B2 and f1 l 
Ä1ý f2) B1 
then 91 1 
Ä2z 82 
B2" 
The axiom state that there is a preference order over events. 
Let us consider the following case: 
f1I xi-f2'B1 and f1 I ÄZ 
f2 B where yl > xl A 
This means that an improvement of the outcome under A is weighted more 
than an improvement under B since it can transform indifference in weak 
preference. This, to some extent, is like considering A more probable 
than B. 
The statement may be reversed if there were g li 
x2_ g2 B such that y2 y2 gASg21B 
The axiom does not allow for this reversal of preferences. However the 
compliance with this axiom is limited to monotonic acts. In practice 
the meaning of comonotonicity is that that each event (A, B) is 
conceived in the same way in each of the above acts in which it appears 
as for Schmeidler. 
In matrix form the axiom says: 
Table 1.9 Illustration of Gilboa's axiom 
A -A B -B 
x f - x f 1 2 
X2 91 X2 g2 
yl f1 
yl f2 
4 
y2 g1 y2 g2 
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Sarin and Wakker's model. Wakker and Sarin (1992) also provide an 
extension of Savage's Expected Utility for decision under uncertainty 
as in Gilboa (1987). Their representation of Choquet expected utility 
differs from Schmeidler's in that it does not use the two-stage 
Anscombe-Aumann representation; moreover they use a system of axioms 
which has a more intuitive appeal than Gilboa's (1987). 
The key axiom of their model is cumulative dominance. Cumulative 
dominance plays the same role for ambiguous acts as the sure thing 
principle in the Savage system of axioms, but is a weaker axiom (like 
comonotonic independence for Schmeidler or Gilboa) and it allows for 
probabilities of some events not to be additive. 
The satisfaction of cumulative dominance requires that, if 
receiving a consequence a or a superior consequence is considered more 
likely for act f than for act g, for every a, then, the act f is 
preferred to g. This condition is satisfied by the acts of the Ellsberg 
paradox, while the sure thing principle is not. For example, in the 
case of the two-colour problem, we can say that if receiving some sum 
of money (x>O) or a superior one is considered more likely with the act 
"betting on white in the second urn", f, than with the act "betting on 
white in the first urn", g, for any value of x, then the act f is 
preferred to g. 
As in the previous models the representation of preferences is given by 
n-1 
CEU(f)=u(f(sl)) +E[ u(f(sl))-u(f(sl-1))] v(U sj) (1.34) 
1=2 LJ =l 
where v(. ) are the non necessarily additive probabilities or 
capacities. 
In order to reach this representation they enlarge the set of the 
states of the world in order two include two kinds of events: the 
ambiguous and unambiguous ones. 
They assume that 
"the Savage's axioms hold for a sufficiently rich set of 'unambiguous 
acts', ie. acts measurable with respect to the unambiguous events. " 
Wakker and Sarin p 1255 (1992). 
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This distinction allow them to require that just the acts which 
are measurable with respect to unambiguous events satisfy Savage's 
axioms. General acts are required to satisfy a weaker condition which 
as we have already said is cumulative dominance. In order to do this, 
they do not assume an a priori definition of ambiguous or non ambiguous 
events, but they still assume the existence of a sub-class of events, 
such those as generated by a roulette wheel that they call unambiguous. 
This subclass of unambiguous events is rich enough to ensure that all 
ambiguous events can be calibrated by appropriate bets contingent on 
unambiguous events. In practice, as in the Savage framework, likelihood 
comparisons of events can be inferred from preferences over acts. A is 
considered more likely than B if I prefer bet on A than on B. In case 
on unambiguous events the likelihood is represented by probabilities. 
These probabilities in the Sarin and Wakker are used to calibrate the 
probabilities on the ambiguous events. The assumption is that for any 
ambiguous event A it is possible to find a matching unambiguous event B 
of equal likelihood such that a person is indifferent between betting 
on A and betting on B. Sarin and Wakker call this assigned to Aa 
capacity v(A). This is stated formally by the following condition: 
R2 For each ambiguous event A, there exists an unambiguous event B such 
that A-'B. 
Now we state the cumulative dominance axiom (P2): 
If the event of receiving an outcome consequence a or a superior 
outcome is considered at least as likely under act f than under act g, 
for every a, then, f >- g 
Cumulative dominance implies that (A, a; A°ß) >- (B, a; B°ß) for some 
outcome a >- ß if and only if this is true for all outcomes a >- is. A 
consequence is that the likelihood order over events is independent 
from the outcome chosen. Moreover it assures that v(A) is independent 
of the particular choice of the unambiguous event B which is 
indifferent to A. Cumulative dominance will ensure that the preferences 
a on A satisfy the usual condition of transitivity and completeness and 
are in proper agreement with preferences over F. 
Moreover, cumulative dominance can be seen as an adaptation of the 
stochastic dominance condition to the ambiguous acts and in particular 
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"in this setting, an act (or its probability distribution as generated 
over consequences) stochastically dominates another if it assign to 
each cumulative consequence set at least as high a probability. In the 
present set up, without probability attach to each event, it is natural 
to say that an act f stochastically ("cumulative") dominates an act g 
if the decision maker regards each cumulative consequence set at least 
as likely under f as under g. " Wakker and Sarin (1992) p 1262. 
An example: different results in the one stage and two stage set 
up. Let us consider the following example taken from Wakker and Sarin 
(1992) which also shows how the application of CEU in a two stage and 
in the one stage set up can give to different evaluation of the same 
lotteries. 
Consider the following lottery. Suppose that a biased and a fair coin 
are tossed, with Hb and Tb we indicate head and tail in the biased coin 
and with Hf and Tf we indicate head and tail in the fair coin. Suppose 
that first the biased coin is tossed and then the fair one. We will 
have the following states of the world: 
Si S2 S3 S4 
HbHf HbTf TbHf TbHf 
100 
-1 
The same situation can be illustrated with a one stage and a two stage 
process: 
Figure I. 10 Wakker and Sarin's one stage formulation 
HbHf 
i 
HbTr 
0 
TbHr 
0 
TbHf 
-i 
Figure I. 11 Schmeidler's two stage formulation 
Hr 
1 Hb 
-4 Tr o r Hf 0 Tb 
Tr 
-1 
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Suppose then that you are asked to evaluate the above lotteries 
according to CEU which have the same states of the world and the same 
utilities (1,0,0, -1) under the same state of the world. 
By Choquet expected utility the utility of f is given by: 
u(f) =r 
i(u(f(s1)) 
- u(f(st+l)) v(s1,.... st)+ u(f(sn)) (I. 37) 
where u(f(sl) a ... a u(f(sn), si = 
HbHf, s2 =HbTf, S3 = TbHf, 
S4 = TbHf. 
If we apply the above functional form to the Wakker and Sarin one stage 
set up after having ranked the utilities of the states of the world 
(u(f(sl)) = 1, u(f(s2) = 0, u(f(s3))=0, Uff (s4) = -1 we will have: 
u(f) = ((1)-(0)). v(sl) + ((0)-(0)) . v(si, s2) + 
((0 )-(-1)) 
V(S1, S2, S3) + (-1). 
Sarin and Wakker assume that betting 1 on Hf as well as betting 1 on Ti 
is equivalent to have 1/2 for sure. On the other hand, betting one on 
Hb as well as betting 1 on Tb is regarded less preferable. In addition 
they assume that these two bets may be regarded as equivalent to a< 
1/2 (that is to say something less then 1/2)45 
Now v(si) is equal to a/2, and V(Sl, s2, s3) is equal to 1/2 + (x/2. Hence 
u(f) = a/2 + 1/2 + a/2-1= a-1/2 which is less then zero. 
On the other hand if we evaluate the lottery according to Schmeidler, 
one stage formulation we will have, since in the first stage we are 
faced with a roulette lottery and consequently CEU reduces to SEU, 
C(E1) = 1/2 (1) + 1/2 (-1) =0 and C(E2) = 1/2 (0) + 1/2 (0) =0 and, 
consequently, u(f) = 0. 
The different result in the evaluation of the lotteries points out 
a problem with the use of the capacity. Each of the analyzed models 
depends very strongly, given the same functional form, on the rule used 
(one stage and two stage set up) in representing the problem and in the 
assumption relative to the capacity. Provided that the capacity of Tb 
and Hb is less then the probability of Hr and Ti, the "actual" value 
will depend on our assumptions on the attitude of the individual 
45 In the Wakker and Sarin's model what is important is that the 
capacity of the two ambiguous events is less then the probabilities of 
the corresponding two unambiguous events. They do not assume as Gilboa 
(1987) that the capacity is equal to the minimum probability; in this 
case the capacity in fact can be equal to 0 leading again to a 
different result. 
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towards ambiguity (Cf. previous footnote) or on the assumption relative 
two the events46. If the individual consider the worst possibility then 
the capacity can be zero. 
As we see all these models allow for the existence of a non 
necessarily additive probability measure and for a Choquet 
representation of preferences. To do so they weaken the independence 
axiom in various ways. In practice the models are very similar, even if 
the mathematics through which they reach their representation is 
different. A consequence of this is that the axiom which substitute the 
sure thing principle does not predict the same in all the models. Here 
below we can see the prediction of Wakker (1989) and Oginuma (1994) for 
Gilboa (1987) see above 
47 
Table 1.10 Wakker(1989)'s representation 
4 
A -A A -A 
a f s ß g 
ä f z d g 
B -g g -g 
a s Z ß z 
7 s t 6 T 
46 For example the capacity in Gilboa is assumed to be symmetric. That 
is to say consider to disjoint event A and B we will have that v(A) + 
v(-A) =1 and v(B) + v(-B) =1 but v(A) + v(B) * 1. The same condition 
is called by Wakker and Sarin additivity respect to A and additivity 
respect to B. 
47Gilboa 
and Wakker are taken from Camerer and Weber (1992) 
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Table 1.11 Oginuma (1994)'s representation 
A ýA B '-B 
x f1 xf21 
x2 gl 
- 
x2 92 
yl fl ' yl f2 
does not implies 
y2 91 > y2 g2 
In Wakker (1989) the acts in the top row and in bottom row are pair 
wise comonotonic; In Oginuma (1994) the acts are in the first two 
colons are pair wise comonotonic as well as the acts in the second two 
colons. 
I. 5.7 Models with decision weights 
There is a group of models which allow for the presence of 
ambiguity using decision weights instead of probabilities; these 
decision weights associated with the occurrence of an event depend on 
the ambiguity in the probability of that event. Hence, for example, two 
events with the same probabilities can have two different decision 
weights if the associated ambiguity is different. Generally we can 
describe these models in the following way: 
Let us consider the example of an uncertain prospect X(xi, E; X2 -E) 
The value function of X can be expressed in the general form: 
V (X) = v(xi) . W(E) + v(x2) . w(~E) (1.38) 
here w(E) * u(E) which is the SEU subjective probability; w(E) may in 
some models be a function of R(E). The way in which decision weights 
are related to probabilities and to ambiguity in probabilities is 
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specified in different ways by different models. For example, the 
decision weight can depend on subjective probability, on the outcome 
and on the level of ambiguity. 
There are a few models of ambiguity which use decision weights48. Most 
of then have been reviewed in other sections (amongst the others, 
Segal (1987), Fellner (1961) and Einhorn Hogarth (1985,86,90)). 
We will here briefly describe two models which uses decision weights: 
that of Kahn and Sarin (1988) and Becker and Sarin (1990). In the next 
section we will analyze in more detail two other models: Hazen (1987) 
and Hazen and Lee (1991), and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Wakker 
and Tversky (1993). 
Kahn and Sarin (1988) use non linear weighting functions. This 
weighting function is used to weight a second order probability 
distribution where the adjustment reflects aversion to the probability 
risk implicit in the second order distribution. They allow for 
ambiguity aversion as well as for ambiguity preference depending on the 
value of the parameter A. If A=0 then their model reduces to SEU. 
According to Camerer and Weber their model resembles theories of 
disappointment and elation (Bell 1982, Loonies and Sudgen (1982,86), 
however the disappointment is due to a bad probability outcome and not 
to a bad outcome. 
In Sarin and Becker (1990) the decision weight is interpreted as the 
probability equivalent of a random variable pe (Sarin (1992). A 
function O(w(e)) (with w(e) we indicate the decision weight) is 
introduce to compute the decision weight and Is given by 
c(w(e))= E[*(pe)) 
Hence the decision weight is given by y-1E[ 
Using different shapes for lc, Sarin and Becker can explain 
ambiguity-aversion ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-neutrality (Concave, 
48 In the models of ambiguity that use decision weights differ from the 
models under risk with respect to the fact that the decision weight is 
a function of the subjective probability instead of a function of the 
probability. It may be important to recall that models which use 
decision weight and consequently do not assume linearity in 
probabilities lead to violation of stochastic dominance. See Fishburn 
(1978), Quiggin (1982). The violation of dominance can be quite 
troublesome for the normative value of a theory. To avoid this 
drawback, for example in prospect theory dominated prospect are 
eliminated in the editing phase. 
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convex and linear fir). When 0 is concave then the decision weights are 
not additive. 
In the next section we will describe the Hazen (1987), Hazen and Lee 
(1991) and the Tversky and Kahneman (1991) models. In the first case 
decision weights are related to subjective probabilities ( in practice 
subjective probability are calibrated through a comparison with the 
objective ones), while in the second case they are related to 
capacities (See the section on non-additive probabilities). 
1.5.7.1 Subjectively weighted linear utility and the problem of 
ambiguity. 
Hazen (1987), Hazen and Lee (1991) develop a theory of non-linear 
utility and subjective probability in which the assessed probabilities 
are allowed to depend on the outcome associated with an event. The 
theory is called subjectively weighted linear utility because when 
objective probabilities are substituted for "subjective" probabilities 
then the theory is equivalent to the weighted linear utility originated 
by Chew and MacCrimmon (1979). In particular, the theory 
" allows the probability of an event A to depend continuously on the 
degree of desirability of the consequences under A, compared to the 
consequences under the complement of A. It accommodates ambiguity 
aversion, but retains transitivity and the independence under pure 
risk. Hazen (1987) p 263. 
The subjective probabilities of an individual relative to the 
occurrence of an event are elicited in the Hazen and Lee model through 
the comparison between event lotteries and risky one. Given an 
uncertain lottery it is always possible to find a risky lottery, with 
the same outcome, which is indifferent to the uncertain one; through 
this process of comparison is possible to elicit the "subjective" 
probability attached to an event. However in the model of Hazen and Lee 
this process of calibration is done in a particular strange way. Let 
us assume that we have a first event lottery ( if A then .. if B then ) 
with two outcomes. We can be able to find a risky lottery which is 
indifferent to this event lottery (eliciting the two probabilities it 
(A), and dB)). Now we consider another event lottery in which the 
outcomes are conditional on the occurrence of B (as in the first 
lottery) and on the occurrence of C, a third event. Also in this case 
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we can find a risky lottery which is indifferent to the ambiguous one 
and consequently we are able to elicit the two event probabilities x 
(B), and n(C). Of course n(B) has been elicited in two different 
contexts and consequently can have two different value. The process 
goes on in the same way comparing other two lotteries with event A and 
C. Now let us assume that our individual is confronted with a forth 
event lottery in which the three outcomes are conditional to the 
occurrence of A or B or C. At this point Hazen and Lee introduce two 
axioms or rules that probabilities have to satisfy in order to 
maintain a certain consistency (which in practice is due to the 
maintenance of additivity). The two axioms are the Multiplicative Odds 
axiom and the Proportional Odds axiom. Hence in the third case the 
subjective probability of the event ABC are in some way adjusted to 
sum to one but according to these rules which are defined to maintain 
a sort of proportion between the values obtain in the first separate 
elicitation. 
Let us see with two examples how the process works from a 
mathematical point of view. 
Consider the case in which our decision maker shows to be indifferent 
between the following two lotteries: 
Figure 1.12 Illustration of the Hazen and Lee's axioms (I) 
A0 
a 
B 100 
Q= 1/3 0 
2/3 
100 
Moreover the same individual is indifferent between these other 
two lotteries: 
B0 
b 
-100 
ß= 1/2 0 
7= 1/2 
-100 
Now if the multiplicative odd axiom holds the following 
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indifferent relation should hold: 
A 100 
c Ec 
-100 
a= 1/3 100 
a' = 2/3 
_ 100 
In fact if we call n(A) the subjective probability of A; we know that 
is indifferent to 1/3. w(B) - 2/3; moreover n(B)=2R(A). But w(B)= n(C), 
hence n(C)= 2 n(A). In this way the proportion between the different 
subjective probabilities is maintained. 
Moreover if the proportional odds axiom holds then a lottery with 
three outcomes 0.100. -100 will be indifferent to the following risky 
lottery: 
Figure I. 13 Illustration of the Hazen and Lee's axioms (continue) 
A0 
dB 100 
C 
-100 
1/5 = at 0 
2/6 100 
2/5 = "' -100 
Since we know that a(B) = n(C) =2 n(A) and in the meantime we want to 
maintain additivity in the probability then 1=2 ir(A)+ 2 s(A) + 
a(A), hence 1= 2/5 + 2/5 + 1/5 
Hazen (1987) asks himself what happens if the absolute size of the 
payoffs decreases. The hypothesis Is that the importance of the 
ambiguity associated to the contingent lottery will decrease and 
consequently the event lottery will be more desirable than the risky 
one. 
In this case, for example, we will have followed the same kind of 
mathematical rule. 
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Figure 1.14 Illustration of the Hazen and Lee axioms (II) 
A0 
B 50 
2/7 O 
13 = 5/7 50 
B0 
-50 
A 50 Ec 
-50 
A 
B 50 
C 
-50 
ß= 5/s 0 
= ail _50 
a= 1/3 50 
V=2 /3 
-50 
2/10 = a0 
5iio = 50 
3/10 = 2' -50 
As we said before Hazen and Lee claims that these axioms are need 
if we want the subjective assessed probabilities to maintain the same 
coherence properties obeyed by standard probabilities. 
49 
From a mathematical point of view the process followed by Hazen 
and Lee is correct, however in our opinion the elicitation process of 
this subjective probability seem quite odd. It is like to say that we 
can elicit subjective probabilities of events calibrating these 
probabilities comparing lotteries with pairs of events but then we 
adjust these elicited probabilities in order to maintain coherence when 
we consider a situation where the set of the events is composed by more 
than two events. So in the case of the two lotteries with three 
outcomes (d for example) the probabilities seem to be inferred by the 
49 In the original version of the axioms instead of prize Hazen and Lee 
consider pure risky lotteries. 
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applications of the two rules and not by a process of comparison with a 
risky lottery following hence a different process of calibration. 
The axiomatic version of their model is developed in a A-A 
framework. The two above explained axioms on probability plus other 
seven axioms give the following representation: 
E n(slas) bi(as) as 
u(f) = sEA (1.39) 
n(slag) bi(as) 
sEA 
where as =u (f(s)) and for all a a(sl(x)>O, O(a)>O and 
Ew(sla)=1. 
sEA 
The function 0 weights the subjective probabilities in a way that 
depends on the outcomes f(s). When 0 (. ) is constant, since we give the 
same weight to all subjective probability the (1.39) reduces to SEU. If 
S is the set X of all consequences x, f(x) =x for all xES and w(x) _ 
'(u(x) then (. ) reduces to the weighted linear utility (Chew (1983)) 
The main characteristic of the model is the dependence of subjective 
probability from the size of the outcome (See Camerer and Weber on this 
point (1991). 
"By distinguishing between events and probabilities, the SWLU model 
permits subjectively assessed probabilities (here termed 
risk-equivalent probabilities) to depend on payoffs, and allow the 
distinction between subjective and objective probabilities. something 
that no pure risk model can do " Hazen and Lee (1990) page 205. 
The model however does not seem to have an intuitive appealing. The two 
axioms on probability in particular seem to have the technical meaning 
of guarantee additivity but they do not seem have any intuitive base. 
1.5.7.2 Cumulative Prospect Theory. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) develop a model of ambiguity aversion 
in which they use decision weights which depend on non additive 
probabilities. Their model is the development of a previous model of 
choice, (1979) (1986) called prospect theory, which explains the main 
violations of expected utility theory in risky choices with small 
numbers of outcomes. 
We will describe briefly the original model (1979), to concentrate 
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then on the main feature of the recent one (1992). which is that which 
relates directly with uncertainty. 
In the original prospect theory, the choice process is divided 
into two parts: editing and evaluation. First, the decision maker 
constructs a representation of the acts, contingencies, outcomes etc. 
Second, the decision maker assesses the value of each prospect 
accordingly. 
Editing: the decision maker does a preliminary analysis of the offered 
prospects in order to reach a simpler representatton5o of the prospects. 
Evaluation: The edited prospects are evaluated and the decision maker 
chooses the prospect with the highest value. 
The editing phase is the same for the 1979 and 1992 models (value 
function and weighted function are applied to already framed choices), 
while it is in the evaluation phase that the two models differ. 
The main elements of the (1979) model are- 
a) a value function which is concave for gain and convex for losses and 
steeper for losses than for gains; 
b) the carriers of value are change in wealth or welfare, rather than 
the final states, hence the value is calculated with respect to a 
reference point and there may be a shift in this reference point. 
c) a non linear transformation of probabilities which overweight small 
probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities. 
In the original model, the value function Is applied to "regular 
prospects": that is to say prospects that have one zero outcome and two 
non zero outcomes or two non zero outcomes on different size of the 
reference point. 
Let us consider a regular prospect of the kind Xi =( xi, pi; X2 p2, ) 
50 According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) the editing phase consists 
in the application of several operations on outcomes and probabilities 
which can help to simplify the problem. Example of these operations 
are: coding, combination, segregation. cancellation, simplification, 
and detection of dominance. 
Coding is of the outcomes as gains or losses rather then final states 
of wealth. Combination is the aggregation of probabilities associated 
with the same outcome. Segregation is the isolation of the risky part 
of a prospect from the risk less part. Cancellation is the discharging 
of components that are shared by the offered prospects. Simplification 
is given by the rounding of probabilities or outcomes and detection of 
dominance is the elimination of clearly dominated prospects. 
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and either pi+p2 <1 or xiZ 0 it x2 
Then in the original version the value function is 
V(X) = V(xi) w(pi) + V(x2) W(p2) (I. 40) 
Denoting with V (. ) the value function and the value of an outcome (V 
operates on both prospects and on outcomes) and with w the decision 
weight. 
Now let us consider another prospect Y( yi, qi; y2 q2, ) where qi+ q2 
=1 and yl>y2>0 or yi<y2<0, that is to say we have strictly negative or 
strictly positive outcomes. In this case according to prospect theory 
in the editing phase such prospects are grouped into two parts: a) a 
risk less component (minimum gain or minimum loss) and b) the risky 
component (additional gain or additional loss at stake). In this case 
the evaluation of the prospect is the following one: 
Let us consider when yi>y2>0 
V(x) = V(y2) + w(qi)[ V(y2)- V(yl)] (1.41) 
The interpretation of Kahneman and Tversky of (1.41) is that the 
decision weight is applied to the value-difference which represents the 
risky part of the prospect and not to V(y2) which represents the 
riskiess part. 
If we look at (I. 41) is easy to see that is exactly the same as 
n-1 
V(X)=u(xi) +Eru (xi)-u(xi-i)] VS Pi) (I. 16) 
1=2 =l 
which is the Rank dependent functional form applied to the case where 
xi=y2 and x2 = yi. In general it can be said that the difference 
between PT and RDEU is that the weighting function depends explicitly 
on the xi and not merely on the ordering of the outcomes. See Quiggin 
(1993). 
The more recent version of the model introduces two major novelties: 
a) it extends the model to uncertain and not only risky choices and 
b) to prospects with any number of outcomes. 
In expending the model to prospects with any number of outcomes the 
new model adopts a rank dependent approach. However, as we will see, 
the rank is establish respect with the capacity (that to say non 
additive probability measures). In this sense Cumulative Prospect 
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Theory is related to Choquet Expected Utility which is defined by: 
n-1 n 
CEU(X)=u(f(si)) +E 
[ 
u(f(si))-u(f(si-i))v (U sI) I. 34) 
1=2 
] 
J=1 
However in Cumulative Prospect Theory, since the risk attitude towards 
gains may differs from the risk attitude towards 
losses, also the 
capacities for gains may differ from the capacities 
for losses. In 
fact, as we will see, we will have two decisions weights w+and w, where 
w+will be defined with respect to v+(capacity for gain) and w 
-will be 
defined with respect to v _(capacity for losses). 
The new model can, hence, be considered as a generalization of the old 
one. The main difference between the two is the non-linear 
transformation of the probability scale is not given by transforming 
individuals probabilities but cumulative ones in the line of Quiggin 
(1982), Yaari (1987), Schmeidler (1989) and Wakker (1989). 
The new development explains, loss aversion, risk seeking and non 
linear preferences in terms of a value function and a weighting 
function as the old version of prospect theory but it also accommodates 
the Ellsberg paradox kind of behavior. 
To sum up, cumulative prospect theory differs from prospect theory 
mainly because the probability transformation is on the entire 
distribution function and not on individual probability. In addition, 
this transformation applies to the cumulative functional separately for 
gain and for losses and, moreover, in case of uncertain events, 
capacities are substituted for probabilities. 
51 
The model. Let as usual S be a finite set of states of nature: 
subset of S are called events. It is assumed that just one state 
obtains and that it is not known in advance to the decision maker. X is 
defined as the set of consequences or outcomes. Kahneman and Tversky 
assume that X includes a neutral outcome which is denoted zero (the 
status quo), while all the other outcomes are defined with respect to 
the neutral outcome as losses or gains (hence defined by positive or 
51 The original model of prospect theory did not satisfy stochastic 
dominance; instead it was assumed that transparently dominated 
prospects were eliminated in the editing phase. 
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negative numbers). 
An uncertain prospect f is a function from S to X which assigns to 
each state seS a consequence f(s)= xeX. In order to define a 
cumulative functional the outcomes of each prospects are arranged in 
increasing order. A prospect is consequently defined with a pair (xi, 
Ai), where xi is given if Ai obtains and x i>x j, 
iff i> j and Ai is a 
partition of S. A prospect is defined as strictly positive or positive 
if all the outcomes are strictly positive or non negative; negative 
prospects are defined in the same way as well as strictly negative and 
strictly positive prospects. The other prospects are called mixed 
prospects. The positive part of F is defined as f+and it is obtained 
letting f+(s) = f(s) if f(s)>0 and f+(s) =0 if f(s)s 0. 
To any prospect fa number V(f) is assigned such that f is preferred to 
or indifferent to g, iff V(f)rV(g). 
The new representation of prospect theory is defined in terms of 
capacities; where a capacity is a function that assigns to each AcS a 
number v(A) satisfying v(o)=0 and v(S)=1 and v(A) v(B) whenever ASB. 
Cumulative prospect theory asserts that there exists a strictly 
increasing value function V: X-*R satisfying V(x0) = V(0) =0 and 
capacities v+ and v such that for f= (xi, Ai), -msisn, 
V(f) = V(f+) + V(f ) 
V(f+) = nO wiV(xi) and V(f) Ln0 wiV(x. ) (1.42) 
The decision weight denoted with w+, that is associated with a positive 
outcome, is the difference between the capacities of the events "the 
outcome is at least as good as xi" and " the outcome is strictly better 
than xi; the decision weight denoted with w-, that is associated with a 
negative outcome , is the difference between the capacities of the 
event " the outcome is at least as bad as x. ' and " the outcome is i 
strictly worse than x According to Tversky and Kahneman, 
"the decision weight associated with an outcome can be interpreted as 
the marginal cýntribution of the respective event, defined in terms of 
the capacities v and v_" Tversky and Kahneman (1992) p 301. 
If each capacity is additive and consequently is a probability measure, 
then w is simply the probability of A. 
"It follows readily from the definition of w and v that for both 
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positive and negative prospects, the decision weights add to I. For 
mixed prospects, however, the sum can be either smaller or greater then 
1, because the decision weights for gain and for losses are defined by 
separate capacities". Tversky and Kahneman (1992) p 301. 
Let us illustrate the model with an example taken by the experiment 
done by the authors. 
The subjects had to choose between prospects whose outcomes were 
contingent on the difference d between the closing values of the 
Dow-Jones today and tomorrow. 
Table 1.12 Application of Cumulative Prospect Theory 
ABC 
d<30 30sds35 d>35 
Problem 1f 25 25 25 
8 25 0 75 
Problem 2 f' 0 25 25 
9000 75 
If we apply the present model to f (Table above) we will have: 
V(f)= V(25) (1.43) 
V(g)= V(75) v+(C) + V(25)[ v+(AuC) - v+(C)l (1.44) 
V(g') = V(75) v+(C) (1.45) 
V(f') = V(25) v+(BvC) 
52 
(1.46) 
We can use the same example to show the subbadditivity of the v+s. 
Since f is preferred to g in problem 1, we have the following 
preference relation: 
V(25)>V(75) v+(C) + V(25)[ v+(AuC) - v+(C)l or (1.47) 
V(25)-V(25)[ v+(AuC) - v+(C)l>V(75) v+(C) or (I. 48) 
V(25)[1 - v+(AuC) + v+(C)l>V(75) v+(C). (I. 49) 
On the other hand, if the subjects prefer g' to f' this implies the 
52 The Ellsberg kind of preference would be f>g and g'>f' showing the 
usual violation of the sure thing principle. 
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following relation: 
V(75) v+(C) >V(25) v+(BvC). (I. 50) 
Then [1 - v+(AuC) + v+(C)] > v+(BuC) or (I. 51) 
1- v+(AvC) > v+(BuC) - v+(C) (1.52) 
which is to say that 
v+(S)- v+(S-B) > v+(BuC) - v+(C). (I. 53) 
Hence subtracting B from certainty has more impact than subtracting B 
from CuB. 
Let v+(D) be equal to 1- v+(S-D) then (1.53) is equivalent to the 
subadditivity of v+ and we will have v+ (B) + v+ (C) > v+(BuC). 
Subadditivity of the weighting function can also be seen as the 
expression through the weighting function of the principle of 
diminishing sensitivity. When we are evaluating outcomes the reference 
point serves as a boundary that distinguishes the gains from the 
losses. In this version of prospect theory the concept of reference 
point is applied also to probabilities and capacities. In the 
evaluation of uncertainty there are two natural reference points 
(boundaries) the impossibility and the certainty. Hence the application 
of the concept of the reference point in case of uncertainty implies 
that the impact of a given change in the probabilities is different 
according to its distance from the boundary. 
Diminishing sensitivity therefore gives rise to a weighting function 
that is concave near 0 and convex near 1. For uncertain prospects, this 
principle yields subadditivity for very unlikely events and 
superadditivity near certainty. However the function is not 
well-behaved near the endpoints and very small probabilities can be 
either greatly over weighted or neglected altogether". Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) p 303. 
The axioms. In the axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory 
these are axioms which play an important role: Comonotonic 
independence and double matching. 
Let us define F= (f : S--X) as the set of all prospects; with n we 
indicate a binary preference relation upon F. Moreover, for any f and 
geF and ACS, h= fAg is defined where h(s)=f(s) if s¬A and h(s) _ 
g(s) if se S-A, That is to say fAg coincides with f on A and g on S-A. 
Kahneman and Tversky assume that: 
- at is complete, transitive, and strictly monotonic. If fog and 
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f(s) g(s) for all sES, then f>g. 
- it is satisfied comonotonic independence; that to say whenever the 
prospects defined as fAg, fAg' f'Ag f'Ag' . are pair wise comonotonic 
independence is satisfied. 
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- it satisfies double matching. 
Let us now explain double matching. For any prospect f we can denote 
by f+ the prospect that results if all losses in f are replaced by the 
neutral outcome; we can denote by f the prospect that results if all 
gains in f are replaced by the neutral outcome. Let now consider two 
prospects f and g and suppose that fg and f-g; double matching 
consists in the fact that these two indifference relation imply that 
f-g 
The main result of the theory is stated in the following theorem: 
Theorem 1. Suppose (F, z) and (F, a) can each be represented by a 
cumulative functional. Then (F, a) satisfies cumulative prospect theory 
iff it satisfies double matching and comonotonic independence. 
To sum up, cumulative prospect theory is the "natural" development of 
prospect theory taking into account ambiguous prospects. All the 
editing part of the theory remains the same. Cumulative prospect theory 
can be seen as the application of a Choquet integral to the evaluation 
of gains and losses. Hence the new model maintains different 
evaluations for gains and losses with a two part cumulative functional 
which reflects the principle of diminishing sensitivity (the impact of 
a change is perceived with a different intensity according to the 
distance from the reference point). This diminishing sensitivity is 
also applied to probabilities or capacities. Diminishing sensitivity in 
the domain of outcomes and diminishing sensitivity in the domain of 
probabilities were a peculiarity of prospect theory. On the other hand, 
the main features of the rank dependent utility and of the Choquet 
expected utility models are the use of transformation of the cumulative 
distribution (and not of single probabilities) and the use of 
capacities respectively. Cumulative prospect theory seems to be the 
attempt to encompass both characteristics in one model , which in the 
53 See previous section for the definition of comonotonicity. 
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intention of the authors is meant to maintain the descriptive power of 
prospect theory and generalize it to uncertain prospects54 . 
I. 6 Psychological literature on uncertainty and probability. 
1.6.1 How people perceive and deal with uncertainty. 
In the last twenty years a consistent part of the psychological 
literature on cognitive psychology and on decision making has addressed- 
the question of what determines people's beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of uncertain events and how people assess the probability of 
an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity. 
Most of the researchers effort has focused on the studies of how people 
judge under uncertainty. The main point of this literature is that 
people in order to reduce the complex task of assigning probabilities 
and predicting values, rely on a limited number of heuristic 
principles. These heuristic principles are quite useful and allow 
people to perform simpler judgmental operations. However, they may lead 
to severe and systematic 'errors'. 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1982) p3 
"The subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective 
assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size. These judgments are all based on data of limited validity , which are processes according to heuristic rules. " 
The most common of these rules are representativeness, availability, 
and anchoring and adjustment. 
Representativeness. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1982), most of 
the probabilistic questions which people have to tackle are of the 
following type: what is the probability that process B will generate 
54 It is important to note that this new version of prospect should be 
applied to already edited prospects. Hence the editing phase remains 
the same. Moreover the authors seem to suggest that also the decision 
weights may be sensitive to the formulation of the problems, the number 
the spacing and the level of outcomes. They think however that to 
accommodate these effects the theory runs the risk of loosing its 
predictive power. 
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the event A or what is the probability that the object A belongs to the 
class B. In such cases "people typically rely on the representativeness 
heuristic, in which probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which 
A is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles 
B. So if A is highly representative of B then the probability of A is 
considered high and vice versa. 
55 
Availability. Another of the heuristic rules is when people assess the 
probability of an event "by the ease with which instances or 
occurrences can be brought to mind" Tversky and Kahneman (1982) page 
11. This happen for example when people. if asked to assess the 
probability of having a heart attack by a middle age man they think of 
how many middle age men among acquaintances have got an heart attack. 
The main consequences in terms of the assessment of probability, 
through the use of availability, is the fact that a class whose 
instances appear easier to retrieve will appear more numerous than a 
class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable. 
56 Another 
factor that can influence availability is how much a situation can be 
easily imagined. Since very often in real life imaginability plays an 
important role In the evaluation of probabilities then if frequency is 
assessed by imaginability then situations that are easier to imagine 
will be also considered more probable. 
55 One example of how this heuristic yield to erroneous judgment is what 
is called insensitivity to sample size. People assess the likelihood of 
a sample result (for example the number of males and females in a group 
of eight brothers and sisters), by the similarity of this result to the 
corresponding parameters (that is the average of baby girls or baby 
boys in population of new born). As a consequence if people assess 
probabilities according to representativeness, then the judged 
probability of a sample statistic will be independent from the sample 
size. Another example is what Tversky and Kahneman call the 
misconception of chance. People expect that a sequence of events 
generated by a random process will have the essential characteristics 
of this random process even when the sequence is short. If asked to 
define a sequence of 10 heads and tails which according to them seems 
more random they are very likely to design a sequence in which there 
are almost the same number of heads and tall and in which heads and 
tails appears alternatively. In this way they try to represent the 
fairness of the coin. From a statistical point of view their sequence 
will have too many alternations and too little runs. They expect to see 
the law of large numbers reproduced also in a small sample. 
56 Other factors in addition to familiarity can increase the 
retrievability as salience for example. 
114 
Adjustment and Anchoring. 
"In many situations, people make estimate by starting from an initial 
point value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial 
value, or starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of the 
problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation. In either 
case, adjustments are typically insufficient. Slovich and 
Lichtenstein, 1971) That is, different starting points yields different 
estimates, which are biased towards the initial values. We call this 
phenomenon anchoring. " Tversky and Kahneman (1982) page 11. 
One of the typical consequences of the adjustment and anchoring process 
is the fact that it yields to biases in the evaluation of conjunctive 
and disjunctive events. In particular studies of choices among gambles 
and of probability judgments shows that people tend to overestimate the 
probability of conjunctive events and to underestimate the probability 
of disjunctive events. This happen because the stated probability of 
the elementary event (success at any one stage) provides the natural 
starting point for the estimation of the probabilities of the 
conjunctive and disjunctive event57. However since the adjustment from 
the starting point is not sufficient, the final probability remains 
close to the probabilities of the elementary events. One , 
typical 
consequence of this bias in evaluating probabilities is the unwarranted 
optimism in the evaluation that a project will be completed on time. 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1982), the important consequence of 
this analysis is that these cognitive biases have a major influence for 
the theoretical and applied role of judged probabilities. 
In the standard theory of probability the subjective probability of an 
event is defined by the set of bets about this event that the subject 
is willing to accept. However, what Tversky and Kahneman argue is that, 
even if subjective probabilities sometimes can be inferred from 
preferences among bet, however 
"in reality, subjective probabilities are the ones to determine 
preferences among bets and are not derived from them, as in the 
57 "A conjunctive event is for example drawing a red marble seven time 
in succession, with replacement, from a bag containing 90 red marbles 
and 10 blue. A disjunctive event is drawing a red marble at least once 
in seven successive tries with replacement from a bag containing 10 red 
marbles and 90 marbles. " Kahnemann and Tversky (1982) p 15 
Usually in case of conjunctive events the overall probability of 
conjunctive event s lower than the probability of each elementary event 
while in case of disjunctive event the overall probability is higher 
than the probability of each elementary event. 
115 
axiomatic theory of rational choice. " Tversky and Kahneman, (1982) p 
19. 
In particular Tversky and Kahneman object to the fact that as 
it 
happens with the standard theory of subjective probability, coherence 
and internal consistency is the only valid criterion 
by which judged 
probabilities should be evaluated. 
"For judged probabilities to be considered adequate, or rational, 
internal consistency is not enough. The judgments must be compatible 
with the entire web of beliefs held by the individual. Unfortunately, 
there can be no simple formal procedure for assessing the compatibility 
of a set of probability judgments with judge's total system of beliefs. 
The rational judge will never the less strive for compatibility, even 
thought internal consistency is more easily achieved and assessed. In 
particular he will attempt to make his probability judgments compatible 
with his knowledge about the subject matter, the laws of probability, 
and his own judgmental heuristics and biases. " Tversky and Kahneman, 
(1982) p 20. 
To sum up what the psychological literature shows (and it is 
relevant to our analysis on ambiguity ) is that from a psychological 
point of view the betting heuristic implied by the Bayesian school of 
probability is unrealistic ( preferences are the basis of beliefs and 
probabilities are derived from preferences between bets). Moreover as 
Tversky and Kahneman, (1982), say, if the psychological heuristics, 
described above, are used in well defined sampling process (where 
objective probabilities are well defined), one can expect these 
heuristics to play an important role where the evolution of uncertainty 
is in unique situations and where there is not a "correct" answer. This 
is particularly important where uncertainty Is assessed in term of 
propensities or confidence. If uncertainty is expressed In terms of 
confidence, that is to say if the subjective probability represents our 
degree of belief or our confidence in what we think would happen then 
there are some of the characteristics of the Bayesian conception of 
probabilities which seem not at all compelling. Complementary is one of 
them for example. When uncertainty is expressed in terms of confidence 
then it is less obvious why probability should add up to one for 
example. The question of confidence is quite Important since the 
problem of ambiguity is very linked to it. If an ambiguous situation is 
one in which we do not have all the relevant information then as in the 
Gardenfors and Sahlin example we can assign a subjective probability to 
the occurrence of an event but we may have a very weak confidence in 
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our esteem and this can affect and control our decision as in the 
Ellsberg case. 
1.6.2 The Competence explanation of ambiguity. 
As we have already seen the pattern of preferences shown by the 
Ellsberg paradox violates the additivity property of probabilities. To 
account for this, several theories have developed non-additive measures 
of beliefs or second order probability. However, in the Ellsberg 
example, as well as in most of the subsequent experimental work, the 
research on the response to ambiguity is mainly confined to chance 
processes. 
However as Heath and Tversky say, the 
"potential significance of ambiguity stems from its relevance to the 
evaluation of evidence in the real world. Is ambiguity aversion limited 
to game of chance and stated probabilities . or does it also 
hold for 
judgmental probabilities? " Heath and Tversky (1991) p 6. 
Starting from the conviction that the aversion to ambiguity observed in 
a chance set up does not extend to judgmental probability, (which 
involves epistemic uncertainty), the two authors explore through an 
experimental investigation an alternative account of uncertainty 
preferences called competence hypothesis. 
The competence hypothesis explanation constitutes, according to us, a 
link to all the theories which make a distinction between a probability 
estimate and the confidence in one's own probability estimate. 
The core of the competence hypothesis is in the recognition that 
"the willingness to bet on an uncertain event depends not only on the 
estimated likelihood of that event and on the precision of that 
estimate, it also depend on one's general knowledge or understanding of 
the relevant context. More specifically, we propose that - holding 
judged probability constant -people prefer to bet in a contest where 
they consider themselves more knowledgeable or competent that in a 
contest where they feel ignorant or uninformed. " Heath and Tversky 
(1991), page 7. 
According to Heath and Tversky (1991) the main reason for the 
competence hypothesis is motivational rather then cognitive. In 
58 The italics is mine. 
117 
particular they suggest that the consequences of each bet are not only 
the monetary payoffs associated to the bets. To the outcome of each bet 
people associate also credit or blame. The credit and the blame 
associated to the outcome of the bet depend on the attribution of 
success or failure. The competence hypothesis is connected with 
assumption that while in a game of chance success and 
failure are 
mainly attributed to luck this does not hold for bets on judgment. In 
particular Heath and Tversky (1991) suggest that in a situation in 
which the decision maker has a limited knowledge of the problem, 
failure may be attributed to ignorance and success to luck. On the 
other hand in a contest in which the decision makers is an expert, 
failure may be attributed to chance while success is attributed to 
knowledge. This asymmetry In the balance of credit to blame will lead 
to the individuals avoiding betting in situations in which they do not 
know a lot or in which the do not understand the process. 
According to Heath and Tversky (1991) this analysis accounts for the 
availability of uncertainty preferences whether or not they involve 
ambiguity. Uncertainty preference can be expressed also if 
a) I prefer to bet on the future rather than on the past (see Rothbart 
and Snyder 1970) or 
b) I prefer to bet on a skill rather than on a chance. 
In all the three cases (betting on the known probabilities, on future 
and on skill) my willingness to bet is determined not simply by my 
probability judgment but my knowledge of the problem relatively to what 
can be known. For example I prefer to bet on the future than on the 
past not because the future is less ambiguous than the past. What makes 
the difference is that "the past, unlike the future is knowable in 
principle", but not to me (what changes is my relative knowledge). 
In this way the competence theory introduces the idea of the presence 
of a discrepancy between choice and judgment. 
59 That is to say that the 
59 This kind of discrepancy has been underlined by many authors as one 
of the main consequence of the presence of uncertainty. In the 
literature of ambiguity as we have seen Ellsberg's original model as 
well as that of Gardenfors and Sahlin's and Levi's are the models 
that most underline this distinction. The same kind of distinction, 
which by the way reproduces the distinction between probability and 
confidence, is typical of other theories of decision under uncertainty. 
In particular Shackle's theory of potential surprise and Keynes's idea 
of probability and its relation with the concept of weight of evidence 
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subject can prefer to bet on A rather then on B even if he judges B as 
probable as A. (I assign to the two events the same probabilities but 
I know more about A so I will choose to bet on A). 
For example in one of their experiments (experiment 1) subjects were 
asked to answer 30 knowledge questions and then to assign their 
confidence on their answers. After that the subjects were given the 
opportunity to choose between betting on their answer or on a chance 
lottery in which the probability of winning was equal to their 
confidence. The idea was that if people were ambiguity adverse they 
should prefer to bet on the chance device which is clearly "objective" 
than to bet on their judgmental probability which are more ambiguous. 
The results of the experiment seem to confirm the competence 
hypothesis. The subjects were not ambiguity averse and the ones who 
knew a lot prefer to bet on their judgment while the subject who knew 
little prefer to bet on the chance lottery and this holding the belief 
constant. 
For Bayesian decision theory the subjective probability obtained 
from judgment and the subjective probability obtained from choice are 
consistent. Instead competence theory implies is that the decision 
weights derived from choices may not reflect the decision maker's 
beliefs. According to Heath and Tversky (1991), the Ellsberg paradox 
simply show that people prefer to bet on clear events, not that they 
consider the red or black in the second urn as less probable. If the 
degree of belief and the decision weight are two different concepts 
then 
of a person may believe that the probability of drawing the ace of 
spades from a well-shuffled deck is 1/52, yet in betting on this event he or she may give to it a higher weight. " Heath and Tversky (1991) p 
23. 
Hence the theory of competence suggests that ambiguity can be 
considered just one of the factors that reduces competence and make 
people avoid betting in certain situations. In this respect the 
competence hypothesis can be linked to the other psychological 
literature which analyses for example ( as we have already mentioned 
above) the preference of betting on future events more than on past 
events ( Rothbart and Snyder 1970) and more recently Levi and Pryor 
seem to stem from the same kind of considerations. 
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(1987) or the protecting the self from negative consequences in the 
work of Josephs, Larrick, Steele and Nisbett (1992). 
1.6.3 Linguisttc uncertainty. 
In this section we want to review some psychological studies on 
uncertainty which mainly regards a comparison between verbally and 
numerically expressed probability measures. 
The studies of Budescu, Weinberg and Wallsten (1988) compared the cash 
equivalents given by subjects for gambles where the probabilities were 
expressed numerically graphically or verbally. 
In the first stage of the experiment the subject had to equate verbally 
and numerically descriptions to 11 different graphical displays. That 
is to say the have to choose for example a number or a verbally 
expression like quite likely, very likely, probable etc for 11 
different graphical displays (spinners). In the second stage the 
subjects had to bid (using the Becker, DeGroot and Marschak device) for 
simple two outcome gamble in which one outcome was always 0. The 
uncertain event was draw from the set of questions of the first stage. 
The gamble varies according to the domain (gains or losses) 
probabilities, and mode of presentation (numerical graphical and 
verbal). According to the authors if verbal probabilities are vague and 
people avoid uncertainty then the prediction was that in the positive 
domain the subjects should bid less for the verbally expressed 
probability while in the negative domain the subjects should bid more. 
These predictions were not sustained. The subjects bid more to obtain 
verbal than numerical probabilities in the domain of gain and offer 
more to avoid them in the domain of losses. 
The same experiment was replicated by Wallsten, Budescu and Erev 
(1988) and the data did not sustained the above prediction either. In 
this last experiment the subject offered exactly the same amount to 
obtain verbal as numerical probabilities in the domain of gain and to 
avoid them in the domain of losses. The only difference is that if the 
variability of the bids is investigated then the bids in the case of 
verbally expressed uncertainty are more variable. Wallsten, Budescu and 
Erev find the result of their experiment quite surprising. To explain 
their results they develop a model according to which the vague meaning 
of a linguistic probability expression to an individual is represented 
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by his or her membership function for that phrase. 
60 According to their 
model and individual when required to act on the basic of linguistic 
probability , he or she behaves in accordance with a specific 
probability value whose membership is sufficient high (sufficiently 
high means above a threshold that can vary according to the contest, 
task or importance of decision). That is to say the model assumes that 
the probabilities are only considered if their membership value µ is 
greater or equal to the threshold value v. 
Wallsten, Budescu and Erev (1988) tested their model in two experiments 
in which subjects made binary choices between linguistic and precise 
gambles for identical outcomes. For example the subject is presented 
with the following two gambles: 
Figure 1.15 Illustration of the Wallsteno Budescu and Erev (1988)'s 
experiment 
- 100 points if white 
0 points if red 
LIKELY 
to lend 
on white 
01 
The subjects were then asked if they preferred to play the spinner 
or the phrase gamble. 
60 A membership function is a function over the [0,11 interval which 
assumes its minimum value usually 0 for probabilities not at all 
denoted by the phrase it represents; it assumes the maximum value 
generally one , for probabilities definitely denoted by the phrase. 
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In order to test the effect of the threshold outcomes for landing 
changed from trial to trial (for gains as losses) by two stakes 100 and 
1,000. The linguistic gamble was represented by 6 adjectives: doubtful, 
improbable, possible, good chance and likely. Each phrase was paired 
with 6 different spinner probabilities of landing on white 
depending on 
he phrase. For example for possible the probabilities were 
0.23, 
0.33,...., 0.73. Each specific choice was presented over a series of 
three section 9 times. 
10 subjects participated in the experiment and the model 
fitted 
significantly for 9 subjects. 
According to Wallsten, Budescu and Erev (1988), the threshold model is 
important since 
"it allowed widely varying choice patterns to be related to equally 
diverse membership functions by means of a single model. Optimal 
threshold values varied across subjects over the entire allowable 
range, although they did not vary with outcome domain or value, as we 
had thought they might. " Wallsten, Budescu and Erev (1988)p 50. 
The surprising result that subjects gave the same response to 
verbally graphically and numerically expressed probability, while the 
hypothesis of ambiguity aversion predicted a preference for numerical 
probability motivated a second group of experiment to test the 
following idea. In discussing the results of the previous experiment 
Walisten pointed out that there may be situations in which one form of 
communication can be superior to another. In particular Rapoport, 
Wallsten, Erev and Cohen (1990) organized an experiment to study this 
problem in a task of sequentially revising opinion or beliefs in the 
face of uncertain situation. In particular what they wanted to test was 
the hypothesis of conservatism according to which subjects'estimate of 
probabilities are conservative that is to say less extreme that the 
optimal values calculated from the Bayes rule. In particular Rapoport, 
Wallsten, Erev and Cohen (1990) wanted to test if conservatism was 
influenced by the presence of verbally or numerically expressed 
probability, that is to say if was influenced by the mode of expression 
of uncertainty. The results of their experiment confirm the results of 
the experiment above described that is to say that there are not 
differences between the two communication modes. 
I. 7 Conclusion 
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As we have see from the present review of the literature the 
problem posed by the Ellsberg paradox has been tackled by many very 
different approaches61. These different approaches are the results of 
different fields of inquiry of different disciplines. Very often these 
approaches share some common feature but their empathize different 
aspects. The review has been conducted as we have already said grouping 
the contributions according to the criteria illustrated in Table 1.5. 
As we will see in the following chapter most of the empirical work on 
the Ellsberg paradox has been in the direction of investigating sources 
of and attitudes towards ambiguity. This is probably due to the fact 
that most of the experimental work has been conducted by psychologists. 
On the other hand, there are few contributions on testing theories and 
on application to this theories to economic contest. Chapter III and IV 
want in fact to be our contribution in this respect. 
61 In this review we have analyzed mainly the contributions which tackle the Ellsberg paradox through a modification of the utility or of the probability. However it should be noted that in Fishburn (1991) (1993) 
a new approach is Introduced in which event ambiguity is dealt with as a primitive concept. 
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CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON THE ELLSBERG PARADOX 
11.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we review some of the experimental evidence on 
ambiguity. Ellsberg never did an experiment by himself, however, since 
the appearance of his article in 1961 others did. This review will not 
be exhaustive, since we want simply to concentrate our discussion on 
(for a complete review see Camerer and Weber (1991)) some experimental 
work which can be considered as the background for the experiment 
described in the third chapter. Moreover, we are going to review mainly 
published papers. (Unpublished work is not easily available). 
Most of the experimental work on the Ellsberg paradox can be 
divided in the following groups: 
a) replicating the paradox (in a chance or in an event contest, that is 
to say using lottery or real events); 
b) investigating the possible sources of ambiguity (for example 
manipulating some factors as the range of the second order distribution 
or testing psychological attitude of subjects with respect to the time 
resolution of uncertainty or the environment surrounding the resolution 
of uncertainty; 
c) exploring new theories; 
d) testing some of the existing theories. 
In this respect, the experiment described in chapter III can be 
classified mainly in the first and in the fourth groups. The experiment 
is In fact a replication of the paradox In a lottery context and tests 
some of the theories which attempt to explain the Ellsberg paradox. The 
novelty of the experiment is mainly in the particular design involved 
and in the theories tested (even if It is important to notice that at 
the moment there are very few works which directly test theories on 
ambiguity which of course we will refer to in the review). The review, 
consequently, will focus on the elements which are considered important 
for understanding subsequent work. 
The chapter is organized as follows: in the first part we will 
analyze in general the experimental work on the Ellsberg paradox. The 
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works will be analyzed in chronological order. In the second part we 
will concentrate on the few works which directly test theories. In the 
last part we will try to compare the existing work with the experiment 
presented in chapter III. (See Tables 11.1 and 11.2 for a summary) 
Table II. 1 Empirical works on ambiguity Summary Table 
Replication of 
the paradox 
Becker 
Brownsn 
(1961) 
Mac Crimon 
(1968) 
Mac Crtmon 
Lars son 
(1976) 
Einhorn 
Hog rth 
(1985) 
(1986) 
Cohen 
Jaffray 
Said 
(1986) 
(1987) 
PossIbale new 
sources of 
ambi tu 1ty 
Becker 
Brown a on 
(1961 ) 
Yate s 
Zkows ky 
(1976) 
McCr Immon 
Larsson 
(1976) 
Curley 
Yate s 
(1985) 
Einhorn 
Hogarth 
(1985) 
Curl ay 
Yate s 
Abrams 
(1986) 
Schoemaker 
(1991) 
Investigating Test Ing 
new theories theo r ! es 
EI nhorn 
Hogarth 
(1985) 
Khan 
Sarin 
( 1988) 
Curl ey 
Yate s 
Abrams 
(1986) 
Curley 
Yate s 
(1989) 
Heath 
Tversky 
( 1991) 
Kopp e 
Webe r 
(1991) 
Yens e1 edorff 
Webe r 
(1992) 
Bern a sconl 
Looms s 
(1992) 
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Table 11.2 Casslficatlon of the empirical works according to 
Var lous factors 
Incentive Task Lo ttery Payoffs 
Becker Brownson (1961) Yes/No C L + 
MacCr i mmon ( 1968) No C/R L /E + 
Yates Zukowsky (1976) No C/P L + 
MacCrimmon Larsson (1979) No R L/E + 
Curley Yates (1985) Yes C L + 
Einhorn Hogarth ( 1985) No C L +/- 
(1986) 
Cohen Jaffray Sald (1986) Yes C L 
(1987) 
Curley Yates Abrams (1986) Yes C/P/R L + 
Kahn Sarin (1988) Yes C L/E +/- 
Curley Yates (1989) Yes R L + 
Schoemaker (1991) Yes C/P L +/- 
Heath Tversky (1991) Yes/No C/P E + 
Kappe Weber (1991) Yes CE/PRO L/E + 
Mangelsdorff Weber (1992) Yes PRO L/E +/- 
Bernas c oni Loomes (1992) No C L 
Legends C=choice task, P=price task, R= Rank task; 
CE=el Icitation of the certainty equivalents 
PRO=El icltation of the probabilities, decision weight etc. 
L=Lottery envlroment, E= Event envi r oment; 
+= choices with gains, -= choices with losses 
11.2 Empirical works on the Ellsberg Paradox. 
11.2.1 Replications of the Ellsberg imaginary experiment and 
extensions. 
Becker and Brownson (1961). Becker and Brownson (1961) ran the 
first experiment which replicated the Ellsberg paradox. They assumed 
"that the ambiguity associated with a given alternative is determined 
by the nature of the distribution on the probabilities of future events 
relevant to that action. "Becker and Brownson (1%1) p 64. 
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Since they believed that ambiguity was determined by the distribution 
on the probabilities of the occurrence of an event, Becker and Brownson 
(1961) analyzed the difference in behaviour due to different levels of 
ambiguity, where the various levels of ambiguity were operationalized 
through different ranges of the possible probabilities of a state. In 
their experiment, subjects were asked to make 10 decisions; each 
decision consisted in looking at a pair of urns and state on which urn 
they preferred to bet and how much they were willing to pay to bet on 
the preferred urn. The experiment consisted of two parts: in the first 
part the subjects were screened with a Ellsberg kind of problem with no 
money involved. Only those subjects who committed the Ellsberg paradox 
(15 out of 37) participated in the second part of the experiment where 
real money was involved. Of these subjects all but one were willing to 
pay a substantial amount of money to draw from their preferred urn. 
Moreover the preferred urn, for which the subject would pay a premium, 
was the urn which had the smaller range around the mean, confirming the 
Becker and Brownson assumption. 
MacCrimmon (1968). The first extension in a event context of the 
Ellsberg paradox is due to MacCrimmon (1968). He replicated the 
Ellsberg paradox In a chance context and in an event one. In addition, 
subjects were exposed to written arguments in favour of or against the 
sure thing principle. Then, they were given the opportunity to reflect 
on their answers. Thirty eight executives participated In these three 
experiments; there was no incentive mechanism. In the first experiment 
they had to express their preference between two situations, one risky 
(betting on red and drawing a card from a well-shuffled deck) and one 
uncertain (betting on the fact that the value of a particular stock 
was higher than a determined amount the day after the experiment62). 
They were exposed to written arguments in favor of and against the sure 
thing principle and had to state with which arguments they agreed. In 
this particular experiment, just three subjects violated the sure thing 
principle, but 11 subjects choose the arguments in favor of the 
Ellsberg paradox (choosing consequently an answer which conflicted with 
62 They were also offered to bet on the complementary situation, that is 
to say betting on black and betting on the fact that the stock price 
would not be higher than a certain amount. 
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their choices)63. The third experiment was very similar to the first one 
and the choice was between betting on tails or heads and the USA GNP 
being less than (no less than ) $620 billion in 1964. The second 
experiment was different and involved a choice between investing in two 
countries with historical frequencies given for one country but not for 
the other. In the third experiment, the subjects who violated the sure 
thing principle were 5, while in the second the number of subjects who 
violated the sure thing principle increased to 19. As we can see, the 
subjects considered the second situation more ambiguous than the third 
one64. This result was confirmed by the interviews. Between the subjects 
committing the Ellsberg paradox in the first and in the third 
experiment just one subject persisted in his choices, all the others 
said that the distinction between risk and uncertainty was not 
reasonable. However, in the case of the second experiment more than 
half of the subjects (10 out of 19) did not want to change their 
choices. 
Yates and Zukowsky (1976). Yates and Zukowsky (1976) reconsidered 
the Becker and Brownson idea that ambiguity can be 
"completely reducible to the range of the induced subjective second 
order probability distribution". page 21. 
The authors constructed three games in order to induce three different 
second order probability distributions. The first game, G, was defined 
in a way to induce a second order distribution equivalent to a point 
estimate corresponding to a situation of risk. The second game, G', was 
defined in a way to induce a uniform second order distribution 
(subjects had to draw from a bag containing the 11 numbers from 0 to 
10, the chosen number would have determined the number of balls of the 
winning colour to be put in the bag from which the subject had to draw 
the final ball). The third game. G", was a replication of the normal 
Ellsberg example, a bag containing 10 chips that could be black or red 
6318 
subjects choose the conforming answer and the remains said that no 
one of the arguments was logical. 
64 And in fact it is reasonable to consider that it was more ambiguous. 
Being executives the subjects should have a better knowledge and 
consequently reach a more "sure" estimate of the probability in an 
increase in the GNP or in an increase in a stock that making investment 
decision in an unknown country. 
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but the proportion of the two colours was unknown. The authors' purpose 
was not to induce the subjects to think of any particular second order 
distribution. According to Yates and Zukowsky (1976), if the aversion 
to ambiguity can be entirely capture by the range of the second order 
distribution, then the following prediction should hold G >- G', G} G" 
(indifference is possible only if the subject's second order 
probability distribution for G" is equal to a point estimate) and G" 
>- G' (since the range of the induced by the uniform distribution is 
maximal). In the experiments, the subjects were given six binary 
choices (G-G', G-G", G'-G"). For each pair of games, they had to 
state which was the preferred one. (they were given the three choices 
above described 
65 ). In addition, they were asked to state their minimum 
selling price for each of the games. The incentive mechanism used by 
the experimenters was the Becker-DeGroot-Marshack device. The subjects 
sold their lottery tickets or they played the game, during individual 
sessions at the end of the experiment. 
The results of the experiment showed that G was preferred to G", 
according to the predictions, but G was not preferred to G' and G' was 
preferred to G" (indifference was not permitted in the binary 
choices)66. These last two preferences are not consistent with the 
predictions described above. The authors concluded their article by 
saying that the aversion to ambiguity cannot be completely reducible to 
the range of subjective second order probability distributions. In 
fact, apart from the range, other factors can be important in 
determining aversion to ambiguity. In G" a subject can imagine a 
second order distribution with the same range as in G', but may attach 
different probabilities to the first branch (G' and G" can be imagined 
as two stage lotteries), thinking that for example some probabilities 
are more reliable. In such a case, G' and G" can be represented, for 
example, by two different second order distributions, with the same 
range but with a different variance. The results of the experiment in 
chapter III and the interpretation of these results in chapter IV give 
a certain support to this hypotheses and this will be one of the topic 
we will pursue in our future research. 
65 The games were six because the order was changed. 
66 G>-G' 53%; G>-G" 787.. -G'>- G 46%; G'>G"68% - G"} G 229.; G"} 
G'327.. 
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MacCrtmmon and Larsson (1979). MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) 
replicated the Ellsberg paradox and extended the MacCrimmon (1968) 
experiment. Nineteen students participated in this experiment; they 
were decision making graduates and there was no incentive mechanism 
involved. In the first part of the experiment (on the three colour 
example), they were put in front of a simple replication of the paradox 
with 90 balls. They were presented with arguments against and for the 
axioms as in MacCrimmon (1968). The novelty of the experiment was that, 
besides the original Ellsberg problem, they were confronted with other 
pairs of choices in which the total number of balls was 100 and In 
which the probability of red was not fixed to 0.33 but was made to vary 
(0.20,0.30,0.33.0.34,0.40,0.5). The predictions of the authors 
were for a maximum of violation around 0.33, with a decrease for less 
than 0.33 (there is a trade off between knowing the probabilities and 
having a small probability for red) and an increase moving towards p= 
0.50 (in this case the probability of red is not just known but also 
higher). The aim was to test whether the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty persisted in the case of a wide change in probability. Of 
the 19 subjects who took part in the experiment, 10 out of 19 committed 
the Ellsberg paradox. In the second choice (the one with 100 balls 
instead of 90), 707. of the subjects committed the Ellsberg paradox when 
the probability of red was 0.33 or 0.34. The percentage of the 
violation decreased to 15% with a probability of 0.20 and to 0 with a 
probability of 0.50 as predicted. MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) 
concluded that the individual would not maintain the distinction 
between uncertainty and risk when It is going to cost a significant 
chance of winning. It would be interesting to repeat the experiment 
with real money involved. 
In the second part of the experiment they tested the two colours 
Ellsberg paradox with the original description of Ellsberg and with 
event lotteries like the rise in the price of a particular stock. The 
subjects were presented with two sets of alternative wagers and they 
where asked to rank the wagers in each set according to their 
preferences. The two sets differed in terms of payoffs ($1000 and 
$1001). Let us consider simply the set with a payoff of $1000 and the 
wager with the original Ellsberg example. In this case the subjects 
were asked to rank the 4 possible options. The rate of violation in 
this case was very high, 84%. Consider now the case of another wager 
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given to the subjects represented by the known urn and by the two 
options"the price of the Pierce Industries goes down or does not go 
down". In this latter case, 10 subjects ranked the two urns options 
before the two stock options, with a percentage of subjects who 
committed the Ellsberg paradox of 53%. In both situations, the rate of 
violation of the sure thing principle is quite high and the authors 
attributed this fact to the kind of task asked, ranking versus choices. 
This may be true but one more obvious and simpler hypothesis can be the 
lack of any incentive mechanism. Comparisons between the various 
results of the experiments are quite often hard to do because of these 
methodological problems. Different incentive mechanisms as well as 
different performed tasks (choice task, rank task or pricing task) can 
indeed have an influence on the behaviour of the subjects. 
Curley and Yates (1985). Curley and Yates (1985) Investigated if 
the center and the range of the probability interval can affect 
ambiguity perception and ambiguity preferences. They represent 
indeterminacy in probabilities through an interval, so they did not 
characterized ambiguity as a specified second order distribution. The 
idea is that of finding another factor, in addition to the range, that 
can influence the perception of ambiguity, which, they suggest, can be 
the center of the interval. Their subjects in the experiment were 
presented with lotteries of the following kind: L (p, $5; 1-p, $0). but 
p was represented by: 
Pmax III Pmin 
C 
Eighty undergraduates participated in the experiment, they were 
given 30 pairs of lotteries, which differed in the range and the center 
of the probability interval. They were asked to choose the more 
preferred lottery of each pair and to express also the strength of 
their preference through a graphic scale of the following kind: 
Rating: 
Lottery LI ------ 
I 
------ 
I Lottery R 
The lotteries consisted in bags containing 100 chips, each red or 
white, in different proportions. Before drawing the subjects were asked 
to compose the bag in the following way: "You have a bag containing 
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0-20 winning chips and 0-20 loosing chips. Now decide which will be the 
winning chip and add 45 winning chips in the bag and 35 losing chips 
in the bag. Then draw a chip. If the chip is of the winning colour you 
will get $5 nothing otherwise. " 
At the end of the experiment each subject was asked to toss a 
coin. If the call was successful for the subject, a pair of lotteries 
was chosen randomly and the preferred lottery was played out 
for real. 
Contrary to what was expected by the authors, the perception of 
ambiguity did not seem to depend on the length of the range 
(that is to 
say the differences in the ranges could not account for changes in 
ambiguity preferences). Moreover there was no predominant switch 
between ambiguity aversion to ambiguity preference according to the 
level of probability. However the perception of ambiguity seemed to 
depend strongly on the level of the center. Ambiguity avoidance 
increased with the increase of C for range comparison, but quite 
surprising for the authors, there was almost ambiguity indifference for 
C=0.40 and ranges Ri 0.40 and R2 0.20. Curley and Yates (1985) 
suggested as an interpretation of this result that the centre might 
have a strong effect on the perception of ambiguity just when one end 
of the range is equal to zero. This can be something that is possible 
to investigate in future, even if around 0 or 1 we have a natural limit 
in manipulating the intervals. Surprisingly, the result of a 
diminishing sensitivity to ambiguity preference around 0.40 is 
replicated in our experiment in chapter IV also in the case of losses. 
When we operationalized the ambiguity in the probabilities through a 
probability interval we find that for a probability center of 0.50 and 
aR=0.40 aversion to ambiguity is strongly reduced. This may simply 
suggest that the perception of the probability near 0.5 is less 
distorted (As for example in Quiggin (1982)). 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1985,86). Einhorn and Hogarth (1985,86) 
also ran a series of experiments which replicated the Ellsberg paradox. 
In particular, they replicated the Ellsberg paradox in the two colours 
form with two urns with 100 balls. In addition they extended and 
replicated the paradox in case of a very low probability, 0.001. The 
subjects were 274 MBA students, they had to answer a questionnaire and 
they were not paid. The imaginary payoffs of the lotteries were either 
$100 and 0 or -$100 and 0. In the first experiment, the mere 
replication one, with a positive outcome, 477. of the subjects showed 
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ambiguity aversion, 197. ambiguity preference and 34% ambiguity 
neutrality. In the situation with imaginary losses, 307. of the subjects 
were ambiguity averters, 14% ambiguity seeking, and 567. ambiguity 
neutral. 
In the second kind of situation, subjects were asked to imagine 
two urns each containing 1000 balls. In the not-ambiguous urn, the 
balls were numbered consecutively from 1 to 1000. The subjects were 
told that their payoff was contingent on drawing the number 687. 
Instead, in the ambiguous case, the subjects were told that any 
proportion of the 1000 balls could have the number 687 on them. In this 
latter case, for positive payoffs 30% of the subjects showed ambiguity 
aversion, 15% ambiguity preferences and 567. ambiguity neutrality. In 
the case of imaginary losses the results were: 75% of the subjects 
showed ambiguity aversion, 57. of the subjects showed ambiguity 
preference and 20% of the subjects showed ambiguity neutrality. Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1985,86) results showed an increase in the ambiguity 
preference behaviour between positive and negative payoffs for a 0.5 
probability level, while showing a diminishing ambiguity seeking 
behaviour from positive to negative payoffs for the low probability 
level. This seems to suggest that the response to ambiguity is sign 
dependent. In addition this seems to suggest a over-estimation of low 
probability in case of losses and an under-estimation of low 
probability in case of gains. 
Cohen, Jaf fray and Said (1986) (1987). Cohen, Jaffray and Said 
(1986) (1987) replicated the Ellsberg paradox and extended it to the 
domain of losses and investigated possible links between risk attitude 
and ambiguity attitude. Their experiment was run as follows. Each week, 
for 10 successive weeks, 134 students participated in the experiment, 
filling in a questionnaire. The experiment required subjects to make 
binary choices of the type used by certainty equivalent methods for 
utility assessment. The subjects were asked to make a series of binary 
choices between a risky prospect yielding gains (or losses) of 1000 
francs with probability p and nothing with probability 1-p, and a sure 
prospect yielding gain g (or losses 1) with different level of g (or 1) 
varying from 0 to 1000 with increments of 50. Binary choices with 
different probabilities for the non zero outcome (1/2,1/3,1/4,1/6) were 
given to the subjects. The binary choices also included a lottery with 
an unknown probability of the Ellsberg kind. In this case the 
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description given to the subjects corresponded to the usual one (100 
balls of two colours with unknown proportion), while in the case of 
risky prospects the probability was not clearly stated, but the 
subjects had to infer it from a description of a simple 
event-generating device like the tossing a coin. The subjects did not 
receive a participation fee for their participation in the experiment. 
However, they were told that 25% of them were to be randomly chosen and 
that in that case one randomly chosen lottery was going to be played 
out for real. In the case that a lottery involving a loss was chosen, 
their were told and given a 1000 franc bonus. This experiment is 
particularly interesting because it explores the different attitudes 
towards risk and towards ambiguity in case of gains and losses and 
possible relation between them. Let us consider for example the case of 
the risky lotteries with p=1/2 . In the domain of gains 407. of subjects 
were risk avers, 287. risk neutral 327. risk seeking. In the domain of 
losses, 117. risk averters, 19% risk neutral and 70% risk seeking. 
Moreover, while 41% of the subjects switched from risk aversion to 
risk loving from the domain of gains to the domain of losses, a good 
percentage (397. ) kept a constant attitude casting doubts on the 
pervasiveness of the reflection effects. (Kahneman Tversky (1979) 
subjects who are risk averters in the domain of gains become risk lover 
in the domain of losses. ). 
As far as ambiguity is concerned, in the domain of gains 597. of 
the subjects were found to be ambiguity averse 35% neutral and 67. 
ambiguity prone. In the domain of losses, 257. of the subjects were 
ambiguity averse, 427. ambiguity neutral and 337. ambiguity lovers, with 
a prevalence for ambiguity neutrality in the case of losses. In 
addition, Cohen Jaffray and Said (1986) did not find any relation 
between ambiguity attitude and risk attitude. (This last result is 
confirmed also by Schoemaker(1991) and by the experiment in chapter 
IV). Hence as far as ambiguity is concerned, the main result of the 
experiment seems to be the difference in attitude towards ambiguity in 
case of losses as compared to gains. This seems not to be very 
surprising, since this difference in attitude holds also in the case of 
risk. However, this different in attitude seems very sensitive to the 
incentive mechanism used and to the context used (lottery experiment 
market experiment etc.; See for example Sarin and Weber (1992), Camerer 
and Kunreuther (1989), Schomaker (1991). Risk attitudes and ambiguity 
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attitudes comparison is surely something which deserve further 
research. 
Schoemaker (1991). Ambiguity aversion and the links between risk 
attitude and aversion to ambiguity have been tested also by Schoemaker 
(1991) in two very interesting and carefully conducted experiments. In 
the first experiment subjects were asked to choose between a urn with 
known probabilities but uncertain outcomes67 and an urn with unknown 
probabilities. However. in this second case, the urn with unknown 
probabilities was operationalized with a uniform second order 
distribution 68. The problem was posed in the positive as well as in the 
negative domain. Seventy three MBA students took part in this 
experiment, they were not paid but 10% of them (randomly chosen) had 
the opportunity to play the preferred lottery for real69. On the whole, 
the results of the experiment showed that for gains as well as for 
losses subjects generally disliked the urn with unknown probabilities. 
This aversion to uncertainty was stronger in the gain domain with 
respect to the loss domain. Moreover, also in this case, risk attitude 
seems not to be correlated with ambiguity attitude. 
The second experiment was very similar to the first one. In this 
case, instead of using continuous probabilities, Schoemaker gave to the 
subjects lotteries involving binary uncertainties. In the case of 
unknown outcome. the positive outcome could be either $50 or $150 with 
probability 1/2. In the case of the unknown probabilities, the 
probability could be either 1/4 or 3/4 with probability 1/2. In this 
experiment subjects were not asked which lottery they preferred. 
Instead they were asked 
"Suppose that you could rather know the true value of p or x (for free) 
prior to choosing among the lotteries. Which type of information would 
67Urn A: Contains exactly 50 red and 50 white balls (mixed at random) 
If you draw a white ball, you get $0. If you draw red, your payoff is 
going to be some unknown prize between $0 and $100, to be determined by 
spinning a wheel of fortune. Assume that each amount in this range is 
equally likely to be the actual prize. " Schoemaker(1991) p 298. 
68 "The urn was randomly filled in such a way that each mixture is 
equally likely" Schoemaker(1991) p 298. 
69The had the opportunity to play both the gain and the loss lottery. 
However the loss was enforced only when the subject gained in the gain 
lottery, that is to say no net losses were Inforced. The Becker-De 
Groot- Marschak mechanism was used. 
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you or should you prefer? The probability or the prize information?. " 
Schoemaker (1991) p 308. 
Schoemaker found that the majority of subjects (627. ) preferred to know 
the number of red balls in the urn (versus 177. ) preferring the prize 
information and 21% being indifferent. When the same problem was posed 
in the loss domain, the number of subjects interested in the negative 
prize information rose from 17% to 36%, with 16% being indifferent and 
48% preferring the probability information. Overall also the Schoemaker 
experiment confirmed that people show consistent aversion to 
uncertainty even when this is expressed with a second order 
distribution. Aversion to uncertainty seems to be unrelated to risk 
attitude and loss preferences seem to be more complex and less clear 
then the gains ones, confirming the results of the Cohen, Jaffray and 
Said experiments. 
11.2.2 Experiments which test different theories. 
There is a group of empirical works which either test new 
hypothesis or theories or test existing theories. In this section we 
will review these works in more detail since some of them have been 
instrumental in determining the design of the experiment described in 
chapter III. 
Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986). One of the first works which 
tested some theories (they call them sources of ambiguity) is that of 
Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986). In this work, Curley, Yates and Abrams 
(1986) did not simply replicate the Ellsberg paradox but investigated 
various psychological sources of ambiguity aversion. In particular, 
they investigated 6 hypotheses of ambiguity aversion: uncertainty 
aversion; if ambiguity aversion is just an expression of a general 
aversion to uncertainty (in this case for example ambiguity aversion 
should be correlated to risk aversion); the hostile hypothesis 
(subjects perceive that the process with which he ambiguous urn is 
determined is not random); other evaluation (in making the decision 
subject anticipates what other can think); self-evaluation (the 
decision maker anticipates the future evaluation, her or his future 
evaluation not that of the others); forced choice (the unambiguous 
lottery is selected just because all other conditions are equal; people 
apply a lexicographic rule in which ambiguity is a second dimension); 
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the mistake hypothesis (in choosing the non-ambiguous bag the subjects 
commit a unconscious mistake, if situations were correctly understood 
the subjects would avoid the bias). To test all the hypotheses Curley. 
Yates and Abrams (1986) ran 5 experiments. In all experiments subjects 
were asked to evaluate and indicate their preferences between two 
lotteries. The lotteries represented the two colour Ellsberg example 
with two bags containing 100 red and white chips. If the right colour 
was chosen subjects could get $5, nothing otherwise. The incentive 
mechanisms used were generally that of picking one or more subjects at 
random, and making them to play the preferred lotteries for real. 
(where it was used another mechanism it will be expressly stated). In 
the first experiment, 26 psychology undergraduates were involved. They 
were given a written explanation of the certain Ellsberg lottery and 
their cash equivalent was elicited through the Becker-De Groot-Marschak 
device. Then, the second lottery was presented; they were asked which 
of the two lotteries they preferred and, then, the cash equivalent of 
the second lottery was elicited with the same procedure. Through the 
evaluations of the subjects, Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986) defined a 
risk premium as the difference between the evaluation of the subjects 
and the expected value of the lottery and an ambiguity premium as the 
difference between the evaluation of the subject of the risky lottery 
and the evaluation of the subject of the ambiguous lottery. The authors 
did not find any relation between risk attitude and ambiguity attitude, 
consequently they concluded as follows: 
"The results clearly fail to support the hypothesis of a general 
attitude towards uncertainty in that subjects' responses to risk and 
ambiguity were independent. This suggest that ambiguity avoidance is 
distinct from risk avoidance. One difficulty with this conclusion is 
the lower power of the test, which results from the relatively small 
sample size. " Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986), p 239. 
The second experiment was designed to test the hostile hypothesis. 
The 20 subjects were given the same lotteries as in experiment 1. 
However, in the case of the second lottery they were instructed to 
"imagine" themselves as the "managers" of lottery two. They were asked 
to consider how they would have composed the bag of lottery two and, in 
particular, if it would have been possible, to set the bag in a way 
that, no matter what colour the players would have chosen, the bag 
would have been biased against them. Of the 20 subjects of the 
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manipulation group (the one who were given the above description, only 
6 (307. ) believed that it would be possible to manipulate the bag. In 
addition, the hostile hypothesis predicts that the subjects who did not 
consider the eventuality of the bag being biased against them should 
not behave according to the Ellsberg paradox. In fact this was not the 
case because also all the other subjects (14) selected the non 
ambiguous bag showing ambiguity aversion. 
To test the forced-choice hypothesis in experiment 3, Curley, 
Yates and Abrams (1986) constructed four choices and used a rank task. 
Subjects were asked to rank four lotteries and they received either a 
flat payment for their participation in the experiment (group one) or 
had the opportunity to play one of the lotteries for real (group two). 
16 + 31 students participated in the experiment. One group of students 
received lotteries 1 and 2 (the usual ones) and 3 and 4 which were 
exactly like 1 and 2 but in in which the non zero payoff was 4.99 
dollars. The other group was given the same kind of lotteries, but the 
non zero payoffs were equal to $10 and $9.99. If ambiguity is a second 
dimension in a lexicographic order subjects should always prefer a 
lottery with higher expected value. The results of the experiments 
showed that the number of non lexicographic patterns significantly 
exceeded the number of lexicographic ones. 
In the fourth experiment, Curley Yates and Abrams (1986) tested 
the other-evaluation and the-self evaluation hypotheses. In the case 
of the other evaluation, subjects had to announce publicly their choice 
and the lottery was played in front of the others or they had to stay 
after the experiment and play the lottery in an individual session. In 
the high self-evaluation condition, the content of the ambiguous bag 
was immediately exposed after the subject had played the lottery, while 
in the low self-evaluation condition the content of the bag was not 
going to be revealed in any case. For the experiment Lottery 1 and 2 
were used followed by the description of the procedure. In their 
experiment all the subjects had to state which lottery they preferred 
and, then, one subject was selected and had to play the lottery. 136 
subjects, all students, participated in this experiment. According to 
Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986), the results of the experiment did not 
give any support to the self-evaluation hypothesis. However, the 
other-evaluation hypothesis was strongly supported by the data. 
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"Publicizing subjects' decisions, which increase the likelihood of the 
evaluation of the decisions by other in the groups, significantly 
raised the level of ambiguity avoidance. " 
Curley Yates and Abrams (1986) p 248. 
In the fifth experiment, Curley Yates and Abrams (1986) tested the 
mistake hypothesis; seventy undergraduates participated in this 
experiment, divided into 3 groups. They were given four pairs of 
lotteries similar to lotteries 1 and 2 (in fact 2 pairs was given by 
lotteries 1 and 2). They had to indicate their preferences amongst 
these four bets which differ from the other cases by the fact that the 
positive payoff was $10, the chips used were blue and red and the 
winning colour was specified in the bet (if red comes out you will win, 
or if blue comes out you will win). First, a pair of bets was offered 
starting from RII and BII and the subjects were asked to indicate which 
was the preferred bet or whether they were indifferent between the two 
bets. In this respect, this was not a forced choice task since 
indifference was allowed. Moreover, the subjects were asked to indicate 
the strength of their preferences on a scale of 1 to S. After the four 
pair of bets were examined, subjects were given another booklet 
containing statements about why subjects should react to ambiguity or 
why subjects should not react to ambiguity. After the presentation of 
the arguments, the subjects were asked to reconsider the last two 
choices. The results of this experiment showed that the subjects did 
not show any systematic colour bias. 
Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986) reported the data of the first and 
of the second choices (the reconsideration after the exposure to the 
above arguments). In the case of the first choice, 19 subjects were 
ambiguity seeking, 46 ambiguity averse and 5 neutral. In the second 
presentation, 22 were ambiguity seeking, 42 ambiguity averters, and 6 
ambiguity neutral. Only four times was there a switch from ambiguity 
preference to ambiguity neutrality, but an equal number of times (4) 
there was a switch in the opposite direction. 
"The reluctance of subjects to change their behaviour after the 
presentation of a prescriptive counter argument in the present choice 
situation replicates the results which has been obtained in other 
choice situations involving ambiguity. The finding is in contrast with 
the prediction of the mistake hypothesis that subjects would not avoid 
ambiguity after the "mistake" was pointed out to them. It is not the 
case the subjects, upon refection, will "correct" themselves after 
their "error" is highlighted and explained. "Curley, Yates and Abrams 
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(1986) page 252. 
To conclude: in the Curley Yates and Abrams (1986)'s experiments 
all the tested hypothesis except for that on the other-evaluation, are 
rejected. However, the fact that in the other-evaluations set up, 
ambiguity avoidance increased give us simply the information that the 
evaluations by other people might be an important source of ambiguity. 
We cannot infer that this is the only source of ambiguity. To test 
this, another experiment is needed. It can be important to notice that 
In this case, on the overall experiments, almost 70% of the subjects 
showed ambiguity aversion. However we have to recognized that, even if 
paid, subjects were paid very little. In fact not only was the expected 
value of the lotteries low, ($5), but also it had to be weighted with 
the probability of being randomly picked that was 1/16 in the best case 
and 1/131 in the worst case. In spite of these methodological problems, 
the Curley Yates and Abrams (1986) work seems to give a quite 
interesting contribution on the possible sources of ambiguity avoidance 
behaviour. 
Kahn and Sarin (1988). Kahn and Sarin (1988) ran various 
experiments replicating the Ellsberg paradox under various conditions 
with the main objective of developing and testing their own model of 
decision making under ambiguity. 
70 In a first informal experiment, Kahn 
and Sarin (1988) replicated the Ellsberg paradox through a choice 
between a two hypothetical games: tossing a coin or a thumbtack. If 
they won the flip they would win $500, nothing otherwise. 54 MBA 
students participated in this experiment; 18 were ambiguity averse, 21 
ambiguity prone and 15 ambiguity neutral. The ambiguity averse people 
were willing to pay an ambiguity premium on average of $172.37, while 
the ambiguity lovers a premium of $60.28. In another experiment, 63 
students had to choose 15 times between two urns, one with a known 
proportion of two-colour balls and the other with unknown proportion of 
two-colour balls. In the second case, even if the proportion was not 
specified the range was specified. Of course, both urns had the same 
expected number of red balls (the winning colour was red and was stated 
by the experimenter). The bets involved a gain of $10 if red and 0 
otherwise or winning $10 if red and a loss of $5 otherwise. Gains and 
70 As far as the theoretical model is concerned see chapter I. 
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losses were hypothetical but the subjects received a flat payment of 
$10 dollars for their participation. The experiment showed a 
significant effect of the range confirming the results of the previous 
reported experiments. Moreover reaction to ambiguity was shown to 
depend on the context: if the bet involved just a gain or a gain and a 
loss. To explore ambiguity reaction in different contexts Kahn and 
Sarin (1988) ran a further experiment with 60 MBA students. They were 
told that 25% of them would be chosen at the end to play out a lottery 
for real. The ones who were not chosen were given $5 for their 
participation. The choices in the lotteries would come from their 
responses to a questionnaire. The scenarios given to the students 
regarded consumer choices (radio warranty decisions, pharmaceutical 
decisions and quality decisions). The decisions involved different 
win/loss payoffs and the stated probabilities involved different means 
and ranges. In addition to the context effect (gain versus losses) 
found in the previous experiment Kahn and Sarin (1988) found a strong 
interaction between the mean and the win/loss payoff. 
"In the gains domain, there is ambiguity seeking at low mean 
probabilities and ambiguity aversion at high mean probabilities. In the 
loss domain. a reflection effect occurs with ambiguity aversion at low 
mean probabilities and ambiguity seeking at high mean probabilities. 
These results parallel those observed for risk aversion. A possible 
explanation of the close resemblance between the finding on risk 
aversion may be that the same psychological factors are responsible for 
both effects. " p 270 Kahn and Sarin (1988). 
These results, however, are in conflict with the Cohen, Jaffray 
and Said (1986,87) results, showing the necessity of a further 
investigation of the relation between attitude towards ambiguity and 
attitude towards risk. 
Curley and Yates (1989). Curley and Yates (1989) extended the work 
of Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986) investigating two main points. On 
the one hand they studied reactions to ambiguity when ambiguity was 
operationalized by a probability interval. As in previous studies they 
varied various factors such as the range of the interval, the centre of 
the interval and the payoffs of the lotteries. On the other hand, they 
tested some models: a lexicographic model (ambiguity as a second 
dimension as in Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986)) and four polynomial 
models. Thirty one subjects participated in this experiment; at the 
end they had to play three lotteries for real getting as a maximum 
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amount $30. The task was to order a set of cards (they were asked to 
rank four lotteries and were give 8 sets of four lotteries) on which 
there was described a lottery. All the lotteries can be defined by the 
following graph: 
Table 11.3 Example of an ambiguous lottery 
10 10 precise winning chips 
60 60 imprecise chips 
30 
30 precise losing chips 
An ambiguous lottery was defined as a lottery in which the range 
of the probability interval was positive (R=0 gives a point estimate 
not an interval). The task was always drawing a chip from a bag of 100 
chips. Each bag contained a precise number of chips of the two colours 
of unknown proportion. The subjects then were asked to add a precise 
number of the winning colour chips and then a precise number of the 
losing colour chips. As we already said, the first objective of the 
experiment was to test the lexicographic rule and the strength of the 
reaction to ambiguity varying C, R and X (centre, range and outcome). 
The results of the experiment showed that people were willing to trade 
off expected value for ambiguity, rejecting consequently the 
lexicographic model. Ambiguity avoidance predominated at . 50 and . 75 
probability levels. At the . 75 probability level they were willing to 
give up twice the amount of money as at 0.50 probability level (. 65 
dollars versus . 31 dollars). Near 0.25 the subjects were willing to 
trade off an expectation of $. 14 to obtain the more ambiguous option, 
showing ambiguity proneness. 
In the second part of their study, Curley and Yates (1989), 
examined four polynomial models by means of the theory of polynomial 
conjoint measurement. They choose this method because they said that it 
has the advantage of making little scale assumption on the data. 
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"In particular, only the ordering of options with respect to the 
undefined ambiguity factor is required for differentiation among the 
models. " Curley and Yates (1989) page 413. 
However this technique seem to have a major drawback - the fact 
that it does not accommodate any error. This means that any failure of 
a property is to be interpreted as a failure of the property and any 
model for which the property is necessary. If we indicate with P the 
probability factor, A the ambiguity factor and U the utility factor 
then the four polynomial model can be indicate as follows: (P+A) *U 
("the subject arrives to a composite measure of uncertainty combining 
outcome and process uncertainty, before incorporating the value 
information" and the modification is on the probability), the 
distributive model 1;. P"(U+A) (here the modification is on the 
utility), Distributive model 2; P* U+A ( the value of ambiguity is not 
applied to each outcome separately as in distributive model but "the 
ambiguity of the option is used as a whole in modifying the value of 
the option"). Dual distributive model; P*U*A, Multiplicative model 
(subjects may employ composite multiplicative uncertainty (P*A) or 
multiplicative composite utilities (USA) or modify the expectation 
globally because of the presence of ambiguity (P'U). Also in this study 
the subjects were asked to rank lotteries similar in the design and 
procedure to the above described one. All the three factors. R, C, X, 
were varied. The utility was set to be either $10 or -$10, P was 
0.25,0.50 or 0.75, the range was 0,20 or 50. Curley and Yates 
(1989)'s results showed various interactions between the different 
factors which, however, seem very difficult to interpret. The only 
clear result was the dependence of reaction to ambiguity according to 
the probability levels. The switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity 
preference allowed them to reject all those tested models, which did 
not allow for such kind of behaviour71. It is not clear from the article 
if these results might be a consequence of the particular method used. 
Tversky and Heath (1991). Tversky and Heath (1991) proposed and 
tested a new model of ambiguity reaction called the Competence 
Hypothesis. The main idea is that aversion to ambiguity observed in a 
chance set up (involving aleatory uncertainty) may not extend to 
71 In these models are Included Fellner (1961) Smith (1969) Gardenfors 
((1982), Ellsberg (1961), Toda and Shuford (1965). 
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judgmental problems (involving epistemic uncertainty). The main point 
is that the willingness to bet may not depend only on the probability 
and on the precision of the estimate: it may also be influenced by 
one's general knowledge or understanding of the relevant context. 
"More specifically, we propose that - holding judged probability 
constant- people prefer to bet in a context where they consider 
themselves knowledgeable or competent than in a context were they feel 
ignorant or uninformed". Tversky and Heath (1991) p7 
According to Tversky and Heath (1991), people generally do better 
in situations which they understand because the consequences of each 
bet include, beside the monetary payoffs, the credit and the blame 
associated with the outcome. According to the two authors, these credit 
and blame depend on the attributions for success and failure. In 
particular, if the decision maker has a limited understanding of a 
situation, failure will be attributed to ignorance, while success will 
probably attributed to luck. If instead the person is an expert on the 
subject, success will be attributed to competence and failure to bad 
luck. The most important implication of the competence hypothesis is 
the existence of a choice-judgment discrepancy, that is to say a 
preference to bet on A rather than on B even though B is judged to be 
at least as probable as A. 
Tversky and Heath (1991) tested this hypothesis under various 
conditions and with different incentive mechanisms by running a series 
of experiments. In the first experiment, subjects answered 30 questions 
on general knowledge (history, geography, sports etc. ). In addition, 
they were asked to rate their confidence on a scale from 257. (pure 
guessing, so defined by Tversky and Heath (1991)) to 1009. (certainty). 
After performing these two tasks, they were given the opportunity to 
choose between betting on their answers and betting on a lottery in 
which the probability of wining was equal to their stated confidence72. 
According to expected utility theory, subjects should be indifferent 
between betting on the stated probability or on their judgment. If 
people are ambiguity averse, in the sense of Ellsberg, they should 
prefer to bet on the stated probability rather than on a judgment 
probability which is more ambiguous. The contrary hypothesis called 
72 They were also given choices with the complementary probabilities. 
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chance aversion predicts that people would prefer to bet on their 
judgment rather than on a matched chance lottery. The regression 
hypothesis predicts that people will prefer to bet on their judgments 
when they are knowledgeable, while preferring to bet on the chance 
lottery when they feel ignorant. In this latter case, Tversky and Heath 
(1991) expect that the percentage of choices that favor judgment bets 
over chance bet will increase with the level of probability (since the 
level of probability is equal to the stated level of confidence). The 
results of this first experiment confirmed the competence hypothesis. 
The percentage of people choosing to bet over their judgment increased 
with the increase in the level of probabilities. This was true for the 
paid as well for the unpaid group of subjects. In the second 
experiment, Tversky and Heath (1991) studied the same phenomenon by 
extending the choice problem to real world events and by eliciting an 
independent assessment of knowledge. Subjects were sorted out according 
to their area of expertise (football or politics) In the case of the 
football group, the subjects were asked to predict the outcome of 14 
football games for 5 consecutive weeks. The subjects were moreover 
asked to assess their knowledge about each game on a scale from 1 to 5. 
Then according to their rating, the subjects were asked whether they 
would prefer to bet on the team they choose or a matched chance 
lottery. The results of the experiment showed that for low levels of 
knowledge as well as for high level of knowledge the percentage of 
choices that favour judgment over chance bets increased with the level 
of probability, but for high levels of knowledge this percentage was 
always higher than for low level of knowledge. Similar behaviour was 
also observed in the group of experts in politics. In a third 
experiment, Tversky and Heath (1991) Investigated if people simply 
prefer to bet on judgment probabilities when the probability of winning 
is higher than 0.5 and on the chance lotteries otherwise. However the 
experimental results obtained showed that people preferred to bet on 
judgment probabilities regardless of the level of p when their 
knowledge was high. In a fourth experiment, Tversky and Heath (1991) 
also investigated what they call "expert" prediction. They divided the 
subjects into groups, according to their knowledge in football and 
politics and asked each subject to make 40 predictions on future events 
(20 football and 20 politics), then 20 triples of bets were 
constructed for each participant. One bet was a chance lottery, a 
145 
second bet was the subject's prediction in his strong category (high 
knowledge) and the third bet was subject's prediction in his weak 
category. They then were asked to rank the bets in each of the triples. 
As expected by the competence hypothesis, subjects raked higher the 
chance lottery in their weak category and higher the judgment lottery 
in their strong category. In the fifth experiment, Tversky and Heath 
(1991) checked for possible bias in the judgment process giving to the 
subjects a pricing task that did not involve probability judgments. 
Sixty eight students were asked to state their cash equivalent for each 
of 12 bets. The bets were defined for high knowledge and for low 
knowledge topics. The results of this experiment showed that 
of people were paying , in effect, a competence premium of nearly 207. 
in 
order to bet on the more familiar propositions. Father more, the 
average price for the (complementary) high-knowledge bets was greater 
than that for the low-knowledge bets in 11 out of 12 problems. In 
accord with our previous foundings, the chance lottery is evaluated 
above the low-knowledge bets but not above the high-knowledge bets. 
Tversky and Heath (1991) p 21 
The experiments conducted by Tversky and Heath (1991) seem to give 
quite strong support to the competence hypothesis. The hypothesis in 
fact gets support even when tested under different conditions and the 
subjects performed different tasks: choices, ranking and cash 
equivalents. What is not completely convincing to me is the difference 
between what the authors call the discrepancy between choice and 
judgment. According to this discrepancy people prefer to bet on a 
judgment than on an equivalent chance bet when they are in a field they 
know a lot about although the judgment is more vague and consequently 
more ambiguous by definition. This discrepancy is what makes the 
authors talk about competence hypothesis in contrast with an 
uncertainty reaction. However, it can be possible that, when asked to 
express a judgment, people act in a conservative way. Hence If they say 
'the probability that I assign is 0.8, because I know a lot about the 
subject, I also know that I am being conservative (in fact that I 
understated my probability estimate). Instead when I do not know 
nothing about the topic I can think that I have not been enough 
conservative and that probably I have overstated my probability 
estimate. In this latter case I would prefer to bet on a chance lottery 
while in the former case I would prefer to bet on a judgment lottery'. 
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My knowledge will consequently change my attitude on my probability 
estimate being my estimate in anyway an estimate and not a precise 
probability. 
Keppe and Weber (1991). The relation between competence or 
knowledge and ambiguity aversion is also tested in an unpublished 
experiment by Keppe and Weber (1991). The two authors did not test 
directly the credit and blame hypothesis, focusing instead on the 
direct influence of knowledge on ambiguity attitude. In their 
experiment participated 36 students who received a flat payment of 15 
marks. They elicited certainty equivalents and decision weights for 
simple and event lotteries, for the occurrence of an event and its 
complement. Indicating with CE(A) and CE(-A) the certainty equivalent 
of the event A and of its complement, they tested the hypothesis that 
in case of ambiguity the sum of the two certainty equivalents was 
directly proportional to the level of knowledge. Moreover they also 
tested the hypothesis that for ambiguous events the probability event 
depends on the judged knowledge of the event where a high knowledge 
implies a higher probability73. The results of the experiment confirmed 
a significant relation between aversion to ambiguity and level of 
knowledge. The average sum of the certainty equivalents did vary in 
accordance with the level of knowledge and in the predicted direction. 
Also the sum of the decision weights was lower in the case of low 
knowledge events showing that the level of knowledge has a direct 
influence on the perceived level of ambiguity. The Keppe and Weber 
1991 results, however, show more the relation between knowledge and 
ambiguity perception than in the validity of the Tversky and Heath 
(1991) theory which is linked to the idea of credit and blame. On the 
other hand, the connection between ambiguity and knowledge is at the 
very heart of the Ellsberg definition of ambiguity. 
"What is at issue might be called the ambtgutty of this Information, a 
quality depending on the amount , type, reliability and "unanimity" of 
information, and giving rise to one's degree of "confidence" in an 
estimate of the relative likelihoods". Ellsberg (1961) p 657. 
Mangelsdorf f and Weber (1992). Mangelsdorff and Weber (1992) 
tested Choquet Expected Utility and compared different ways of 
73A11 
the lotteries were designed to have for ambiguity neutral people a 
probability of 1/2. 
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eliciting non-additive probabilities. To do so they used the three 
colours Ellsberg example. They used lotteries with positive outcome of 
50 DM or 0. In addition to the classical urn example, they also asked 
subjects to bet on the share price of the Japanese Dal Ichs Kangyo 
Bank. In this way they tested ambiguity aversion and Choquet Expected 
Utility also in a event environment. We will now analyse briefly their 
results. In the Dal Ichi Kangyo Bank example, subjects were asked to 
choose between four pairs of lotteries. One lottery (the ambiguous one) 
was defined on the share price of the Dai Ichi Kangyo Bank (the share 
price should be greater than a certain amount); the certain lottery was 
defined with an urn containing 50 black and 50 white balls. Capacities 
were elicited into two ways: asking people how many balls they wanted 
to be added in the urn to make the two lotteries indifferent or varying 
the winning amount. In the standard lotteries representing the three 
colours example, capacities were elicited changing the amount to be 
won. In addition to eliciting capacities, in order to test Choquet 
expected utilities, Mangelsdorff and Weber (1992) tested some of the 
predictions of the theory. In particular, they made the assumption that 
for Choquet Expected Utility the two ways of eliciting capacities 
should give the same results and that capacities are identical when 
derived from gains and from losses. Seventy four students participated 
in this experiment, they received a flat payment for their 
participation. The experiment was organized in two parts. In the first 
part capacities were elicited as described above(capacities were 
elicited in the domain of gain as well as in the domain of losses). For 
each subject also the utility function was elicited. In the second part 
of the experiment subjects had to evaluate lotteries and they were 
asked the certainty equivalent for each lottery. 
The results of the experiment are reported in table 11.4 
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Table II. 4 Manelsdorff and Weber (1992) experimental results 
Ellsbert lotteries 
Subjects 
Averter  Neutral Lovers Others 
Payoffs 
11.7% Gains 49% 35% 4.3X 
Losses 23X 40.5X 26X 10.5% 
Dal Ichl Kangyo Bank share pr ice 
Subjects 
Averters Neutral Lovers Others 
Payoffs 
Gains 59X 25X 10% 6% 
Losses 33% 39X 17X 11% 
In addition Mangelsdorff and Weber (1992) found that all the means 
of the capacities were significantly lower (statistically) than the 
means of the probabilities in case of gains, while for lotteries 
involving losses, they were significantly lower only in one case. 
Moreover the capacities based on changing the numbers of balls were 
larger than the ones calculated changing the winning amount, and this 
difference was statistically significant. This fact, that capacities 
elicited for gains and for losses were found different, and the fact 
that the capacities elicited with the certainty equivalent method and 
the ones calculating using the direct elicitation plus the utility 
function gave different values, are all results that in conflict with 
the prediction of Choquet Expected Utility. However it may be worth 
noting that a partial explanation of this results may come from the 
experimental designed adopted. If for example there exist problems of 
scale compatibility as in Kahneman and Tversky (1990) this can have 
caused for example the different results given by the two methods of 
eliciting capacities. In varying the number of balls subjects may focus 
on the probability side, while in varying the amount of the winning 
149 
money, subjects may focus their attention on the price. Moreover a 
choice task, as well as an evaluation task, as well as a ranking task, 
even if applied to the same problem, can give different results (See 
also Payne and Bettman (1992)). 
Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) ran also an experiment which 
replicated the three-colour Ellsberg paradox and tested the Segal 
theory of ambiguity (for the explanation of Segal theory see chapter 
U. To do this they designed an experiment which dealt explicitly with 
multistage lotteries in which the probabilities were known. Hence the 
Segal "imaginary lottery" was represented by a two stage lottery with a 
known (fixed by the experimenter) second order distribution. The idea 
was that, if Segal's model was correct, the violations of the reduction 
of compound lottery axiom observed in the experiment would have been in 
the direction consistent with the behaviour predicted by Ellsberg and 
of the scale reported in earlier experiment. On the other hand, if 
ambiguity aversion cannot be explained through the violation of the 
reduction principle, according to Bernasconi and Loomes (1992), there 
would have been no behaviour consistent with the Ellsberg paradox at 
all. The experiment was ran in four sessions and, on the whole, 566 
subjects were involved. There was no financial incentive. The 
participants were asked to answer to a questionnaire in which three 
questions were reported. The first question regarded the first choice 
of the three colour Ellsberg paradox in the Segal version (two stages). 
In the second question the subjects were asked whether they wanted to 
change their previous choice or to stick to it in exchange for a 
certain amount of money (all imaginary as well as the payoffs). This 
question was designed to see If the preference reported in 
question 1 is a strong preference. In the third question, subjects had 
to answer to a problem which was a modified version of the second 
choice of the three colour Ellsberg example. To test against colour 
bias and other factors the question and the order of the colours on the 
answer sheet was different for the various groups of subjects. The 
results reported in Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) showed that: 
a: The subjects regarded red (not as a colour but as a choice) as 
different from the other colours. This was true for the subjects who 
indeed choose red in the first question and for the subjects who choose 
yellow or bleu. In the second question the only switches were from blue 
to yellow and vice versa. 
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b: This preference toward red can be interpreted as aversion to 
ambiguity only if the subjects in the second choice choose BY. This 
happened only for the 23.5 7. of the people. 
According to Bernasconi and Loomes, the data of the experiment 
showed that the percentage of violation of the reduction principle is 
relevant but smaller than in other experiments where a standard 
Ellsberg problem was proposed. The percentage of this violation can be 
considered an indicator of the fact that Segal's model only partially 
explains ambiguity aversion. Moreover, the fact that quite a big 
percentage of subjects first choose red (and who did not want to switch 
to an other colour in the second question) and than choose YR or BR in 
the third question showed a kind of violation of the reduction 
principle which cannot be consistent with Segal's explanation. The 
proposed explanation (by the two authors) is that for people who 
violated the reduction principle 
"it is not sufficient to characterize their preferences in term of non 
expected utility functional forms. The way in which an individual 
mentally represents a multistage problem is also important, since the 
same non expected utility functions may results in different decisions 
depending in which representation is used" Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) 
p 97. 
2.3 Some concluding remarks. 
As we can see from the above review the empirical investigations 
on the Ellsberg paradox show the pervasiveness and the persistence of 
the phenomenon. Most of the experiments described above were 
replications or extensions of the Ellsberg paradox. Even if is it 
impossible to make comparisons between the various results, given the 
different conditions under which the various experiments were run, it 
is however possible to conclude that the phenomenon is robust. To 
accommodate the paradox various models of decision making under 
uncertainty have been developed (see chapter I). We review some of the 
experiments which tested some of these theories. Also the experiments 
however show a limited application of the other theories. Subjects seem 
to be conditioned by the presence of ambiguity in their decision but 
further research is needed to verify sources and patterns of behaviour. 
This is also partially the conclusion that we draw in chapter III. In 
this chapter, in fact, we try to test various theories of decision 
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making under ambiguity trying to replicate some and extend some of the 
results of previous experiments. ( in particular Curley and Yates 
(1989), Bernasconi and Loomes (1991) and Mangelsdorff and Weber 
(1992)). As we will see however the design of the experiment is quite 
particular since the evaluation task is done mainly with two stage 
lotteries. 
It is our opinion that further research is needed in the direction 
of investigating particular sources of ambiguity and relations 
(ambiguity versus risk and different attitude in the domain of losses 
and gains for example) as well as in the direction of testing existing 
theories. In this respect it can be important to try to replicate the 
same experiments with different task and different incentive mechanism. 
The tasks as well as incentives might strongly influence the results of 
the experiments especially when as in the case of decision making under 
uncertainty we can test theories through consistency in behaviour 
(example violation of particular axioms) more than through the adoption 
of a particular functional form of the utility function. 
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CHAPTER III 
EVALUATING LOTTERIES WITH UNRELIABLE PROBABILITIES: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF EXPLANATIONS OF THE ELLSBERG PARADOX 
III. 1 Introduction 
According to the traditional analysis of decision making under 
uncertainty, the decision maker's preference over outcomes, which are 
represented by a utility function, and his or her belief relation over 
events, which is represented by a subjective probability function, 
uniquely define his or her preference over lotteries. In particular, 
according to the traditional theory, the probability of an event, as 
judged by any given individual, is a statement of that persons's degree 
of belief in the occurrence of that event. This implies that an 
individual can attach a subjective probability to any event, and that 
every belief about an event can be captured by the single dimension of 
probability. 
The Ellsberg paradox challenges this approach and shows that 
beliefs about uncertainty cannot be reduced to a single dimension, and 
suggests that what people know about a state's probability does 
influence their willingness to bet on a state. The Ellsberg paradox, 
hence, identifies situations in which individual choices between 
lotteries seem not to allow us to infer a "more likely than" relation 
over events. 
Let us consider the following example which is a replication of the 
Ellsberg paradox (given to the subjects in our experiment): 
1 In front of you there is a bag which contains 12 balls, 6 black 
and 6 white. The bag is opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are 
asked to bet on a colour and then you will draw a ball from the 
bag. If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will 
get £25, otherwise you will get nothing. (Lottery E in this 
experiment) 
2 In front of you there is a bag which contains 12 balls. Each ball 
is either black or white but you do not know how many there are 
of each. The bag is opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are 
asked to bet on a colour and then you will draw a ball from the 
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bag. If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will 
get E25, otherwise you will get nothing. (Lottery 0 in this 
experiment) 
(In the original example the subject is asked to bet simultaneously on 
a colour and on a bag and then a ball is drawn from the chosen bag; if 
the ball is of the chosen colour the subject will get $100, otherwise 
he or she will get $0). 
Hence the subject is presented with the following four choices74: 
BI: bet on black in the first bag; 
WI: bet on white in the first bag; 
B2: bet on black in the second bag; 
W2: bet on white in the second bag; 
According to the standard theory, the subject should show the 
following preference relations B1 - W1 - B2 - W2, or B2 r Bl - W1 
>- W2 or W2 >- WI - BI >. B2, depending on his or her prior beliefs about 
the second bag. 
What Ellsberg thought, and subsequent experiments on the paradox 
showed, is that a substantial group of people, if asked to bet on one 
of the two colours and on one of the two bags, shows the following 
pattern of preferences: B1 - Wl, B2 - W2, but B1 >- B2 and WI } W2. This 
pattern of preferences contradicts the standard axioms of the theory of 
choice under uncertainty, and in particular the sure thing principle 
and the additivity of probability (cf. Camerer and Weber (1992) and 
Gilboa (1987)). 
Ellsberg (1961) and others defined this pattern of preferences as 
ambtgutty averston (Cf. Karni and Schmeidler (1991) amongst others). As 
we have seen from the analysis in chapter I, there is no generally 
accepted definition of ambiguity in the literature (cf. Camerer and 
Weber (1992)); neither there is a generally adopted 
operationalization of ambiguity (see chapter II). Normative and 
descriptive theories on the Ellsberg Paradox seem to agree that we can 
talk about ambiguity in case of probability uncertainty, while we can 
talk about risk in case of outcome uncertainty (cf. Schoemaker (1991)). 
However, they differ markedly in their explanations as well as in 
their modellings. Ambiguity aversion Is in fact modelled mainly either 
74 We use black and white in this chapter because they are the two 
colours used in the experiment. 
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through a change of the probability but also through a change of the 
utilities (cf. Sarin 1992 amongst others). 
The purpose of this chapter is that of exploring, through an 
experimental analysis, some of these theories with the twofold task of 
trying to discriminate between different theories and of trying to 
differentiate between different sources of ambiguity. 
As will be described below, this has been done in a particular set up; 
all the lotteries presented to the subjects are two outcome lotteries, 
the outcomes in all lotteries are the same (10 and £25), and all the 
lotteries (except for the two representing a version of the original 
Ellsberg paradox) are two stage-lotteries. The choice of a two stage 
set up was due to the idea of representing ambiguity mainly as a second 
order distribution. See on this point Yates and Zukoswky (1976) and 
Segal (1987). 
The presentation of the experiment and the discussion of the 
results will be organized as follows: in the next section we will 
discuss the design of the experiment and we will present the theories 
tested in relation to the experimental design. In the third section we 
will present and discuss the results of the experiment in relation to 
the various theories. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
follow. 
III. 2 Design and organization of the experiment 
Since the original work of Ellsberg (as we have seen in chapter 
II) a number of experiments have been run in order to verify the 
robustness of the phenomenon shown by the Ellsberg paradox. These 
experiments have mainly been replications of the original 
Ellsberg-thought experiment and subsequent experiments. In addition to 
replicating the original Ellsberg paradox, in the two colour or in the 
three colour versions, these experiments investigate ambiguity aversion 
or partial ambiguity aversion mainly through chance devices. As in 
some of the experiments reviewed in chapter II, we replicate the 
original Ellsberg paradox in the two colour form. and we investigate 
ambiguity aversion through a chance device. In addition, we perform a 
direct test of particular theories (some of these experiments also do; 
see Curley and Yates (1989), Schoemaker (1991), Bernasconi and Loomes 
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(1992) for example). As will be explained in more detail, some of the 
theories we tested are well-defined ones, while others are more vague 
or intuitive explanations. What these theories have in common, from the 
point of view of the design of the experiment, is the fact that they 
can be represented with a two-stage lottery (except for the original 
versions of the Ellsberg paradox). Nineteen out of twenty one 
lotteries given to the subjects to evaluate in this experiment are 
two-stage lotteries; they all involved two outcomes; a positive outcome 
of £25 and one of i0. The two-stage set up was made explicit in the 
following way. Each lottery was constructed in such a way that the 
subject was presented with some bags from which he or she had to draw a 
ball. The subject was asked first to bet on a colour, then to choose a 
bag, and then to draw a ball. The presence of ambiguity was 
operationalized in different ways according to the various theories; 
ambiguity was generally operationalized either as a set of probability 
distributions, or as a second order probability distribution, or 
through changes of the mechanism by which the bag was chosen before the 
draw (for example a random device, the experimenter or the subject), 
according to the models of the various theories75. There were also two 
lotteries in which different levels of ambiguity were introduced 
through the change of the range of the unknown probability (as in 
Curley and Yates (1989)). In practice, the subjects were asked to 
choose a bag and draw balls from it; what was different was either the 
proportion of white and black balls contained in each bag, or the fact 
that that proportion was unknown, or the mechanism in order to choose 
the bag from which to draw. 
III 2.1. The experimental design. 
As has been said above, the theories tested in this experiment 
have in common, from the point of view of the design of the experiment, 
the fact that they can be represented with a two-stage lottery. Hence 
all the lotteries but two presented to the subjects are two stage 
75 As we will see in more detail each model is linked to a particular 
way of representing ambiguity. In fact, each model describes how 
people would imagine the ambiguous bag and consequently how they would 
evaluate it. 
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lotteries. (For a brief description of the lotteries and the theories 
see Table III. 1) The other characteristic of the lotteries is that all 
the lotteries involve two outcomes; a positive outcome of £25 and one 
of i0. It is our opinion that the fact of using the two-colour version 
of the Ellsberg paradox and lotteries with two outcomes can have an 
influence in the perception of ambiguity. What we would argue, and this 
can be partially seen later on, in the discussion of the results, is 
that the perception of the symmetry of the two events, black and 
white, is emphasized by the fact that the events are just two. What can 
be the consequence of this factor in the perception of ambiguity can be 
a topic of further research; in this experiment, as will be discussed 
in section 111.5, It seems to have reduced the perception76 of 
76Using 
a two outcome set up might represent a constraint in the choice 
of what theory to test; not all the theories involve two or three 
outcomes. A natural extension of this experiment would be to use on 
the one hand a three-colour version of the Ellsberg paradox and to 
introduce, on the other hand, lotteries with three outcomes. These 
modifications could help to solve some problems of interpretation due 
to symmetry and introduce a test on other theories. 
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Table III. 1 
--- --------------- ---------- - ---- ------------ ----- ----------- 
Summary of the lotteries given in the experiment 
--- --------------- ---------- - ---- ------------ ----- ----------- 
Lot tery Explanat ion Theory 
--- --------------- ---------- - ---- ------------ ----- ----------- 
One stage 
E# Certainlottery Ell. original 
on Unknown lottery Ell. original 
Two stage two bags 
of the certain lottery 
The bag is chosen by 
U of the subject Control 
B0a random device Raiff a 
V% the experimenter Kadane 
Two stage two bags 
of the unknown lottery 
The bag is chosen by 
S 
the subject Control 
a random device Raiff a 
Q the experimenter Kadane 
Two stage two bags 
with different probability 
in the second branch 
D- 1/2,1/2 Maximi n 
U"1,0 
Information lottery 
two stage two bags 
First bag 6 black, 6 white 
Second bag unknown proportion 
TL1 out of 12 Information 
NF3 out of 12 
M unknown probability in the 
second branch 
Z> First bag unknown probability 
left and right bag 1/2 Schme idler 
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Table 111.1 cont inue 
--------------- -- --- - ---------- - --------------- --- --------------- 
Lottery Explanation Theory 
---------------- ------------------------------------------------- 
Two st age of the 
certain lottery 
wi th more then two bags 
F§3 bags Segal and 
A*5 bags Complexity 
GC7 bags 
Hº11 bags 
C= 13 bags 
Two st age of the 
certain lottery 
13 bags 
The bag is chosen by 
C= the subject Control 
I random device Raiffa 
Two st age 3 bags 
with different probability 
in the second branch 
F§1,1/2,0 Maximin 
L! 4/12,1/2,8/12 
R< 1/2,1/2,1/2 
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ambiguity. 
III. 2.2 The organization of the experiment. 
The experiment was held at the University of York in March and 
April 93. One group of 21 students were involved in it. There was no 
selection of subjects by their study topic77. As we can see the number 
of subjects who participated in this experiment was small. This was 
mainly due to two factors: financial problems (we had to make a trade 
off between the number of students and the money to stake on each 
lottery); objective of the experiment (we wanted to know the kind of 
reasoning adopted by the subjects, hence we choose to interview each 
subject). 
The subjects were asked, first, to examine and evaluate 21 lotteries, 
and, second, they were asked to come for an interview in which they 
were asked to describe and explain their evaluations. 
At registration, the subjects were given the lotteries to be evaluated 
at home, the instruction sheet and the answer sheet. 
The invitation of the experiment was the same as the instruction sheet 
and included the following 
You will each be asked to examine and evaluate 21 lotteries. Each 
lottery will give you a chance to win t25. You are asked to give a 
price to each lottery. This price can be seen as a minimum selling 
price for the lottery: that Is, the lowest sum of money that you would 
be prepared to accept in exchange for the lottery. The lotteries will 
be riven to you when you register for the experiment. 
The lotteries were given to each subject in a random order which 
was different for each subject. In addition, to avoid any implicit 
order, the lotteries were named neither with a number nor with a letter 
79 but with a symbol (see Table III. 1). 
r However, after the experiment, we asked just for curiosity, if the 
subject had attended one or more courses in statistics and maths. 8 
subjects out of 11 non EP attended one or two years courses in 
statistics, while between the EP subjects just two subjects had 
attended courses in statistics. 
78The 
complete instruction plus the text of the 21 lotteries is included 
in appendix B. 
79 A letter was then used in the interviews to make communication and 
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The lotteries were described to the subjects in words; the selected 
words were the same and followed the same scheme and order, in order to 
avoid or limit the influence of the description in the evaluation of 
the lotteries. As example lotteries U and P are reported below. 
Lottery " 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, while the other contains 12 
white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see Inside. You are 
asked to bet on one of the two colours and, then, first, you will 
choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from the bag. If you 
draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise 
you will get nothing. 
Lottery ' 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls. Each ball is either black or white but you do not know how many 
there are of each. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You 
are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you will 
choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from that bag. If you 
draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise 
you will get nothing. 
Each subject was also given an answer sheet in which he or she was 
asked to write his or her evaluation of the lotteries and a few notes 
of explanation. The answer sheet contained a list of symbols each 
corresponding to each lottery, and the order of the symbols was the 
same for each subject, but it was different from the order of the 
lotteries in the envelope but, still random. 
As we have already said, the subjects were asked in a interview 
some questions about their evaluations. The interview was tape 
recorded; it lasted around 20 minutes and followed a fixed scheme. They 
were always asked the same questions. First they were asked for a 
general explanation of the kind of reasoning behind the evaluations. 
Second we asked " Why did you evaluate this lottery this and that 
the recognition of the lottery easier when listening to the tape. 
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lottery that" for each group of lotteries. 
80 If the lotteries were 
evaluated the same they were asked "Do you really evaluate these 
lotteries the same, or at the margin do you find any difference? ". 
Before starting the interviews, the subjects were told to give in their 
answer sheets with their answers. They were not allowed to change their 
answers during the interviews even if in some cases during the 
interviews they realized that they wanted to change some of their 
evaluations (see interviews in the appendix B). 
111.2.3 The incentive mechanism. 
At the end of the interviews the subjects were paid according to 
the following incentive mechanism, as explained in the invitation and 
instruction sheet: 
At the end of the interviews the following procedure will be carried 
out. One of the 21 lotteries will be picked at random: we will look at 
your evaluation of the randomly picked lottery. Then a number between 0 
and 25 will be picked at random; if the number is greater than your 
price for the lottery you will get that numbers of pounds: otherwise 
the lottery will be played out and you will be rewarded with either CO 
or L25 depending on the outcome of the lottery. 
At the moment of the registration the same procedure was explained in 
other words: moreover at the end of the instruction there was written 
this is the Becker, DeGroot and Marschack device, for a discussion of 
its properties see below): 
It is important to know that it is worth your evaluating the various 
lotteries accurately: if you give to a lottery a price which 1s less 
than the value that you place on that lottery you may end up with an 
amount of money when you would prefer to play out the lottery: while if 
you give to a lottery a price which is more than the value that you 
place on that lottery you may end up playing out that lottery when you 
would prefer to receive that amount of money. 
No subjects seem to have had any problem in understanding the 
mechanism. Moreover some of them came to the interview with a 
calculation that showed that it was optimal for them to reveal their 
80 The groups reflect the grouping in Table 111.1 
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true evaluations (for example subject 21). 
In addition to whatever they gained from the procedure described above 
they also received a £5 participation fee (the subjects were aware of 
the participation fee since it was written in the instruction). 
Some comments are needed in order to justify the choice of the 
selected incentive mechanism. Usually experimentalists face the problem 
of choosing a system of incentives which can induce the subjects to 
take the gamble seriously; that means, on the one hand, to limit the 
number of random choices or " mistakes", and on the other hand, to make 
the subject to reveal their true preferences. The standard options 
present to the experimentalists who deal with experiments involving 
individual choice with fairly abstract lotteries are 
a) make all choices hypothetical 
b) use real gambles with small prizes 
c) use gambles with large prizes but play just a randomly selected 
group for real money. 
d) Use gamble with large prizes but play out for real the gambles of a 
randomly selected subset of subjects. 
Each of these approaches has its drawbacks. In the case of the first 
approach, making all choices hypothetical, the usual criticism is that 
it lacks realism and is weak in terms of incentive81. The second 
approach suffers from the same criticism, though perhaps to a slightly 
lesser extent. 
On the other hand the third approach, which Is the one used in this 
experiment, may introduce some distortions. It may Introduce a common 
ratio effect In that a fractional probability of playing is applied to 
all the gambles (Schoemaker 1991). 
Moreover, the standard method of eliciting certainty equivalents (the 
Becker, DeGroot and Marschack device) may not be incentive compatible 
if subjects violate the independence axiom, (Holt (1986) and Karni and 
Safra (1987)). Moreover, according to Holt there may be particular bias 
affecting random lottery experiments, and, in particular, if subjects 
treat a random lottery experiment as a single choice problem: If the 
compound lotteries are reduced to simple ones by the calculus of 
81 Thinking costs in terms of effort and time. If the subject is not 
going to earn anything he or she will tend to minimize time and effort 
or have some alternative motives for answering. 
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probabilities, and if the independence axiom of expected utility theory 
does not hold, then the B-D-M device fails in eliciting the true 
preferences. An experimental investigation of this hypothesis has been 
held by Starmer and Sugden (1991), and the two authors reached the 
following conclusion: 
"Holt has shown that random lottery experiments can fail to elicit true 
preferences If the reduction principle holds and if the independence 
axiom is violated. In showing that the reduction principle does not 
hold, our results suggest that experimental researchers need not to be 
too concerned about this particular problem. Of course, this does not 
eliminate the possibility, mentioned by Holt, that the random-lottery 
design might be subject to some other source of bias. All we can say is 
that for choice problems used in our experiment, subjects' responses 
did not differ much between the random lottery and the real-choice 
designs. If there are any 'contaminations' effects at work in the 
experiment, they seems to be fairly weak". p 978. 
The use of a incentive compatible system for these kinds of 
experiment is still a problem that has to be solved. If the incentive 
mechanism is meant to be used to make the subjects take the experiment 
seriously, that is to say minimize the possibility of error and 
increasing the effort of the subjects, then we share Schoemaker's 
opinion that 
"subjects' cognitive strategies are not greatly affected by incentives, 
when using tasks of medium complexity and stakes". (Schoemaker (1991) p 
298). 
Experimental psychologists generally support these views. 
In this case the aim of the incentive is just the one of giving a 
monetary reward for the attention and the effort put in the experiment 
by the subjects. If this is the case, it is our opinion that different 
incentive mechanism like a flat payment or play out a lottery randomly 
chosen may give the same results. Subjects can behave "seriously" in 
this respect even if the choices are hypothetical if they are motivated 
with non monetary rewards. (cf. Camerer 1989), Kahneman and Tversky 
(1991); see also Smith and Walker (1993) with a first price auction as 
incentive mechanism. 
We would suggest that the problem of decreasing the probability of 
errors in the choices of the subjects or the one of increasing the 
"care" they use in performing the requested task should be considered 
separately from the one of verifying if the random-lottery system 
elicit true preferences. If we define the true preferences as Starmer 
and Sugden (1991) 
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" We shall say that an individual has a true preference for x over y if 
he would choose x in an experiment in which he had to choose between x 
and y, in which this problem was for real, and in which no other 
problem was for real" p 971. 
then the problem is if the random-lottery system elicit true 
preferences that is to say if it does not distort them. And to this 
problem Starmer and Sugden's conclusions apply. 
As far as this experiment was concerned, it was our original 
opinion that giving high prizes could have an influence on the choices 
of the subjects. The original idea was that a high reward would give an 
higher incentive to them. To economize on the cost of recruiting 
subjects there were two the feasible alternatives: 
a) choose to give a very high prize in each lottery and to make just 
few subjects (picked at random) play one of the lotteries. 
or b) I could choose to give a smaller prize but still high and 
make all the subjects to play a randomly selected lottery. 
If alternative a) was adopted then the prize could have been higher, 
but of course the probability to each subject to be chosen would have 
been very small, decreasing the potential power of the incentive82. 
In this experiment we adopted alternative b): each subject had to 
play for real a randomly selected lottery. The interviews were 
introduced mainly for gaining some insight into the reason behind the 
evaluations of the subjects. Even if there was no sign that the 
incentive mechanism was misinterpreted, we would argue that a side 
effect of the interviews was that of providing the subjects with a 
strong incentive. It seems to us that to sustain an interview and 
explain their choices made the subjects more careful about their 
evaluation 
93. We do not argue that the chosen mechanism was irrelevant 
but we have the suspicion (given to me by the interviews) that a flat 
payment could have produced the same results. On the other hand, for 
the structure of the present experiment, it was more important to know 
the rationale behind the evaluations and the relative evaluations of 
82 This was the incentive mechanism used by Schoemaker (1991) in the 
experiment in which choices were played out for real. 
93It is also possible to argue that an interview can force a subject to 
find a "rationale" to his or her choices with the intent, for example, 
of showing his or her intelligence. We think that this risk is reduce 
if the interview, as in our case, is just in front of the experimenter. 
Cf Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986) 
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the lotteries than their exact absolute value. 
These considerations are not intended to dismiss the problem of an 
incentive compatible system for this kind of experiment; however to 
verify the consequences of the various incentive mechanisms on the 
subjects's evaluations or choices, it can be interesting to run the 
same experiment with different incentive mechanisms. The few existing 
works that compare choice for real and hypothetical ones seems to 
suggest a minor influence84. But this deserves further investigation. 
III. 3 Results and Discussion. 
111.3.1 Organization of the discussion 
We will describe the results in the following way: we will divide 
the subjects into two groups: one group is represented by subjects who 
did not commit the Ellsberg paradox; the second group is composed by 
all the subjects who did commit the Ellsberg paradox (we will always 
define as Ellsberg paradox people (EP, hereafter) the subjects who did 
commit the EP and non-EP people the subjects who did not commit the EP. 
This latter group can include Expected Utility people or also people 
who may be not be Expected Utility but who did non commit the EP). 
As far as the first group is concerned the analysis will focus 
first on the evaluation of the lotteries and, second, on the explicit 
rationales given by the subjects to their evaluations. As far as the 
second group is concerned, the analysis will follow the same scheme, 
but the explanations of the subjects of their evaluations have a 
particular importance in so far as understanding the consistency or 
inconsistency of their behaviour with the various theories85 which try 
84 See Schoemaker (1991) and Camerer (1989), Weber, Loomes, Keppe and 
Meyer-Delius, (1994 ) 
85 We will use the word theory in a very broad sense. According to 
Oxford dictionary a theory can be "a set of reasoned ideas intended to 
explain facts or events " but also "opinions or suppositions". Actually 
some of these theories can be defined as a set of reasoned ideas while 
others can more easily be included in the category of suppositions. 
Moreover some of the theories are expressed in models while others can 
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to explain the Ellsberg paradox. In particular, the behaviour of each 
subject will be analyzed in the light of each of the theories 
examined; for each theory we will describe the expected evaluation for 
each lottery (belonging to the subset of lotteries used to test that 
particular theory) and consequently the order in which the lotteries 
should have been evaluated if the explanation of the EP was of the type 
stated by that particular theory. We will, at the end, analyze for 
each subject if his or her choices can be considered consistent or 
inconsistent with one or more of the theories. It is important to note 
that the evaluations of all the lotteries are not expected to be 
different for all the theories. In fact some of the lotteries were 
built just to verify some explanations and can be completely irrelevant 
for other explanations. As a consequence of this design it is possible 
to find that the evaluations of a particular subject are consistent (or 
at least not inconsistent) with more than one theory. To understand 
better the reasons underlying the Ellsberg kind of behaviour of each 
subject, we will make use of the explanation or reasoning used by the 
subjects in the interviews. Indeed we would argue that it is difficult 
to interpret correctly the evaluations of the subjects without this 
tool. The analysis of the interviews, moreover, can give some insight 
into possible explanations of the behaviour of the subjects other than 
those explicitly considered during the experimental design. 
111.3.2 Results 
Of the 21 subjects who took part in the experiment 10 out of 21 
committed the Ellsberg paradox: they evaluated the unknown lotteries 
differently from the certain ones'. Moreover for 9 out of these 10 
be just defined as hypotheses. Where a hypothesis is " idea or 
suggestion that is based on known fact and it is used as a basis for 
reasoning or further investigation"; while a model is "a simplified 
description of a system used in explanation". 
8' We will always use the term "the unknown lotteries" to refer to 
those lotteries in which the proportion of white or black balls in the 
bag is unknown; those in which the proportion of the two colours is 
clearly stated will be referred to as " the certain lotteries". We 
would classified as EP subjects all the subjects who evaluated the 
certain lotteries equally to the uncertain one, whatever representation 
of uncertainty was adopted (E evaluated the same as D, B, F, G, H, C, 
I, R, L, P, S, 0, Z, M). (the evaluations of T, N, Q and V may differ 
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subjects the premium they were willing to pay in order to avoid the 
unknown lottery was more then 207. of the price given to the certain 
lottery. Of these 10,5 were willing to pay more than 507.. Of the 10 
subjects who committed EP, 9 were ambiguity averse and 1 ambiguity 
prone. (See Table 111.2 and 111.3). 
. III. 3.3 Subjects who did not commit the Elisberg paradox 
87 
111.3.3.1 General results. 
Expected Utility Theory. Nineteen 88 lotteries (depending on the 
personal beliefs of the subjects) out of 21 were designed in such a way 
that they should be evaluated the same by an Expected Utility subject. 
All (19) these lotteries in fact collapse to the single lottery (1/2, 
B; 1/2, W). Consequently the evaluation of these lotteries should depend 
only on the personal different degrees of risk aversion or preference 
of the subjects. (The expected value of these lotteries was £12.5). 
Lotteries N and T. Two lotteries, N and T were different in this 
respect: 
across EP subjects. See relevant section). We classified as non EP 
subjects the subjects who evaluated E differently from 0. At this point 
is also important to notice that in our experiment we do not consider 
any theory of error ( which is the theory that fits better considering 
the possibility of an error in the evaluations). However we check for 
the presence of mistakes because we used more than one lottery to test 
each theory. 
87 Within these subjects, there are some who did not commit the Ellsberg 
paradox but who cannot be defined for sure as Expected Utility 
subjects. An EU subject is a subject who behaves as if she or he 
evaluated all the lotteries according to EU; however some of the 
subjects evaluated lottery T and lottery N the same as the others when 
they "should", according to EU, have evaluated these lotteries more. 
88 T and N should be evaluated more than the others. See the evaluation 
of lotteries V and Q in section 111.4.3 
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Table 111.2 
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Evaluations in pounds of the lotteries by non EP subjects. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Subjects 
2 4 6 9 10 12 13 15 17 18 21 
Lot tery 
E 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
D 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
U 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
B 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
V 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 0 
F 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
A 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
G 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
H 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
C 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
1 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
N 14 10 12.5 14 13 15.9 19 14.01 12.5 12.5 14 
T 13 11 12.5 13 13 13.9 15 14.01 12.5 12.5 13 
F 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
R 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
L 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
P 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
S 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
Q 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 0 10.01 12.5 12.5 0 
0 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
Z 12 10 12.5 12 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
M 15 11 12.5 15 13 12.9 12 12.01 12.5 12.5 12 
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Table 111.3 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Evaluations in pounds of the lotteries by EP subjects. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Subjects 
1 3 5 7 8 11 14 16 19 20 
Lottery 
E 13 12 10 12 12 12 13 15 15 13 
D 12 12 8 12 12 12 13 16 12 13 
U 10 12 8 12 12 12 13 13 13 5 
B 10 12 7 12 12 12 13 18 20 5 
V 10 12 10 12 12 12 13 17 18 5 
F 9 12 8 12 12 11 13 16 15 6 
A 10 12 7 12 12 10 13 14 10 7 
G 10 12 7 12 12 9 13 16 20 8 
H 12 12 8 12 12 8 13 18 10 9 
C 12 12 8 12 12 7 13 20 14 2 
I 12 10 7 5 12 8 10 10 15 2 
N 10 10 8 4 6 10 15 17 15 3 
T 6 10 7 4 6 9 7 9 14 3 
F 9 12 8 12 12 11 13 16 15 6 
R 13 12 10 12 12 12 13 19 10 13 
L 12 12 8 12 12 9 13 16 12 10 
P 8 10 7 4 6 9 5 10 15 2 
S 10 10 8 4 6 9 5 11 12 2 
Q 5 12 8 3 6 9 5 5 10 2 
0 6 10 7 4 6 9 5 8 20 2 
Z 13 12 8 3 12 10 15 12 15 1 
M 8 10 7 12 12 10 13 13 17 1 
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in these two lotteries 
89 
the conditional probability of drawing a white 
or a black ball was different from 1/2 since the subject knew the 
colour of some of the balls put in the bag from which he or she was 
asked to draw (3 in N and 1 in T). As we have already explained the 
purpose of using these lotteries was twofold. On one hand, it was a 
check for the Expected utility subjects; we expected them in fact to 
evaluate these two lotteries more then the others; specifically lottery 
N should be evaluated more than T and T more then the rest. On the 
other hand, in the case of the "Ellsberg subjects" these lotteries were 
an attempt to measure in some way the influence of adding some 
information in the case were you do not know the probabilities of the 
two outcomes of the lotteries; N and T are in fact the only two 
lotteries in which the level of ambiguity (specifying ambiguity as the 
range in the probability interval) of the unknown bag varies90: we know 
at least the colour of one out of 12 or three out of 12 balls. 
Results. If we look at table 11.2, we can see that of non-EP 
subjects 7 out of 11 evaluated the lotteries N and T more then the 
others, while 4 gave to the 21 lotteries all the same value. During the 
interview, however, two of the these four subjects said that the 
probabilities of getting the desired colour In lotteries N and T was 
89 In N subject were asked first to draw 3 balls with replacement from 
a bag containing 6 black and 6 white, and, then, to put them in a bag 
containing 9 balls which can be either black or white. The final draw 
is from this latter bag. In T the procedure is exactly the same but in 
the second bag, which contains 11 balls you have just to put 1 ball. 
Take first lottery T: now in case of the first draw we expect an EU 
subject to belief that the probability of drawing a black or a white is 
1/2. In the second stage if we have put a black ball then I know that 
the other balls in the bag cannot be all whites but 1 black and 11 
white or 2 blacks and 10 white etc. so the probability of drawing a 
black is 1/12+2/12 etc and consequently the expected winning of the 
lotteries is 13.5. 
In case of lottery N the reasoning Is the same; however the 
combinations of balls can be the following ones BBB, WWW, BWW, WBW, 
WWB, WBB, BWB, BBW. The EV of the lottery when we know that there are 
2 balls of the same colour is 14.5 while the EV of the lottery with 
three balls of the same colour is 15.6 so the EV of N can be calculated 
as 2/8.15.6+ 6/8.14.5a 14.8 
90 As has been already said in section 1 in lotteries T and N the level 
of ambiguity was operationalized through a change in the range of the 
unknown probability following Curley and Yates (1987). Moreover since 
in T the range is bigger then in N, we consider lottery N less 
ambiguous than lottery T according to the above stated criterion. 
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higher than in the other lotteries but not sufficiently higher to make 
them evaluate the lotteries more91. 
Lotteries V and Q. There are two other lotteries whose 
interpretation in terms of Expected utility theory is not so 
straightforward: lotteries V and Q. Lotteries V and Q were designed to 
represent a two stage version of the original Ellsberg paradox. However 
the choice of the bag is made not by the subject but by the 
experimenter after the subject had already declared the colour on which 
he or she will bet. The original idea was that of verifying the theory 
that states that people avoid betting on the unknown urn just because 
they distrust the experimenter, and, consequently, this distrust 
diminishes the utility of the lottery in which the percentage of white 
and black balls Is not known. Making the choice of the bags depend 
explicitly on the experimenter was a way of focusing directly on this 
explanation of the Ellsberg paradox. In terms of an expected utility 
subject we can expect that, if the focus is on the way in which the bag 
is chosen, then these two lotteries may be evaluated zero, since the 
experimenter can determine the final outcome of the lottery choosing 
the bag in which there are none of the balls of the chosen colour92. 
However, the subject can also interpret the two lotteries on the 
assumption that, since the bags are opaque, neither the subject nor the 
experimenter will know the contents of the bags. 
The evaluation of the two lotteries by the non-EP subjects (the 
same hold also for EP subjects) will consequently depend on what they 
assume. However since the distrust In the experimenter has been 
introduced as an explanation of the aversion to ambiguity, what non-EP 
people do in this respect is not relevant to test this explanation. 
Results. Table 111.2 shows that just two subjects evaluated V and 
91 Subject 10 for example said in the interview "These are the only one 
I thought you have just a slightly more chance really, because you 
could choose; you knew three of the balls of the bag you draw from: So, 
if you draw out three black balls or white you get an advantage betting 
on those but, at the same time, you knew any of the balls in the second 
bag. So I decided that it was not really worth evaluating them more.. 
but, I think, you can evaluate them a little more. 
92 However to evaluate this lottery 0 it must be assumed that the 
subject assigns a p=1 to the possibility of being cheated. If the 
subject assigns a positive probability, but less then 1, then the 
evaluation of the lottery can be more than 0. 
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Q less than the other lotteries. In particular subject 21 evealuated 
both lotteries 0, while subject 13 evaluated just Q 0. 
In looking at the evaluations of the non-EP subjects in table 11.2 it 
must be taken into account that lottery M has been misinterpreted by 
some subjects of the first group93. Interpreting the lottery as 
lotteries N and T the subjects evaluated that lottery more than the 
others; on the other hand, the subjects who interpreted the lottery 
correctly gave to it the same value as to all the others94. 
111.3.3.2 The interviews. 
The questions asked followed the same scheme. However, while for 
the EP subjects the entire set of questions was asked, in the case of 
the non-EP subjects the questions focused especially on the 
differences between the two lotteries which represented the original 
Ellsberg paradox and the two groups of the two stage version, that to 
93 As has already been said the experiment was organized in two 
different weeks with two different groups of students. After 
interviewing the first group of students I realized that lottery M has 
been misinterpreted by some of the subjects. To avoid any further 
misunderstanding I changed the lottery in the following way: 
First version: In front of you there is a bag which contains 12 balls, 
6 are black and 6 are white. Then there is a second bag which is empty. 
From the first bag a ball is to be draw by somebody who is neither you 
or the experimenter. If the drawn ball is black he or she will put a 
black ball into the second bag. Then after replacing the drawn ball in 
the first bag a new ball is drawn and a ball of the same colour is put 
in the second bag. 
Second version: ... If the drawn ball 
is black he or she will put a 
black ball into the second bag; if the drawn ball is white she or he 
will put a white ball into the second bag. Then, after replacing the 
drawn ball in the first bag, a new ball is drawn. If the drawn ball is 
black he or she will put a black ball into the second bag; if the drawn 
ball is white she or she will put a white ball into the second bag. 
In the first case since in the lottery was mentioned only the case of a 
black ball some of the subjects thought that in the case that a white 
ball was drawn first no ball was put in the second bag. In this case 
the probability of drawing a ball of the two colours is different since 
in the second bag you can just have a black and a white , two blacks or 
a black or a white. With the correct interpretation you may have in the 
second bag 2 black 2 whites or a black and a white and consequently the 
probability of drawing a ball of each colour is 1/2. 
94 When we use the word "correctly" we mean that the subjects did not 
misinterpret the lottery we do not mean that they behaved according to 
some theory. 
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say lotteries E and 0, B, U and V and S, P and Q. 
Lotteries E and 0 provide a version of the original Ellsberg lotteries; 
lottery E is the certain one, while lottery 0 is the unknown one. 
Lotteries B, U and V are two-stage versions of lottery E. The subjects 
are asked to bet on a colour, to choose a bag and then to draw a ball 
from the chosen bag. The two bags contain 12 balls each; in one bag 
there are 12 black balls and in the other bag there are 12 white balls. 
The design of the three lotteries is the same; they differ from each 
other by one element: how the bag was chosen: by the subject, by the 
experimenter or by a random device. 
The purpose was to discover which kind of reasoning the subjects 
adopted. In focusing on lotteries E and 0 most of the subjects 
recognized the fact that, while in E the probability of drawing black 
ball or a white ball was known and equal to 1/2, in 0 these 
probabilities were not known. However the reasoning by which they 
justified their evaluations were different. Four subjects declared that 
since the probability could vary from 0 to 1 they used the average 
value, another four explicitly used the Principle of Insufficient 
Reason ("since I do not know I assume that it is half and half"). Three 
people motivated their choice in a different way. Their reasoning can 
be summarized as follows: There is a bag and I do not know the 
proportion of black and white so I do not know the probabilities. 
However this is not so important, in fact there are two kind of 
probabilities; the probabilities when you put your hand in the bag and 
the probability of me saying black or white. Since there are just two 
colours my probability of saying black or white Is still 1/2 and it 
does not matter which is the real probability present in the bag 
95 
. 
95 In an experiment reported in Raiffa (1961) used a very similar 
argument was used to convince the subjects who committed the Ellsberg 
paradox that they behaviour was non rational. "But then someone - all 
too often that someone is I- comes up with the following argument: 
Suppose you withdraw a ball from the urn with unknown composition but 
do not look at its colour. Now toss a fair (unbiased) coin and call 
'red' if heads, 'black' if tails. The 'objective probability of getting 
a match is now 0.5 and therefore it is just as desirable to participate 
in the second game as in the first. I have found out that after the 
student convinces himself It does not matter whether the ball is drawn 
first or whether the coin is tossed first, that he is most willing to 
increase his price for the second game up to the price he was willing 
to pay in the first game. "Raiffa (1961) p 693. 
In fact the reasoning of some subjects in the experiment was quite 
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Their evaluation is consequently due to the symmetry of the problem 
%. 
Symmetry can depend on the presence of either two colours or two 
outcomes, both equally unknown. This kind of distinction has been 
present also between subjects who did commit the Ellsberg paradox. 
111.3.4 Subjects who committed the Elisberg paradox. 
General discussion. In this experiment 10 subjects committed the 
Ellsberg paradox. Of these 9 were ambiguity averse and 1 ambiguity 
prone. The evaluation given by ambiguity averse subjects to the 
ambiguous lottery was less than 80 7. of the evaluation given to the 
certain lottery (0 versus E); and for 1/2 of the subjects it was less 
than 50% of the evaluation given to the certain lottery; it is hence 
possible to conclude that 1/2 of the Ellsberg subjects showed a strong 
ambiguity aversion. It may be worth noting that the same subjects did 
not show a particularly strong risk aversion in evaluating the certain 
lottery. In fact the expected value of all the lotteries was 12.5 and 
for most of the subjects the evaluations given to the certain lottery 
was between 13 and 10. (See table 3). It is also important to note that 
10 out of 21 (47.6%) of the subjects participating in this experiment 
committed the Ellsberg paradox which is a higher percentage than 
observed in experiments of a similar kind97 . 
similar; they divide the problem into two stages: first the drawing of 
a ball (black or white) and then the calling of a colour (black or 
white). Whatever was the result of the draw they still had to call a 
colour and in this case the probability was anyway one half. Reasoning 
in this way some of the non-EP people evaluated the two lotteries E and 
0 equally. However, it is worth noting that the same kind of 
reasoning, plus the fact that people were not temporally indifferent 
about calling the colour or drawing the ball, motivated a different 
evaluation of E and 0. For example, subject 1 said that he evaluated E 
more because "once you have put the hand into the bag there is still a 
fifty-fifty chance of getting the colour that you want". 
9' Raiffa's idea and the reasoning of these subjects seem to suggest 
that the results could be different if the colour to be called was 
defined ex ante (the subject is told to bet on white for example). Let 
us suppose that the subjects were offered two lotteries exactly equal 
to the certain and the unknown one but in which instead of you are 
asked to bet on a colour' you put 'you are asked to bet on white', we 
suspect that even assuming that no subject has any aversion or 
preference to a colour, the percentage of EP people would increase. 
97 The fact that it is not possible to find a correlation between 
ns 
111.3.4.1 Segal's explanation of the Ellsberg paradox. 
The model. As we have seen in chapter I, Segal (1987) suggested 
that the Ellsberg paradox depends on how people perceive the unknown 
urn. In particular, Segal suggests that the ambiguous lottery is 
perceived as a two stage imaginary lottery in which the first imaginary 
stage is over the possible values of the probability in the second 
stage. 
In this experiment, the event to be considered is drawing a white ball 
or a black one, so the first stage is over the possible values of the 
probability of drawing a white ball or a black ball. 
In the second stage the decision maker participates in the lottery in 
which the probability of black (as well as of white) has been 
determined by the resolution of uncertainty in the first stage. 
Segal assumes that, while evaluating this imaginary two stage lottery, 
people do not reduce the compound lottery to the equivalent single 
lottery. 
Instead they calculate the certainty equivalents at the second stage. 
These certainty equivalents become the outcomes of the first stage. At 
each stage the lotteries are evaluated according to anticipated 
expected utility. 
Then, the explanation of the EP suggested by Segal is composed of three 
different elements: 
a- The way in which people perceive the unknown lottery (as a two 
stage lottery). 
b- The fact that the decision maker does not apply the reduction of 
compound lottery axiom. 
c- The use of anticipated utility theory to evaluate the lotteries. 
Let us now consider the following imaginary two stage lottery and let 
us assume that we are betting on black. Hence, if black comes out we 
will get £25, otherwise we will get i0 . 
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Table 111.4 Segal 's model 
P=1/3 
1 p=1 B CE(1)= f(1). u(B) = u(25) 
p=1/2 P=1/3 ZI 
w 
CE(2)= u(W) + [u(B)-u(W)). f(1/2) 
p=1/2 = u(O) + [u(25)-u(0)1. f(1/2) 
P=1/3 3 
p=1 
W CE(3)= f(1). u(W)= u(O) 
CE(1), CE(2), CE(3) are the certainty equivalents evaluated applying 
the anticipated utility functional form (see relevant section in 
chapter I), where CE(3)<CE(2)<CE(1). Following Segal (1987), we now 
evaluate the imaginary lottery according to anticipated expected 
utility. This lottery is now reduced to a single stage lottery in which 
the outcomes at the first stage are given by the certainty equivalents 
at the second stage. Applying anticipated utility theory, we have: 
CE(3) + [CE(2)-CE(3)]. f(2/3) + [CE(1)-CE(2)]. f(1/3)= 
= U(0). f(1) +[ u(25). f(1/2)1. f(2/3) + [(u(25)-u(25). f(1/2))) 
f(1/3)= 
= u(25) [f(1/2). f(2/3) +(1- f(1/2)). f(1/3)] 
The experimental design. This experiment partially follows the 
design of the experiment of Bernasconi and Loomes (1992)98 that is to 
say the two-stage representation of the unknown urn has been made 
explicit as in the lottery of Table III. 4 (this is in fact lottery F of 
our experiment). 
There are two groups of lotteries which are relevant to the analysis of 
Segal's model: 
Lotteries U and D; they are two different two-stage representations of 
lottery E. In each of the two lotteries the subject is asked to bet on 
a colour and to choose a bag from which to draw a ball. However, in 
lottery U one bag contains 12 white balls and the other 12 black 
balls; while in lottery D both bags contain 6 black and 6 white. If 
98 In Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) we have a two-stage representation of 
the three-colour problem. 
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evaluated with the anticipated utility functional, the two lotteries 
should be evaluated the same, since they have the same certainty 
equivalent. Their evaluation moreover (the evaluation of U and D) 
should be 
99 
equal to lottery E. The two-stage set up should not change 
the evaluation in any case. Consequently we expect the following 
pattern of preference from a subject using an anticipated utility 
functional E-U-D. 
In the second group there are the lotteries F, A, G, H, C. In lottery F 
there are three bags , one contains 12 black balls, another contains 
12 
white balls and the third contains 6 white and 6 black balls. Lotteries 
A, G, H, C follow the same scheme (See also Table III. I. ). In lottery A 
the number of bags is 5; in lottery G is 7; in lottery H is 11 and in 
lottery C is 13. As far as the proportion of the two colours in each 
bags is concerned, in lottery A the proportion of each colour varies 
over 0, to 3,6,9,12; that to say the probability of having a white ball 
or a black ball in one bag can be 0 or 3/12 or 1/2 or 9/12 or 1. In 
lottery G, the proportion each colour in each bag varies over 0, 
2,3,5,6,7,9,10,12; in lottery H, it varies over 0,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11 
and in lottery C, it varies over 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12. 
F is a two-stage version of lottery E in which the subject has first to 
choose one bag out of three and then to draw a ball from the chosen 
bag. If we compare lottery F with E. U and D, a subject following Segal 
should evaluate them according to the following pattern of preference 
E-D-U >- F. 
As has been said In the previous paragraph, Segal's explanation of the 
Ellsberg paradox is that if people perceive the uncertain lottery as a 
two-stage lottery and do not apply the reduction principle in 
evaluating that lottery then the one stage and the two-stage lottery 
should have different evaluations. Hence E and F should be evaluated 
differently and in particular E should be evaluated more than F 
(lottery D and U are also two-stage lotteries; however if we evaluate 
these lotteries with the anticipated utility functional, their value 
should be equivalent to the value of E)100. The fact that these two 
lotteries are not evaluated equally to E means that they are not 
" See appendix for calculations. 
100 See the appendix for the evaluation of these lotteries according to AEU. 
178 
evaluated according to an Anticipated Utility functional. 
Results. Let us consider first the pattern of preference E>-F. If 
this pattern of preference occurs with the same percentage as the 
Ellsberg paradox it is possible to conclude that the behaviour of the 
subjects is consistent with Segal's theory. In fact one can expect to 
see violation of the reduction principle in the same percentage as the 
Ellsberg paradox. On the other hand, if the number of subjects who show 
this pattern of behaviour is consistently less than the number of 
subjects committing the Ellsberg paradox, then ambiguity aversion 
cannot be solely explained by Segal's theory. 
In the experiment, 5 subjects evaluated lottery E differently from 
lottery F: in four cases lottery E was evaluated more then lottery F 
(consistent with Segal's theory) in one case E was evaluated less then 
F (and this behaviour is not consistent with Segal's explanation since 
the same subject is ambiguity averse). From this result it seems 
possible to conclude that Segal's theory can explain at most 407. of the 
Ellsberg paradox. It is important to note at this point that some of 
these subjects evaluated E differently from D and from U. U and D are 
expected to be evaluated equally according to Segal's model; this was 
true only for one of the subjects; for the other three subjects D was 
preferred to U. This is worth noting since a pattern of preference of 
this kind is consistent with the application of MMEU (maximin) (See 
section 111.4.5). And, in fact, if we look at the subjects who exhibit 
this pattern of preference, we can see that in two out of 4 cases their 
behaviour was consistent with a maximin rule and in another case was 
not inconsistent with it. 
Let us consider, now, the group of lotteries F, A, G, H, C. Consider 
first each of these lotteries relative to E. For the same reasoning as 
above, we expect a subject following Segal to evaluate each of the 
lotteries less than the certain lottery E. All the 5 lotteries are in 
fact two-stage versions of the lottery E. The difference between the 
five lotteries is due to the number of bags from which the subjects 
have to choose. And in fact the five subjects that evaluated E 
differently from F also evaluated each of the five lotteries 
differently from E and in particular they evaluated them less then E. 
Let us now consider the relative evaluations of the lotteries F, 
A, G, H, C. If we take one of the two functional form of the weighting 
function f indicated by Segal which satisfy theorem 4.2 (see chapter I 
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relative section) and choosing t=2 we obtain f(p)= p2. If we apply 
the functional form of the anticipated utility function for a 
multistage lottery defined by the anticipated utility functional form 
to all the above mentioned lotteries and and if we use the weighted 
function f(p)= p2 then we obtain an evaluation of the lotteries which 
is decreasing with the number of bags. The calculations of the value of 
the 5 lotteries applying the anticipated utility functional form with 
the specific functional for f(p)=p2are contained in the appendix-The 
same calculation has been done with different values of t In the 
interval [1.10 3) and the result is the same (See Table AB. I in the 
appendix) in the appendix). 
That is to say the pattern of preference which is consistent with Segal 
model and with the conditions stated by theorem 4.2 and the specific 
selected functional form should be the following one: F>A}GrH>-C. 
However, the results of the experiment (See table 111.3) shows that the 
subjects who committed the Ellsberg paradox and were ambiguity averse 
ordered the lotteries exactly in the contrary way: they evaluated 
higher the lotteries with more bags. 
This can suggest that, either Segal's theory may explain a smaller 
percentage of the Ellsberg paradox. or that there might exist another 
functional form for f(p) which allows for ambiguity aversion and which 
satisfies the other requirement of theorem 4.2 but which also allows 
for an evaluation of the lottery which increases with the number of 
bags. 
To summarize, if we look at the subjects' evaluation of the 
multistage lotteries F, A, G, H, C, only one subject exhibits a pattern of 
preference consistent with Segal's explanation (in the sense above 
specified) and only one not inconsistent. For the other subjects the 
preference relation showed by the subject can cautiously be defined as 
not consistent with Segal's theory (though only to the extent above 
specified). 
To sum up: as has already been noted, with an explicit two-stage 
set up, we observe a reduction of 50% of the Ellsberg kind of behaviour 
which shows that apparently Segal's explanation of the Ellsberg paradox 
can account for almost 507. of the subjects'? 
' if, however, we analyze the 
101 This result is very similar to Bernasconi and Loomes's 
experiment, (23.8), but they used the three-colour Ellsberg example. 
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behaviour of these subjects, in one only case it can be concluded that 
the behavior shown by these subject is consistent with the model, in 
the sense specified above. The order given to the lotteries (inferred 
by the evaluations) seems in fact to cast doubt on the consistency of 
the behaviour of these subjects with Segal's theory. What the result of 
the experiment may suggest is that, as in Segal (1987), ambiguity 
aversion can be partially explained with the non-application of the 
reduction principle. However if one subject uses a anticipated utility 
function and does not apply the reduction principle then his or her 
order of the lotteries should be different. How can an evaluation 
increasing with the number of bags of the of 4 subjects be explained? 
One possible road is verifying if such a kind of preference can be 
compatible with the non application of the reduction principle but with 
the use of a utility functional form different from the anticipated 
utility one (For other two possible explanations see chapter VI). 
111.3.4.2 Raiffa (1961) 
The model. As we have seen in chapter I Raiffa suggested that one 
explanation of the Ellsberg paradox may be the fact that people, when 
analyzing the unknown lottery, dislike it, or they evaluate that 
lottery in a different way from the certain one, just because they do 
not understand the process which generates the data. The subjects do 
not know in which way the probabilities of the two colours will be 
defined. If we look at the original lottery of the Ellsberg paradox, 
lottery 0 in our experiment, the kind of reasoning that can be adopted 
by an ambiguity averse subject can be simplified as follow: let me 
consider the unknown lottery, I do not understand how the probabilities 
can be decided, I do not have any insight into the process, so I simply 
dislike it. 
Raiffa's suggestion is that if we teach people. that in the unknown 
bag, the probabilities can be thought of as generated by a random 
process, then they would evaluate the unknown lottery the same as the 
certain one. 
The experimental design. To verify this hypothesis we put into the 
set of 21 lotteries 3 lotteries (B. S and I) in which the "unknown" 
181 
process which generates the probabilities of the final outcomes is 
substituted by a "known, objective" random process, like the tossing of 
a coin or a random draw. Let us consider the three lotteries B, S and 
I, in lotteries B and S the bags are chosen by tossing a coin; in I the 
probability of the second stage is chosen drawing a ball from a bag 
containing 13 balls, each with a different number on it; the chosen 
number will correspond to the probability of one of the two colours in 
the second branch of the decision tree. Lottery B can be compared with 
the equivalent two-stage-with-known-probability lottery U and lottery S 
can be compared with the equivalent two-stage-with-unknown-probability 
lottery P, and lottery I can be compared with the 13-bags lottery C. 
The relevant lotteries to be considered are hence: 
U versus B, U versus E (in which the probabilities are known); 
I versus E, I versus C; 
S versus 0, S versus P (in which the probabilities are not known). 
In lotteries B, I and S the probability of the second branch is 
generated by an objective device; the toss of a coin for B and S, a 
draw of a number between 0 to 12 for I; If Raiffa's suggestion is 
correct, then at least some subjects are expected to show the 
following pattern of preference B-E, S-0. I-E, P"S. 
Results. If we look at table III. 3 we can see that in 4 cases out of 
10 B-E , in 2 cases I-E, in 6 cases S^-0 and S-P, but 
in only two cases 
B-I, and in 7 cases B-U, in 5 cases U-E, but just in 3 cases I-C. 
What can one conclude from this pattern of preferences? Since for 5 
subjects out of the 10 committing the Ellsberg paradox the lotteries U 
and E have the same evaluation, and this is also true for the lotteries 
P and 0, while 6 out of 10 subjects gave the same value to the 
lotteries P and S and 7 subjects to B and U, it seems possible to 
conclude that at least 407. of the subjects behave in a way which is 
consistent with the Raiffa explanation. If, however, we examine the 
evaluation of the lotteries C and I, the behaviour which can be 
considered consistent with Raiffa hypothesis seems less frequent. Let 
us consider lottery C; this is a two-stage version of the lottery E 
with 13 bags. The subject is asked, first, to choose a bag and, then, 
to draw a ball; each bag has a different proportion of black and white 
balls in it; choosing a bag is equivalent to choosing the probability 
distribution of the second branch of the decision three. Lottery C can 
be considered equivalent to lottery I where the probability of the 
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second branch is determined by the draw of a numbered ball. From the 
point of view of Raiffa's hypothesis the two lotteries should be 
evaluated exactly the same, since they are just two ways of choosing 
randomly the bag from which to draw. This is true just in two out of 
the 4 cases which exhibit the preference pattern I-E. In the other two 
cases lottery C is evaluated more than lottery I; this latter lottery 
seems to have been perceived as more uncertain. There is one 
difference between the two lotteries: the choice of the bag Is either 
by the subject or by a random device. In this case it seems as If the 
random device had increased the element of chance in the lottery102. 
Moreover, lottery I has been evaluated equal to lottery E in just 1 
case (lottery C in 4 cases), showing that it has been perceived by 90% 
of the subjects as more uncertain. It can be worth noting, however, 
that Raiffa's intuition assumes that people clearly understand what is 
a random process, that for them equivalent random processes can be 
considered the same and that they do not show any aversion to 
randomness, that is they do not dislike the fact that something Is 
decided by chance. This can be true if the random objective process is 
quite simple like the toss of a coin. The fact that, in the two-bags 
lotteries, the Raiffa kind of preference is more common, can be 
explained by the fact that the chosen random process is quite simple 
and that In any case the choice (all white in one bag, all black in the 
other bag) was quite straightforward. In the case of lottery I, the 
choice is not so straightforward, and the random process can be 
perceived more "random" from a psychological point of view. This 
interpretation seems to be supported by the evidence that the 
randomness built into the lottery has been perceived much more in the 
case of lottery I than in the other two cases (as can be seen from the 
103 interviews ). 
102 This behaviour can be linked with the idea of "illusion of control" 
demonstrated by Langer (1975). See also section 111.4.7.2. 
103 One of the subjects declared that what she disliked most was 
anything determined by chance and a random device was, according to 
her, a sort of "chance over chance". She said "in general the higher is 
the degree of casuality (randomness) built in the lottery the less I 
like to bet on it. I evaluated the lotteries three, two and one 
according to this criterion.. 
... but I mean there is too much chance built into it, chance on chance, 
chance on chance that you know... I just do not want to play. " 
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To sum up: it seems possible to conclude that at least for some 
subjects, the suggestion that the aversion to uncertainty can disappear 
if the subject learns to see the "uncertainty" as a random process, can 
be true. But can this always be true? On the one hand, some random 
processes can be too complex to understand, and, on the other hand, we 
doubt that all "uncertainties" can be reduced to a random process. 
111.3.4.3 The healthy skepticism of Kadane (1991). 
The model. In his work, Kadane (1991) still assumes that people 
evaluate lotteries according to Expected utility theory. However his 
model differs from the traditional one in the following way: if the 
subject assigns a positive probability of a strategic behaviour of the 
person making the offer (the experimenter), then he or she will compute 
the expected utility according to the positive probability assigned to 
this behaviour. The expected utility of the lottery will be decreased 
accordingly. The Ellsberg paradox is consequently due to the fact that 
the subjects evaluate less the unknown lottery just because they think 
that the experimenter can cheat. 
According to Kadane, in the Ellsberg paradox, the method of possible 
cheating is made very obvious; the experimenter in fact will 
presumably know the number of white and black balls contained in the 
bag and consequently the experimenter can decide which bets are on. The 
kind of reasoning adopted by the subject can be the following one: I am 
told that in the bag the proportion of black and white is unknown but 
if the experimenter knows what there is in the bag or can manipulate in 
some what the content in the bag then if I choose black he can arrange 
things in a way that in the bag there are more white balls than black. 
Only by choosing white and or black from the certain bag the subject 
can protect themselves against such manipulation. 
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On the other hand another subject, the only one who was ambiguity 
prone, declared exactly the contrary; he liked everything that was 
more random. 
104 For Kadane reasoning to be true, however, one have to assume that 
either the experimenter has more than one bag of "unknown composition", 
and he is able to choose the bag accordingly to the colour on which the 
subject has decided to bet, or it is the experimenter who chooses the 
colour. If the experimenter has just one bag of "unknown composition". 
whichever is the true composition, if it is the subject who chooses the 
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"Again the experimenter is supplying the prizes, the urns and chooses 
which offered alternative will actually obtain" Kadane (1991) page 61 
To sum up: the idea is that the Ellsberg paradox makes a reasonably 
skeptical person suspect the possibility of being cheated. 
The experiment design. Let us consider lotteries V and Q; V and Q 
are two-stage representations of the certain and uncertain lottery. The 
possibility of being cheated by the experimenter has been introduced 
explicitly in these two lotteries; the subject is asked to bet on a 
colour and then the experimenter will choose the bag from which the 
subject has to draw the ball. In one case, lottery V, the composition 
of the two bags is known, one bag contains all white balls and the 
other contains all black balls, while in the other case, lottery Q, the 
composition of the bag is unknown. If people think that they can be 
cheated then they can be expected to evaluate these two lotteries less 
then the certain one or zero. 
The results. As as we can see from table 111.3, however, not one 
of the subjects evaluated lottery V (zero or) less then the equivalent 
two- stage lottery B. In case of lottery Q, 4 out of 10 subjects 
evaluated it less than the two-stage counterpart P. One possible 
interpretation of this pattern of preferences may be the following one: 
in the case of known probabilities, the mere fact that the composition 
of the bag was known even if the probability of the two colours is 
either one or zero reduces the level of suspiciousness in the choice; 
after all, as one subject said, the bags are opaque so no one can see 
inside. On the other hand in the case of the unknown composition "there 
are too many unknown values" as one subject saidl05. The choice of the 
subject not to give zero as the evaluation of lotteries Q and V was 
generally motivated by the fact that they were not sure of the fact 
that the experimenter could cheat, it was just a hypothetical 
possibility. They did not assign a probability equal to 1 to the 
colour on which to bet, then, the subject still has 1/2 probability to 
bet on the "right" colour. 
105 Subject 16 said "Q you do not have any decision in it; it is all up 
to the experimenter and it was not pure chance; so I might give a 
slightly less value just In case I do not know, in case the 
experimenter knew or .. there are too many values, so I gave 5 to it. 
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possibility of being cheated but just a probability greater than 0. In 
only two cases the lottery Q was evaluated less then 0 and in the other 
7 cases was evaluated the same (in one case lottery Q was evaluated 
more then the equivalent one stage unknown or the two-stage P). The 
percentage of people showing the fear of being cheated by the 
experimenter is small in the expected utility group as well as in the 
group exhibiting the Ellsberg kind of behaviour, however 4 were the 
subjects who evaluated Q less than P. between the EP subjects. Two 
subjects out of the three exhibiting an aversion for the choice of the 
bag made by the experimenter evaluated these lotteries less then the 
unknown one, showing that more then the cause of the uncertainty the 
feeling of being cheated can increase the aversion of uncertainty 
106. 
To sum up, the fear of being cheated does not seem to capture the 
problem of aversion to ambiguity; even in situations were it is made 
explicit the fear of being cheated does not seem the main reason for 
people to avoid the unknown bag; it may at most constitute a further 
element of ambiguity. However, as far as the design of experiments is 
concerned it can be worth putting a special care in trying to avoid 
this source of uncertainty. A careful frame of the experimental 
environment might help to avoid this risk. 
111.3.4.4 Choquet Expected Utility. 
The model. In this experiment we tested the two-stage 
representation of Choquet Expected Utility (Schmeidler (1989). 
Following Anscombe and Aumann (1963) (see chapter I), Schmeldler adopts 
a two stage representation. In this framework a lottery can be seen as 
a two stage process where the state S, in the set up of this experiment 
white or black, occurs in the first place. Then, in the second stage, 
conditional on which state of the world occurs, a lottery Is played out 
to determine the outcomes, the final consequences. The framework Is 
106 From the interview of subject 1 "With Q the external force is the 
experimenter, you do not feel as lucky when the experimenter is doing 
.. you know what I mean. It is an external force that, even If it does 
not have more control than you do on the bags, it seems to have more 
control than you do over the experiment in itself. 
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quite similar to that of Segal 
107. The subjects see the ambiguous lottery 
as a two stage lottery. However, in the first stage the subjects are 
presented with an event lottery. The outcomes of this first stage are 
pure risky lotteries, and these risky lotteries will determine the 
final consequence. To the occurrence of an event subjects assign 
capacities, which are not necessarily additive measures of the 
likelihood of the occurrence of an event. In Schmeldler's (1989) 
framework, the subjects evaluate the second stage risky lottery 
according to expected utility. The so obtained certainty equivalents of 
the second stage become the outcomes of the first stage event lottery, 
which is evaluated according to Choquet Expected Utility. 
The experimental design. Let us consider, as an example, lottery 
Z. In the first stage the subject has to draw a ball from a bag which 
contains 12 black or white balls but in an unknown composition. 
Conditioning on the occurrence of the event Black or White, he or she 
is asked to draw a second ball from one of the other two bags: if the 
first draw is black he or she has to draw from the left bag, if the 
first draw is white she or she has to draw from the right bag. Both 
bags, the left one and the right one contain 6 white balls and 6 black 
balls. 
Table III. 5 Lottery Z 
1/2 
B L- C B Where In the second branch we have 
Z 1/2 
W 
p(B) and p(W) which are additive. 
1/2 While In the first branch we have 
W R- C B v(B) and v(W) which are not additive. W 
1/2 
107 From this similarity the criticism of Wakker to Schmeidler model. See 
Wakker (1989) and Sarin and Wakker (1991). In this experiment we 
considered Schmeidler version of capacities (See also Camerer and Weber 
1992). It is worth noting however that if the unknown lottery is not 
mentally represented as a two stage lottery but as a single stage as in 
Sarin and Wakker, the evaluation of the lottery is different from its 
evaluation in a two stage set up. See chapter I. 
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The value of this lottery can be computed according to Choquet 
Expected Utility. It is important to note, however, that another 
crucial feature of Schmeidler's theory is that, while subjective 
probabilities (capacities) are dealt in a non additive way, the 
objective, known probabilities, are dealt with in the traditional way. 
This means that CEU in case of objective probabilities reduces to EU. 
Since CEU reduces to EU if the probabilities are additive (see Table 
111.5 ) we will have u(CE(L)) = 1/2 . u(25) + 1/2 . u(0) and u(CE(R)) _ 
1/2 . u(25) + 1/2 . U(O) 
In the second branch, since the probabilities or capacities are not 
additive, we will have:. 
V(Z)= 
u(CE(L)). v(B)+u(CE(R)) 
[v(RUW)_v(B)] 
= (III. 1) 
= u(CE(L) . V(B) +u (CE (R)) v(BuW) - u( CE(R)) . v(B) 
since u(CE(R)) is equal to u(CE(L)) then the above expression 
reduces to u(CE(R)) .v (BuW). 
Since S, the set of all possible outcomes is given by B and W, and we 
know that v(S) = 1, then we can assume that v(BuW) (which is the 
probability of the certain event) is equal to 1. Hence, the evaluation 
of lottery Z, V(Z), will reduce to u(CE(R)) But Lottery R is equal to 
lottery E consequently, if subjects behave in a way consistent with 
Schmeidler's theory, we will expect them to evaluate lottery Z the same 
as lottery E. Hence, If the subjects evaluate lottery Z the same as E, 
and this preference relation appears in the same proportion as the 
Ellsberg paradox, then the Ellsberg paradox can be totally captured by 
the existence of capacities. If, on the contrary, the percentage of the 
subjects showing this preference relation is less than that committing 
the Ellsberg paradox, then, Schmeidler's theory can only partially 
explain the Ellsberg paradox. 
The results. If we look at table 111.3 we can se that in this 
experiment 4 out of the 10 EP subjects evaluated Z the same as E; one 
evaluated E more than Z, and 5 evaluated Z less than E. 
The more frequent motivation to this latter pattern of preference by 
the subjects was the following one: "I know that what happen in the 
first stage is almost irrelevant to my final choice but the point is 
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that any way in the first stage I do not know which is the composition 
of the bag from which I draw so, since I do not like betting on things 
that I do not know I evaluate anyway this lottery less". 
108 
Moreover, if we analyse in more detail the evaluation of the other 
lotteries by the subjects who evaluated E the same as Z, it is 
important to notice that just two out of these 3 subjects behave in a 
consistent way with Schmeidler's model. In fact, as CEU reduces to EU 
when the probabilities are known, I would expect these subjects 
consistently to evaluate lotteries D, U, F, G, H, C the same as 
lotteries E and Z This pattern of preferences is shown only by two 
out of 10 subjects in this experiment. 
To sum up, it is possible to conclude that in this experimentl09 only few 
subjects seem to behave in a consistent way with Schmeidler's theory. 
III 3.4.5 Maximin criterion for expected utility. 
The model. According to Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982), (see 
chapter I) an ambiguous situation can be depicted as a situation in 
which beliefs about the states of nature can be represented by a set of 
probability measures II (see relevant section In chapter D. However not 
all of an agent's beliefs about the states of the nature relevant to a 
decision situation can be captured by a set of probability measures. 
There is a second element which is relevant to a decision situation: p, 
which is a real value measure of the epistemic reliability of the 
probability measures in P. To define which distributions are reliable p 
is used, and the level of p depends first on the level of information 
108 Subject 11 said " You got three bags. In one of the bag you do not 
know which combination there is, and in the second and in the third, 
you know that there are 12 balls of which 6 are black and 6 are white. 
So you have to draw a colour from the first bag; so you do not know the 
choice of taking a white or a black because you do not know the 
combination that is in there. Then, depending on if you draw a black or 
a white, you draw a ball from one of the other bags. And I gave then 
pounds, because, I thought, well, you pick out a white from the first 
bag, that is Irrelevant. It does not matter which one you pick, you end 
up picking up a ball from the second or the third bag, and, so, you got 
507. chance of picking up the colour you want. So, even if you got 50% 
chance I gave 10, because first you have to pick up from the first 
bag. " 
109 See Mangelsdorff and Weber (1992) for a more detailed test of Choquet 
expected utility in a quite different set up. 
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of the individual -their epistemic reliability-110, and, second. on a 
psychological factor -the fact of being more or less sure of one's own 
evaluations ( if I am sure of my evaluation I will just have one 
probability measure). Hence, in making a decision an agent considers 
TI/p defined as the set of all the distributions which satisfies his 
level of p, that is to say the distribution which are epistemically 
reliable according to him. 
From the set TI/p the individual chooses as follows: 
The maximin criterion for EU (MEUT); the alternative with the largest 
minimum expected utility ought to be chosen. 
The experimental design. Gardenfors argues that the pattern of 
preference displayed by people committing the Ellsberg paradox is 
consistent with the adoption of a MEUT decision criterion. To 
investigate this lotteries R, L and F were designed. These three 
lotteries are two-stage lotteries in which, in the first instance, the 
subject is asked to choose a bag (out of three) and, in the second 
instance, the subject Is asked to draw a ball from the chosen bag. Each 
bag consequently represent a probability measure, so the problem can be 
seen as a case in which the subject has a set of probability measures 
for the event "drawing a black ball" and each of these probability 
measures has the same probability. In Gardenfors' terminology we can 
say that the subject's set of probability measures Is composed of 
equally epistemically reliable probability measures. In the present 
set-up of this experiment the epistemic reliability Is not due to any 
individual weight of evidence or psychological factor since the various 
probability measures are known. The problem becomes simply the one of 
choosing in the situation in which the subject has not just a 
probability measure but a set of them. 
ill 
110In 
this respect the reliability of a probability measure is given by 
the quality of the information we have. Hence the Gardenfors and 
Sahlin's idea is very similar to Keynes's concept of 'weight of 
evidence'. It is in fact the weight of evidence that determine the 
epistemic reliability of our probability measures. The concept of 
"epistemic reliability" simply mean reliable according to our level of 
knowledge. 
ill In the 3 lotteries of the present experiment there is no ambiguity, 
if by ambiguity it is meant that we do not have any idea of the 
reliability of the probabilities contained in our set. In this 
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Lotteries R, L and F differ because the set of probability 
distributions that are assigned to the draw of a black or a white in 
each lottery is different. Let us take for example the drawing of a 
black (the same is valid for white since the distributions are 
symmetric): in all three lotteries the probability of choosing one of 
the three bags is 1/3; what is different in the three lotteries is the 
probability of having a black in the second branch. In particular the 
minimum probability varies from 0 to 1/2. If I bet on black, for 
instance, in lottery F the probability of having black can be 0,1/2,1; 
in lottery L, 4/12,1/2,8/12, while in lottery R the set of probability 
measures for black will be 1/2,1/2,1/2. The decision criterion of 
Gardenfors is a maximin (in particular Wald maximin) but the worst 
outcome is not given with respect to the payoffs but with respect to 
the probabilities. If we compute the expected utility for each 
probability measure in each set we can see that the minimum expected 
utility is bigger in lottery R then in lottery L, which is, in turn, 
bigger than in lottery F. If people use MEUT as a decision criterion it 
is predicted that they will value R higher than L and L higher than F. 
The results. In this experiment 2 out of 10 subjects who committed 
the Ellsberg paradox show the pattern of preferences implied by MEUT 
for all the three lotteries and 3 others preferred lottery R to the 
other two. Are these choices consistent with the MEUT criterion? Three 
of the subjects explicitly gave in the interview an explanation which 
resembles the adoption of a maximin criterion. For example subject 1 
said " With R, any bag you choose you got 50 7. chance of getting a 
black or a white ball, so this is pretty fair; there is no chance of 
being persecuted, of having all the other colour balls; with lottery L 
the bag is still mixed up, but one is fifty percent chance, another is 
40, so if you choose the one in which you have just 40, then, you are 
worse off then in lottery R". 
Subject 5"I put 10 here, because the chance is fifty percent in R; 
experiment the set of the possible probability is defined by the 
experimenter as well as their reliability. All the probabilities are in 
fact equally reliable; however there is more than one probability 
measure and we do not know which state of the world will prevail. The 
extension of the Gardenfors and Sahlin theory to encompass cases like 
this seem to be justified. See Gärdenfors and Shalin (1983). 
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then I thought that it is more equally distributed. F, I do not like 
it, because there were 12 white balls in one of them; so I thought I 
might get nothing, and L was not so evenly distributed". 
The same kind of reasoning is shown by subject 11. " Because with R 
which bag you pick out it does not matter, you got fifty percent chance 
to get whatever colour you want, but with F, depending on which bag you 
got, you pick out one hundred percent chance of picking out 12 white 
balls or one hundred percent chance of picking out 12 black balls, 
actually, I would have given even less value. " 
Subject 22 was even clearer. "I order lotteries according to the 
probability of the bag with the wrong colour. Now, because in F there 
is the bag with the wrong colour, which I do not like. R, R is the one 
I like better because you can never pick the wrong bag; in every bag 
you have half and half percentage of winning, and in L you still have 
.. L is the same as R in the sense that you always... again.. you 
necessarily will pick a bag in which there is the right colour, but the 
probability of piking that colour is lower. " 
Also three of the same subjects preferred lottery D to lottery B which 
reproduces exactly the same situation than lottery R and F but in a 
two-stage set up. Hence around 50% of the subjects were ambiguity 
averse and seemed to behave in a way which is consistent with the 
Gardenfors and Sahlin decision criterion. The idea of avoiding 
lotteries in which the probability of the chosen event could be zero 
was explicitly stated by the subjects and in some cases the rationale 
of this aversion was explained saying that on one hand the situation 
was worst and on the other hand the lottery was not "fair". 
III. 3.4.6 Information lotteries. 
The experimental design. As we have already said (describing the 
results of this experiment for the " non EP " group), lotteries N and 
Lottery T were introduced with the twofold tasks of checking EU people, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, of trying to verify which is 
the influence of information in an uncertain situation. In this case 
the lottery presented to the subjects involve betting on a colour and 
drawing a ball from a bag in which the proportion of black and white 
balls is partially known (there is a reduction in ambiguity 
consequently since some of the distributions are ruled out after the 
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draws from the first bag). In fact, in lottery T the subject is asked 
first to draw a ball from a bag which contains 6 white and 6 blacks 
ball; then he is asked to put the chosen ball in a second bag 
containing 11 balls in an unknown proportion. At this point the subject 
is asked to bet on a colour and to draw a ball from the second bag. In 
the second lottery, N, the quantity of balls that the subject puts In 
the second bag becomes 3. (After any draw there is replacement. Hence 
at the end in the second bag he or she knows the colour of 3 balls out 
of 12. It is important to note that the subject is asked to bet on one 
colour after he has put one or three balls in the second bag and 
consequently just before the final drawing). 
Let us consider lottery T; if I put a white ball the probability of 
drawing a white is higher then the probability of drawing a black 
112; 
the 
same holds for lottery N once I have already put two or three white 
balls in the second bag. 
In evaluating, these lotteries an Expected Utility subject can be 
expected to assign a higher value to lottery N and T than to all the 
other lotteries. In fact, if the subjects follow some form of updating 
procedure in the light of new evidence, they will evaluate T and N more 
and this may happen even if they do not follow Bayesian updating 
rules. (cf Jaffray (1992) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993)). Moreover, 
our initial idea was that, in the case of an ambiguity averse subject, 
the new acquired information might need to overcame a sort of threshold 
level before the subject could feel the necessity of changing his or 
her prior. This can happen either because changing prior implies 
effort, hence is costly, or because ambiguity averse people can be 
pessimistic people who need a substantial increase in information in 
order to modify their judgment113. 
The results In this experiment 4 out of the 10 EP subjects group 
evaluated the two lotteries N and T the same, 3 of these 4 evaluated 
these two lotteries the same as the unknown lotteries, while the fourth 
evaluated these two lotteries slightly more then the unknown one. In 
the other 6 cases, lottery N was evaluated more than lottery T, showing 
112 See section 111.3.3.1 
113 This later phenomenon has been noted in an experiment presented by 
Cohen, Gilboa Jaffray and Schmeidler in the FUR 1994 Conference on 
updating ambiguous beliefs. Private conversation with Michele Cohen. 
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that the reduced ambiguity was "correctly" perceived. Moreover, 3 of 
these subjects evaluated T equally to 0, the unknown one, but evaluated 
lottery N substantially more (Showing the existence of threshold 
level? ). 
To sum up, it is possible to say that while in lottery T the 
weight of the uncertainty overcomes the weight of information, in 
lottery N the amount of information was considered sufficient to 
increase substantially the evaluation of the lottery. 
In the present experimental set up the role of information was quite 
limited: the information received was clearly in the direction of 
reducing the uncertainty. However It is possible to think of situations 
in which the increase In the information set can reduce (or not 
increase) the support of the evidence; that is to say, an Increase in 
the information can as well increase the level of ambiguity. How the 
information can influence the perception of uncertainty and the 
aversion to it is an interesting field for further research. 
111.3.4.7 Some psychological and intuitive theories. 
Does it make any difference in which branch of a compound lottery the 
uncertainty is present? 
The experimental design. In this experiment lottery M has been 
introduced specifically to verify if in a compound lottery the 
introduction of uncertainty Is perceived in a different way whether It 
is introduced in the second stage or in the first stage of the lottery. 
In lottery M there are two bags, one contains six white and six 
black balls; the other bag is empty. People are asked to bet on one of 
the two colours, then a person, who is neither the subject or the 
experimenter draws two balls with replacement from the first bag and 
put them in the second bag, without showing the balls neither to the 
experimenter nor to the subject. At this point, the subject has to draw 
a ball and he or she will get the prize if the ball he or she has drawn 
is of the chosen colour. Of course, since the first two draws are with 
replacement, the probability of each colour is 1/2. However the aim of 
the lottery is to know how the subject perceives the fact that he or 
she does not really know what Is in the second bag; actually in the 
second bag there can be 2 black balls, two white balls or one white and 
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one bag ball. The second stage can be consequently represented exactly 
as lottery F. 
Results. In this experiment just 6 out of the 10 subjects who 
committed the Ellsberg paradox evaluated lottery M less then lottery E, 
showing that the presence of uncertainty has been perceived also in the 
second stage. 
The fact that the number of subjects who showed this preference 
relation were less than the number committing the Ellsberg paradox in 
our opinion, may depend on two factors: either on the fact that in the 
second bag the balls are two 
114; 
or that the focus of the subject in a 
compound lottery is more on the first branch, which in this case has 
certain probabilities. The first of these two interpretations has some 
support from the interviews; more than one subject declared i that, 
while evaluating the lottery, they were considering in how many cases 
they could choose from bags in which there was at least one ball of the 
chosen colour (in this case 2 out of 3 and consequently more then in 
lottery B); the second branch of the lottery can, actually, be 
represented in a decision tree as lottery F. 
Lottery M can so be evaluated more then lottery P or the same as 
lottery P depending whether individuals consider more important the 
existence of the uncertainty or the way that this uncertainty is 
represented. But also in the evaluation M towards P it Is important to 
consider that in the P case the number of unknown balls is 12, while in 
M they are just 2. 
In 3 cases we have M evaluated the same as P and in 6 cases M evaluated 
more then P, while just in one case P was evaluated more than M. 
showing that the limited number of balls in lottery U might had had had 
a positive influence in the evaluation of the subjects. 
The hypothesis of control 
The Model. One hypothesis that we wanted to test in this experiment 
was whether the feeling of having control over the experiment has an 
114The 
number of balls contained in a bag can have an influence 
especially if one bag can be considered as a sample of the other. A 
sample of two can be perceived in a different way than a sample of 6 
etc. See Gillotti and Sopher (1990). 
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influence on the valuations of the decision maker. To verify this we 
used lotteries U and P. Lottery U is a two-stage representation of the 
certain lottery E, while lottery P is the two-stage representation of 
the lottery 0. 
In lottery U the subject is asked to bet on a colour, to choose a bag 
(there are two bags one containing 12 black balls and the other 
containing 12 white balls) and to draw a ball. The same procedure is 
followed in lottery P, but the two bags contain an unknown proportion 
of black and white. 
In order to verify this hypothesis, lottery B should be compared with 
lottery U and lottery P with lottery S. What distinguishes these two 
pairs of lotteries, and Is crucial to the verification of our 
hypothesis, is the fact that, while in lottery U and in lottery P, the 
choice of the bag in the first stage is the responsibility of the 
subject, while in lotteries B and S the responsibility is given to an 
objective random mechanism. The rationale of repeating the choice is 
that the psychological weight of the feeling of having control over the 
experiment or of taking the responsibility of the choice of the bag can 
be different in a framework in which the probability of the outcome is 
known from a situation in which the probability of the outcome Is 
unknown. 
This kind of reasoning can be linked to the hypothesis of Heath and 
Tversky (1991). In their experiment the two authors try to verify the 
following hypothesis: subjects prefer to play out a lottery, of which 
they have a subjective probability over the outcomes, when the lottery 
is related to some field of their knowledge than to play out a roulette 
lottery, in which the probabilities and the two outcomes are exactly 
the same as the horse lottery. However, if they have little knowledge 
about the field related to that bet, then, they will prefer to play out 
the random objective lottery instead of a lottery with the same but 
subjective probability over the same outcomes. This kind of preference 
relation is explained by the Heath and Tversky in the following way: 
when you know the field on which you are betting, whatever the final 
outcome will be, you will be considered responsible for your choice, 
hence you will take the blame or the credit for it. But when your 
knowledge in the field on which you are betting is weak then, from a 
psychological point of view, it is better if the blame or the credit is 
given to luck more than to you. 
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Lotteries B and P and U and S can be reread in this context; let us 
consider lotteries B and U, first: in this case, the subject knows the 
composition of the two bags, he or she has not to use any subjective 
probability; the only difference is in the first stage of the lottery. 
In B the subject is responsible for the choice; he or she can be blamed 
or get credit for the choice; while in U the choice is made by a random 
device. 
The results. Let us now consider lotteries B and U; in this case, 
the composition of the two bags is known and, consequently, the subject 
is betting in a situation in which knowledge is strong. 
In the first set of lotteries 807. of the subjects did evaluate the two 
lotteries equally; the usual explanation was that the probabilities 
were in any case equal to 1/2 and so the mechanism according to which 
the bag was chosen in the first stage was irrelevant to their choices. 
In the second set of lotteries, (the composition of the bag was 
unknown), 30% of the subjects preferred lottery S over lottery P, 
giving the responsibility for the choice of the bag to the random 
device. This kind of pattern seem at least not inconsistent with the 
credit and blame model. What seems to matter to the subjects was not 
the feeling of having a better control of the experiment if they were 
to be asked of choosing the bag; the stronger feeling seem to be more 
that avoiding the responsibility of the choice in an unknown 
environment; when the environment was clearly defined, the mechanism of 
choice in the first stage is perceived as irrelevant. This is clearly 
stated 
US In the interviews of the subjects. The behavior of these 
subjects appear to be in some ways at least not inconsistent with Heath 
and Tversky's theory; the fact that the subjects behaved in a more 
115 Subject 1, for example, "With B you have got to choose the colour of 
the ball and, then, it is like down to faith, again, when you toss the 
coin, whether you go for the bag , which has got your colour of the ball that you have chosen: it seem rather down to faith if you are 
lucky. U it seems of the same sort. It is down to faith which bag you 
choose, because the coin is just external to the experiment really; the 
only thing which is different is whether the coin designs where you put 
your hand in , or, you decide where to put your hand in. But the bags 
are equal, anyway, they can be mixed up. V is the same as B. The only 
difference is because I is the experimenter to choose the bag; it is 
still down to luck again, because V and B are exactly the same; because 
it is an external force. U is the same because it is still down to luck 
where you choose. " 
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consistent way with the credit and blame hypothesis in the case of the 
unknown bags can be explained with the particular contest in which they 
have to decide in this experiment; the lottery with the unknown 
probabilities can be quite easily be assimilated to a bet on a field in 
which your knowledge is very weak, on the other hand in lottery U you 
do not have much to worry about since anyway the composition of the bag 
is fixed and known116 
To sum up, it seems possible to conclude that the feeling of 
control does not seems to matter a great deal in the evaluation of the 
lotteries especially when the environment is known or considered clear 
by the subject. However some of the choices can be more easily, even if 
cautiously, interpreted in a way quite close to the credit and blame 
hypothesis of Heath and Tversky (1991). 
Ambiguity aversion as aversion to complexity. 
The model. Another psychological factor which can have an 
influence on the explanation of the Ellsberg paradox can be the 
aversion to complexity. If ambiguity can be represented by a set of 
probability measures, then to evaluate lotteries becomes more complex; 
since thinking is costly then the more complicated is to evaluate a 
lottery, the more is the requested effort and the less will be my 
evaluation. 
The experimental design and the results. To verify this hypothesis 
I introduce the set of lotteries B, F, A, G, H, C, where complexity 
is represented by an Increase in the number of probability measures 
that the subject has to consider in evaluating a lottery. If people 
react negatively to complexity it can be expected that their 
evaluations of the lotteries would be in inverse proportion to the 
number of bag. Since this is true just for one subject out of 10 this 
psychological explanation can be dismissed as an explanation of the 
Ellsberg paradox. In analyzing those lotteries the focus of the 
subjects was not on the complexity of the choice, but more on the value 
116 It is important to remember, however, that in the case of lottery I 
and C, two subjects preferred C to I showing that they prefer to choose 
the bag directly than to give the choice to a random device when 
probabilities are known. 
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Table 111.5 Summary of the results. 
Theory Patterns of evaluations number of 
subjects 
Non EP E-D-U-B-F-A-G^-H-C-I-R-L-P-S-O-Z-M 11 
EU T and N evaluated more than E7 
Kadane T and Q evaluated 02 
EP E >-O 10 
Segal E>-F 5 
F>A>-G -H>-C 1 
Raiffa C-I 3 
B-U 7 
E-U 5 
S-p 6 
S-0 6 
Kadane B>-V 0 
P>-Q 4 
Schmeidler E-Z 4 
Maximin R>-L>-F 2 
R>-L--F 3 
Information N>-T 6 
Control B»U 2 
S>-P 3 
Complexity F>A>-G»H>-C 1 
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of probability of choosing one bag containing at least one ball of the 
chosen colour. 
III. 4 Discussion and conclusion 
111.4.1 Rereading the results by subjects 
III. 4.1.1 The non EP subjects. 
As far as non EP subjects are concerned, they can be divided in 
two groups. In one group there are the subjects who recognized the 
different expected value of lotteries T and N (6 out of 10). In the 
other group all the subject gave the same evaluation to all the 
lotteries. In the first group however just three of the six subjects 
seem to have actually calculated the exact value of the lotteries. On 
the other hand, as has been described in detail in section 111.3.1, 
three of the subjects who evaluated all the lotteries the same 
recognized a different value of the lotteries T and N in the Interviews 
but this difference was not considered big enough to change their 
evaluations (see Table 111.5 for a summary of the various theories). 
111.4.1.2 The EP people. 
Now we will look at the results of the experiment referring to the 
specific evaluations of each subject, to verify if it is possible from 
their evaluations infer whether they behaved consistently with one or 
other of the various suggested explanations. 
As has been already observed the lotteries were designed to verify 
various explanations and not all the lotteries are relevant to explain 
all the hypotheses. This factor can have an influence in the way the 
data should be interpreted, since some models do not tell us anything 
about how the subject should evaluate a lottery which was originally 
designed to verify some other hypothesis or model. 
At a first look at the data, it is possible to divide the subjects into 
two main groups. In one group, we put all the subjects who made a 
different evaluation of each or almost each of the lotteries, while in 
the other group we put the subjects who grouped the lotteries mainly in 
two groups: the certain ones and the uncertain ones; and evaluated them 
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accordingly. 
Let us first consider the first group. In this group there are 
subjects 1,11,16,19 and 20. we will leave for the moment subject 19 
since this deserves special analysis. 
Subjects 1 and 20 are the two subjects who used consistently and 
explicitly the maximin criterion. Moreover for both of them the fact 
that a lottery could be considered fair or not was the more important 
factor in their evaluations. And they identify as fair a lottery in 
which there are no bags with just one colour in it; or, if there is a 
bag of this type, they evaluate the lottery according to the weight of 
this bag in the total of the bags. Both the subjects were quite 
consistent in their evaluations. 
Subject number 11 was the only subject who evaluated the lotteries 
consistently according to Segal's explanation. 
It is almost impossible to classify the behaviour of subject 16 
according to a specific theory apart from the fact that she always 
evaluates less the lotteries in which the experimenter chooses the bag. 
Subject 19, as has been already said, is the only subject who shows 
ambiguity loving behaviour. It is almost impossible to find any 
consistency of the evaluation of this subject with any of the theories. 
The subject however behaved in a quite consistent way to his own 
criterion which explicitly stated in the interview. He said that he 
liked very much to gamble and that he evaluated the lotteries not 
accordingly to likelihood of the prize but accordingly to the pleasure 
that a lottery gave to him. "More difficult or complicated I find a 
lottery more pleasure it will give to me if at the end I succeed hence 
I will evaluate It more". 
The second group of subjects is composed of subjects 5,7,8.14. 
These subjects mainly divided the lotteries in two groups; in one group 
they put all the lotteries they considered unknown, and, in the other 
group, all the lotteries they considered certain, and evaluated them 
accordingly. They did not distinguish each lottery in their evaluation 
even if for them there are some of the lotteries which are evaluated in 
a different way with respect to the known and the unknown probability 
group. Subject 8 said that she considered certain just lottery E, and 
that she regarded as uncertain all the other lotteries. Her evaluation 
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of these latter lotteries was alternatively 8 or 7 pounds and she 
explained the choice between 7 or pounds as a random way to maximize 
the possible gain due to the B-D-M device. This can just be interpreted 
in the sense that since she was not sure between 8 and 7 she just 
evaluated half of the lotteries 7 and the other half 8. 
In the interview, the subject explained her choice as follows: " Just 
because I played out without any risk, so, I thought, let's evaluate 
them all about between seven to ten pounds, because the chance that you 
get that number, when a number is picked, where you just got the money, 
and you do not play the lottery at all, is over 507.; so I thought, it 
is better to get some money than nothing, because playing the lottery 
is 25 or ought so I thought .. I just play without any risk, 
because 
there is more chance... 
.... From 7 to 10 I think I have just randomly chosen, actually... 
I 
mean, it depends on how much I thought the lottery will come towards a 
good end, or a bad end; I did not really calculate the lotteries, but I 
thought, if there were fifty percent chance I play ten, but if it just 
sounds suspicious to me, I just put 8 or 7 pounds, just randomly. " 
To sum up, this latter group seem to focus in their evaluation on 
just single dimension the presence of uncertainty and the absence of 
it. In particular these subjects seem to identify the presence of 
uncertainty with the fact that the probability where not known and 
absence of it with the known probabilities. They did not seems have 
given importance to any of the other differences, not even the presence 
of more then one probability distribution for the events to be 
considered in the choice. 
111.5 Final consideration. 
Before concluding, some general comments on the results of this 
experiment are needed. If we look at the subjects that committed the 
Ellsberg Paradox and to their evaluations, we can observe (see table 
111.3) that can be divided into two main groups. One group of subjects 
made a different evaluation of each or almost each of the lotteries, 
while an other group just gave roughly two different evaluations: a 
bigger one to the certain lotteries (usually lottery E and the 
lotteries with known second order distribution) and a smaller one to 
the uncertain lotteries. In the first group of subjects most of them 
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seem to follow consistently one model or another 
117 
at least where 
possible. In this group, for example, we can find subjects who used 
consistently and explicitly (recognized from the interviews) the 
maximin criterion. Subjects belonging to the second group seem to focus 
in their evaluation on just single dimension: the presence of 
uncertainty or the absence of it. In particular these subjects seem to 
identify the presence of uncertainty with the fact that the 
probabilities were not known, and presence of it with known 
probabilities. They did not seems have given importance to any of the 
other differences, not even the presence of more then one probability 
distribution for the events to be considered in the choice. 
It is important to note that most of the subjects evaluated the 
lotteries by dividing them Into groups (they came at the interview with 
little packs of lotteries). They put the lotteries together according 
to some criterion, and then, evaluated them separately in each group. 
It seems that the focus of their attention was, first, for example, on 
the presence or absence of uncertainty and, then, within each group on 
other factors, like the number of bags or the mechanism of selection of 
the bags. 
Moreover, the subjects who have evaluated the majority of the lotteries 
in a different way seem to have adopted different criteria in different 
contexts, which may suggest that uncertainty is perceived in a 
different way in different environments (See chapter VI for a more 
detailed interpretation). 118 
The fact that each subject seems to apply different theories can be due 
either to the fact that the application of a particular theory by a 
subject is context based, or that each theory recognized just one 
source of ambiguity. As we have seen, very often a particular theory 
operationalizes ambiguity in a particular way. These different 
117 Cf Table 111.3 Subject 16 for example follows Segal (1987), while 1 
and 2 follow always a maximin rule. Since however each lottery was 
designed to test a particular theory, a lottery must be considered just 
in respect to the theory according to which has been designed (a 
lottery may not reveal anything about other theories. ) 
118 Each individual seems to have reasoned according to a different theory in 
the various contexts. The point Is that since every theory focus on a 
different source of ambiguity (different operationalization of ambiguity), 
most of the subjects recognized all these different sources and evaluate 
accordingly the corresponding lotteries. 
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operationalizations may or may not all be perceived by the subjects. 
This latter interpretation can, it seems, explain why some subjects 
made a single evaluation for all the unknown lotteries without 
differentiating between them. For these subjects their ambiguity 
aversion may just depend on their aversion to the lack of information 
(unknown proportion). But this aversion is not linked to any particular 
way of representing ambiguity. 
The various theories we have tested may explain how people represent 
ambiguity in different contexts or how different people generally 
perceive ambiguity. However they do not seem to give an exhaustive 
explanation of aversion to uncertainty. They surely identify some of 
the main sources of ambiguity but they are not able to explain all the 
ambiguity aversion behaviours. 
Are these result partially determined by the present set up of the 
experiment? Apart from the fact that in any case the design of an 
experiment is always crucial for the result, it is hard to say how far 
in this experiment the design may have had a major Influence. For sure 
some of the evaluations of the subjects were due to the fact that the 
lotteries were all two outcome lotteries and that the problem was 
always symmetric; symmetry however is one of the characteristics of the 
original Ellsberg problem. Changing the set up to a multi-outcome one 
can probably partially change the results. 
On the other hand one there is one thing which the results may suggest 
and that may be crucial in designing a further experiment. Uncertainty 
in the present set up was actually a limited concept of uncertainty. It 
was represented through the evaluation of gambles, all with the same 
two outcomes, t0 and £25. 
It was a concept of uncertainty that was mainly confined to the idea 
of the existence of a set of probability measures or to a second order 
distribution. But nevertheless even in this particular set up 
uncertainty was clearly perceived and people showed a strong aversion 
to it. 
Moreover, if a conclusion is to be draw from this experiment is that 
probably, even in this set up, too many elements were present and were 
interacting one with the other. The explanations, theoretical or 
psychological were all to some extent true, but no one could totally 
capture the behaviour of any one of the subjects. If this is true in 
203 
such a limited set up then it is hard to figure that any theory could 
explain the behaviour of people when faced with "real" uncertainty. 
What kind of suggestions can be draw from this experiment for 
further research? On the one, hand we would suggest that to have a deep 
insight into the phenomenon of decision making under uncertainty, it 
would be more important to test different elements of one theory than 
various theories. As we have seen in the analysis of section 
111.3.4.1. Segal's theory of ambiguity is formed by more than one 
element and all the elements are crucial to Segal analysis. It could be 
useful according to me to try to verify the differing importance of the 
various elements in the explanation of the subjects ' reaction to 
uncertainty. The importance of the different elements can vary 
according to the level of ambiguity or kind of outcomes (gain or 
losses) or their levels. The same theory can moreover be tested in a 
game of chance set up or in a event set up. The same kind of inquiry 
can be applied to other theories like Gardenfors' (maximin) or 
Schmeidler's ones, for example. One the other hand, as far as the 
explanation of the EP is concerned in general, we think that more 
experimental investigations on decision making under ambiguity are 
needed with bets on natural events. In particular we are thinking of 
investigating the role of information in decision making under 
ambiguity in a natural event set up. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPACT OF AMBIGUITY ON THE VALUATION OF SELF-INSURANCE AND 
SELF-PROTECTION 
IV. 1. Introduction 
In chapter III we tested some of the theories which explain the 
Ellsberg paradox in a chance context. People had to evaluate lotteries 
and all the lotteries had a zero or a positive outcome. The aim of this 
chapter is instead that of testing if ambiguity matters in real life 
situations. To do so we choose an insurance decision. People had 
consequently to evaluate how much to spend to self protect or self 
insure themselves when faced with ambiguous and risky choices. Being 
an insurance problem the choice of our subjects involve a zero or a 
negative outcome. This allowed us to test in a completely different 
context one theory which seemed to have performed quite well in the 
previous experiment, that is to say the Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982) 
maximin model, but with choices involving losses. As we have seen from 
the analysis of the literature in Chapter I and II, some of the 
theories which explain ambiguity aversion in the case of positive 
outcomes allow for ambiguity preference in the case of negative 
outcomes. In this respect the experiment described in this chapter can 
be seen as a test of this more general hypothesis. 
On the other hand we concluded the last chapter by saying that 
ambiguity theories need to be tested in a event context and not just in 
a chance context. The following experiment is somehow in-between. 
People in fact had to evaluate scenarios about the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of some event and consequently the choice of investing 
in self-protection or in self-insurance. The probability of the 
occurrence of the event is described by imprecise statements to convoy 
the idea of ambiguity. (we choose different imprecise statements 
according to different theories). Vagueness as imprecision in 
probability estimates is one of the way in which in real life ambiguity 
is expressed. In evaluating the various scenarios subjects do not have 
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to refer to a lottery context. However, there still remains the problem 
that to resolve uncertainty (play out one of the scenarios for real at 
the end of the experiment in order to pay the subjects) we choose a 
lottery, that is to say a chance device. This was due mainly (as will 
be explained later on in much detail) to the fact that we expressed 
vagueness in the probabilities through (1) an imprecise esteem, (2) a 
set of probability measure, and (3) an interval probabilities. Hence, 
the more straightforward way to operationalize it at the end was 
through a second order distribution. However at the time of their 
evaluations the subjects did not know how the scenario was going to be 
played out. We choose not to show it on purpose in order to avoid a 
possible decrease in the ambiguity perception (Camerer and Kunreuther 
(1989)). As a practice question deliberately we chose a risky one. As 
will be seen by the account of the following experiment, testing 
theories in a more real life context creates more problems for the 
experimental design, but allows us to know more about theories which 
are proposed to explain a phenomenon (ambiguity aversion or aversion to 
uncertainty) which has more to do with every day life situations than 
to a chance context and whose implications (and policy implications) in 
real life might be rather important. 
IV. 2 Self insurance and self protection. 
The seminal paper by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) discussed the 
alternatives to market insurance available to an expected utility 
maximising consumer or firm who wants to cover against the risk of a 
loss. An individual can either purchase preventive measures that reduce 
the probability of a loss (self-protection) or invest in a reduction in 
the size of the loss (self-insurance). 
Several papers have extended the original model on self-protection 
and self-insurance, showing, for instance, how self-protection is not 
monotonically related to the degree of risk-aversion (see for instance 
Dionne and Eeckhout (1985) and Briys, Schlesinger and Schulemburg 
(1991)). Sweeney and Beard (1992) show that, given two individuals with 
a von Morgestern utility wealth function and with the same initial 
wealth , it is impossible that one of the two individuals buys 
systematically more self-protection than the other, even if no 
restriction is placed on the individual risk attitude. Concerning the 
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relative preferability of self-protection and self-insurance, Boyer and 
Dionne (1983), for instance, show that if self-protection and 
self-insurance expenditures reduce the average loss by the same amount 
and have the same cost, risk adverse individual will prefer 
self-insurance to self-protection because the former involves a lower 
risk. 
However if we consider complete self protection and complete self 
insurance, it can be shown in very simple terms that if the lottery 
being evaluated involves a loss in the bad state of the world and a 
payoff of zero (no loss) in the good state of the world, then 
self-protection that reduces the probability of loss to zero should be 
equivalent to self-insurance that reduces the loss to zero, because 
they both eliminate risk completely. 
Consider the following simple lottery [p, -L; (1 - p), 01. Both an 
investment in complete self-protection or in complete self-insurance 
give an expected value of 0. 
However, since decision making is influenced by the frame under which 
the decision problem is presented, individuals may evaluate 
self-protection and self-insurance differently simply because they are 
perceived as two different ways of reducing risk, even though an 
expected utility maximiser should be indifferent between the two 
risk-reduction tools119. 
The equivalence between self-protection and self-insurance should 
not hold (even for the expected utility maximiser) if the good state of 
the world involves a gain of G. The value of the lottery [p, -L; (1 - 
p), + GI is G with certainty if the individual reduces the probability 
to zero and (1 - p)G if the individual purchases self-insurance and 
reduces the loss to zero. In the latter case, individuals should value 
self-protection more than self-insurance. 
In this paper we intend to explore the issue of the existence of a 
particular framing effect due to the risk reduction mechanism used. In 
a laboratory experiment we try to elicit the prices that individuals 
are willing to pay for self-insurance and for self-protection. 
119 The reduction of the potential loss to zero can be perceived 
differently from the reduction of the probability to zero. Even if the 
result in term of expected value is the same . in one case the focus is on the outcome while in the other case the focus can be on the 
probability side. 
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The issue of the existence of a frame due to the risk-management tool 
has already been addressed in an experimental study by Shogren (1990), 
which uses a lottery involving a loss. L. in the bad state of the world 
and a gain. G. in the good state of the world. In Shogren's experiment, 
the valuation of self-protection was consistently higher than that for 
self-insurance, which is interpreted by the author as evidence that 
risk reduction mechanisms matter to evaluation. 
120 However, the use of a 
lottery involving gains does not allow the Isolation of framing 
effects due to the risk reduction mechanism used. As mentioned above, a 
utility maximiser would always prefer self-protection to self insurance 
as this would give a sure gain of G. 
In this work it is our intention to modify Shogren's work in order 
to detect up "pure" framing effects (if any) and to extend it to cover 
the case of lotteries characterized by ambiguous probabilities. Our 
first aim is to test whether the different frame provided by the two 
risk reduction mechanisms really determines a different evaluation of 
self-insurance and self-protection. We then test whether ambiguity 
affects the evaluation and the ranking of risk management tools. One 
might suspect that if individuals are averse to ambiguous 
probabilities, they might value self-protection less than 
self-insurance when asked to evaluate a lottery characterized by a 
known loss and an ambiguous probability. 
We construct an experimental design that Incorporates two markets: 
the market for self-insurance and the the market for self-protection 
(see Table IV. I for a summary). 
The design of the experiment is meant to capture three phenomena which 
are of relevance to theories of decision making under uncertainty. 
(1) The first issue concerns whether the presence of ambiguity alters 
the valuation of self-protection and self-insurance, and whether 
self-insurance and self-protection are ranked in the same order under 
risk and under ambiguous probabilities. For instance. an individual may 
prefer to install a burglar alarm in a house (self-protection) rather 
than put his valuables In a safe (self-insurance). But If there is no 
agreement concerning the probability of a burglary, would he still 
120 In addition, Shogren finds that if private versus collective 
financing mechanisms are used, private mechanisms are valued 
significantly more. 
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value the purchase of the alarm more than the safe? 
The issue of the effect of ambiguity on the valuation of self-insurance 
and self-protection will be explored considering three different ways 
of representing ambiguous probabilities. 
121 
Lotteries with different descriptions of ambiguity are administered to 
different subjects. Together with the ambiguous lotteries, subjects are 
asked to evaluate risky lotteries where the probability of loss is 
known with certainty and which are characterized by the same expected 
probability of loss (relative to the central probability in the 
ambiguous case. See below). 
(2) In addition to exploring the issue of how self-protection and 
self-insurance are ranked In individuals' preferences, our goal is to 
provide subjects with both low probability and high probability 
lotteries. 
If ambiguity matters to the evaluation of risk management tools, then 
by considering a wide range of probability measures, we hope to assess 
whether attitude to ambiguity varies with changes In the reference 
probability. Each lottery will be evaluated at four probability levels, 
3%, 207., 50% and 80%. 
(3) Finally, the results will be examined in the light of two models 
of behaviour under uncertainty, namely Einhorn and Hogarth (1985)'s 
Model of Anchoring and Adjustment, Gardenfors and Sahlin (1983)'s Model 
of Unreliable Probabilities. We shall derive predictions for these 
theories and test whether the results of the experiment accord with 
either of them. 
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121 As will be explained in detail in section 4.2, the three different 
ways of representing ambiguity are the following ones: to one group of 
subjects, we gave a description of a scenario in which the probability 
of a loss was given as a point estimate but not a precise one (the 
subjects were told that they had to consider themselves uncertain about 
such an estimate); for a second group of subjects, the expert's 
probability estimate was represented by an interval of probabilities 
(the true probability could fall anywhere in the interval); for a third 
group of subjects, a set of four probability measures was given, 
representing the estimates of four experts. 
122 We will interpret the results according to these two models, because 
the experiment was designed to test these two particular theories. As 
we will see below the bahaviour of a large group of subjects cannot be 
explained by any of these two models. We however feel cautious about 
attribute the behaviour of these subjects to other theories of 
ambiguity aversion. 
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Figure I VA 1 Summary of the experimental design. 
Experimental structure Hypotheses tested 
Risk reduction mechanism 
Se1f-Ins urance (SI) 
S. If -protection (SP) 
Does the risk reduction 
mechanism influence valuation? 
Valuation of risky versus 
ambiguous lotteries 
-Best estimate" 
-Intervals of probability 
-Set of probabil I ty 
me asure  
Does ambiguity matter to the 
valuation of risk reduction? 
Does the presence of ambiguity 
alter the bids for SI and SP? 
Is there a change In prices when 
the definition of ambiguity is 
changed? 
Valuation over a range Of How doss valuation change from 
probabilities of loss low-risk to high-risk events? 
I p. W-L; (1 - p) W1 Do bids for ambiguous lotteries 
Where p= 3%. 20X. 50%. 80% follow the predictions of the 
model by Einhorn and Hogarth? 
IV. 3 Ambiguity in the probability and the valuation of self-insurance 
and self-protection. 
Since Ellsberg (1961) decision theorists have recognized that, 
when asked to evaluate an uncertain prospect, a large number of 
individuals make choices from which it is impossible to infer 
subjective probabilities obeying the classical laws of probability 
theory. Subadditivity of the "subjective" probabilities of 
complementary events is often observed in choice. Thus, a descriptive 
theory of behaviour under uncertainty must allow for sub-additivity (as 
well as super-additivity) and explain what determines an individual's 
attitude to uncertainty. 
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Here we apply two theories of behaviour under probability 
uncertainty, namely Einhorn-Hogarth (1986), and Gardenfors-Sahlin 
(1983) to the problem of the valuation of self-protection versus 
self-insurance. In particular, for each of these models, we derive 
predictions concerning the attitude that individuals display towards 
ambiguity at varying probability levels and check whether the data 
obtained from the experiment support either of these predictions. 
Einhorn and Hogarth's model has been found to fit pretty well the 
price-setting behaviour in an insurance context both by 
insurers/underwriters and by consumers (see Hogarth and Kunreuther 
(1985,1989)). Given the strong similarity between the problem we 
investigate and that explored by Hogarth and Kunreuther (1985,1989), we 
would have expected more support of our data to the theory. However, we 
find ambiguous support for the model of anchoring and adjustment. 
The model by Gardenfors and Sahlin has been interpreted mainly as a 
maximin rule and applied to a case in which the set of possible 
probability distributions and their reliability is exogenously given. 
Although we realize that this procedure is an over-simplification of 
the original model, our aim was to check for the percentage of 
respondents in an insurance/protection experiment who applied a maximin 
rule to choose their buying price. 
With respect to the pricing of self-insurance vs self-protection, as 
will be seen, both the theories tested predict that if the investment 
in self-protection is such that it reduces the probability of the loss 
to zero, and likewise, if expenditure in self-insurance reduces the 
size of the loss to zero, then, the two risk reduction mechanisms 
should receive the same valuation, even if the probability of the loss 
is ambiguous. 
Hence, an individual that is averse to ambiguity at a given probability 
level in the context of self-insurance, should be so also in the 
context of self-protection. Thus, any differential impact of ambiguity 
on the valuation of self-insurance and self-protection should be again 
ascribed to a framing effect linked to the risk reduction mechanism. 
IV. 3.1. Expected utility theory predtcttons. 
Consider an expected utility maximiser consumer with initial 
wealth who faces the risk of a loss L if the bad state of the world 
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occurs. Let p be the probability of the loss occurring. If there is no 
gain in the good state of the world, expected utility predicts that the 
individual should give the same valuation to a reduction in the loss to 
zero and to a reduction of the probability of the loss to zero. 
Consider the lottery [W - L, p; W, (1 - p)), where W represents the 
individual's endowment. Then, the maximum willingness to pay to reduce 
the risk of a loss to zero, P, is identified by: 
U(W - P)= pU(W - L) + (1 - p)U(W) (IV. 1) 
It is easy to check that one gets the same expression for a reduction 
of the size of the loss to zero. If there are no gains in the good 
state of the world, the individual gets a utility of U(W - P) with 
certainty both with self-insurance and self-protection. 
Since utilities are linear in the probabilities, ambiguity in 
probabilities should not matter to premium setting by consumers who 
want to self-protect or self-insure. The "ambiguous" probability can be 
in fact represented through a second order distribution. As long as the 
mean of the second order probability distribution coincides with the 
probability of the correspondent risky lottery ambiguity should not 
matter. 
123 Hence, the prices that subjects are willing to pay to acquire 
the right to self-protect or to self insure should be the same for both 
ambiguous and risky lotteries. 
HyDothesis 1- An individual asked to bid his maximum willingness to 
pay to self-insure or self-protect given a lottery of the type (W - L, 
p; W, (1 - p)), will quote the same premium. In addition to this, he 
should value ambiguous and risky lotteries equivalently. 
IV. 3.2. Einhorn and Hogarth's model of anchoring and adjustment 
In the anchoring and adjustment model It Is assumed that 
123 Since we had to choose how to operationalize ambiguity at the end of 
the experiment, when one scenario was picked out randomly and played 
out for real in order to pay the subjects, we decided to use always a 
second order distribution operationalization. This allowed us to use a 
uniform method while maintaining as much as possible a representation 
compatible with the chosen theories. 
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individuals evaluate an ambiguous lottery by forming a subjective 
assessment of the true probability, S(p), according to the following 
functional: 
S(p)= p+ C[(1 - p) - pß] (VL2) 
where p is the anchor, i. e. the starting value which is adjusted 
upwards or downwards according to people's perception of ambiguity and 
according to their attitude to ambiguity. The anchor value of the 
probability is established according to the individual's experience, 
information set, and can be assumed to coincide with the expected value 
of the probability distribution. 6 (0 s6s 1) is a parameter that 
indicates the amount of ambiguity perceived and ß is the parameter 
that indicates the attitude to ambiguity (but not necessarily ambiguity 
preference or aversion). In particular, ß=1 means that the individual 
gives equal weight to adjustments below or above the anchor. ß>1 
implies that individuals attach more weight to adjustments above the 
anchor and the opposite if ß<1. ß=0 implies that adjustment takes 
place only below the anchor. 
If individuals assess probabilities according to the anchoring model, 
the premium for self-protection or self-insurance is then identified 
by: 
U(W - AP)= S(p)U(W - L) + S(1 - p)U(W) (IV. 3) 
where AP is the ambiguity premium and S(1 - p) is given by: 
S(1 - p) = (1 - p) + ß[p - (1 - p)ß) (IV. 4) 
Assuming that the anchor used in forming the value of S(p) coincides 
with the probability of loss in the risky lottery, we can divide (IV. 3) 
by (IV. 1) and obtain: 
Rc-U(W - AP)_S(p)U(W - L) + S(1 - p)U(W) (IV. S) 
U(W - P) PU (W -L)+(1-p)U(W) 
If W=L, utility can be conveniently normalized so that U(W - L) 
U(O) = 0. In this case: 
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Rc=Rc(P, 6,13)U( 
W AN 
= 
S(1 - p) (IV. 6) 
U(W - P) (1 - p) 
The value of Rc is a function of the individual's 13,6, and of the 
value of the anchor. If the individual is averse to ambiguity, he will 
be willing to pay a higher premium to self-protect or self-insure 
against the uncertain lottery, i. e. AP > P. If utility is monotonically 
related to wealth states, this implies that Rc < 1, and in turn that 
S(1 - p) < (1 - p). It can be easily checked that a necessary condition 
for the individual to remain persistently ambiguity averse whatever the 
value of the anchor is that ß=0. If ßs1, a necessary condition for 
the individual to be ambiguity averse is that (1 - p) < . 5. If ßs1, 
in fact, the individual will give more weight to adjustments below the 
anchor (1 - p), and hence will deem the state of the world Involving 
a loss more probable. If ß>1, then the individual can only be 
ambiguity averse for (1 - p) > . 5. 
If the individual exhibits ambiguity preference, then AP < P, and 
Rc > 1. This implies that S(1 - p) > (1 - p). As before, if ßs1, it 
must necessarily be (1 - p) > . 5. For ß>1 then it must be 
(1 - p) < 
. 5. In this case, the individual will give greater value to adjustments 
above the anchor (1 - p) and thus he will consider the loss less 
probable. 
In general, for each value of ß, as the value of p rises, Rc increases 
and the individual may eventually switch from ambiguity aversion to 
ambiguity preference according to its ß. Each value of is. in fact, 
identifies a unique cross-over point from ambiguity aversion to 
ambiguity proneness. 
Figures IV. 2 (a, b, c) present the results of some simple simulations 
carried out using three possible values of 0 (0 = . 1,. 5,. 9) and three 
possible values of ß (ß =0,1.2). Figure IV. 2 (a) illustrates that for ß 
= 0, the cross over from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity preference 
never occurs, whatever the value of 0 and p: the ambiguity function 
consistently lie below the unity line. If ß=0 we should observe the 
same value of Rc both at low and high probability levels. In Figure 
IV. 2 (b) (ß = 1), the cross-over point occurs when p= . 5. Finally, in 
Figure IV. 2 (c) (ß = 2), the individual switches to preference for 
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Figure IV. 2 Simulation of Einhorn and Hogarth's model 
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ambiguity at a value of p= . 38. For each ß, the greater the value of 
ß, the greater the distance of S(1-p) from the anchor at each 
observation point. 
Hypothesis 2- As the probability of a loss increases from low to high 
values, individuals will tend to move from ambiguity aversion (Rc < 1) 
to ambiguity preference (Rc > 1). 
IV. 3.3. Gardenfors and Sahltn' s maxtmtn model 
The model by Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982) argues that the main 
drawback of Bayesianism is the failure to realize that the information 
available to a decision maker who has to form subjective probabilities 
of an event can carry different degrees of eptstemic reliability. 
In the model, it is assumed that people - when confronted with 
lotteries in which a set of probability measures is substituted for a 
single probability measure - will evaluate them in the following way: 
they will compute the expected utility corresponding to each of the 
probability measures contained in the set and then they will evaluate 
the lotteries according to their minimum expected utility, i. e. they 
will place a higher value on the lottery which has the highest minimum 
expected utility. 
Let f and g be two lotteries each characterized by a set of states of 
the world S= (s 
l, sZ,.., sJ,..., sm). 
Beliefs about the states of the 
world are represented by a set of probability measures for each state 
of the world sJ , P(sJ), made up of n probability measures 
(plJ 0p2j ,.., p11,..., pnJ). The set of all probability measures defined 
over all states of the world will make up the set P. Under uncertainty, 
even if several probability distributions are possible, some 
distributions will be considered by the individual more reliable than 
others, i. e. some probability measures attached to each state sj will 
have a higher degree of epistemtc reliability. The set P(s1) which is 
actually mentally simulated by the individual is one which includes 
only those probability measures considered to carry a sufficient degree 
of epistemic reliability (See relevant section in chapter I). 
Let xJ, = f(sI) be the outcome associated to the occurrence of state 
of the world si if lottery f is chosen, and xk = g(s1) be the outcome 
associated to state of the world sJ if lottery g is chosen by the 
216 
decision maker. The utility of each outcome is denoted as normal by 
U(-). Lottery f will be preferred to lottery g if the minimum expected 
utility of f is higher than the minimum expected utility of g. 
fg if min 
J 
U(f(si))p1J >min 
J 
U(g(si))pIj (IV. 7) 
where i=1....., n 
This is equivalent to saying that individuals will evaluate a lottery 
according to what the worst situation will be, i. e. using a maximin 
criterion. 
In the problem of choosing the premium for self-insurance or 
self-protection there are only two states of the world, namely, loss 
occurs NO or does not occur (sa). Subjects are asked to evaluate 
lotteries of the following kind: 
L= P(sI)U(W-L) + P(s2)U(W) (N. 8) 
where P(sI) is a vector of n probability measures (p1, p2,.. p1"". pn), 
with pl < p2 < pI < pR, and P(s2) is made up of complementary 
probability measures P(s2) = (1-pl, l-p2,.. 1-p1,.. l-pn). The set of n 
probability distributions that are included in P(sI) are those 
considered to be epistemically reliable by the individual, i. e. those 
which are assigned at least a minimum level of epistemic reliability. 
In our experiment, in order to simplify treatment, we decided to fix 
the number of epistemically reliable probability distributions 
exogenously (See an example of the scenario given to subjects in the 
Appendix). Subjects were told that the probability distributions 
included In the set "all carried some reliability", although it could 
not be said which distribution was more reliable than the others. P(sl) 
was fixed to be a vector of n-4 probability measures (p1, p2, p30p4), 
with pl < p2 < p3 < p4, and P(s2) was made up of complementary 
probability measures P(s2) _ (1-p1,1-p2, l-p3,1-p4). 
The subject had to choose whether to self-protect (or self-insure) or 
not by identifying which alternative gave him the highest minimal 
expected utility. If self-protection (or self-insurance) completely 
eliminates risk, then to invest a positive amount will always be the 
best alternative. The maximum willingness to pay will be determined by 
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equating 
124 
p4U(W-L) + (1-p4)U(W) = U(W - AN (W. 9) 
This is equivalent to saying that, when evaluating the expected utility 
of each lottery in order to choose the maximum premium they are willing 
to pay to self-protect or self-insure, individuals should give more 
weight to the situation in which the probability of a loss Is higher. 
125 
If an individual evaluates the lottery according to the Gardenfors and 
Sahlin model, therefore, it is easy to see that the individual will 
always pay a higher price for the ambiguous lottery as compared to the 
risky lottery, at all probability levels. 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who apply a Gardenfors and Sahlin maximin 
rule will show ambiguity aversion, at each probability level. Hence, 
the maximum premium that they are willing to pay in case of ambiguity 
will always be higher than in case of risk, AP > P. 
IV. 4 - The experimental design 
IV. 4.1. The scenarios. 
In order to test the hypotheses put forward above, we ran 10 
experiments, with approximately 
126 8 subjects per session. In five 
124 This implies that the probability distributions in the set P(si) are 
all considered epistemically reliable. See Gardenfors and Sahlin, 
op. cit, 
p. 377. 
125 Example: If P(st) = (. 01,. 02,. 04,. 05), and L=W= 10, not investing 
in protection gives a minimum expected utility of ((. 05)U(0) + 
(. 05)U(W)), while purchasing protection gives a utility of W for sure. 
The maximum willingness to pay for self-protection will then be 
obtained from (. 05)U(10) = U(10 = AP). If utility can be approximated 
by expected value, this would give 'a premium AP = 0.5 
Compare now this result with the premium that would be quoted by an 
expected utility maximiser asked to evaluate a risky lottery with 
probability of loss equal to the mean value of P(si) _ 
(. 01,. 02,. 04,. 05), µ= . 03. This would give a premium P=0.3 126 Each session was designed to be run with the participation of eight 
subjects, but in practice we run sessions with 8, or 6 subjects. This 
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experiments we simulated a market for self-protection and in the 
remaining five a market for self insurance. 
In each experiment, each subject was asked to evaluate 8 scenarios, 
four referring to a risky prospect and the remaining four to an 
uncertain prospect. The four risky scenarios are characterized by four 
different probabilities of loss, namely, 37., 207., 509., 80%. The four 
uncertain scenarios are characterized by the same four levels of 
"ambiguous" probabilities. In order to do so, whichever representation 
of ambiguity we adopted, the means of the second order probability 
distributions, by which we choose to characterize the ambiguous 
probability, were 3%, 207., 50%, 80%. (See section IV. 4.2) 
IV. 4.2 The incentive mechanism. 
To elicit the preferences of each subjects we adopted a 
computerised auction mechanism. The auction mechanism was adopted in 
order to provide subjects with an incentive mechanism capable of 
inducing truthful revelation of the subjects' willingness to pay. In 
order to elicit the maximum willingness to pay of all the bidders 
(winner included) we used a variant of the second price auction. 
127 The 
auction was computerized and an ascending clock was used to help the 
bidders decide when they wanted to leave the auction, i. e. when the 
price had hit their maximum willingness to pay. For each market, 
subjects were asked to place a bid to purchase the right to self insure 
(or to self-protect); in practice they were asked to press a key when 
they wanted to leave the auction that is to say when the price shown by 
the clock reached the maximum price they were willing to pay. Before 
each bid, each subject was endowed with £10 and was told that he faced 
the risk of a loss of £10 with probability p. 
In the market for self-protection, each subject was asked to quote 
his or her maximum willingness to pay to reduce the probability of loss 
to zero, given the magnitude of the loss. In the market for 
self-insurance, subjects were asked to quote their maximum willingness 
was mainly due to lack of subjects or to the fact that some subjects 
did not turn up at the very last moment. 
127 This particular auction has been studied by Harstad (1990). On the 
preference revealing property of the second price auction in case of 
ambiguity see Karni and Safra (1986)(1987) and Salo and Weber (1994). 
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to pay to reduce the loss to zero, given the probability of the loss. 
When the subjects had expressed their willingness to pay in all the 8 
scenarios, one of the 8 scenarios was chosen at random. For that 
scenario, the first and second highest bid were identified . The player 
who had made the highest bid acquired the right to self-protection (or 
self-insurance) and was obliged to pay the second highest bid. The rest 
of the participants were subject to a random draw to determine whether 
the negative event (a loss of £10) took place or not and they were paid 
accordingly. The auction worked as follows: the subjects were shown a 
screen with the description of the scenario and then they were asked to 
state the maximum amount of money that they were willing to pay either 
to reduce the probability of the loss to zero or tho reduce the loss to 
zero. 
They were asked to press a key when they were ready to start. At this 
point on the screen a clock was displayed, with a price that was 
steadily increasing. They were asked to indicate their willingness to 
pay by pressing any key when the price reached the most that they were 
willing to pay; that is to say when they wanted to leave the auction. 
For example the words used in the case of self-insurance were the 
following ones: 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce this potential loss to zero. 
You will be asked to press any key when the price reaches the most that 
you are willing to pay, That is, when you want to leave the auction. 
Before starting the real experiment subjects were given an 
hypothetical risky scenario to make them familiar with the problem and 
with the auction procedure. The risky scenario was chosen instead of 
the ambiguous one in order to avoid the risk of a reduction In the 
perception of ambiguity due to a sort of learning effect. On the 
contrary the literature on the problem of overbidding and underbidding 
in auctions suggests to introduce the hypothetical question in order to 
help people to become more familiar with the auction procedure 
ý. It is 
important to notice however that, in this experiment, the auction 
mechanism was used to elicit subjects' preferences in the case of risky 
and ambiguous choices. In this case overbidding or under bidding should 
128 Cf.. Vickrey, (1961), Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987), Kagel and Levin 
(1993), Kagel (1992). 
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not be a problem since we are interested any way in the ratio of the 
two premia and there is no reason to think that overbidding should be 
more/less frequent in a risky than in an ambiguous situation. 
The following paragraph explains in detail how the concept of ambiguity 
is made operative. 
The instructions and an example of the lotteries are given in the 
appendix C. 
IV. 4.3. The definitions of ambtguity and their operattonalizatton. 
In the experimental design we use three different ways of 
representing ambiguous probabilities: (1), a so called "best estimate" 
scenario 
129 (2), a probability interval, and (3), a set of probability 
measures. The choice of these three ways was determined mainly by three 
factors. 
a. uncertain probability as best estimate probability is the original 
way of representing ambiguous probabilities by Einhorn and Hogarth 
(1985,1986,1990),. 
b. a set of probability measures is the original way of representing 
Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982) model. 
C. using a definition of ambiguous probability as interval probability 
(but preserving the same mean and the same extremes of the second order 
distribution as in Einhorn and Hogarth (1985,1985) and Gardenfors and 
Sahlin (1982)) gave us the opportunity of testing the two models with a 
further representation of ambiguous probabilities. 
In all the three cases, moreover, it was possible to operationalize 
ambiguity as a second order probability distribution when we had to 
resolve the uncertainty and pay the subjects, once an ambiguous 
scenario was randomly picked up at the end of the experiment and 
played out for real. 
129See 
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989). However we do not use the 
definition "your best estimate" as in Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989) but 
instead "an expert's estimate". If we represent the "best estimate" as 
a second order probability distribution, nobody can guarantee that the 
subject would consider that stated value as the mean and not for 
example the mode of the distribution. In order to limit this problem of 
the Einhorn and Hogarth theory we use a symmetric second order 
distribution in which mode and mean coincide. See also the following 
footnote. 
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We faced, in fact, two different problems: to describe an 
ambiguous situation in a scenario and to make it possible to play out 
the scenario for real. In both cases we tried to maintain a certain 
uniformity. In the description of the scenario we always used the same 
words; and we always referred to the probability estimate as "provided 
by some expert hired by a Governmental agency"130 On the other way, we 
chose to operationalize ambiguity, once again in a uniform way, once a 
scenario had to be played out for real, 
Hence ambiguity was made operational by specifying a second order 
distribution for the probability of loss, but in each of the three case 
this second order distribution had different characteristics. The first 
two definitions of ambiguity correspond to a different second order 
probability distribution: the "best estimate" ambiguity corresponds to 
a second order distribution centered on the "best estimate" value, 
while the interval of probability corresponds to a uniform second order 
distribution of the probability measures inside the interval. 
The set of probabilities corresponds to a situation where various 
second order distributions are possible, but the subjects do not know 
ex ante which particular one will apply. 
In all instances, subjects were not told how the lotteries 
corresponding to the ambiguous scenarios were going to be resolved 
until they had evaluated the eight scenarios, in order to avoid the 
possibility that the amount of ambiguity might be reduced during the 
process of evaluation. 
131 
1- Best estimate probability. Subjects were told that p was the most 
reliable estimate of the likelihood of a negative event but that the 
expert who had provided the value was not 1007. certain. By doing this 
130 By doing this, we meant to avoid problems tied to source reliability 
which might affect the valuations of the scenarios used in the 
aforementioned Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989). See Appendix C. 
131 The problem is that if the uncertainty has to be resolved in a 
lottery context then it had to be specified in some way, but this 
"specification" may reduce the level of ambiguity. The description of 
the probabilities in various scenarios was left as vague as possible in 
order to avoid people to be forced to perceive ambiguity as a second 
order distribution. See Appendix. This is also one of the reasons we 
decided not to give any information on the resolution of uncertainty at 
the beginning of the experiment. May be interesting to note that none of 
the subjects asked any questions on how uncertainty was going to be 
resolved. 
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we tried to induce the subjects to anchor on the value of p (the 
expert estimate). 
As already mentioned, the best estimate ambiguity was characterized in 
terms of a second order distribution centered on the probability 
estimate shown in the scenario. 
We made this definition of ambiguity operative by asking one of the 
subjects to draw a ticket out of a bag that contained five tickets, 
three with the probability estimate given in the scenario and two with 
values corresponding the the extremes of the intervals. The ticket that 
was drawn determined the combination of black and white balls that was 
put in a bag and from which subjects were asked to draw a ball. The 
anchors provided are 37., 20%, 507. and 80%. 
2- Probability Interval. Subjects were given a range (pL, pH) within 
which the true probability lay. The intervals were fixed wide enough to 
allow us to discriminate between results that accord with the various 
theories tested. The probability intervals provided were: 
. 01 . 05 
. 05 . 35 
. 35 . 65 
.6 ; --. 95 
The average values of these intervals coincide with the probability 
measure provided in the best estimate scenarios. 
To resolve lotteries characterized by this type of ambiguity, we asked 
subjects to first draw a ticket from a bag containing as many tickets 
as there were numbers inside the interval. The ticket drawn 
corresponded to the combination of black and white balls put in the bag 
from which subjects had to pick a ball. 
3- Set of probability measures. The ambiguity in the probability of 
the loss is described by the fact that for each scenario four different 
probability measures are possible: pi, p2, p3, p4. However, the 
reliability of each of these estimates is not known, i. e. confidence 
weights, wi, w2, w3, w4, attached to each probability are unknown. This is 
equivalent to saying that the second order distribution of probability 
f (p) is unknown. 
The set of probability measures chosen are the following: 
(. 01,. 02,. 04,. 05) E(p) - . 03 
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(. 05,. 15,. 25,. 35) E(p) = . 20 
(. 55,. 45,. 55,. 65) E(p) = . 50 
(. 65,. 75,. 85,. 95) E(p) = . 80 
Again, the mean value for each set corresponds to the "best estimate" 
provided in the first type of ambiguous scenario described. 
To make ambiguity operational we told subjects that loss could occur 
with four different probabilities pi, p2, p3, p4 but that the experimenter 
did not know which probability measure was the most reliable. We then 
ask one subject to draw a six-face die from a bag containing 10 biased 
dice132. The die is played and the number drawn corresponds to a bag 
with a combination of black and white balls corresponding to one of the 
p 1's. 
(Therefore there were four bags). One of the subjects was then 
asked to draw a ball from the selected bag to resolve the lottery once 
the corresponding scenario was randomly chosen. 
IV. 5 - Experimental evidence 
IV. 5.1. Descriptive analysts. 
The data presented in this section was obtained from running the 
experiment with 84 undergraduate students at York University in the 
month of May 1994. Subjects' maximum willingness to pay to purchase the 
risk-reduction tool (self-insurance or self-protection) was elicited by 
means of the auction procedure described above. 
132Numbers 
on the dice go from 1 to 4 and stand for the number of 
probability measures in each set. The number of times a number 
corresponding to a probability measure figures in a dice gives the 
weight attached to that probability measure. Given the following 11 
die: 
A 1,1,1,2,3,4 
B 2,2,2,1,3,4 
C 3,3,3,1,2,4 
D 4,4,4,1,2,3 
E 1,1,2,2,3,4 
F 1,1,3,3,2,4 
G 1,1,4,4,2,3 
H 2,2,3,3,1,4 
I 2,2.4.4.1.3 
J 3,3,4,4,1,2 
Dice A gives a weight of 1/2 to pi. and 1/3 to each of p2, p3, and 
p4. Each set of weights is equally probable. 
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Each subject was asked to evaluate 8 scenarios relating to the same 
risk-management tool (self-insurance or self-protection) and to only 
one type of ambiguity (either "best estimate" or "interval" or "set of 
probability measures"). However, each subject provided his or her 
valuation at each probability level. The scenarios were arranged in 
random order using the table of random numbers. Subjects participating 
in different sessions faced therefore the scenarios in different 
sequences. Also, lotteries appeared one at a time on the screen. 
On the whole, four factors were manipulated in the experiment: two 
of them were between subjects factors (risk-reduction mechanism, type 
of ambiguity), and the other two were wtthtn subject factors (risky vs 
ambiguous lottery, probability levels). 
Some of our subjects can be considered as task-sophisticated either 
because they were economics students or because they had previously 
taken part to other experiments on decision making organized by the 
EXEC. 
Tables IV. I, IV. 2, IV. 3, and IV. 4 below present some qualitative 
results obtained from our sample of respondents. 
Table IV. 1 presents the ratio of the mean bid for self-protection to 
the mean bid for self-insurance. Ratios are calculated at each 
probability level, for risky lotteries, and for each definition of 
ambiguity. 
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Table IV. 1 Ratio of mean self-protection to mean self-insurance 
prices, SP/SI. 
. 03 . 
20 . 50 . 
80 
Risky lotteries . 92 . 
98 1.19 . 98 
Amb. lotteries 2.91 1.06 1.39 1.28 
"Best estimate" 
Amb. Lotteries . 66 . 
95 1.11 1.55 
Interval of 
probability 
Amb. lotteries 1.09 1.14 1.02 1.09 
Set of prob. 
" significant t at the 5% significance level 
As the table shows, there is no unambiguous evidence of a "framing 
effect" due to the risk-reduction mechanism used: the ratios of mean 
prices for self-protection to mean prices for self-insurance are in the 
majority of cases not significantly different from one. Self-protection 
and the self-insurance lotteries were, on average, perceived as 
indifferent. 
In the valuation of the risky lotteries, only at a probability of 507. 
is the mean valuation of self-insurance significantly lower than the 
mean valuation for self-protection at the 57. significance level (t = 
-2, p= 0)133 
When ambiguous lotteries are compared, there are two definitions 
of ambiguity in which we find some evidence of a framing effect, namely 
the "best estimate" and the "interval of probability" type of 
ambiguity. For the "best estimate" case, the ratio of prices SP/SI is 
always strictly greater than one and the mean valuations are 
significantly different at the probability levels of 3% and 50%. 
However, the sample that evaluated the "best estimate" scenario was our 
133The t test is performed assuming independence. 
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smallest (8 subjects for each market) so that a more robust sample 
should be obtained before accepting the hypothesis that the prices 
offered for the two risk management tools are significantly different. 
For all the other observations, when two "indifferent" lotteries are 
used, there is no evidence of Shogren (1991)'s hypothesis that the 
risk reduction mechanism matters. 
The risk-reduction mechanism was also manipulated as a within 
subject factor for some of the participants. Nine participants to one 
of the self-insurance experiments in the first week were asked to play 
the self-protection experiment after about a week. Similarly, 5 
participants to a self-protection experiment in the first week returned 
after about a week to play a self-insurance experiment. This procedure 
provided us with a control group of 14 subjects for whom we could 
observe matched pairs of prices for the two risk-reduction tools. 
Table IV. 2 gives the mean ratio of the price of self-protection to the 
price of self-insurance for risky lotteries and at each of the 
probability levels. 
Table IV. 2 Mean Ratios of matched prices for self-protection 
and self-insurance (control group) 
. 03 . 20 . 50 .8 
Risky lotteries 1.62 " 1.07 1.32 1.09 
As in table IV. 1, also for the control group there is no 
conclusive evidence in favor of a framing effect due to the risk 
management tool, except at the probability level of 37.. However, the 
mean ratios are always greater than one. At the individual level, of 
our 14 subjects in the control group, 4 valued self-protection 
consistently more than self-insurance, and thus were clearly prey to 
the "frame" suggested by Shogren. 
l34 
There remains, of course, also to assess the robustness of this result 
when specific contexts (inside the insurance frame) are used. In an 
experiment carried out on 50 undergraduate students in Economics and 
134 Two of them played the self-protection experiment as their second 
experiment, the other two played self-protection before self-insurance. 
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Accounting using hypothetical questions, we used the example of house 
burglary to obtain evaluations of self-insurance and self-protection. 
Subjects in the self-protection experiment were asked to state the 
maximum price they were willing to pay to purchase an alarm that would 
make it impossible for burglars to break In. In the self-insurance 
experiment, subjects were instead asked to quote a price to purchase a 
safe that would have made it impossible, in the event of a burglary, to 
steal the valuables contained in the house. Subjects were also told to 
assume that in the event of a burglary, the house would not have 
suffered any damage. In this "house burglary" experiment, the mean 
price of self-protection was consistently and significantly higher than 
the mean price for self-insurance, at each probability level. 
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To analyse more directly the difference between ambiguous prices 
and risky ones in the two markets we use mainly two indices; the ratio 
of the two prices as a relative measure and the difference between the 
two prices as an absolute measure. 
Table IV. 3 presents the mean ratios of ambiguous to non ambiguous 
prices for each of the two markets and for each type of ambiguity. This 
format of the table allows us to test the three hypotheses discussed 
above with regard to behaviour under uncertainty. The first result that 
emerges from the data is that ambiguity matters: the mean ratios are 
always different from one, contrary to the prediction of Expected 
Utility Theory. 
The mean ratios, however, do not provide support for the model of 
anchoring and adjustment of Einhorn and Hogarth. Nowhere do we find a 
monotonically decreasing ratio of ambiguous to non ambiguous prices as 
predicted by that model, whatever the specification of the second order 
probability distribution. 
Hence there doesn't seem to be on average any evidence of anchoring and 
adjustment, not even in the type of scenarios that should encourage 
anchoring to the probability measure provided namely, the "best 
135 These results even if not comparable with the ones of the York 
Experiment (we use different probabilities levels and different 
incentive mechanism) may suggest that in a non contest free experiment 
other factors like psychological costs may be at work. These factors 
may determine preference for self insurance or self protection even 
when the monetary reward connected with the two reduction mechanism 
tools are strictly the same. For possible interpretation see Di Mauro 
Maffioletti (1994). 
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estimate" definition of ambiguity. 
The mean ratios are always greater than one at low probability of loss 
(3%) indicating ambiguity aversion, but only in two instances do we 
find ambiguity preference at high probability levels (self-insurance, 
best estimate scenario, self-insurance set of probability). Rather, 
the mean ratios (except in the self-insurance, best estimate 
experiment, self-insurance set of probabilities) are strictly greater 
than one. On the other hand, mean ratios always greater than one 
suggest aversion to ambiguity irrespective of probabilities levels 
which is consistent with the Gardenfors and Sahlin (1983) 
Table IV. 3 - Means of ratios of ambiguous to non-ambiguous 
prices 
Probability of loss 
. 03 . 20 . 50 . 80 
Self-insurance 
Best Estimate 2.24 . 90 . 90 . 90 
Interval of prob. 3.74 1.10 1.10 1.15 
Set of prob. 2.5 1.12 1.32 0.87 
Self-protection 
Best Estimate 1.62 1.47 1.20 2.25 
Interval of prob. 1.18 1.17 1.01 1.35 
Set of prob. 1.11 1.93 1.01 1.25 
Table IV. 4 gives instead the mean of the differences between ambiguity 
prices and risky prices which we think can give us an indication of the 
absolute value of the "ambiguity premium". 
1' 
136 The values are in pence. Since these are absolute values they depend 
more directly on the level of probability considered. A positive value 
indicates ambiguity aversion, a negative one ambiguity proneness. 
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Table IV. 4- Means of the differences between ambiguous and 
non ambiguous prices 
Probability of loss 
. 03 . 20 . 50 . 
80 
Self-insurance 
Best Estimate -22 -46 -73 - 60 
Interval of prob. 15 25 34 - 100 
Set of prob. 17 23 73 - 92 
Self-protection 
Best Estimate 26 6 -8 152 
Interval of prob. 5 43 -3 95 
Set of prob. -11 101 -6 73 
Also in this case, it is not possible to notice on average a 
switching from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity preference from low to 
high probability levels. As it is possible to notice the ratio and the 
differences between the two prices not always reveal the same attitude 
towards ambiguity. (See the following footnote). 
To explore further which model best fitted the data, we proceeded 
to analyze the pattern of the ratios of ambiguous to risky prices at 
varying probability levels for each of the subjects in the 10 
experimental sessions we run. This approach was also justified by the 
fact that the sample size for some of our experiments was quite small 
and therefore, the presence of outliers could distort greatly the value 
of the means. 
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137 In fact also the difference is sensitive to the presence of outliers. 
The situations where ratios and differences give different results 
toward ambiguity are the ones in which there is more variability 
between the subjects evaluations. The ratio seem more sensitive to 
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Table IV. 5 gives the proportion of subjects who behaved according to 
the predictions of expected utility (EU), the anchoring model (AA), and 
the maximin model, (M), in all the experiments. The last column, (0), 
gives the proportion of subjects whose behaviour does not accord with 
any of the three hypotheses tested. The number in small character next 
to the type of the scenario indicates the sample size. In the case of 
the best estimate we used the individual ratio between the two prices. 
The presence of a switching from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity 
proneness from low to high probability was assumed to be the sign of 
the use of the anchoring and adjustment model138 . To verify the use of a 
maximin we just computed the maximum price considering the worst 
situation and we compared such a price with the one stated by the 
subject. 
ambiguity aversion when the ratio is very near to one. We calculate 
also the ratio of the means and the ratio of the median prices and they 
generally reveal the same trend; that is to say there is not a general 
switching from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity proneness from low 
probability levels to high probability levels. 
138 
This is what is used in Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) (1990) and in 
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989) 
231 
Table IV. 5 - Proportion of subjects whose behaviour is in 
accordance with one of the theories tested 
Theories tested 
EU AA M 0 
Self-insurance 
Best Estimate (8) - . 50 - . 
50 
Interval of prob. (i6) . 13 . 
47 . 07 . 33 
Set of prob. (20) .2 . 
45 . 05 .4 
Self-protection 
Best Estimate ($) - . 125 - . 875 
Interval of prob. (12) . 25 . 
25 - . 50 
. 
Set of prob. (21) . 14 . 24 - . 
62 
0 includes control group 
The behavioural model that receives more support from the analysis 
of individual data is the anchoring and adjustment one. This model of 
behavior fits particularly well the valuations for self-insurance, 
while it receives less support from the self-protection experiments, 
regardless of the definition of ambiguity. All together, about 36% of 
our sample behaved according to the prediction of the model. Some of 
the subjects behaved according to a "weak" version of the anchoring 
rule. Although the ratio between ambiguity prices and risky prices did 
not decrease monotonically, still subjects always displayed ambiguity 
aversion at low probability levels and ambiguity preference at high 
probability levels. 16 subjects, however, displayed exactly the 
decreasing monotonic relation between ratios of prices and probability 
of loss, predicted by the Einhorn and Hogarth model. The number of 
subjects who behaved according to expected utility was 12: the majority 
of them were students of economics. 
Very few subjects behaved according to the maximin rule at least 
in its extreme case. It is however not possible to verify if the 
subjects in evaluating the scenarios considered the probability of the 
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worst situation and then adjusted it up words or considered the best 
case and the adjusted it down words. In this case their behaviour would 
resemble the one of a subject who follows an anchoring model. 
139 Thus the 
analysis of the individual data seems not to give any strong support to 
either of the models, in spite the fact that ambiguity seems to matter 
for 80 7. of the subjects. 
As in previous studies, we did not find any correspondence between 
attitude to risk and attitude to ambiguity: ambiguity aversion and 
preference were completely independent of risk aversion and 
preference. 
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In the following table we report risk and ambiguity attitudes of the 
various subjects. Along the diagonal we can read the subjects who 
maintain a constant attitude, that to say they were ambiguity adverse 
and and risk adverse. The table reported below is referred to the self 
insurance group and for the 4 probability levels. For the self 
protection group see appendix C. 
139 A behaviour like this one it is consistent with the subjects which 
can be called optimists between the pessimists or pessimists between 
the optimists. This kind of pessimistic optimistic behaviour which 
mitigates to some extent a pure maximin behaviour has been observed in 
other contexts. See for example the experiment on updating ambiguous 
beliefs, Cohen, Gilboa, Jaffrey and Schmeidler (1994). 
140 The only regularity we found (but only for 25% of our sample) was a 
correspondence between risk pronenss and ambiguity proneness at the 
high probability level of 809.. The same results can be found using the 
differences instead of the ratio. 
233 
Table IV. 6 Risk and ambiguity attitudes for 
the self-insurance group 
Probability 0.03 Probability 0.2 
AA AN AP AA AN AP 
RA 10 19 RA 12 24 
RN 222 RN 365 
RP 952 RP 415 
Probability 0.5 Probability 0.8 
AA AN AP AA AN AP 
RA 4 17 RA 0 3 5 
RN 3 43 RN 0 4 3 
RP 13 34 RP 7 4 16 
AA Ambiguity averse RA Risk averse 
AN Ambiguity neutral RN Risk neutral 
AP Ambiguity prone RP Risk prone 
Further insight into the data is provided by table IV. 7, where we show 
the median bids and the mean bids for risky and ambiguous lotteries at 
all probability levels and for both risk-management tools. We provide 
median bids and mean bids because there is quite a strong skeweness in 
some of the distributions. 
In all experimental conditions, there is ambiguity aversion at low 
probability of loss. In the self-protection experiments, we also found 
ambiguity aversion at the high probability level of 80%. For 
probability levels between 37. and 807. results are mixed. 
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Table IV. 7. Mean and Median bids for all 
experimental conditions 
Probability of loss 
. 03 . 20 . 
50 . 80 
Self-insurance M Md M Md M Md M Md 
R 62 29 262 197 449 495 643 718 Best Estimate {A 40 31 216 181 376 452 583 700 
R 91 94 266 220 454 500 683 710 Int. of prob. 
ý 
w 106 101 292 264 488 561 538 511 
tR 45 30 236 201 407 500 669 707 
Set of prob. w 61 31 272 205 482 500 630 501 
Self-protect ion 
Best Estimate 
IR 31 
A 116 
Int. of R 
65 JA 
prob. 70 
Set of prob. 
{R 78 JA 
67 
30 330 193 496 525 514 650 
46 228 227 528 500 745 812 
48 235 200 546 511 737 800 
49 279 214 543 521 833 824 
52 211 216 502 538 619 639 
65 312 300 495 516 692 775 
It has been argued that the fact that ambiguity matters simply depends 
on lack of familiarity with the problem the subject is asked to 
evaluate. If the subject is exposed to the comparison between risky and 
ambiguous version of the stimulus more than once. then ambiguity 
aversion/preference is bound to disappear. This effect is likely to be 
stronger if, at the end of each round of the evaluation, the ambiguity 
is resolved. This point is stressed by Camerer and Kunreuther (1989)141: 
If we used the same f(r) throughout the experiment, their ambiguity 
141However 
a different result is obtain by Sarin and Weber (1991) 
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would be reduced as the experiment continued. The effect of this 
reduction in ambiguity on prices could be confounded with convergence 
to equilibrium and other kinds of learning in the experiment. (p. 285) 
To check whether in the course of the auction, prices for 
ambiguous lotteries converged to expected value, we made use of 
diagrammatic analysis. We constructed a diagram for each experimental 
session we ran (In figures IV. 3, we report the diagrams for the 
control sample. The others diagrams are included in the appendix C). 
The horizontal line in the diagram stands for the the case in which the 
mean bid at each probability value coincides with the expected value of 
the ambiguous lotteries. The point observations on the broken line are 
the mean prices for the ambiguous versions of the stimulus. The four 
observations are numbered from 1 to 4 according to their sequence 
during the experiment. Since the order in which the lotteries appeared 
in each experiment had been randomized, each lottery may be assigned a 
different number in each diagram. 
We did not find any evidence of a converging path of mean bids to 
the expected value. The ratio of the mean bid to the expected value 
depended not so much on the order in which the lotteries were 
evaluated, but rather on the probability of loss in each scenario. For 
instance, when subjects were asked to evaluate an ambiguous lottery 
with an expected value of the probability of the loss equal to 50%, the 
ratio BID/EV was always close to one, no matter whether the lottery was 
the first to be evaluated or the last. Likewise, when the expected 
probability of loss was 3%, BID/EV > 1, regardless of the position of 
the lottery in the session (This reduction of ambiguity perception at 
0.50 probability level Is consistent with the result of Cohen, Said and 
Jaffray (1985). 
This pattern is clearly shown by the two diagrams reported in 
figure IV. 3 which refer to the two control groups which participated to 
both the experiment on self-protection and on self-insurance. If there 
was a convergence to EV, this should have been stronger for the 
participants of the control sessions, given that they had seen the 
ambiguity resolved already once, and therefore had some information 
concerning the second order distribution of probabilities. 
Nevertheless, the oscillations around the EV do not appear to dampen as 
we move from the first ambiguous lottery to the fourth. 
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Figure IV. 3 Path of mean bids to the expected value for the two 
control sessions 
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IV. 5.2. Analysis of Variance. 
We performed two types of analysis of variance on the data 
obtained from the experiment. We first conducted a two-way analysis of 
variance where the dependent variable was the individual ratios of 
ambiguous to risky bids and using as factors the definition of 
ambiguity and the risk management tool evaluated. This analysis was 
undertaken at each probability level. We did not find any evidence of 
differences in the ratios of ambiguous to risky prices across 
definitions of ambiguity or across risk reduction mechanism at all 
probabilities of loss. Hence, the definition of ambiguity does not 
appear to determine a different behaviour in uncertain situations. In 
one instance, namely when the probability of loss was 37., we found a 
significant interaction effect between the type of ambiguity and the 
risk reduction tool. 
We then carried out a three factor analysis of variance on the 
price ratios adding the within subject factor of probability to the two 
between subject factors (the type of ambiguity and the risk reduction 
tool). We did not find any significant main effect or interaction 
effect. In particular, the fact that probability is not a significant 
explanation for price ratios is against the predictions of the model of 
anchoring and adjustment. 
Secondly, we carried out an appropriate analysis of variance on 
the individual bids using as factors the risk reduction mechanism, the 
probability level and whether the price referred to a risky or to an 
ambiguous lottery. As can easily be expected, we find a strong main 
effect for probability (F = 12.74) but no significant effect for the 
risk reduction tool, and for ambiguity (overall the probability effect 
seem to overcome the ambiguity one). 
However, when ambiguity is used as the only explanatory factor and 
prices are pooled across the other experimental conditions, we do find 
a strong effect for ambiguity (F = 97) Table IV. 8. This last result 
confirms the analysis of the individual data which show a pervasive 
ambiguity reaction. Comparing our results to others experimental work 
we can say that we found a stronger ambiguity reaction than in Camerer 
and Kunreuther (1979) and this was probably due to the one shot auction 
we adopted. On the other hand, Elsenberger and Weber (1993) found a 
stronger ambiguity aversion than in our experiment but they 
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operationalized ambiguity in an event context not in a chance one. 
Table IV. 8 Analysis of variance 
THREE-WAY ANOVA ON RATIOS OF AMBIGUOUS TO RISKY PRICES 
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES 
Type of Amb. (A) 987.19 
Market (M) 70.88 
Probability (P) 1301.96 
Int(A and P) 4277.25 
Int(M and P) 3123.12 
Residual 175308 
D. F. F PROB(FS x) 
2 . 72 . 51 
1 . 10 . 24 
3 . 63 . 65 
6 1.126 . 81 
3 1.6 
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ONE-WAY ANOVA ON INDIVIDUAL BIDS (POOLED SESSIONS) 
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES D. F. F PROBABILITY 
Ambiguity 75 446716 1 978 1.00 
Residua 1 41442820.05 559 
IV. 6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper has considered experimental markets for two alternative 
risk-reduction mechanisms in order to obtain individual valuations of 
risk reductions. Our results show that there is no significant 
difference in the mean valuation of the self-protection lotteries and 
of the self-insurance lotteries. Thus, we do not find any unambiguous 
evidence of a "framing effect" due to the risk reduction tool, as 
assumed in Shogren (1990). 
In our experimental scenarios, the two risk management tools 
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provided the same payoff and thus, the frame was created simply by a 
difference in wording. It might be that the "framing effect" would be 
significant if a different context were used, as suggested by the small 
"house burglary"experiment we have carried out. Alternatively, even 
with a neutral lottery context, self-protection might be valued more 
than insurance provided the two scenarios were not as clearly 
equivalent as in this experiment. 
In view of the importance that protection and insurance against 
environmental risks, product failure and work place safety has assumed 
in policy making, we think that these issues need to be explored 
further. 
In addition, our subjects have evaluated both risky and ambiguous 
versions of the scenarios. Three different definitions of ambiguity, 
characterized in terms of second order probability distributions were 
provided. Although we found that ratios of ambiguous to risky prices 
were always different from one, we did not find any significant 
difference due to the particular definition of ambiguity used. 
Hence, the type of ambiguity does not affect the price that Individuals 
are willing to pay to self-protect or to self-insure, although in the 
majority of cases mean ratios were greater than one, showing that 
individuals are willing to pay more to protect/insure against ambiguous 
events. 
Finally, given the similarities between the self-insurance and 
self-protection contexts and market insurance, we have tested whether 
the model of anchoring and adjustment by Einhorn and Hogarth - which 
has performed well in the insurance frame - was a good predictor of 
mean behaviour in our sample. We do not find any conclusive evidence 
to this end: while the mean ratios do not show the monotonically 
decreasing pattern predicted by that model, on the other hand the 
analysis of individual patterns of response shows that some 35% of the 
sample behaved according to the predictions of the theory. However the 
number of subjects which seem to follow the anchoring model diminishes 
if we use the difference between the prices instead of the ratio. 
Whether the difference between our results and those obtained by 
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989) are due to the fact that there is no 
unique model of behaviour under uncertainty in the protection/insurance 
context or to the different incentive mechanism used in this study we 
are unable to say at the present stage. 
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CHAPTER V 
AMBIGUITY AS SECOND ORDER DISTRIBUTION: SOME COMMENTS 
V. 1 Introduction 
As we have already seen in Chapter I, the models which try to 
explain attitudes to ambiguity (amongst others see Schmeidler (1989), 
Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982,83), Ellsberg (1961), Segal (1987)) are 
often constructed on two main elements : 
a) The authors describe how people perceive the ambiguous urn (and in 
doing so they define what for them is ambiguity). 
b) They apply a particular preference functional to the ambiguous urn. 
In doing so, these models implicitly or explicitly consider a two 
stage mental process in the evaluation of the ambiguous urn: 
a) an editing phase (the subjects try to imagine how It is possible to 
represent the ambiguous urn); 
b) an evaluation phase (the subjects apply a particular preference 
functional to the edited or imagined ambiguous urn. ) 
The two processes together are used to describe a pattern of 
preferences which is consistent with the one shown by the Ellsberg 
Paradox. 
One consequence of this is that, since each model adopts a particular 
description of how subjects imagine the unknown urn, in practice each 
model proposes a particular definition of ambiguity or identifies a 
particular source of ambiguity. 
One of the most common descriptions of ambiguity (amongst others 
see Segal (1987), Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982,83) or even Ellsberg 
(1961)) is the one which considers a situation ambiguous if either the 
subject is presented or has in mind a set of probability measures or he 
or she thinks in term of a second order distribution of probabilities. 
That is to say, the subjects, when analyzing the ambiguous urn, 
consider themselves as confronted with a distribution over the possible 
probability values that the two outcomes (black and white) can assume 
(we will use always the two colour example). 
Different models consider different kinds of second order 
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distributions. More generally, the characteristic of the second order 
distribution may depend on the level of information, on psychological 
factors or can be defined objectively by the model. 
In Gardenfors and Sahlin (1983), for example, the second order 
distribution is determined both by the available information and by the 
psychological attitude of the subjects (Cf. Chapter I). Segal (1987), 
instead requires this imaginary distribution to be symmetric around the 
mean (which for him is reasonable in the case of the two-colour and 
three-colour Ellsberg examples). 
The question of how to represent ambiguity is not only a 
theoretical question linked to what we called above an editing phase, 
it is also a practical question. Experimentalists when testing models 
or investigating theories on ambiguity do have to consider how to 
represent it. This is true especially when they replicate the Ellsberg 
paradox in a chance context. In fact when they face the problem of 
playing for real one of the scenarios they have to choose a way to 
represent ambiguity. Very often ambiguity is represented as a uniform 
second order distribution (see amongst others Schoemaker (1991) Camerer 
and Kunreuther (1989), Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989)). In our opinion, 
this choice, even if reasonable, reduces to some extent the possible 
psychological impact of ambiguity. In fact we give the same weight to 
each of the possible outcomes, and this is like assuming that there is 
no pessimistic or optimistic individual since we give the same weight 
to the worst and the best outcomes as well as to all outcomes in 
between. According to Schoemaker (1991), for example, a uniform second 
order distribution is the weakest way of representing ambiguity. 
In this chapter our idea is to explore some elements that, either 
in the editing phase or in the evaluation process, can cause a 
different evaluation of different second order distributions. The 
reason behind this is to try to explain some results of the experiment 
presented in chapter III, which cannot be explained with the models 
tested in the same chapter. 
In particular we will suggest two possible alternative 
explanations. Both explanations are consistent with the idea of 
representing ambiguity as a second order distribution; however they 
differ in the decision criterion used to evaluate the different 
distributions. 
With the first explanation we want to explore whether it is 
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possible to establish a preference ordering over second order 
distributions. Moreover we want to explore in which way this preference 
ordering can be linked to the concept of a more or less ambiguous 
distribution. In particular the idea is to identify a concept of 
ambiguity which allows for different evaluations of different second 
order distributions which can explain the subjects' evaluation in the 
quoted experiment. 
In the second explanation we will propose an interpretation or 
extension of the Gardenfors and Sahlin model (1982) which can allow for 
the use of maximin and for the preference ordering shown by the 
subjects in the experiment. 
Since both explanations are consistent with the results of the 
experiment described in chapter III (relative to the behaviour of some 
of the subjects), we will finally suggest an experimental test to 
differentiate between the two models. 
The discussion will be organized as follows. First, we want to 
review the lotteries presented in the experiment, the evaluations given 
by the subjects and why the theories tested in the experiment cannot 
entirely explain the preference order given by some of these subjects. 
Second, we will introduce the concept of different degrees of ambiguity 
as developed by Segal (1987) and we will put it in relation with the 
concept of risk aversion. Then we will discuss why it cannot be used to 
explain the results of the experiment. 
Then, we will propose a different definition of degrees of ambiguity in 
the second order distributions which may be used to explain the results 
of the experiment. 
Third, we will suggest an interpretation of the Gardenfors and Sahlin 
model which can allow for the same results and seems consistent with 
the reasoning adopted in the interviews by the subjects. Finally we 
will discuss possible developments or tests of the two explanations. 
V. 2. Ambiguity as a second order distribution 
V. 2.1 The Lotteries 
In the experiment described in the Chapter III, we presented the 
subjects with the following lotteries (we will concentrate on three 
groups of lotteries not on all of them, the reasoning can be applied 
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also to the other lotteries). 
Figure V. 1 corresponds to the first group, Figure V. 2 and V. 3 to the 
second and the third group. 
Figure V. 1 Decision trees corresponding to lotteries D and B 
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Figure V. 2 Decision trees corresponding to lotteries B, F, A, G. 
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Figure V. 3 Decision trees corresponding to lotteries F, R, and L. 
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All the lotteries , D, B, 
F. A, G, L, R are two stage lotteries. 
These lotteries, if evaluated using the reduction principle, collapse 
to the simple lottery (1/2, B; 1/2, W). Moreover, all of them can be 
considered different ways of representing the ambiguous urn. In fact 
they are all different symmetric distributions over the possible values 
of p (proportion of black and by symmetry of white) with the same 
mean p=1/2. 
In group 1 and 3 what changes is the probability of obtaining black or 
white in the second stage, but the probability of obtaining one 
particular combination of black and white is the same (1/2, for group 1 
and 1/3 for group 3). 
In group two, instead, what varies is not only the probability assigned 
to black or white in the second stage, but also the probability of 
obtaining one bag, since the number of bags in each lotteries increases 
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(in the experiment it goes from two to thirteen). Consequently 
lotteries D, B, F, A, G, H, LR can all be considered different ways of 
representing a second order distribution. The outcome of the first 
stage is in fact the probability of obtaining black in the second 
stage. 
Assuming that these are all ways to imagine the unknown bag, is it 
possible to define a criterion according to which these different 
distributions represent different degrees of ambiguity ? Moreover can 
this concept of ambiguity be incorporated in the evaluation process and 
consequently determine different evaluations of different 
distributions? 
V. 3 Ambiguity aversion as, a form or risk aversion 
As we have seen in Chapter I, one characteristic of Segal's model 
of ambiguity is that of underlining the intuitive connection between 
the Ellsberg paradox and the concept of risk aversion. 
Risk aversion suggests that a decision maker always prefers a certain 
value x=x to a random variable x with expected value x. Ambiguity 
aversion can consequently be intuitively explained with the preference 
toward a sure probability p=p with respect to a random variable 
p with 
expected value p. In Segal's words 
"ambiguous lotteries appear to be riskier than 'clear' lotteries, where 
the probabilities are well defined and are known to the decision 
maker". p 179. 
What makes a decision maker prefer a certain value to a random variable 
is the presence of variability. It is consequently possible to think of 
ambiguity aversion as a form of aversion to variability. Moreover if 
ambiguity is defined as a aversion to variability the concept of 
variability can be used to define different degrees of ambiguity. 
V. 3.1 How to measure ambiguity with respect to risk 
The traditional concept of risk aversion deals with uncertain 
outcomes rather than uncertain probabilities. Consequently the possible 
indexes that we can use to measure different degrees of riskiness are 
the ones that traditionally are used to measure the variability of 
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random prospects. 
The variance. One simple way to measure the variability of a 
distribution is given by the variance, a 2. If we take the variance of a 
distribution o-2 as a measure of variability, we can define an order 
between distributions according to the variance where the F aRG (F is 
more riskier then G) if the variance of F is higher then the variance 
of G ((r2> e2). (The variance has been used as a measure of riskiness 
of a random variable xin the sixties and its tractability led to the 
widespread of the mean variance analysis. However the use of variance 
to rank risky prospects yields to the violation of first order 
stochastic dominance Borch (1969). For experimental evidence see Coombs 
and Lehner (1981). This problem was overcome by the Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970) definition. 
Rothschild Stiglitz (1970) definition. One other way of measuring 
different degree of riskiness is given by the Rothschild Stiglitz (1970) 
definition of"more variable than". 
Let us consider the case of risky prospects (we face uncertain 
outcomes). Suppose now that we have two distributions; we indicate 
with F(. ) and G(. ) their distribution functions on the interval [0,1]. 
Let us consider distributions which have the same mean: that is to say 
1 
0f 
[G(x)-F(x)]dx=0 (V. 1) 
According to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) definition a distribution G 
can be considered more variable than a distribution F if and only if 
1 f [G(x)-F(x)] dx =0 and 
0 J [G(x)-F(x)) dx Z0 (V. 2) 0 
for every y, Osys1 
If a distribution G is more variable than another F according to R-S 
definition, the variance of G is higher than the variance of F. The 
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contrary however does not hold142 
Segal's definition. Segal (1987) defines directly the concept of 
"more ambiguous than". The following definition concerns directly the 
characteristics of the second order distributions. 
Definition 1 
Let Fand Gbe two distribution functions on [0,11 G Is more ambiguous 
than F( G aAF ) iff G is star shaped spreading143 of F, that is 
a) F and G have the same mean value p; 
b) G (p) at F (p) for p sp and G (p) sF (p)for p zp 
In Segal (1987) the distribution function F represent the decision 
maker ambiguity concerning the probability of the event S in the 
lottery (x, S; 0, - S). Hence in order to rank the various degrees of 
ambiguity Segal defines an order on the set of the distribution 
functions. 
Theorem 6.1 establishes the condition according to which a more 
ambiguous distribution is evaluated less. 
Theorem 6.1 
Let G and F be symmetric around p such that Hp aA G ZAF. If f is 
convex, if the elasticity of f' is nondecreasing, and if the elasticity 
of f' is non increasing, then the value of the ambiguous lottery (x, S: 
0, -S) under F is greater than its value under G. 
(where H-is the uniform distribution on [0.2p]for psl/2 and on (2p-1,11 
for pa1/2) 
Now the conditions determined by theorem 6.1 are very strict 
conditions. Moreover if we apply the Segal Definition 1 of "more 
ambiguous than" to the various lotteries presented in Figures V. 1, 
V. 2, V. 3, we will find out that D is less ambiguous than any other 
142And 
all risk averters prefer F to G. 
143 The definition of star-shaped spreading of beliefs is taken from 
Jones and Ostroy (1984) 
249 
lottery, B is the more ambiguous, B is more ambiguous than F (that to 
say BaAF zAD). 
However the Segal definition does not allows us to infer any order 
in ambiguity as far as lotteries F, A, G, H, C are concerned. Moreover 
the conditions defined by theorem 6.1 are so strict that even in case 
of lotteries D, B and F, in which Segal definition allows us to say 
that D is less ambiguous than F and F is less ambiguous than B, we 
cannot conclude anything applying this theorem about the order in the 
evaluations of these three lotteries. As we told before Definition 1 
allows us to define that Bit AFaAD. 
Theorem 6.1 requires however in order 
to establish an order in the evaluations that the degree of ambiguity 
of a distribution is related to the distribution Hp; that is to say 
only if Hp zA GtF (and also the condition on f are satisfied) we can 
conclude that F should be evaluated more than G. In our case we have 
(applying Definition 1) that B aAHp aAD. Hence theorem 6.1 cannot be 
used to establish the order in the evaluation for F and D and B even if 
the three distribution can be define one more ambiguous than the other 
according to definition 1... 
Moreover as we have seen in Chapters I and III Segal (1987) 
defined the requirement that the f(. ) function has to satisfy in order 
for a subject to be ambiguity averse (Theorem 4.2) (which are also the 
requirement of f(. ) in the theorem 6.1). (In this Theorem Segal compare 
some ambiguity with none). As we have already pointed out in Chapter 
III the evaluations of the lotteries B, D, F, A, G, H, C according to 
Segal model and adopting a functional form which satisfies the 
condition of theorem 4.2, that is to say f(p) = pt with t>1 are the 
following: B has the same value of D. B is evaluated more than F, F 
more than A, A more than G. G more than H, H more than C.. 
Hence what we can observe is that if we evaluate lottery B, F and D 
with the anticipated expected utility and applying the specified 
functional form of f we obtain that B and D have the same value and F 
is evaluated less than D and B. However applying definition 1 we can 
conclude that B is more ambiguous than F, and F is more ambiguous than 
D. Hence the different degree of ambiguity is not reflected in the 
evaluations of the lotteries. 
For the other lotteries however the ambiguity definition combined with 
theorem 6.1 do not allow to infer any evaluation order. 
On the other hand, some subjects in the experiment gave 
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evaluations which go exactly in the opposite direction of the ones 
obtained applying anticipated expected utility and the specified M) 
with H is evaluated more than G and G is evaluated more than A and A is 
evaluated more than F and F evaluated more than B and D is evaluated 
more than any other lottery. 
To sum up: 
a) the Segal's definition of more or less ambiguous distribution 
function does not allow us to infer any ambiguity order about the 
lotteries described in Figures V. 2 and V. 3. 
b) the order that we find when we apply Segal functional form and 
evaluate the lotteries accordingly in the case of lottery D, B and F is 
different from the one given by the application of Segal 's definition 
of different degrees of ambiguity (for the others lotteries definition 
1 is not applicable). 
3) Moreover it remains to be explained why some of subjects evaluated 
the lotteries in a different order with respect to the one given 
applying Segal functional form with f(p)= pt with t> 1. 
Hence we cannot use the Segal definition of more ambiguous than to 
define an order over the second order distributions represented by the 
various lotteries in Figure V. 1, V. 2, V. 3 which explain the results of 
the experiment since Segal definition does not tell us anything at 
least as far as lotteries F, A, G, H, C are concerned. 
V. 3.2 Using the variance as measure of ambiguity 
The variance and the Rothschild and Stiglitz measures of 
variability are applied to risky prospects. To extend their use to 
second order distributions and apply them to define different degrees 
of riskiness of a second order distribution (different degree of 
ambiguity) we have to assume that people deal with the outcomes of the 
first stage, which are the probabilities of getting the two colours in 
the second stage , as real outcomes. (There are no studies to our 
knowledge of the applications of the variance and of the Rothschild and 
Stiglitz definition in the contest of second order probability 
distributions. However from an experimental point of view Curley and 
Yates (1985) tested the importance of variance as an cause of ambiguity 
reaction and rejected cautiously this hypothesis. Kahn and Sarin (1988) 
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introduced a parameter related to the variance of the second order 
distribution in the evaluation functional form of their model. In this 
chapter however the used of variance is confined to determined 
different degrees of ambiguity in second order distributions which have 
the same mean and the same probability ranges, with the exception of 
lottery D). In this case we can try to measure the different degree of 
ambiguity using one of the two concepts. 
Applying the Rothschild and Stiglitz definition we will find that the 
evaluation order found in the experiment is consistent with this 
definition as far as lotteries DBFH are concerned and but not as far 
AG and H are concerned. For example applying 
J3TEG(x)-F(x)1dxO (V. 1) 
0 
to the various lotteries while F- AL 0, we have A-G <0 as well as 
G-H < 0, but H-C L 0. 
On the other hand if we use the variance as a definition of variability 
of the lotteries described in Table 1,2 and 3 we will find that B is 
the lottery with the highest variance (r 
e=0.25, while D is the lottery 
with the smallest variance cD 0 (and also lottery R). 
Figure V. 4 Variances of the lotteries used in the experiment 
------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
T=0 D2 
0'2 =0.25 
a, 
F=0.166 
B2 
01F = 0.166 0'L=0.018 
0'A =0.125 0'R=0 
2 
0G =0.07 
2 
H =0.109 
2 
CC =0.09 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
If we consequently apply the variance criterion to the lotteries in 
Figures V. 1,2,3 we find that D and R should be evaluated the same and 
G should be evaluated more than A and A more than F and F more than B, 
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while C should be evaluated more than H but G should be evaluated more 
than H and C. ( If we look at the actual evaluations of the experiment 
in chapter III we will see that D>C>H>G>A>F>B which is in accordance 
with the variance rule except for G). 
As well as the evaluations of the lotteries FR and L is concerned, 
their order should be the same as the one due to the application of a 
maximin rule that is to say R evaluated more than L, L evaluated more 
than F. 
Except for the case of the lottery G the evaluations of the 
lotteries based on their variance should increase from B to C. 
Hence we suggest that we take the variance of a distribution a las a 
measure of variability and we can define an order between distributions 
according to the variance where the F aAG (F is more ambiguous then G) 
2 2 if the variance of F is higher then the variance of G( c'F> °T2). 
In case of ambiguity aversion a person would discount the utility of an 
ambiguous lottery according to the variability of the second order 
distribution and consequently he or she would evaluate more the lottery 
which has the smaller variance. 
The variance criterion can consequently explain the evaluation order 
given to the lotteries in term of "more ambiguous than". 
V. 3.3 The modified maximtn rule. 
The evaluation order consistent with the application of the 
variance rule can however be consistent with another explanation. 
As we have already say B should be evaluated more than D and R more 
than L and L more than F according to maximin. The simple application 
of a maximin to lotteries BFAGHC does not allow for an evaluation 
order between these lotteries since they all have the same maximin. 
The above lotteries have always the same two outcomes 0 and 1: if we 
simply apply the maximin rule as for example in Gardenfors and Sahlin 
the minimum expected utility is in each case (Table 1 and 2) always 
zero. Suppose however that the subject thinks of the probabilities of 
the second order distribution as pure outcomes and depicts the problem 
to himself or herself in the following way: 
Let us take for example lotteries B and F. 
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Figure V. 5 Editing of 1 otteries B and F 
Lottery B Lottery F 
P=1/2 P=1/2 P=1/3 P=1/3 P=1/3 
101 1/2 0 
where with P we indicate the probability in the first branch while with 
p we indicate the probability in the second branch. The same can be 
thought for all the other lotteries. 
If we consider the three lotteries following a simple maximin rule 
we will have that lotteries B and F have the same minimum expected 
utility. 
We can however think that people may adopt the following kind of 
reasoning. For lottery B and Lottery F the worst outcome is the same , 
that is to say ap value of 0. However, the probability attached to the 
worst outcome is less in lottery F then in lottery B; hence I prefer 
this lottery to B. 
If we apply this kind of reasoning to all the lotteries described in 
Table V. 1 and V. 2 that we will find the following evaluation order over 
the lotteries C >H >G >A >F >B. 
In the original model of Gardenfors and Sahlin the maximin is not 
applied to a second order distribution. It is applied directly to the 
various probability measures belonging to the set of all epistemically 
reliable probability measures. Gardenfors and Sahlin define some 
criteria to establish which probabilities are epistemically reliable. 
However, since they do not talk explicitly of second order 
probabilities, they are vague about the assignment of probabilities to 
the probability contained in the set. The modified maximin rule can 
consequently be seen as the natural extension to their model once the 
concept of a second order distribution is introduced. 
What we are suggesting is that people who rank lotteries according to a 
maximin rule when confronted with lotteries with the same maximin can 
rank them according to the weight given to the worst outcome. They will 
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choose the lottery which has attached to the worst outcome the smallest 
probability. 
This decision rule may be expressed formally saying that given lottery 
f and g when 
min Eu (f(s)) p=Eu (g(s)) p then (V. 3) 
f >- g iff p(W)f< p(gi)g 
where p(W) is the probability assigned at the worst outcome. 
When two lotteries have the same maximin one lottery will be preferred 
to the other one only if the probability of the worst outcome under f 
is smaller than the probability of the worst outcome under g. 
This second explanation is the one that according to us is more similar 
to the kind of reasoning that the subjects adopted or described in the 
experiment reported in chapter III. Subjects 1 and 20 for example 
described the lotteries B and F as "unfair" because the probability of 
choosing the bag with "wrong" colour in it was to high. On the other 
hand lottery D and lottery R were described as completely "fair" 
lotteries since the possibility of choosing the bag with the wrong 
colour was 0. In all the bags the probability of the two colours was in 
fact one half. This kind of reasoning give in fact a higher weight to 
the worst outcome. In lottery B or F since they are symmetric the worst 
and the best outcome are balanced, however the subjects seemed not to 
give importance to this. What seems to matter was simply the fact that 
they had a higher probability of choosing the wrong bag and this is 
what determined their evaluations. 
Although we would suggest that the modified maximin rule is the most 
plausible interpretation of the results of the experiment, however the 
lack of data does not allow us to draw such a strong conclusion. 
V. 4 Conclusion and suggestions. 
The lotteries described in Figure V. 1,2 and 3 do not allow us to 
discriminate between the two decision rules above described . Most of 
the lotteries in fact would be ranked in the same order according to 
both the criteria. In fact the variance ( but not for lottery G) as 
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well as the weight attached to the worst outcome are decreasing with 
the number of bags. 
In fact both explanations have their own appeal. An evaluation of the 
different distributions according to the variance seems to be quite 
intuitive if we express ambiguity as a second order distribution. In 
this case in fact the parallel between ambiguity aversion and risk 
aversion as Segal suggests is quite straightforward. On the other hand, 
since people use a maximin rules and several models explain ambiguity 
aversion through the use of a maximin (amongst others Gilboa 1987, 
Ellsberg, (1961) and Gardenfors and Sahlin (1983)), this modified 
version of maximin can allow us to establish a preference order in 
cases where the mere application of a maximin rule gives to the same 
evaluation. 
In order to discriminate between these two possible explanations It is 
maybe worth to design an experimental test. 
One way can be to present the subjects with pairs of lotteries very 
similar to the one used in the experiment in chapter III but in which 
the modified maximin criterion and the variance criterion predict 
different evaluations. 
Let us consider for example lotteries Z and Q. 
Figure V. 6 Decision trees of lottery Z and Q 
0 1/8 B 
1/12 
a/9 
11/12 
B 
5/12 
w 
w 4/8 H 
1 /2 7/12 
Z 1/9 1/2 7/12 
B 
w 4/8 
11/12 5/12 
4/9 B w 
1/12 1 
w 1/8 a 
0 w 
Now if we calculate the variance of lotteries Z and Q we can easily see 
that the variance is higher in lottery Z than in lottery Q. (0.154, 
0.0005)144 However if we apply a maximin rule the minimum expected 
utility is given by lottery Z. If I choose by discounting the value of 
the lottery according to the variance since lottery Q has a smaller 
144 These two lotteries are not one more variable than the other in term 
of the R-S definition. 
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variance I would preferred lottery Q to Z. If, instead, I apply in my 
evaluation a maximin rule, then, I would prefer lottery Z to lottery Q 
since lottery Z has the highest minimum expected utility. 
Let us consider now these other two lotteries: 
Figure V. 7 Decision tree for lottery P 
2/13 B 
w 
P 9/13 
1/2 B 
w 
2/13 
0B 
w 
2=0.076 
P 
and lottery C given in the experiment in which the probability of 
getting a ball of the right colour varies from 0 to 1 and there are 13 
bags with different composition of black and white [0,1/13; 1/12, 
1/13;...... 1,1/13. As we can see the variance of lottery C is 0.10 
while the variance of lottery P. is 0.7. 
Consequently if we apply the variance criterion we should evaluate 
lottery P more then lottery C. 
Suppose now instead that we apply the modified maximin criterion. 
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Lottery P can be thought as: 
Figure V. 8 Editing of lottery P and C according to the maximin model 
2/13 9/13 2/13 
10 1/2 1 Lottery C 
1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 1 
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
In this case we can easily see that the probability attached to the 
worst outcome is smaller in lottery C than in lottery P. Hence if we 
apply the modified maximin rule we should prefer lottery C to lottery 
P. 
As we have seen it is possible to distinguish between the two 
criteria and consequently to test their validity in describing people 
mental processes. Establishing a preference order between second second 
order distributions can help us to understand better this form of 
ambiguity. The relevance of this can be high since as we have already 
said this is the most common operationalization of ambiguity in 
experimental settings. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SOME COMMENTS ON THE EVALUATION MENTAL PROCESS 
VI. 1. Introduction 
At the end of chapter III, we concluded our analysis of the 
results of the experiment described there saying that none of the 
theories tested there seems to explain entirely the phenomenon of 
ambiguity. In fact we concluded that people seem to have acted in 
accordance with different theories in different contexts (ambiguity was 
perceived in different ways according to the different environments). 
In this chapter we want to investigate some possible explanations 
of this behaviour. We do not derive these possible explanations from 
the adoption of an alternative model of preferences. Instead, the 
explanation proposed here regards the mental process used by the 
subjects in order to perform the requested task. 
As described in detail in Chapter III, the participants in the 
experiment were given 21 lotteries to evaluate. If we put aside for a 
moment what was the aim of that experiment - testing alternative 
theories of ambiguity145 - the subjects were simply asked to evaluate 21 
objects. Hence, they had to establish through their evaluations a 
ranking of the lotteries. What we want to investigate is the mental 
process apparently adopted by the subjects in performing such a task. 
In particular, by describing this mental process, we will try to 
investigate if this process has been influenced by the experimental 
design or whether it is the result of some sort of simplification 
adopted in the evaluation process by the subjects. 
Evaluating 21 lotteries can be considered by some a quite complex task. 
If such is the case, the subjects might have adopted some strategies in 
order to simplify this task. The outcome of the evaluation process, the 
single prices given to the various lotteries, might be seen on the one 
hand as the result of acting according to different models in different 
circumstances. On the other hand, however, the same outcome can simply 
be the result of the simplification strategy adopted by the subjects in 
145 Each lottery was designed to test a model and was characterized by a 
particular source of ambiguity. 
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order to perform a complex evaluation task. The fact that each subject 
seemed to apply different theories can be, in fact, the result of 
different stories; it is consequently important to try to distinguish 
between them. 
We will proceed as follows: first we will describe the evaluation 
process of some of the subjects in the experiments explaining how the 
evaluation process might be due to the experimental design. Second we 
will see which conclusion can be drawn from the application of such a 
evaluation process. Third we will suggest a possible interpretation of 
the result of the experiment which can link the evaluation process 
adopted by the subjects to the psychological literature on constructive 
preferences and beliefs (See Payne, Bettman, Johnson (1992)). 
VI. 2. The evaluation process of the subjects. 
VI. 2.1 The description of the experiment and of the lotteries. 
In the experiment described in chapter III the lotteries were 
given to each subject in a closed envelope. They were put in a random 
order (different for each subject). In the instructions for the 
experiment, the subjects were told to give a price to each lottery and 
that this price could be seen as a minimum selling price for the 
lottery. They had to evaluate the lotteries at home and they were asked 
to come for an Interview describing their choices afterward. Hence, 
they were neither asked to perform the evaluation task under any time 
constraint nor to follow any particular procedure. 
In such an evaluation task one might expect people to examine each 
lottery and compare it to each of the others in order to establish a 
complete ranking. As described in chapter III this does not seem to be 
the process followed by the subjects. The subjects seemed instead to 
have grouped the lotteries in groups and then to have evaluated them 
within each group. 
Before analyzing in detail the process apparently followed, we 
need to point out some aspects of the design of experiment which may 
have influenced the strategy apparently adopted. 
The lotteries were designed to test different theories. These theories 
were defined in various ways according to the different sources of 
ambiguity. Moreover there were groups of lotteries designed to test 
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the same theory. These sets of lotteries share some characteristics 
(the same source of ambiguity) but they differ one from the other for 
other respects. 
Let us consider for example lotteries F, A, G, H, C; they were 
all designed to test Segal's (1987) model, hence they were all two 
stage lotteries. They identified different second order distributions 
in the probabilities, but these probabilities distributions shared the 
same mean and the same extreme values. 
If we take the whole group of 21 lotteries and we try to analyze 
it according their similarities we can distinguish various subgroups or 
subsets according to various characteristics. It is important to 
notice, at this point, that there were different characteristics 
objectively present in the lotteries, because they were essential to 
define or identify different sources of ambiguity. However, if we look 
at the lotteries simply as objects these factors can be considered 
simply as different characteristics of these objects. 
In the original group we can identify the following characteristics 
which are shared by different groups of lotteries. 
a) One stage lotteries 
b) Two stage lotteries 
c) Lotteries with known proportion of black and white balls 
d) Lotteries with unknown proportion or black and white balls 
e) Lotteries with different probabilities in the second stage but 
always with 3 branches each with probability equal 1/3 at the first 
stage. 
f) Lotteries with probability 1/2 in the first stage but different 
probabilities in the second stage. 
g) Lotteries with probability 1/2 in the first stage and 1 and 0 in the 
second stage. 
h) Lotteries with different second order distributions but with the 
same extreme values. 
i) Lotteries in which the unknown proportion of black and white was 
varying. 
1) Lotteries with probability 1/2 in the first stage but in which the 
proportions of black and white in the bags in the second stage was 
unknown. 
m) Lotteries with 13 bags and the same probabilities in the first and 
in the second branch. 
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Legenda 
"a red one stage "b black two stage 
"c green known proportion Sd orange unknown proportion 
"e violet different probabilities In the second stage but always 
3 branches with 1/3 probability 
"f pink lotteries with probability 1/2 in the first branch but 
different probability in the second branch 
"g blue lotteries with probability 1/2 in the first branch but 
1,0 in the second branch 
"h brown lotteries with differenct second order distr ibutions but 
always the same extreme value 
i yellow lotteries in which the unknown proportion of black 
and white was varying 
1 navy lottery wit probability 1/2 in the first stage but 
which the proportion of black and white in the bag in the second 
stage was unknown 
m grey lotteries with 13 bags 
If we look at Figure VI. 1, we can see the various subsets of L (the 21 
lotteries) defined according to the different characteristics, a, b, c, 
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Figure VI .1 Groups of lotteries according to the various 
characteristics 
d, e, f, g, h, i, 1, m. 
The lotteries were defined for the primary purpose of testing 
particular theories, however they can be classified or grouped 
according to different characteristics objectively present. Moreover 
assuming that these lotteries can be grouped according to these 
characteristics ( from L, the set including the 21 lotteries we can 
form other subets), we can easily see from Figure VI. 1 that the groups 
so defined overlap (some of the subsets derived from L according to 
different characteristics may contain the same object (lottery) 
contained in other subsets). 
For example suppose we define the subset A, of L, on the base of the 
characteristic a, (one stage lotteries). In A we will have lottery E 
and lottery 0: A= (E, 0). If we define the subset B, on the base of the 
characteristic b, (two stage lotteries), then B-- 
(D. U, B, V, F, A, G, H, C, I, L, R, P, S. Q, M, Z, T, N). 
Then we can define the subset D, on the base of the characteristic d, 
(unknown proportion of black and white), and the subset C, on the base 
of the characteristic c, (known proportion of black and white), we will 
have D= (O, P, S, Q, M, Z, T, N) and C= (E, D, U, B, V, F, A, G, H, C, I, L, R). As we 
can see 0 belongs to the set D as well as to the set A and E belongs to 
the set A as well as to the set C. Or in other words assuming that a 
lottery is characterized on the basis of some characteristics (these 
characteristic are based on similarities), Lottery A can be 
characterized by the factor a, one stage, and c, known proportion. 0 by 
the factor, a one stage and d, unknown proportion; while D, by b, two 
stage and c, known proportion, and P. by the factor b, two stage, and 
d, unknown proportion. As we can see lotteries A and 0 share the factor 
a, while they are dissimilar as far as factors c and d are concerned. 
This can be expressed graphically in two ways: if we look at Figure 
VI. 1 the various circle represent the possible subsets of L. On the 
other hand if we look at Figure VI. 2 we can have a comparison between 
lotteries E, 0, P, D, according to the various factors, d, a, c, b. 
(This approach can be extended to all the other lotteries but probably 
using more than one graph146) 
We use the same approach of Tversky (1972) 
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Figure VI. 2 Comparing EDP0 according to abcd. 
0A 
P d a c D 
b 
VI. 2.2 The descrtptton of the groups identified by the subjects 
As has already been said briefly in Chapter III, most of the 
subjects who participated in the experiment evaluated the various 
lotteries by dividing them into groups. In fact most of them came to 
the interview with little packets of lotteries147. Of course not all the 
subjects had the same packets since they identified different groups 
according to different characteristics. 
What in general they apparently did was to group the lotteries that 
they regarded as similar. In fact, one of the subject, Subject 11 
stated in the interview "I grouped the lotteries which I thought that 
were quite similar and in which there good chance of winning and then I 
made my minimum to 7 pounds because I think I am a little of a gambler. 
If you don't get it it does not matter. So I thought seven pounds is a 
fair enough sum. " 
Of course the factor that makes similar a group of lotteries is also 
the factor that makes this same group of lotteries dissimilar from the 
other groups. Moreover, as we have already seen, not all the subjects 
recognized the importance of all the factors. 
However most of the subjects identified the various groups. (It is 
147 However, some of the subjects (11 out of 21) did not group the 
lotteries at all. These were those subjects (exept for 1 and 19) who 
were applying the expected value (they declared so in the interview). 
In addition, there were two subjects 1 and 19 which evaluated each lottery 
singularly, even If in their evaluations (especially in the evaluation of 
subject 1), all the characteristics above described were recognized and 
were taken into account in the evaluation. 
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important to notice here that the various subsets intersect with each 
other and there is not just one partition of the entire set L). Between 
the subjects who group the lotteries in order to evaluate them, all the 
subjects identified the groups of the known and unknown lotteries. 
These two groups were even identified by two subjects that applied the 
expected value in their evaluations. They recognized the existence of 
these groups of "riskier lotteries". Three subjects recognized the 
existence of the one stage group of lotteries and of the two stage 
group of lotteries. And four subjects recognized almost every group 
described in Figure VI. I 
VI. 2.3 Description of the various stages of the evaluation process 
As we have seen most of the subjects recognized some of the 
possible groups into which L can be divided. We will try now to 
describe the various stages which this "grouping process" follows and 
how this "grouping element" entered into the evaluation process and 
influenced it. 
If we try to describe the evaluation process of the subjects, we 
can recognized a first stage: 
a) In order to analyze the problem in a easier way the subjects divided 
the lotteries into groups according to certain characteristics. 
b) This grouping seem to have followed a sort of lexicographic order: 
The most important factors (the one which the subjects assign more 
weight) were the unknown or known proportion of balls (presence of 
uncertainty). From these factors the subjects derived two groups of 
lotteries, set D and C. These two factors can be considered the most 
important for two reasons: they were the only factors recognized by 
everybody. Moreover the presence or the absence of the known proportion 
of balls determined very often the two extremes in the evaluations of 
the whole set of lotteries. In addition, within these two sets, 
lottery E and Lottery 0 played a particular role. They were not 
recognized always as one stage lottery but as the simplest lotteries. 
And consequently they were used in the evaluation as a benchmark. 
c) Some of the subjects took these two main groups and divided them 
according to other characteristics that they considered important. This 
process went on till they could identify groups based on some 
particularity. In this respect lottery E and Lottery 0 can also be each 
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considered as one lottery group. 
d) They took each group and evaluated the lotteries contained there. 
These evaluations followed a double consideration. The characteristics 
used to distinguish one group from the other one determined a higher or 
a smaller evaluation of the lotteries contained in the first group with 
respect to the lotteries contained in the other group. However, inside 
each group, another factor could acquire importance and determine the 
different evaluations between the various lotteries. 
Let us take, for example, lotteries B and D. These two lotteries can be 
identified as (known proportion, two stage, two bags). Assuming that we 
arrive at the identification of this set or group containing the two 
lotteries, and that in order to identify this set we have used the 
factor (two bag). However at this point another factor can acquire 
importance for the evaluation; in this example, this factor can be the 
different value of the second order distribution and hence the 
evaluation between B and D is determined by this last characteristic. 
e) In this "grouping by aspects" the subjects sometime insert the same 
lottery in more than one group. Take for example lottery B. Lottery B 
can be included in the set (B, D), (two bags but two different extreme 
in the probability distribution); or it can be included in the set 
(B, U, V), (two bags, same extremes, different selection mechanism). This 
element, the existence of an overlapping) has a twofold influence. 
On the one hand, if the subject compares B and D the focus is on the 
factor that makes the two lotteries dissimilar. The same of course 
happen when B, V, and U are compared amongst them. In this case the 
focus will be on the selection mechanism. 
Let us now assume that we first grouped the lotteries according to the 
characteristics (two bags, different extreme values) of the 
distribution. And then we evaluate the two lotteries comparing these 
lotteries. Let us suppose that we evaluate lottery D 12 pounds and 
lottery B 10 pounds. Now assume that we identified the second group in 
which lottery B can be included, (two bags, same extreme value, 
different selection mechanism), B, V, U. At this point we evaluate the 
three lotteries within this group. B is 10 pounds so the value of U and 
V is determined in the straight comparison with B. Assuming now that we 
identified another group, (two stage increasing number of bags same 
extreme values) in which B can be included (B, F, G, A, H, C). Then we 
proceed in evaluating them in the same way. 
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This kind of procedure may have a major influence in determine the 
final evaluation of a lottery. Grouping the lotteries to simplify the 
evaluation task in this way give a particular role to lottery B which 
is contained in all the three mentioned sets. Lottery B actually is 
used as a tool for comparison (benchmark) within each set. However 
since we focus on different elements in ranking the lotteries within 
each group, this procedure may cause inconsistencies in the evaluations 
or odd results. Let us consider lottery F for example: its value has 
been determined directly in comparison with lottery B, within a 
particular set. The same occurs in case of lottery D and U. It Is 
possible that the evaluation, so established would differ from the one 
possibly obtained comparing directly F with D and U. 
It does not seem from the given evaluations nor from the interview, 
that the subjects tried at the end to make an overall evaluation. 
f) We already said that the subjects when forming a group used a 
particular characteristic. This characteristic enters into the 
evaluation of the lotteries within the group with respect to the 
lotteries outside the group. The possession of a characteristic 
increases or decreases the attractiveness of a group of lotteries. 
However, when the lotteries are evaluated within the group the previous 
characteristic (the one used to form the group) is now a common 
characteristic of the new group and consequently does not enter in the 
evaluation which is instead determined by the differences within the 
group. 
It is also important to notice that, even if recognized through the 
composition of a group, not all the characteristic are evaluated 
negatively or positively by the subjects. That is to say different 
subjects give different importance to different characteristics. If we 
look at Figure VI. 2 the area given to a characteristic a, can be 
regarded as the weight given to this characteristic. 
The entire evaluation process depends crucially on the characteristics 
identified by the subjects and on the weight given to each 
characteristic. The number of characteristics as well as the weight in 
fact seem to determine in this procedure the number and the elements of 
the grouping. 
VI. 3 Final considerations 
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The process described above can strongly influence the final 
evaluation of a lottery. The final value assigned to it in fact does 
not depend only on the utility of the considered lottery with respect 
to the alternative lotteries. The final evaluation depends crucially on 
how the process of comparison is constructed. And how this process is 
construed depends on the characteristic identified by the subjects and 
the weight assigned to them. Or, even more, the utility of a lottery 
depends crucially on which group this lottery has been included. 
In our discussion we were constrained by the fact that our 
"objects" to be evaluated were lotteries designed to test alternative 
theories of explanations of the Ellsberg paradox. However this kind of 
procedure can be used to evaluate any kind of objects. It is possible 
to imagine that in order to simplify a complex evaluation task 
individual will tend to group objects according to some 
characteristics. 
This kind of analysis however raises two main problems: 
1) how people identify the various characteristics? 
2) is it the characteristics which determine the preferences, or they 
are just used to determine the various group and then it is the 
composition of the group that determine the preferences between 
objects? That is, is the whole process the result of preferences or 
does the mental process determine the preferences? 
The result of the experiment as well as the material of the interview 
cannot be used to infer any answer to the above two problems. However 
both aspects have been approached by the psychological literature on 
decision making. 
For example, the choice of the various aspects to be considered in 
order to form the different choice sets can be determined by 
characteristic objectively present in the original choice set148. The 
characteristics identified may be determined by other factors as 
salience representativeness, availability, familiarity, etc, all 
factors which has been analyzed by the psychological literature (See, 
148 Characteristic determined by the experimenter like for example in 
case of the described experiment the different sources of ambiguity. 
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for example, Kahaneman Slovic and Tversky (1982). 
On the other hand, as we noted at the beginning there is a growing part 
of the psychological literature on behavioural decision making which 
sees personal preferences as a result of the mental process adopted in 
the evaluation or of any other task performed by the individuals. 
According to this literature ( See Payne, Bettman, Johnson 1992) 
"information and strategies used to construct preferences or beliefs 
appear to be highly contingent upon and predictable from a variety of 
task, context, and individual-different factors. Task factors are 
general characteristics of a decision problem, such as response mode 
(judgment or choice for example), which do not depend upon the 
particular values of the alternatives. Context factors such as 
similarity of the alternatives, on the other hand, are associated with 
the particular values of the alternative. Task and context factors 
cause different aspect of the problem to be salient and evoke different 
process for combining information. Thus, characteristic of the decision 
problem, such as response mode or similarity, can evoke different 
strategies that at least partially determine the preferences and 
beliefs that we observe. " page 90. 
In this framework , Simonson and Tversky (1992), Tversky and 
Simonson (1993) develop a model ( which also they test experimentally) 
which allow for context-dependent preferences. In short according to 
them preferences can be determined by the composition of the choice 
set. Let us assume that we have two choice sets (x, y, z) and (x, y), my 
preference over x and y can be different if expressed in relation to 
the first set or the second set. They identified two main factors which 
can determine this different preferences which the call trade off 
contrast and extremeness aversion. Their entire analysis is related to 
choices between goods. However it is possible to extrapolate their 
reasoning and apply it to any kind of objects. If their model can be 
apply ed to other contexts, then it is possible to go a step ahead. Let 
us assume, as in the Interpretation of the result of the experiment, 
that people in order to simplify their evaluation process construct, 
from a unique choice set, different choice sets according to various 
characteristics. If preferences are context based, we can infer that 
the preferences and the evaluations expressed towards the objects 
contained in each of these sets may be different from those that the 
subject would have expressed when evaluating the objects in the bigger 
set. This is also what could have happen in the evaluation process in 
the experiment described in chapter III. Of course we do not have at 
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this stage any evidence that this was the case. However, since the 
context base model can be quite challenging for the standard decision 
theory this can be for sure a interesting field of research. 
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"Much of the recent theoretical work on decision under 
uncertaintyattempts to reconcile rational choice with observed 
violations of expected utility theory. Although such attempts have 
enriched the theory of choice, the psychological analysis of preference 
and belief indicated that it is not possible in general to reconcile 
normative and descriptive account of individual choice. The reason for 
this conclusion - which may be regarded by some as pessimistic or even 
negative - is that decision making is a constructive process. In 
contrast to the classical theory that assumes consistent preferences, 
it appears that people often do not have well-defined values, and that 
their preferences are commonly constructed, not merely revealed, in the 
elicitation process. Furthermore, different constructions can give rise 
to systematically different choices, contrary to the basic principles 
that underline classical decision theory. " 
Amos Tversky "Constructive Preferences and Rational Choice" prepared 
for the special session on "Rationality in Economics" held at the 
meeting of the International Economic Association in Turin October 
1993. 
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APPENDIX A 
(Chapter I) 
Let us consider the following compound lottery 
L (Al, l/3; A2,1/3; A3,1/3), where A1(25,0; 0,1), A2(25,1/2; 0,1/2), 
A3(25,1; 0,0), which is exactly lottery F in the experiment reported in 
chapter III. 
Using V {x p;... ;x p} _ (I. 16a) 
En- 1 u (xn) f(pn)+ i=1u(xiLf 
n PjJ-f 
lý = 
pý)l= ni 
j=i+1 
u(x1)f(pl)+ Eni 
_21u(xi)-u(xi-1), 
f 
(j1Pj) 
(I. 16b) L 
to compute evaluate each simple lottery of the compound lottery we 
obtain 
V(AI)= u(0)f(1) 
V(A2)= u(25)f(1/2) 
V(A3)= u(25) f(1) 
where the decision weight function F: [0,1] ->[0,1] satisfy f(O)=O, 
f(1)=1. 
If with CE(AI) we indicate the certainty equivalent of the lottery Ai, 
where the (CE(AI), 1)- Ai; if the preference relation satisfy the 
indipendent axiom then 
(A1, P1;...; AnPn) - (CE(AI), P1;...; CE(An), Pn). (I. 17) 
If the preference relation is represented (I. 16 a) 
then the CE(AI) = u-1(V(Ai)). 
Assuming that CE(AI)sCE(A2)s... SCE(An)then (1.17) implies that 
(A1vPI;...; AnPn)- (u ...; 
ü I(V(An)). Pn) (1.18) 
In our example 
(A1,1/3; A2,1/3; A3'1/3) - (CE(Al), 1/3; ... ; CE(A3 
), P3) 
and CE(A1)= i1 (V(A1) = u-1( u(0)f(1)) 
CE(A2)= i1 (V(A2) = u-1( u(25)f(1/2)) 
CE(A1)= -1 (V(A3) = ü-1( u(25)f(1)) 
by (I. 16b) then by (I. 18) the value of the two stage lottery 
1 
V (A 1P 1; A 2P 2; A3P3) can be represented by 
V(A1) + 
_2 
[V(A 
i)-V(Ai-1 )j 
=i 
J f( nPJJJ l (1.19) ll 
that in our case is 
U(O) f(1) + [u(25) f(1/2) - u(0) f(1)] f(2/3) 
+ [u(25) f(1)-u(25)f(1/2)] f(1/3)= 
= u(25) f(1/2) f(2/3) + u(25) f(1/3) - u(25)f(1/2) f(1/3)= 
= u(25) f(1/2) f(2/3) + u(25) f(1/3) [1-f(1/2)]= 
= u(25) [ f(1/2) f(2/3)+ f(1/3) [1-f(1/2)] 
Now if we apply 
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u(x) f(p1) + u(x) i=21 f(pi)-f(pi-1)I f(Ej=iP(pj) 
to the same lottery we obtain: 
P1sP2sP3 and P1=0' P2= 1/2' P3 1 
u(25)f(O) + u(25) [f(1/2)-f(0)]f(2/3)+ u(25)[f(1)-f(1/2)]f(1/3)= 
= u(25)f(1/2)f(2/3) + u(25)[f(1)-f(1/2)]f(1/3)= 
= u(25) [ f(1/2) f(2/3)+ f(1/3) [1-f(1/2)] QED. 
(I. 20) 
Let us consider the following lottery, which is equal to the first 
branch of lottery F: L1(0,1/3; 1/2,1/3; 1,1/3); we want to show that 
taking one of the two forms (I. 16a) and (I. 16b) above in the text is 
exactly the same. 
Let us consider Li(x1'p1'xn'pn) where n and xe... sxn. 
The value of the lottery LI using (I. 16a) 
V(L. )= u(xn) f (pn) +E1 u(xi) 
[c( 
pj, f 
(jip)J 
i_=1 
So V(LI)=u(1) f(1/3) + u(O) [f(1)-f(2/3)] +u (1/2) [f(2/3)-f(1/3)] 
Since f(1) =1 f(0)=0 we will have 
u(l) f(1/3) + u(O) [1- f(2/3) ]+ u(1/2) (f(2/3) - f(1/3)) 
putting u(O) =0 u(1/2) = 1/2 u(1) =1 the above expression becomes 
f(1/3) + 1/2 [f(2/3) - f(1/3)]. 
+ 
2 
Now we evaluate Li following the second form indicate by (I. 16b). 
n=2 rn 
V(Li) =u (x1) f (p1) +I u(xi) - u(xi-1)J f 
(p. ) 
V (L1) =u (0) f (1/3)+ [u(1/2) - u(O)]f(2/3) + [u(1) - u(1/2)) f(1/3) 
putting u(O)=O u(1/2)=1/2 u(1)=1 the above expression becomes 
1/2 f(2/3) + f(1/3) - 1/2 f(1/3) = f(1/3) + 1/2 [f(2/3) - f(1/3)] Q. E. D. 
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APPENDIX B 
(Chapter III) 
INVITATION 
We are looking for 10 volunteers to take part in an experiment. The 
experiment is to be held in the early part of week 11 (from the 29th to 
the 31st of March). All 10 volunteers must register for the experiment 
in week 10: on Wednesday and Thursday from 9 a. m. to 5.30 p. m.. For 
participation in this experiment, you will receive a participation fee 
of E5, in addition to whatever you gain from the procedure described 
below. 
You will each be asked to examine and evaluate 21 lotteries. Each 
lottery will give you a chance to win £25. You are asked to give a 
price to each lottery. This price can be seen as your minimum selling 
price for the lottery; that is, the lowest sum of money that you would 
be prepared to accept in exchange for the lottery. Hence the price you 
give will represent your evaluation of the lottery. The lotteries will 
be given to you when you go to register for the experiment; 
registration will take place in the EXEC office in Derwent, D block, 
second floor, room 203 (D/D203). 
When you register you will also be given an answer sheet in which you 
will be asked to write your evaluations of the lotteries and a few 
notes of explanation. A few days later we will meet in the EXEC office 
and you will be asked some questions about your evaluations of the 
lotteries. The interview will be tape recorded and will last around 15 
minutes. At the end of the interview the following procedure will be 
carried out. One of the 21 lotteries will be picked at random; we will 
look at your evaluation of the randomly picked lottery. Then a number 
between 0 and 25 will be picked at random; if that number is greater 
than your price for that lottery, you will get that number of pounds; 
otherwise the lottery will be played out and you will be rewarded with 
either l0 or X25 depending on the outcome of the lottery. It is 
important to note that it is worth your evaluating the various 
lotteries accurately: if you give to a lottery a price which is less 
than the value that you place on that lottery you may end up with an 
amount of money when you would prefer to play out the lottery; while if 
you give to a lottery a price which is more than the value that you 
place on that lottery you may end up playing out that lottery when you 
would prefer to receive that amount of money. 
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ANSWER SHEET 
Name: College: 
Address: 
Could you please explain how you arrived at your evaluation? 
We will talk about this in more detail at the interview. 
Please put your evaluation of the lotteries on the other side 
of the paper. 
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Lotteries Prices 
0 
  
I 
F 
7. 
LOTTERIES 
Lottery E 
In front of you there is a bag which contains 12 balls, 6 black and 6 
white. The bag is opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are asked to 
bet on one of the two colours and then you will draw a ball from the 
bag. If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get 
£25, otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery D 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls, 6 black and 6 white. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see 
inside. You are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, 
you will choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from that bag. 
If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, 
otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery U 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, while the other contains 12 
white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are 
asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you will choose 
a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from that bag. If you draw a 
ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you 
will get nothing. 
Lottery V 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, while the other contains 12 
white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are 
asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, the 
experimenter will choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from 
that bag. If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will 
get £25, otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery B 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls. One bag contains 12 black balls while the other contains 12 
white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are 
asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you will toss a 
coin: if it lands heads you will choose the bag on your left; if it 
lands tails you will choose the bag on your right. At this point you 
will draw a ball from the chosen bag. If you draw a ball of the colour 
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you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery F 
In front of you there are three bags. Each of the three bags contains 
12 balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, a second one contains 6 
black balls and 6 white balls and a third contains 12 white balls. The 
bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are asked to bet on one 
of the two colours and then, first, you will choose a bag and, second, 
you will draw a ball from that bag. If you draw a ball of the colour 
you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery A 
In front of you there are five bags. Each of the five bags contains 12 
balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, a second one contains 9 black 
balls and 3 white balls, a third one contains 6 black balls and 6 white 
balls, a fourth one contains 3 black balls and 9 white balls and a 
fifth one contains 12 white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot 
see inside. You are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, 
first, you will choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from 
that bag. If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will 
get 425, otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery G 
In front of you there are seven bags. Each of the seven bags contains 
12 balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, a second one contains 9 
black balls and 3 white balls, a third one contains 7 black balls and 5 
white balls, a fourth one contains 6 black balls and 6 white balls, a 
fifth one contains 5 black balls and 7 white balls, a sixth one 
contains 3 black balls and 9 white balls, and a seventh one contains 12 
white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are 
asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you will choose 
a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from that bag. If you draw a 
ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you 
will get nothing. 
Lottery H 
In front of you there are eleven bags. Each of the eleven bags contains 
12 balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, a second one contains 11 
black balls and 1 white ball, a third one contains 10 black balls and 2 
white balls, a fourth one contains 9 black balls and 3 white balls, a 
fifth one contains 7 black balls and 5 white balls, a sixth one 
contains 6 black balls and 6 white balls, a seventh one contains 5 
black balls and 7 white balls, an eighth one contains 3 black balls and 
9 white balls, a ninth one contains 2 black balls and 10 white balls, a 
tenth one contains 1 black ball and 11 white balls and a eleventh one 
contains 12 white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. 
You are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you 
will choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from that bag. If 
you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, 
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otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery I 
In front of you there are two bags. One bag contains 13 balls. Each 
ball has a number from 0 to 12. The other bag is empty but it will 
contain 12 balls which can be either black or white. The bags are 
opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are asked to bet on one of the 
two colours and then you will draw a ball from the second bag. The 
proportion of black and white will be determined In the following way. 
You will draw a ball from the first bag, if the ball you drew has the 
number three on it, 3 black balls and 9 white balls will be put in the 
second bag. At this point you will draw a ball from the second bag. If 
you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, 
otherwise you will get nothing. Note that you have to choose the colour 
on which to bet before you will know the proportion of the black and 
white balls in the second bag. 
Lottery M 
In front of you there is a bag which contains 12 balls, 6 are black and 
6 are white. Then there is a second bag which is empty. The bags are 
opaque, so you cannot see inside. From the first bag a ball is to be 
drawn by somebody who is neither you nor the experimenter. If the drawn 
ball is black he or she will put a black ball into the second bag; if 
the drawn ball is white he or she will put a white ball into the second 
bag. Then, after replacing the drawn ball in the first bag, a new ball 
is drawn. If the drawn ball is black he or she will put a black ball 
into the second bag; if the drawn ball is white he or she will put a 
white ball into the second bag. At this point, without knowing which 
colours are the two balls put into the second bag, you have to bet on a 
colour and draw a ball from the second bag. If you draw a ball of the 
colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you will get 
nothing. 
Lottery T 
In front of you there are two bags. The first bag contains 6 black 
balls and 6 white balls. The second bag contains 11 balls. Each ball is 
either black or white but you do not know how many there are of each. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are asked to draw a ball from the first bag: if a black ball is drawn then a black ball is 
put in the second bag; if a white ball is drawn then a white ball is 
put into the second bag. At this point you are asked to bet on a colour 
and to draw a ball from the second bag, which now contains 12 balls. If 
you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, 
otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery 0 
In front of you there is one bag which contains 12 balls. Each ball is 
either black or white but you do not know how many there are of each. The bag is opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are asked to bet on 
one of the two colours and then to draw a ball from the bag. If you 
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draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise 
you will get nothing. 
Lottery P 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls. Each ball is either black or white but you do not know how many 
there are of each. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You 
are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you will 
choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from that bag. If you 
draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise 
you will get nothing. 
Lottery Q 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls, each ball is either black or white but you do not know how many 
there are of each. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You 
are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, the 
experimenter will choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from 
the bag. If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get 
£25, otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery C 
In front of you there are thirteen bags. Each of the thirteen bags 
contains 12 balls. One bag contains 12 black balls, a second one 
contains 11 black balls and 1 white ball, a third one contains 10 black 
balls and 2 white balls, a fourth one contains 9 black balls and 3 
white balls, a fifth one contains 8 black balls and 4 white balls, a 
sixth one contains 7 black balls and 5 white balls, a seventh one 
contains 6 black balls and 6 white balls, an eighth one contains 5 
black balls and 7 white balls, a ninth one contains 4 black balls and 8 
white balls, a tenth one contains 3 black balls and 9 white balls, a 
eleventh one contains 2 black balls and 10 white balls, a twelfth one 
contains 1 black ball and 11 white balls and a thirteenth one contains 
12 white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are 
asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you will choose 
a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from that bag. If you draw a 
ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you 
will get nothing. 
Lottery S 
In front of you there are two bags. Each of the two bags contains 12 
balls. Each ball is either black or white but you do not know how many 
there are of each. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You 
are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, you will 
toss a coin: if it lands heads you will choose the bag on your left; if 
it lands tails you will choose the bag on your right. At this point you 
will draw a ball from the chosen bag. If you draw a ball of the colour 
you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you will get nothing. 
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Lottery Z 
In front of you there are three bags. The first bag contains 12 balls. 
Each of these 12 balls can be either black or white, but you do not 
know how many there are of each. The second and the third bags each 
contain 12 balls, of which 6 are black and 6 are white. The three bags, 
are opaque so you cannot see inside. First you are asked to bet on one 
of the two colours and, then, to draw a first ball from the first bag; 
if you draw a black ball you will have to draw the second ball from the 
bag on your left, if you draw a white ball you will have to draw the 
second ball from the bag on your right. At this point you will draw a 
second ball from the chosen bag. If this second ball is a ball of the 
colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise you will get 
nothing. 
Lottery R 
In front of you there are three bags. Each of the three bags contains 
12 balls. One bag contains 6 black balls and 6 white balls, a second 
bag contains 6 black balls and 6 white balls and a third one contains 6 
black balls and 6 white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see 
inside. You are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, 
you will choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from the bag. 
If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, 
otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery L 
In front of you there are three bags. Each of the three bags contains 
12 balls. One bag contains 4 black balls and 8 white balls, a second 
bag contains 6 black balls and 6 white balls and a third one contains 8 
black balls and 4 white balls. The bags are opaque, so you cannot see 
inside. You are asked to bet on one of the two colours and then, first, 
you will choose a bag and, second, you will draw a ball from the bag. 
If you draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, 
otherwise you will get nothing. 
Lottery N 
In front of you there are two bags. The first bag contains 6 black 
balls and 6 white balls. The second bag contains 9 balls. Each ball is 
either black or white but you do not know many there are of each. The 
bags are opaque, so you cannot see inside. You are asked to draw a ball 
from the first bag, if a black ball is drawn then a black ball is put 
in the second bag, otherwise a white ball is put into the bag. Then you 
are asked to draw a second ball from the first bag, after the first one 
has been replaced in the bag: if a black ball is drawn a black ball is 
put into the second bag; otherwise a white ball Is put into the bag. 
Then you are asked to draw a third ball from the first bag, after the 
second one has been replaced in the bag: if a black ball is drawn a 
black ball is put into the second bag; otherwise a white ball is put 
into the bag. At this point you are asked to bet on a colour and to 
draw a ball from the second bag, which now contains 12 balls. If you 
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draw a ball of the colour you have chosen, you will get £25, otherwise 
you will get nothing. 
Interviews 
Subject 1 
Generally I ask you to explain to me which is the kind of reasoning 
that is was behind your evaluations. 
For A there were only two bags with all the same colour, so there was a 
good chance to get a mixture. B, the two bags have just one colour in 
each, so there is all or nothing; lottery C, there are only two bags 
with one colour, again, there is a good chance to have a mixture, D 
seems very fair as there is the same proportion of white and black; for 
E again there is an equal proportion so it is fair, for F there is not 
I think, a 50 per cent chance.. all the same colour In two bags, so 
that does not seem pretty fair in doing the lottery; G again there are 
only two bags with all the same colour, so there is a good chance of 
having a bag which has got a mixture of the two balls in each; for H. 
again, there are two bags with all one colour In each, so there is a 
good chance to get a mixture of the two and for I the same again, there 
is a good chance to have a mixture. For L, all the bags are mixed up, 
so I feel like to have a better chance of getting the one you choose. T 
you know some of the proportion of the black and white balls in there, 
so I assigned a higher value for that N; you do know at least some of 
the percentage. Each is a fifty percent chance two balls the same 
colour; for 0, I do not know the percentage at all, so you can't 
assign a very high value to the lottery; P same again you do not know 
the percentage at all again, so you do not know on what you are betting 
really; for Q, same again, you still do not know the percentage when 
you do the lottery so I cannot assign a higher value to It, R is an 
equal chance so you can assign a higher value to it; the same 
percentage chance of getting either balls; S again you do not know the 
percentage at all so I can't give a very high value; T you do know the 
colour of a lot of the balls but you do not know the colour of the rest 
of them so I cannot assign a value very high to that lottery; U, you 
have all one colour in the same bag so it does not seem very fair 
really; you feel like an all or nothing, B again is a all or nothing 
feeling, with Z there is an equal chance, so I assign a higher 
probability to it. 
You have put the higher evaluation to E 
Right 
Can you explain me why you have put this evaluation to E. 
May I look at the lottery? 
Yes of course.. 
Because it is just one bag which has got six of each in it so it is 
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definite; you just feel you have a 50-50 chance to getting your ball. 
There is the whole mixture in that so, when you put your hand in, you 
still got a 50-50 chance. 
And pick the lottery D, for instance. Compare it to the one that you 
have just evaluated you gave an evaluation just lower 
It just seems more definite E; just the way I think about the problem. 
And then take B, U, and V. You have evaluated them all the same. Can 
you just explain me why ?. 
With B you have got to choose the colour of the ball and, then, it is 
like down to faith, again, when you toss the coin whether you go to the 
bag which has got the colour of the ball that you have chosen; it seems 
rather down to faith if you are lucky. U is the same sort, but it is 
like the experiment setting up the coin again, it is down to faith 
which bag you choose, because the coin is just external to the 
experiment, really the only thing which is different is whether the 
coin decides, whether you put your hand in , or you decide where to 
put your hand in but the bags are equal, anyway, they can be mixed up; 
V is the same as B, the only difference is because it is just the 
experimenter to choose the bag; it is still down to luck, again, 
because B and V are exactly the same, because it is an external force; 
U is the same because it is still down to luck where you choose. 
Take F, A, G and H and C; you gave a slightly different evaluation 9 on 
F, 8 on G, on H, A and C 12. What made you change your evaluation? 
With F two out of three bag are just one colour, so once you have 
chosen your colour then there are just two bags that have some 
proportion of your colour in, so the chance once you picked a bag, when 
you put your hand in, there may be no chance of getting your ball, 
anyway, because there can be all balls of the other colour. With A, 
again, you got two bags with all the same colour, but in between the 
other three bags are a mixture, so once you have chosen the bag, there 
are four out of five bags you can choose in which you got an actual 
chance of getting the colour you have chosen.. With C again there are 
13 bags and just two which have all the same colour, but this time you 
got 12 out of 13 in which your ball will be in, so you got a greater 
chance of getting your ball anyway when you have chosen one of the 
bag; there is just one out of 13 in which you do not have any hope of 
having your ball out of it. With G even though there are 2 with all the 
same colours out of 7 bag, the proportion in between seems fair; if you 
have chosen a black ball, even if there are 6 out of seven bags which 
contain your balls there is a higher number of the bags that are 
between the two extremes; so you got greater chance of picking your 
ball and with H you got eleven bags again you have got 10 bags which 
would contain your colour but the proportion within it seems reasonably 
fair to you to pick a ball which you have chosen once you do not chose 
one of the bag that is at the extremity 
And then L. R and F, you gave to L 12, to R 13, to F 9, can you explain 
me why you have evaluated the three of them in a different way? 
With R any bag you choose you got a 50 percent chance of getting a 
black ball or a white ball, so this is pretty fair; there is no chance 
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of being persecuted of having all the other colour balls; with L the 
bag is still mixed up but one is fifty percent chance another one is 45 
percent chance and the other one is 25 percent chance so if you choose 
the one in which you have just 25 percent chance then it is worst off 
that being in lottery R; in F again you got a bag which is fifty 
percent mix but you got one bag which is all the same colour you have 
chosen and one bag in which there is none of your balls in it, if you 
choose that bag you have just no chance of picking the ball that you 
have chosen it does not seem as fair as the other two. 
And then, S, P, Q , and 0; look before to SP and Q and then to 0; 
you have given the higher evaluation to S then to P then to 0 then to 
Q. 
For S you got two bags; it is very annoying that both the bags have 12 
balls which you do not know, you got an external force that decides 
which bags you go for, but since you got the two bags, it appears that 
you got a better chance to pick the bag that has got the colour you 
want; P is the same but with no external force, it is down to you to 
choose which bag; as the lottery seems to be down to luck it does not 
seem to be as fortuitous as the lottery in which it was the coin to 
decide which bag you draw from; with Q the external force is the 
experimenter; you don't feel so lucky when the experimenter is doing 
it, you know what I mean. It is an external force that even if it does 
not have more control than you do on the bags, it seems to have more 
control than you do over the experiment in itself; 0 has just one bag 
which contains 12 balls so one bag could be just all of the colour that 
you have not chosen, that is why I did not assign a higher value to it, 
because there is a higher probability of having all of the colour 
opposite the one you have chosen because there is just one bag. 
Just look at Z, you put a higher evaluation; just explain me why. 
It is the last two bags with which you are concerned rather than the 
first one of the lottery. The first bag just determines from which of 
the second and the third bag you will take the lottery from and since 
in the second and in the third bag there is equal chance of getting the 
black ball or the white ball, you just feel that both bag have a fifty 
fifty chance; so once you have put the hand into the bag there still a 
fifty fifty chance of getting the colour that you want. 
That's all. 
Subject 2 
Just explain me in a general way which was the kind of reasoning that 
you used in evaluating the lotteries. 
The main one.. for most of them it was the fact that you pick up a bag 
at random and you have no idea of the one you picked and the chance 
that you draw out a white ball or a black one is the same. You can win 
25 pound or naught so it means that the expected gain from the lottery 
is 12.50, so I put 12.. 
Go on this... this one you got eleven balls and they can be black or 
white, therefore I assume that there are 5 and a half of each; if you 
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draw a ball (that can be black and white) and you put It into the bag; 
so it seems much as you have 6.5 of one colour and 5.5 of the other 
colour; so, if you choose the colour that you have just put into the 
bag... (ruined) 
And then N 
It seems as you got 9 balls so you have 4 and half of each 
if... (ruined) 
Look at V and U 
It makes no difference if you choose or I choose the bag so, therefore, 
B and U are just the same; V is the same because you toss a coin 
randomly, so randomly you choose a bag and you do not know anyway 
which balls are in the bag. 
And then the other group P, S, Q, and 0. 
S is the one in which you choose; it is equal to P, because the coin 
chooses randomly, you choose randomly; in Q the experimenter chooses 
randomly, therefore, Q is just the same as the other; 0 is the same as 
the other because there is just one bag, and it does not really matter 
which bag you choose since they are chosen randomly. 
And just explain me why you put a higher evaluation on T and N 
This is because there are eleven balls and, then, you put one ball you 
know into the bag and, then, you chose a colour; if you choose the same 
colour you put into the bag you have a better chance. In T you put 3 
balls into the bag; this means that you got at least two of one colour 
and one of the other colour and there might be the case in which you 
put three of the same colour that means that you have much more chance. 
And, then, M which is the other one you gave a higher evaluation. 
M is one in which in the first bit if a black ball is picked it is put 
into the bag and for the second one you have got a fifty fifty chance 
of putting a black one or a white one; this means that 7.5 percent of 
the time you can get a black ball and 25 percent of the time you get a 
white one .. which means that the black one 
is more probable. 
O. K. Thank you 
Subject 3 
Just explain me, which kind of reasoning did you use in evaluating the 
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lotteries? 
0. K. I have not done much, I have not GSG in Maths and so my statistics 
is not very good. I looked through them all and, as far as I could see, 
they were .. most of them represented a fifty per cent chance of picking 
up your colour ball, because the simplest case, when you have one bag, 
and 6 black balls and 6 white ball in the bag, you have basically a 
50-50 chance of picking up the colour but, when I went through it and I 
worked out the more complicated ones, I am talking about the ones I 
priced 12 now, I decided that, no matter how complicated you made the 
lotteries, they all still represent a 50 percent chance, because they 
where balanced. In the one with seven bags there is one bags with 
twelve blacks, but there is also one with 12 whites, one with 8 blacks 
and 4 whites, but there is also one with 4 blacks and 8 whites and then 
6 and 6, so, theref ore, if you don't know, you can't see in the bags, 
then, actually, as far as I can work out with my statistics, you still 
have 50 percent chance of betting on the ball that you have 
chosen... The only complication I had is that there are some lotteries 
which are the one I priced 10, which were to some extend blind; in some 
way you did not know how many balls... I am trying to find them. There 
is one here which says: in front of you there are two bags... each ball 
..... This is a blind one; what you 
do is that you pull out a number, 
and you choose the proportion of black and white from that number, but 
you have to bet on the colour that you choose before you decide the 
proportion; so there is really no way you could influence that, you can 
pick up a naught and bet on the wrong colour and there is no way you 
can win the lottery. Then, I decide just to make them slightly less 
because I would prefer not to play out the lotteries; as I said before 
I didn't work out the maths behind; all I could do is just decide to 
price them slightly less, because I thought I had less chance to win 
the lottery on those. The reason I priced all the others as twelve is 
because, as far as I can work out, that gives me the best chance to win 
the most of money, because it is half way between 0 and 25 which are 
the extremes you have and it is a 50 - 50 chance. 
Can you pick U, V and B? You have evaluated them all the same; can you 
just explain me why? 
O. K. I have to read through them again. O. K. They are basically all the 
same lottery, there are two bags and there are.. one with 12 black and 
one with 12 white, now, of course it is not an ideal situation but 
still 50-50 because the bags are opaque, so when you bet on one colour 
you still don't know you still got a 50-50 chance. The choice is not if 
you pick out a black ball from the bag the choice is which bag you 
chose but the odds are still 50 percent, because there are two bags and 
the only difference between this three lotteries is the way the bag is 
chosen; in B here you have .. the bag 
is chosen by tossing a coin, 
that's 50-50, that is a random game; in this I chose the bag but I mean 
the bags are opaque so it is like tossing a coin and, then, the 
experimenter, and in this I was slightly confused because I did not 
know whether the experimenter would have known what was in the bag and 
so therefore, he deliberately could choose the bag which would affect 
what I might decide. I decided at the end that I did not really care, 
so I just evaluated the same assuming that he did not know so it makes 
no odds how the bags is chosen, because it is random; no one knows what 
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there is in the bag and, therefore, they are all the same. 
And then look at this and this group you also have evaluated the same 
(E and U, V, B). 
Yes there is only one bag this time but there are 6 blacks and 6 
whites, there I have to chose a bag all the differences that there were 
in these lotteries is the different number of stages that you have to 
go through before you actually chose a ball out, and in this one what 
you got is one bag with the balls and you just choose a ball and there 
are 6 black and 6 white and there are 50-50; you can say you just 
choose a colour and see if luckily you get it; in effect in this 
lottery, here, it is exactly the same that this one expect that you 
just separated out the black and the white balls into different bags; 
you could have another bag, you could have a big bag and inside you 
could have 6 black and 6 white balls and a little bag also, it could 
not make any difference because you can't say which is which. 
Just take the T and N which you gave 10, slightly less then the 
others... 
Ye these are more difficult one and I am sure that I priced them 
inaccurately but really I could not decide how to price these at all, 
because.. I could actually give them even less because .. O. K. These are 
quite interesting because N would be valued differently depending on 
the colour of the three balls that you draw out because if you draw out 
three black balls then you are going to bet on black , but if you draw 
two black and a white then ..; but even if you do that you 
know that 
you have a slightly better chance in theory to pick up black ball that 
white one, but you still don't know, there could be 9 white balls in 
the bag; you have no clue of what is in the bag so, therefore, there 
will be still 9 whites, even If you draw 3 black balls, so there is a 
great difficulty to decide; then I decide that the only way you could 
work it out at all would be to assume that the blind bag you didn't see 
in was equally split or roughly split so it would be like four and five 
and then depending on what you drawn out. So I just assume that and I 
priced it slightly lower than twelve because I think I would be worried 
to play this out, because I do not know which chances I have. What is 
the next one ... this is the same thing, 
it is just slightly less 
complicated, you just have 11 balls; the only sensible thing to do is 
to draw a colour and bet on that colour. 
Now take the S, P, and Q and 0 .. 0. You gave 10 to S.... 
I gave 10 to Q as well because also this is a blind one, you do not 
know how they are split at all so .. you gave 12... 
P is the same thing 
you got two bags it does not matter really you do not know what colours 
the balls are so what you can do is the same as blind so I priced it 
slightly lower for me it is just blind, there are blind chances, there 
is no way you can guess; as for 0, I suspect this is also the same, 
there is one bag with 12 also and you don't know so the only thing that 
you can do is bet on one colour .. this is different again 
is the 
experimenter who chooses .. the bag in P you choose I eventually decided that it does not really make much difference ... again in this 
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one is just tossing a coin, which is just a random choosing what you 
are really doing; put a conscious choice into it, it does not make 
really any difference; you don't know what you choose anyway you may 
want to toss a coin. 
And them just M that you evaluated 10; just explain why 
O. K. .. then because, again, this is a quite complicate one, you get 
... you don't see what colour are the two balls put into the bag and 
again the fact I do not know if this is true, but it is how I read it, 
it does not matter if there are two balls in the bag or 12 or 24, the 
odds are still the same but you do not know if if is a black or a 
whiteone or if there are two blacks or two whites; it could be quite 
easily two whites, it is just 50-50 and 6 of each and you are just 
asked to draw two balls out so quite easily there can be two whites so 
you do not lie; there is no way to control the balls so It is why I 
have evaluated slightly less again, because it is blind and you do not 
know anyway. And Z which you evaluated 12 .. It is just complicated, 
in the first stage again you have to choose the bag instead of deciding 
which bag you want and draw a ball out of that bag; if it is black you 
choose a right bag .. actually the second and the third bags from 
which, you are choosing, tell you that six are black and six are white 
so you got 50-50 chance and both bags have got 6 of each. So, therefore, 
it is really immaterial what you do at the beginning; which bag you end 
up with in the first part is the same with the fact that the first bit 
is blind we do not know how many balls there are; really it is not 
important at all; because you do not know what are you betting on, when 
you draw from that; it is a sort of random way of choosing the bag, it 
would be more complicated if the second and the third have got 
different numbers, since they have got the same number, it is really 
immaterial which bag you draw the ball from. 
O. K. Thank you. 
Subject 4 
I ask you which is the general reasoning behind your evaluation. 
When I was looking at all the lotteries it seemed to be about 50-50 
chance of the ball you have chosen being collected; the fact that you 
chosen, before drawing the ball out or after it has not really matter. 
And for some of them, it was really obvious, you had one lotteries 
with 12 white balls in one bag and 12 black balls in the other bag and 
you choose a ball and the bag are just 50-50. In others, there was a 
lot more information given to you; for instance, the one In which it 
starts off with twelve bags and, then, you have 11 black balls and 1 
white; but even then, eventually, you still have the same number of 
balls of each type and consequently, you still have a fifty-fifty 
percent chance; there is just confusing information and you have just 
to spend more time to look through all them; there seems to be a couple 
where the chance is slightly higher, but only slightly, so it does not 
really change that much so I change the price accordingly slightly to 
11 pounds but .. 
I originally started off with 8 pounds and it was a toss between 8 and 
18 
9 and 10, then, I thought well with 10, it is a lot of money and you 
probably get a quite higher chance to pick up; so 10 to 25 is hat to 
hat so half to a third chance, I said why not? otherwise, I would be 
quite happy to get a gamble and take 25 pounds or nothing and then you 
can have just the 5 pounds which you start off. I just thought that I 
had 50 percent chance to get 25 pounds, which was equivalent to getting 
no much less of 10 pounds, so I just put 10 pounds. That is how I made 
my evaluations. 
I will just ask you about some groups of lotteries. Can you take B, U, 
and V. You have evaluated the lotteries all the same; you gave 10 to 
all of them; are they really equal to you or, at the margin, there are 
some differences? 
May I read .. 
Or just explain me why you have evaluated them in this way.. 
... There is only one bag and in the end you got 
6 black balls and 6 
white balls and you draw a ball from the bag and that is an even chance 
to draw out the colour that you have chosen; so it is a 50-50 chance 
even thought there are less balls to draw out; in this the experimenter 
has to choose the bag; well it does not really matter who chooses the 
bag either, because the bags are opaque anyway ... the 6 and 6 has just 
been translated in 12 whites and 12 blacks, it is still the same ratio 
so they were absolutely equal and also probably the other one .. The 
difference is just that you choose the bag or the experimenter chooses 
the bag but, as I just said before, as for the fact that it is the 
experimenter; he hasn't any hint, any more knowledge than you do, it is 
still down to chance so... they are all the same and.. you toss a coin 
ye that tossing a coin is just a different method of choosing a bag, 
but it is like you choose the bag , the experimenter chooses the bag, 
you toss a coin. Still you have no more insight in what is going to 
come up, and it is just someonemaking a decision for you instead of 
making it by yourself; but you make a decision without really knowing 
anything at all, it is still chance, totally down to chance anyway when 
you toss a coin or you just point out a bag. 
May you just take the S, P, Q, and 0? 
You have evaluated ten all of them. 
That is a little more riskier, but I just thought that because there 
are just two different colours of balls so it is like having a 50-50 
chance to picking out the one you want; I was tempted to put a slightly 
lower price on that, but I set down and then I thought, if you choose 
black there can be 12 black balls or no one and so you do bad but .. If 
you think that you can cancel out like tossing a coin, I think it does 
not matter who is making the decision for you and it cancels out and 
become the some as the experimenter, so what I think is that this Is 
the group of the slightly riskier .. I do not know what to say on that because it is the same as the first one (0).. so in this one, you choose 
the bag but you do not know which is the good bag, so how it will be 
the chance on that bag. 
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Take F, A, G, H, you also evaluated them the same so just explain me why, 
which kind of reasoning you adopted in evaluating them. 
I just tried to sort of mentally calculating if there were the same 
number of black and white balls so .. choosing a bag you do not know 
what it is inside, but you still have got a 50-50 chance of getting the 
colour that you want and it was the same with all of these as well, I 
read through just in case they slightly changed and to see.. there 
might be one bag missing in the sequence and I thought that would 
change the experiment but they are all with the same number of black 
and white balls; it just takes a lot longer to read them, that's all. 
And then T and N, you also gave the same evaluation. 
This is going back to the experiment where you do not know how many 
balls there are so this is just a slightly more risky one, but again, 
because there are just two coloursof balls there is 50 per cent chance 
to pick out a white one; if you knew how many balls there where in the 
bags then there could be slightly more blacks than whites, but you do 
not know that so.. 
I just put the same price because I thought you can end up with a bag 
full of the balls you have chosen, but you could end up with a bag with 
none of those balls so it is even though..... 
Take the two that you have evaluated differently which are T and M 
.. It it does not say if a white ball is 
drawn it is put in the second 
bag .. no it does look at them separately. 
You still end with 6 blacks and 6 whites then a second ball is drawn 
and a ball of the same colour is put into the second bag, ye so it 
seems to having more chance of getting black then the first time that 
you pick out a ball from the first bag, it is only black that is put 
into the second bag to be chosen from and then, the second time, it is 
whatever colour you get; so there are just marginally more chances to 
picking out black so you chose black anyway .. so I put a higher price 
on it because there are more chances to play out the lottery .. I do 
not know if I slightly misread this one .. because it is eleven balls 
and you actually do know the colour of the balls that you put into the 
second bag, then you can choose that colour so you do not know the 
ratio of the balls in the second bag but you know that a white ball or 
a black ball will be in and you bet on that colour so I thought it is 
risky but there is still more chance of picking the right colour. 
And then Z you evaluated 10. 
Well with this one you bet on the colour after drawing a white ball 
this means that you have less chance to draw another white ball out, 
then I probably would have put a higher price on that but you have to 
chose the colour before you have to draw any of the balls at all so it 
is like taking it out of your hand isn't it? 
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I suppose that it is slightly riskier, basically I found that ought to 
be about the same; if I had thought longer I might have changed the 
price marginally but there was not really that much point and you know 
changing a price about one pound or two pounds; well I did for those 
two because I found that definitely they were different so I changed 
the price therefore, but I thought there was no much need to mess about 
all the other prices 
O. K. Thanks. 
Subject 5 
Can you just explain to me which kind of reasoning did you use in 
evaluating your lotteries ? 
Yes. Just because I play out without any risk so I thought let's 
evaluate them all about between seven to ten pounds because the chance 
that you get that a number is picked when you just get the money and 
you do not play the lottery at all is over 50 percent; so I thought it 
is better to get some money than nothing, because playing the lotteries 
is 25 to naught so I thought ... I just play without any risk 
because 
there is more chance. 
And which are the reasonings behind the different evaluations of the 
lotteries ? 
From 7 to 10, I think I have just randomly chosen, actually ... I mean, 
it depends on how much I thought the lottery will come towards a good 
end or a bad end; so I did not really calculated all the lotteries, but 
I thought, if there were fifty per cent chance I play 10, but if it 
just sounds suspicious to me I just put 8 or seven pounds.. just 
randomly o. k.. 
Can you take lottery E, B and then V and U so .. You have put 10 on V 
and on E, are they .. you evaluated them equally.. 
They are ... V and D are the same. 
Then you put B, 7, and U, 8, may you explain me why you put this 
evaluation, why a different evaluation between U, B, and V. 
I think just because I thought try one this way and try this other in 
that other way to give all of them a chance; I just did not want to 
play the same on all of them, because I thought that could be more 
risky some time but not if they were the same.. the same value if 
there is the same chance I thought let's try both ... 
And pick up the P. Q and S and 0. look at S, P and Q and then you have 
evaluated S and Q in the same way which is 8 and P is 7, may you 
explain me why. 
I think that it was for the same reason as before, therefore I think 
that these are a bit risky, because you don't know how many balls there 
are of each colour In the bags, so I thought, it might just be one, so 
I gave seven pounds, since I thought I can try; but I thought that it 
was not worth ten because there could be just one ball in each of the 
21 
colour I have chosen. I did not like this. 
And then just F, A, G, H, C, you gave to to F, G, C, the same 
evaluations 8 and then to A and G, 7. 
This was the same as before, because I thought, because here you are 
not sure of how many in each bag, because you do not see in it; so I 
did not fancy to put 10 on them, and it was the same reason as before, 
I just wanted to get both, to try. 
Take L, R and F; you gave to L, 8, to F, 8 and to R 10. 
I put 10 here because the chance are fifty fifty in R. Then I thought 
that is more equally .. With respect to 
FI do not like it, because 
there were 12 white balls in one of them, so I thought I might get 
nothing, and L that was not evenly distributed. 
And then T and N, which you evaluated 8 and 7. 
I do not like them, because you do not know how many there are of each; 
I was not risky at all and .. I think that there are more chances, 
because you know at least for one bag that it was evenly distributed 
but for the other one .... this 
is a little better I think. 
And then Z you evaluated this one 8 tell me why 
It is the same thing isn't it because In one bag there might be just 
black balls or just white balls, and , then, I just thought not be risky 
at the end. 
And then M you have evaluated 7. 
Because one is empty so I might get naught I think I play out from the 
same pattern like when I was not sure if it is fifty percent, I just 
went a bit lower down so it is a kind of the same thing. 
O. K. Thank you. 
Subject 6 
Just explain me which is the kind of reasoning behind your evaluation 
in general. 
I went through them all, as some of them obviously look the same, so I 
look to them first. As I looked at all of them, they just came down to 
the same thing; you could not really deduce anything, they were all the 
same probability. I might be wrong but this is how I think as far as I 
reckoned there was no main difference between them, so I put them all 
the same; I put to all of them 12.50, because it was like medium and I 
had good chance. Some of them look different because the instructions 
were different; like whether I pick the ball whether the experimenter 
picks it, but it did not make any difference. 
I ask you about some of them. Take, for example, B, U and, V you have 
evaluated them equally; are they equal to you or there is a marginal 
difference or explain just why you have evaluated them equally. 
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They were all the same I decided .. the choice Is taking out a bag at 
random and I do not know more than taking a ball from the bag, If you 
choose the bag it does not make any difference. 
Just take T and N you also have evaluated these two equally just 
explain me why they are equal to the rest. 
They seem to be the same, because you can not get if it is going to 
have more whites or blacks in these situations; it is just a little 
more complicated because there are two bags. 
Pick Q, S, P and 0; just look at S, P, and Q first, you also evaluated 
them 12.5. Just explain me why ? 
O. K, Because they were exactly the same there is no difference between 
the various methods of selection and I do really think that I could not 
make any difference in how I evaluated them. 
And between this one and the others? 
It is just the same, but there is just one bag; so whether I chose one 
of the two bags or I take from this bag, it does not make any 
difference. 
And between E and, 0 you have also evaluated in the same way. 
On that one you know that you got a fifty percent chance of getting 
that right; on the other one, you do not know what chance you are 
getting but since you do not know you may well assume that there is 
fifty percent chance, nothing else. 
And then just between B and E 
Whichever of the two bags you choose, it does not make any difference, 
because they are the same so.. 
And between B, I and 0 that you have evaluated equally? 
In I, the proportion of blacks and whites is random; you do not know 
the exact proportion but you may assume fifty percent. 
And then F, G, H, C, you also have evaluated them the same; which kind 
of reasoning have you adopted? 
These are the same; the only difference is the number of bags, and even 
if there is a different number of whites or blacks in each bag, when 
you pick a bag you do not know if there is white or black in it, so you 
again may assume fifty percent chance because this is what is the 
average. 
And then Z which also you evaluated the same. 
In the first one you pick, you do not know if there are more blacks or 
whites; there is no way of guessing, so it is just random if you choose 
black or white. 
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M 
You do not know of which colour are the two balls in the second bag, so 
you just guess randomly, there is no way you can guess if there are 
black or white. 
O. K. That's all. 
Subject 7 
Can you in general explain to me which is the reasoning that you 
adopted in evaluating the lotteries and then I will ask you about some 
lotteries in particular. 
I hope to get them ready now this or that not .. O. k. then.. So you don't go from the start, do you? 
Well, first give me your evaluations and, then, you can go from the 
beginning to the end and follow your reasoning. 
All right. In some cases it was obvious to me that the chances were 
fifty fifty and, in these cases, I thought, you bet half the money you 
have in order to make sure that you approximately match the probability 
that you get the money, when you get fifty percent chance of getting 
25 pounds and fifty percent chance of getting nothing, so I bet 12 
pounds, because that is the average. Then there were few cases, In the 
end especially, were it was really hard to figure out what your chances 
are, because everything seems to be very uncertain and I just gave 4 or 
5 for no particular reason but intuition. I looked at the lotteries and 
I thought, maybe this is the one, and I thought that 25 pounds were 
o. k., given the gamble, some time you choose the ball and I have to 
tell the colour In advance, so you could.. you could perfectly easily 
cheat and put the other colour in and I was a little worried and I do 
not know. 
A few were pretty similar, A, C, F. G, H. They were pretty similar, 
they were all fifty fifty; you just had a different amount of bags were 
the number of white or black balls was reduced or increased 
proportionally, so equaled down to fifty fifty in these case. They were 
pretty obvious fifty fifty cases, there were B for example and D and E 
were fifty fifty as well. I think if I did not make big mistakes. This 
one where there is an arrow going down, took me quite a lot to find out 
that this was a fifty fifty case as well, but I had to figured out, if 
there is one ball then it must be .. well ... I do not know, well, shall I have a look? 
Yes 
Ye there was just one ball, then you might take a second ball. If the 
first ball drawn is black she or he will put it in the second bag, if 
the second ball is white then it does not go into the second bag and I 
do a second draw and then I got a fifty fifty chance because there are 
six blacks and six whites in the first bag. Then you fill up again, so 
I got fifty percent that it is black or white and if there were two 
balls inside then, also, I think that there is a fifty fifty chance, I 
do not go into much detail, I do not really know. 
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May you take the B, U, and V: you have evaluated the same way. 
I think they were all fifty-fifty, if I did not get anything wrong here 
the only different.. I think... were the last two, the percentage, the 
experimenter would choose the bag and, in the other case, I would 
choose the bag. I think that Is was the only major difference, 
otherwise they were equal. Is that wrong ?I can't remember. I think 
this was the only difference. I think I have evaluated them similarly, 
but I thought, if you choose a bag I bet on one of the colour and, 
then, you choose a bag, you could easily choose a bag in which there is 
not the colour that I have chosen. I could have valued them 
differently, but I trust you and I thought that you were not playing 
unfair, so I said, it does not matter whether I choose the bag or you 
choose the bag. 
Can you take I? 
It says Uncertain. 
You evaluated 5. 
I do not really know why I could not figured out any probability; I just 
gave 3 or 5 just intuitively, in order to make sure that you could get 
at least something and may be you are lucky in the lottery and you get 
.. but I really don't know, I couldn't 
figure out any probability; 
there may be some, but I am not very good in probability as that. 
Can you just take T and N; you have evaluated them less then the others 
4 just can you explain me why? 
They are both very uncertain and uncertain when I look through the 
lotteries and they seem to be very complicated; this one in which you 
draw three times and you only know three out of twelve and, do not ask 
me, I couldn't figure out any probability at all. 
And then just take L and R and F, which are this one and then that one 
and the exclamation point; you evaluated anyway all the same. 
All fifty ye. 
Just explain me why 
The first one was one of these which only differs in the quantity of 
bags which have the same probability, so that I thought it was pretty 
easy, there was fifty percent chance, and this one, that is one of 
those, as well isn't it, ye, and it is with three bags, and the last 
one three bags 6 blacks and 6 whites, it is fifty fifty the same as far 
as I know as far as my probability math goes. 
Just take the Z one which is this other. 
I do not think that I am very helpful for you am I? I really don't 
know 
o. k. I was a bit confused, it said a first ball from the first bag and 
then it talks about left and right, I was a little confused by that but 
I do not know why it sounds pretty complicated to me either black or 
white and you do not know how many.. it sound very uncertain .. six 
25 
blacks and six whites which would be fifty fifty .. you can't bet on one 
of the two colour, well you could, in the case of the second and the 
third bag, because it is fifty fifty, but since you do not know the 
number of the first bag, which contains 12 balls, but you do not know 
which ones; it is hard to figure out which colour you choose, it is 
pure chance .. what is the bag on my left if I got three bags standing 
there, I do not know which one are the ones which are fifty fifty, do 
I? 
It is just the second and the third bag which are on your left or on 
your right 
All right so the one that is uncertain is in the middle; all right I 
got this now then, it is not too uncertain actually At does not seem 
to bad, then, how much I have evaluated 3. I could have evaluated 5 or 
6. I really did not know what to do with left and right, but now as you 
said, it makes sense; if you choose the one you have got on your right 
side and then one on you left side but it is still not very certain I 
play safe. 
And then may you just take S, P and Q which are.. this one .. this one 
this one and then that one you have evaluate S, the arrow and the 
little rectangle 4 and the other symbol three; just explain me why? 
And the black square four .. 
Yes 
I evaluated this one.. we had these already do we? is not the one in 
which the experimenter chooses? 
Another one. 
Ye it was in another contest, all right. 
Forget this one for a while, you have evaluated these all the same. 
Yes you can't figure out; it says in all three cases that you do not 
know; in this case there is one bag, in the other two cases there are 
two bags, each containing twelve balls and you do not know what the 
combination is, and from that basis it is really hard to figure out 
what the lottery is worth; I do not know It is just chance. You have to 
tell me if I got all these wrong and they were all pretty easy to 
evaluate and I am too stupid to find out. 
Thanks you. 
O. K. 
Subject 8 
Just explain me how you evaluated your lotteries, which kind of 
criterion is behind your reasoning. 
I looked at the probabilities and when they were fifty per cent I chose 
twelve pounds and the other lotteries where it was uncertain I chose 
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10, a smaller price that would be 10 pounds. I did not want to take any 
risk. 
Because you say 25 pounds, so you have 50 so I chose 12 instead of 13. 
Take the lotteries E and B, U, and V. 
O. k. 
You gave the same value to all of them. 
Ye 
May you just explain me why? 
You have the probability. You have the same choice to pick one colour, 
you can't see any difference between them, because you have the same 
choice, even if the procedure is longer it does not make any difference 
how and who picks the balls. 
Just take F, A, G, H, E, and F also these you evaluated equally you 
gave the same value. 
O. k 
Explain me why. 
At the end, it comes down to the same total again, even if the 
distributions inside the bags are different... you got the same chances. 
And then, these two: N and T. 
In lottery N, in both lotteries there is a bag in which you do not know 
how many balls there are; you do not know if the distribution is equal 
or whether there is one ball of one colour and all the rest of the 
other; so the chance of betting on one colour varies of a small number 
for that I did not want to set too mach on a number, on a colour, since 
I did not know how many there were. 
And then S, Q, P, and 0 you gave 6 to all of them you gave the same 
evaluation, just explain me why and if for you their value is really 
the same or at the margin there is a difference. 
There is no difference; just because you toss a coin or because the 
experimenter chooses them, it does not make any difference. You still 
do not know how the colours are distributed and how many balls are 
there of many colours so.. 
And then A you evaluated 12, just explain me why. 
13 There are 13 balls and between them one randomly will be chosen and 
it will determine how the distribution will be; if ball number 6 is 
chosen then the distribution will be even, and before is just like one 
of the other lotteries, where you got the same relation if you add them 
together they are equal, there are no more black balls and no more 
white balls. 
So it depends on which bag you get but the chance are equal because 
there is an equal number of balls. 
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And then this one also this you evaluated 12: M. 
Just because the balls are moved, but since they are replaced again in 
the first bag the chances of getting a white ball is fifty percent and 
the chance of getting another white ball, for example, is still fifty 
percent, again after the ball has been replaced there are two colours 
in one bag, the chances are fifty fifty; it does not mean anything, it 
does not matter that there are just two balls in it. 
And then this one Z you have evaluated 12. 
Because the bag in which you do not know the number of balls does not 
play any role in the game if a ball is chosen from the left bag or from 
the right bag the proportion is the same fifty fifty balls so one could 
toss the coin alteratively or one could left it out and just take a 
ball 
0. K. Thank you. 
Subject 9 
I just ask you in general which kind of reasoning you used In 
evaluating the lotteries. 
Of most of them what, I actually I find the probability of winning and, 
then, I looked at the expected winning which was 12 pounds, because in 
half of the situations there was half of the probability that I will 
win and half that I will loose, because in some of them like M, I could 
see for example with M, if I chose black I would have a slightly chance 
of winning, so that is why the price I put on it was higher, then, the 
other and the same with T. 
May you just take the B, U and V lotteries; may you look at these and 
explain your evaluation to me; you have evaluated all the same, 
explain me why you have evaluated the same or if at the margin they are 
different for you. 
With all three of these lotteries one bag has all blacks and the other 
all whites, but I do not know which is which, so whether I choose or I 
toss a coin or you choose does not really make much difference, so I do 
not see that they are really too different. 
Just take E and compare with all the three of them. 
This one is only different in the sense that in B or V the bags is 
chosen which determines the outcome, but in E, there is only one bag, 
but the probability of getting black or white is the same. I do not see 
.. there is really no difference between them. 
And then S, P, and Q. 
There were 12 balls and I did not know the colour of any of them, I 
thought I do not know the proportion of the colour of the balls in the 
bag, so I thought that the distribution of the colour would be 
symmetrical: I can assume that there are six of each and assuming that, 
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then, it is the same that the others. 
And then F, E, G, H. 
Again, these are all symmetrically black and white and since it is 
symmetric there is still only a fifty percent chance of choosing one 
ball so if you chose a ball from any of the bag and them ask me to 
guess the colour it would not make any difference If I guess the colour 
and then you pick the ball afterwards because it is symmetric so 
betting white or black is equal. 
Just this one M. 
With this one if a black ball is drawn out then a black ball is put in, 
but if a white it is drawn out then nothing happens, and then if the 
second ball is black or white then, a white or black ball is put- In so 
if black is drawn out first and then there are four possible 
combinations of colour in the second bag: two blacks, black and white 
or either black or white and there is more chance of having a black 
picked out because, if a black ball is taken out from the first bag 
first, there are more probabilities that a black ball will be put out 
at the and but, if a white ball is taken out, first, it does not mean 
that it will be a white ball at the end, and so there is a higher 
chance that a black ball will be pulled out at the end, so I would bet 
on the black ball. 
Subject 10 
Just explain to me, in general, how you have evaluated them. 
What I think is that all of them were virtually fifty-fifty, even those 
in which you do not know how many white balls or black balls were in 
the bag. You still have to make just a simple choice between black and 
white and you do not know if you will draw a black, even in the others, 
so I evaluated all the same but still a little lower of what you expect 
to win which is 12.50 to have a good chance of getting a reasonable 
amount If you do not play them through which is a fifty percent chance 
of getting 25 or naught. 
O. K. 
Can you take the lotteries B, U, V. I put letters on them, so it is 
easier to look at them. You have evaluated all of them exactly the 
same; are they really equal or at the margin the differ In some ways? 
In V, you have 50 percent chance of you choosing a colour and then you 
have to choose a bag, so it is about choosing the right bag. For the 
colour you still have the same chance to having one bag with the colour 
you choose, I think. I am afraid I am not good at statistics. For B, I 
have to toss a coin and you ... this is the same sort of thing anyway 
E and the others you also evaluated the same. 
It is the one with 6 black and 6 white; you just pick one ball and you 
do not know which colour it is; but you do not know which bag contains 
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black balls or white balls either so it seems to be the same 
And then just take T and N. 
These are the only one I thought you have just a slightly betterchance 
really, because you could choose, you knew the three of the balls of 
the bags you draw from, so if you drawn out three blacks or whites you 
get an advantage betting on those, but, at the same time, I do not 
think you knew any of the balls in the second bag .......... so I decided that it was not really worth evaluated them more .. but I think you can evaluate them a little more. 
Then P, S and Q. 
Now, you do not know what colours are in the bag, which bag is the 
right one and on which colour you want to choose, but the choice is 
still a fifty fifty choice, even thought you choose the colour and then 
you toss a coin, there were 10 white balls and two black balls there 
are still fifty fifty percent chance, if you choose black or white you 
still have to make the choice without knowing, you have to make a 
choice between black and white at it is like tossing a coin: it is just 
luck: just Q because I do not know whether the experimenter knows what 
balls are in the bag so you can choose a colour and then he chooses the 
other bag and I have to choose the colour first and the experimenter 
have to choose the bag, then if the experimenter does not know then is 
back to the others. 
And then take 0 please. 
Choosing a bag make no difference actually from the choice of taking a 
ball, because you don't know either the bags nor the balls; if there 
would be just one bag you still have the same chance. 
Can you take 0 and E. 
In this you know that definitely you have 50 percent chance, but 0 as 
well, if you consider what a fifty fifty chance is, there isstill a 
50-50 chance, even if I do not know what the balls are, or if I do not 
know what ball to choose, even if all the balls were black there are 
still the chance between choosing between black and white; when you 
have made the choice, then, I would have evaluated differently, but I 
evaluated them before choosing a colour, and I have evaluated all the 
same. 
And now I. 
E was the one that you have to choose the bag without knowing if the 
bag from which you have to draw have 8 or 5 etc but if you add all the 
balls there is an equal number of white and black balls in the bag and 
also you chose without knowing there is still an equal chance of 
getting black or white despite the fact that it look quite the same for 
all of them you have 12 6 and 6 12 the other have 12 93 so they are 
all basically the same. 
Then Z which also evaluated the same. 
This is the one you chose a ball from the bag in which you do not know 
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how many blacks or whites there are and depending on what colour you 
chose, you chose the bag from which you have to make the other choice, 
but in fact both the bags from which you make the choice between black 
and white are the same with 6 blacks and 6 whites, so in fact if you 
miss the whole of taking the first ball out, and then decide, it is the 
same as E or B: you just have six black and six white. 
O. K. Thank you. 
Subject 11 
Can you just explain to me which kind of reasoning you adopted in 
evaluating these lotteries? 
There are few of them where there are two bags, and each of the two 
bags has 12 balls and of each bags you do not know if they are black or 
white; so you had a 50 percent chance of getting the ball that you 
wanted, if there were 12 balls of your choice in there or none of the 
balls of your choice and there were quite few like that and then there 
was also Q and S .. there were two bags one bag containing 12 black balls and the other containing 12 white balls so I thought you have 
like fifty percent chance and that was like in U and so I put 12 pounds 
on that because it is half of 25 pounds, leaving to luck if I had to 
play the lottery or not. The one in which there were a large number of 
bags, the larger the number of bags, the less likely you were to get 
the colour of your choice because you had to choose a bag and then to 
choose a colour when you had the bag, so the chance that you get the 
bag where there might not be the colour that you have chosen was very 
probable. There are some where I just put down rough number, for F 
there was 3 bags one contains 12 black balls one 12 white balls one 6 
and 6 of each so I thought, well, depending on which bags you pick out 
you got more or less chance of having your colour, so I gave 11 so 
there were few like that A, G, H and I are quite similar; there were 
five bags, seven bags, eleven bags, in which you do not really know 
which colour there are in each; I grouped the lotteries which I thought 
were quite similar and in which there were good chances of winning and 
then I made my minimum at 7 pounds, because I think I am a bit of a 
gambler, if you do not get it, it does not really matter; so I thought 
seven pounds is a fair enough sum. 
Just take the lottery E. 
I got this. 
E, U and V and B. 
You have evaluated all of them equally, may you explain me why? Is 
there a marginal difference or are they equal?. 
I thought they were all the same as for the probability so I thought 
perhaps those two U and VI thought they were exactly the same, it does 
not matter whether you choose the bag or the experimenter chooses the 
bag, you got 50-50 chance of having the bag where there are the balls 
you want, and the other E, I thought you got a bag with 50-50 chance of 
picking up the colour that you want, because there are six black and 
six white and the other one was B, you toss the coin to see which bag 
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is chosen, I do not think that there is much difference if you choose 
the bag or the experimenter chooses the bag or you toss a coin. It is 
just luck what bag you pick up. 
May you take F, A, G, H, C you gave 12,10,8. and 7; just explain me 
why. 
I thought that if you have 13 bags I put the price of 7 pounds because 
the chances of you getting the ball that you want are quite remote. 
Because you first you got to choose a bag and then you got to choose a 
ball out of the bag, so the chance that you pick the bag that you 
wanted is one out of 13 and, then, I put seven pounds because the 
chance that you are going to have a good chance to pick out a number 
that is above seven, so you can have that money without having to play 
the lotteries and, then, as I went down to eleven, I put eight, because 
there is more choice that you get the colour that you want and then I 
went down to seven you have more chance of getting the colour that you 
want so I put down ten and then I gave 11 when there were three bags I 
gave 11, because with two bags I gave 12 with three you have less 
chance. 
Just take N and R and F. 
You have evaluated F 11 R 12 and 19 may you just explain me why. 
The F, I gave 11 pounds because you have got one out of three chances 
to have the bag that have totally your colour in it and again I gave 12 
pounds to R. Probably, I have to give the prices on the other way round 
I should give more money to R then F but there is just a difference of 
a pound because there are less chance on you with F so .. because with R 
which bag you pick out it does not matter, because you got fifty 
percent chance of getting whatever colour you want, but with F 
depending on which bag you got you pick out one hundred percent chance 
of picking out 12 white balls and one hundred percent chance of piking 
out 12 black balls so ... I actually should 
have given less value but it 
does not matter; and L. I have given to this less money because there 
are three bags and there is a combination of 4 and 8 and 6 and 6 and 8 
and 4I gave less money because you only got one out of three chances 
of picking up one that contains 6 and 6, but there is one out of three 
bags and you got quite a remote chance of piking the other one in which 
you have only four balls in the bags instead of eight so I gave to this 
less money than I gave to the other two because there were less chances 
of picking the ball that you wanted. 
Now T and N. 
You gave 9 to T and 10 to N; just explain me why and how you have 
evaluated in this way. 
First with N where you have got a fifty-fifty chance of picking out a 
black or a white ball from your first bag and then you put it in the 
second bag but you do not know any-way, so you it is really irrelevant 
what you pick up and it does not make much difference if you know one 
ball which you know the colour of and the other which you do not know, 
so since you draw from the second bag I thought there was not much 
difference, if you draw first a white or a black ball and then you draw 
another ball from the first bag, and then depending on what you have 
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drawn in the first case, you can have more chance of having the colour 
you want and then you put the ball in the second bag and then you draw 
from that; I put down 10 pounds because... I have to read it .. the 
second bag you do not know more so I thought that it is luck that you 
come out with what you wanted; it does not really matter what you have 
done with the first bag; it is just pure luck; it is like the other one 
in which you do non know which is the combination, so that was for N 
and then for T, I put less money in the first bag you have 50-50 chance 
of picking up a black or a white ball and then you put that into the 
second bag and there are 11 balls and you do not know which they are 
anyway, so you can't really say what the combinations are; so it is 
just pure luck if you get your colour out, I gave less value that the 
others because.. because in N you got more control on what there is in 
the second bag than you have in T, because in T you have to put just 
one ball; in N you have two balls, so you add to 11 you actually are 
picking three balls there, while in the other you are just picking one 
ball. 
And now please take S, P, Q and 0. You have all the same. 
I put 9 to all of them 0. K. This are like the other one you toss a coin 
or you choose the bag or the experimenter chooses the bag and in this 
other you do not have to choose the bag since there is just one bag so 
it does not really matter if you toss a coin or if you chose or the 
experimenter chooses you are going to get a bag which you do not know 
which is the combination of balls in it. So I put the same number 
because there was no difference who chooses the bag or if you toss a 
coin, because you got 50 percent chance because you have to choose the 
colour so if you do not choose the colour 
Take 0 and E. 
I gave 12 to E because you definitely know that you have 6 blacks and 6 
whites so you know that once you have picked out the colour you have 
got fifty percent chance to picking out of the bag; with 0 you do not 
know what there is in the bag you have not definitely got fifty percent 
chance so I gave 9 to it because I had more chance of getting that 
money or more without having to draw a ball out, it is risky. That is 
why I gave Ea higher value. 
Z you gave 10; may you explain me why?. 
You've got three bags and in one of the bags you do not know which 
combination there is and in the second and in the third bag you know 
that there are 12 balls of which 6 are black and 6 are white, so you 
have to draw a colour from the first bag, so you do not know the choice 
of taking a white or a black because you do not know the combination 
that is in there, then depending on if you draw a black or a white ball 
you draw a ball from one of the other bags. I gave 10 pounds, because I 
thought .. well.. you pick out a white 
from the first bag that is 
irrelevant. It does not matter which one you pick, you end up piking up 
a ball from the second or the first bag and so you get 50 percent 
chance of picking up the colour that you want, so even if you got 50 
percent chance, I gave 10, because you first have to pick out from the 
first bag and then.. 
N 
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I thought that you have 50 percent chance because you pick a ball out 
from the bag that contains 6 blacks and 6 whites; so you do not know 
which one are you going to get, and the chance of getting two blacks 
balls from the bag you draw from are 0.5, the chance that there is a 
combination of black and white is 50 percent, you do not have exactly 
50 percent chance of getting the ball you want because you do not know 
the balls in the bag from which you draw, so I gave 10 because I 
thought that it is depending on which ball you choose. 
Subject 12 
Just explain to me in general how you have evaluated these lotteries. 
I evaluated them from my knowledge of statistics, I applied the rules; 
I assumed in the one in which the experimenter has to choose that he 
was impartial, apart from that It was just probability and the value of 
the probability has been half in each one, so I just priced them half 
of 25 pounds. 
Just take the one you have evaluated more, T and N and explain me why, 
look at them. 
First of all for T you know exactly what the ball is, opposite to the 
others where either you do not know or at least you do not know how 
many of each, so the fact that you know it means that you have a better 
chance of picking that colour. 
The same for N where you have the knowledge of three of them, three out 
of 12, you know exactly what they are and then I priced them 
accordingly. 
Please just take B. U. and V. 
You gave the same evaluation to all of them, just explain if you really 
evaluated them equally or at the margin you find any difference just 
explain me your reasoning. 
First of all for B it comes down to tossing a coin, the probability of 
each is really a half so I gave half value. U is the same, instead of 
tossing a coin you pick a bag since you do not know how the bag is, it 
is just like picking at random, so the probability of getting your 
colour is still half as well; for V the experimenter chooses the bag, 
so as far as I assumed the experimenter was impartial, so I gave them 
the same value if I was the one to pick the bag. 
Look at E and B. you have evaluated them the same; are they really the 
same as the others according to you ?. 
This is just the same, since you have the same number of black and 
white balls overall, if they were in just one bag you still have to 
pick them at random, you have a fifty-fifty chance of getting your 
colour. 
Just take S. P. Q and 0; you also have evaluated the same explain me 
why. 
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First of all for 0 you do not reckon which colour there are and assume 
that they are an even selection, on average they will be half, so 
picking up randomly. There is a fifty-fifty chance of getting the one 
you want. For P, it is actually the same, you do not know how many of 
each there are, the fact that you pick one bag or the other does not 
really matter, on average you will get the same; so you get half. For 
Q, it is just the same as P but it is the experimenter picking the 
bags, so assuming that the experimenter knows what you knew; so P would 
be the same and half and for S it is just the same again, somebody 
choosing one bag or the other is just as tossing a coin; first of all 
it does not matter which one you pick if there is the same selection; 
in both there is a fifty fifty chance whichever one you pick anyway and 
so I put half as well. 
Just Z 
Although, yes, first of all, picking a ball at random from the bag.. you 
do not know how many.. I say. We have fifty fifty chance therefore we 
have a fifty-fifty chance of picking a ball in the second or third bag, 
since the second and the third bag contains the same and i is a 
fifty-fifty, so there is no difference which one of 12 so there is a 
fifty-fifty chance of getting that ball. 
O. K. Thank you 
Subject 13 
Explain to me in general, which kind of reasoning have you adopted in 
evaluating your lotteries? 
It is written down here, do I have to repeat ?I studied a bit of 
mathematics and a bit of statistics, just I based my guess on something 
like this; I tried of course; I did not have time to check. 
I ask you now to explain to me your evaluation of some particular 
lotteries. You have given 12 to almost all the lotteries, so I ask you 
to explain me your evaluation of the lotteries which you have not given 
12. You have given 19 and 15 to lotteries T and N just explain me why? 
First this one. T first of all; O. K. This one I gave fifty, because I 
think that in this case here my chance are better than here, where I 
gave 12. In those I have almost seventy percent of chance to win more 
than twelve that means 13 pounds, up to 25; I put 12 because of this. 
In this case my chance are better, so I have more space to go, so I put 
fifteen, since I have more chance, and it is the same case in N; I have 
to put three balls I think and then I have to choose and then I choose 
of course the colour of these three balls, o. k. 
Just take please B, U, V. 
have evaluated all of them 
them, just explain me why. 
I just have fifty percent 
criterion, because I have 
this one here then; yes. 
which are this one and this one and.. You 
the same; you have given 12 to the three of 
chance to win and I put 12 because of this 
.. percent chance to win more then 12, and 
yes just half percent of win something; ye, 
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half percent. 
So for you they are equal? 
Yes. 
And then take please the S, P, and Q. Just look at them, you gave to Q 
10 and to the other two you gave 12 just explain me why? 
Yes, the others; I said that because I have half percent, in my opinion 
of course; and this one, QI do not know the criteria that the 
experimenter uses to choose the bag because.. not just to choose the 
bag of course but what the black balls inside the bags because he has 
two bags and has put all the black balls here and all the white balls 
here and he knows, before I go to choose, my opinion, my guess, so if I 
choose black he can choose the whites; he has just the gain in his 
hand, so I do not think that is fair. 
Now take the V that you have taken before and compare to Q. Not this 
one .. the percentage sorry; you gave to one 
0 to the other 12; just 
explain me why. 
As here it depends on the experimenter he has to choose the bag but he 
does not know my opinion while here he knows it when he is going to 
choose the bag but here he does not know my opinion so he has half 
percent and me too. 
That's all, thank you. 
Subject 14 
I just ask you to explain to me in general which kind of reasoning did 
you adopt in evaluating the lotteries and then I would ask you some 
explanations about some group of lotteries. 
The price I put on the lotteries is mainly based on probability and I 
found that most of the lotteries the probability of choosing one colour 
of the ball is fifty percent, so, since the winner price is 25 pounds, 
and I think there are fifty percent of the probabilities. The price I 
like to say is 13; it seems to me suitable I think, for example, if the 
probability is fifty percent, if you choose one you try twice, maybe 
you can win 25 pounds, It is 26 so I organized after lotteries I can 
win one pound so I chosen 13 pounds. Then in some of the lotteries, the 
probabilities of one colour ball is not clear, since I do not know in 
each how many colour there are. I do not know how many white colours 
balls in the box and how many black colour balls in the box, so it is 
not clear. I think maybe I take some risk further, so just the price 
would be lower considering the risk, maybe the purchaser thinks the 
risk will be higher, I put some low prices on lotteries. For others the 
probability is a little higher or a little lower, the prices are based 
on the lotteries on the probabilities or uncertainty. This Is in 
general. 
So I just ask you to take some of the lotteries; can you take if you 
want to use these ones I put the letters on them so it is easier 
Just take the B. U, V; you gave to all of them 13 pounds I just ask you 
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why and if they are equal to you or if at the margin there Is a little 
difference. . 
B, this one has two boxes, one contains 12 black balls and the others 
contains 12 white balls, so if I bet on one of the two colours I think 
that the probabilities are fifty percent, and this is also.. it is the 
same one, it is all black and the other Is all white so I think that 
for the two, V and B, the probability is the same, fifty percent and U 
is .. U, V, B is the same one box contains 12 black balls the other 
contains 12 white balls, so the probability to choose one colour ball 
is fifty percent; so V, U and B are the same, so I choose 13 pounds. 
Take this one U and this one which is E; you also gave to E 13 pounds; 
may you just explain me why, look at the two. 
The E the box contains 12 balls six are black balls and six are white 
balls, so counting from mathematics if you choose one ball from the box 
the probability of choosing one colour ball is fifty percent, so it is 
equal, the probability Is the same fifty percent, so I put the same 
price. 
Then, take I, to this one you gave 10, a little less; just explain me 
why. 
I think the probability to choose one ball of the colour which is my 
choosing colour, the probability is larger than fifty percent; once 
contains 13 balls so the number is 12 and I think the proportion of 
colour put in this box depends on what number you draw from here I 
think if you .. I mean from six to 
12 the total is 7 and the total of 
the balls is 13 this is probably why I choose the colour larger then 
fifty percent; do you understand what I mean if you choose the minimum 
number for the probability then larger then fifty percent each is six. 
That means that if the minimum number I choose is six, I put six black 
balls into here, in this case, I choose a ball from the box, the 
minimum probability is fifty percent and if I choose, for example, a 
number larger than six, for example 7, I put seven black balls inside 
here; and other five balls in white colour, so I prefer to choose black 
colour. The probability is larger then fifty percent and the total .. 
in this moment I choose the number that is larger or equal to six, the 
probability of this one Is 7 over 13, I think, this is larger then 
fifty percent I choose 10 pounds. 
Then just take N and T; to N you gave 15 and to this one, you gave 7, 
just explain me why please 
There are two boxes and one contains 12 balls, six balls are white 
colour and six ball are black and in the other box eleven balls but I 
do not know how many white colour balls there are inside here, and how 
many black balls there are inside here. First, I choose one from this 
box; if I choose for example a black ball, I put a black ball inside 
here and now the numbers of the balls is 12 and I think, maybe the 
probability is .. the number of black balls, the probability of the 
number of black balls is larger than the white colour ball, it is 
higher, I compare with this one in which there are 6 white balls and 6 
black balls, so maybe If I choose the black balls the probability is 
larger of fifty percent, so I choose seven I am not sure but I think 
maybe the probability of the colour I have chosen will be more than for 
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the white ball so I priced 7 pounds here. 
And then the other one which is N you put 15. 
In this case there are two boxes, all contain 12 balls; there are six 
black colour balls and six white colour balls inside the box and in the 
second box there are nine balls, but I do not know what colour each of 
them, what colour the balls are inside; I know that they can be white 
or black, but I do not know how many white balls there are inside here 
and how many black balls, so either the probability I do not know but I 
had to put inside here 12 balls so I choose, so I should add another 
three balls inside here and I choose for example three white one two 
three and put them here, there are three probabilities of the white 
colour and in this case of course I bet on white colour, ifthree balls 
are black colour so I will bet on the black colour in these cases the 
probability to choose what I choose as colour are higher and the last 
case is that one Is white colour and the other two is the black colour 
so I bet on the black colour, the other is the same the two are white 
and the one is black and I will bet on the white, so I think that the 
probability will be higher so I gave fifteen pounds. 
And then these five G. F, H. C, A to which you gave 12. Just explain me 
why in general. 
I just used the mathematic in general. I just calculated I think all of 
them; in these lotteries the probability to choose one colour ball is 
fifty percent. The probability of each box containing... each box I 
know how many black balls and how many white balls inside the box, so I 
can easily calculate the probability to choose one colour of the ball 
and all of these lotteries the probability of choosing one colour ball 
is fifty percent. I priced the same price on the lotteries. 
And then this one Q, P, and S, you put to all of them five pounds. 
In these three lotteries, in each lottery each of the box contains 12 
balls but I do not know how many black balls and how many white balls 
there are in the each, it is just the same I know there are two boxes 
and each of the box contains 12 balls, but I do not know how many white 
balls and how many white ball inside the box, so I think I do not know 
the probability to choose one colour of the ball. I can't make the 
decision so I think for the lottery buyer it will be a higher risk to 
bit on one colour so in this case for people psychology, I think, if I 
do not know anything, I think the risk will be high, so I priced the 
low price on the lotteries; for example, if I circulate even if I know 
that there is some short way but I never have been before passed before 
I prefer the longer way, since it is clear at this is not clear, I 
cannot take the risk it is the same case. 
And all of them are equal to you. 
Yes they are equal for me. 
And then take this one and this one. You gave to both of them five just 
explain me why. 
In the lottery P there are two boxes and each of the box contains 12 
balls but I do not know how many black balls and how many white balls 
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inside the box. I am asked to choose out of the box. I think it is the 
same, because I do not know how many black balls and white balls inside 
the two boxes, so for me is the same to choose any of the box. In 0, 
there is just one box and the box contains 12 balls inside but I do not 
know how many white balls and how many black balls there are inside the 
box, so in this case the lottery 0 is the same that lottery P, so I 
price the same price on the lotteries. 
And then this one M you gave as the others you gave 13, explain me why. 
In lotteries M there are two bags and one is empty. One contains 12 
balls and six are white balls and six are black balls and in this box 
we have to put two balls and these balls are put by another person a 
third party; For me, I think for any if I choose to draw a ball from 
the box, the probability of choosing each of the colour of the balls is 
fifty percent for any person, for the third party, for me the 
probability is the same, so after I have chosen twice maybe I have 
chosen one colour, the probability is the same for the examiner for 
the third party or me it is the same, so I think. 
And then this one Z; you gave 13 to this one, just explain me why. 
Right this is the case of the three boxes, each of the box contains 12 
balls and in the first box I do not know how many black balls and how 
many white balls there are; here In the second and in the third box I 
know there are six white balls and six black balls in a box and first I 
draw one ball from this box, If it is a black one, I put It here, I put 
the black one here, if it is the white one I put here and before I draw 
a ball from the box I have to bet on one colour, I can bet on any one I 
bet on the black one and if I choose black one I put in that here so I 
choose this box to draw the box to choose the ball. If I choose a black 
one I know there are 7 black balls inside here, so here it is 
thirteen, the probability is 7 over 13, so it is larger then fifty 
percent, so I priced fifteen pound over here. 
And then just this one and this one you gave to this 13 and to this 5; 
just explain me why. 
Lottery E is the one that contains 12 balls 6 are black and 6 are white 
but you choose any one colour of the balls so the probability is fifty 
percent so I priced 13 pounds; and lottery 0 is one box and the box 
contain 12 balls, but I do not know how many black balls, how may white 
balls inside box so I think the probability I do not know so I think 
the risk will be higher so I price them low I priced 5 pounds. 
Thank you. 
Subject 15 
I ask you in general, which kind of reasoning you adopted in evaluating 
the lotteries. 
Right, most of them, almost all of them seem to be a straight fifty 
fifty chance, because you do not know what the balls are going to be, 
you can't make any decision in which to choose in the first place, so 
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the chance to be correct is fifty fifty, anyway, if I know that there 
is no way of deciding the only exception to that is Q in which your 
choice . the person choosing the bag is you, and it is also after you 
have plaid your bet at it is also that choice could be made so that 
you lose, but you do not know that, so I just priced slightly less. And 
N and T what you actually come to play with the bag of which you know 
what colour some of the balls are. So you have some slightly chance to 
decide where to bet, so I priced more for that, and I worked out that 
the best price for the various lotteries, it actually come out as the 
probability of winning in the lottery multiply for the 25 pounds and I 
worked out that for most of the lotteries the best price is 12.50. I 
actually put down 12.01, but it does not matter as long as it is 
something between 12 and 13, but not 13. And the others I really did 
not work out the probabilities but just had a slightly different 
feelings for the other ones. 
I just ask you these two you gave the same evaluations 0 and E, just 
explain me why. 
Basically, because you do not know what the content of the bag is, as I 
told you before, you got an equal chance of choosing the right colour; 
in E there is no bias at all so automatically you got a half percent 
chance, but in 0 there is a bias and you do not know, you still do not 
know which way is the bias so it depends on which you decide to bet in 
the first place as how likely you are to win and the two chances I 
think as I worked out will probably cancel out. 
And then this three which are B, U and V and you gave to Va slightly 
lower price, just explain me why you have priced it in this way. 
Right, B and U are basically so , again, you do not know which bag is 
which, so choosing one yourself or tossing the coin is exactly the 
same, since you do not have any idea you got an equal chance of being 
right. And then there is the thing with the experimenter is choosing 
the bag, if the experimenter does not know then it is going to be 
exactly the same as the other three but before you actually play the 
bet you do not know, that is why I priced rather less, otherwise it 
would be the same. 
And then this one Z you gave also 12. 
This is very similar to the three we have just talked about. Although 
it does not really matter which bag you choose, both the two bags where 
you draw the second ball from are identical so it does not matter which 
you choose in the first place and when you come to choose the ball 
there are equal numbers so equal probabilities again of the right 
colour. 
And then U and E. 
Right. In E you got straight fifty percent chance to get the right 
colour again because there are even chances again for each colour, in 
U, it can be fifty percent chance of being correct because of a 
slightly different reason; basically you do not know which bag contains 
your chosen colour, although you got again half and half chance of 
choosing the correct bag They are two completely different mechanisms 
but they lead to the same chance again. 
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And then just this one M, you also gave 12.01. 
O. K. It is again fifty percent because you have no idea of what is in 
the bag in the first place, and so you 've got again an equal chance of 
choosing the right colour in the first place the content of the bag can 
be all black but you got fifty percent of chance of choosing black, 
also in that case, if it is a black and a white in there then you got a 
fifty percent chances of picking black afterwards and the same with 
white. 
Subject 16 
I just ask you in general to explain me the kind of reasoning that you 
adopted in evaluating your lotteries. 
I tended to bet more money when I thought that there was a higher 
chance of winning, and I based on a sort of rough percentage of chance 
in my head of getting one of the same colour ball, twice. Just I guess. 
I would ask you now about some lotteries in particular, please take the 
E lottery. You have evaluate 15. 
This is the one in which you have guaranteed fifty chance of that 
number. Oh This is the one in which you have guaranteed fifty percent 
chance of what you bet, the colour you choose; there is only one bag 
with 12 balls half black and half white, so you are guaranteed 
certainty, so I just priced a little higher of what the chance was. 
And then take D. You gave to this one a slightly higher value than the 
previous one. Just explain me why. 
I just priced higher because since there are two bags, I know that 
there is a fifty fifty guaranteed chance, but there are two bags and I 
thought it might be a little easier. 
Just take the B, U, and V. You priced B 18 U 15 V 14, just explain me 
how you have evaluated this lotteries. 
B and VI gave almost the same price because in B you have to flip the 
coin, so you do not have any control, it iscompletely down to chance 
what is going to happen so even thought you got 50 percent chance 
relying on the coin, I figured to bet a little higher since there is no 
decision at all on my part, it is pure chance. 
V is quite similar because I did not feel like pure chance as tossing a 
coin And U this one I priced slightly lower because you have to choose 
the colour before as well as a bag and I decided that this decreased my 
chances. 
And then just take F, H, C. G. A, F and G; you put 16 to A, 14 to G, 16 
tol8, and to H to C 20. Just look at all of them and explain me why 
you gave these evaluations. 
F and GI gave the same price to because there are at least fifty 
percent chances of getting right and I put higher because for G. I 
decided it was slightly higher than 50 percent chance, because there 
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are so many bags, even though more than half of them have half black or 
higher;, so there are quite a chance I thought, because there was more 
then one bag. I put the same price, because I thought again that the 
chance was at least fifty percent or higher because two out of the 
three bags have guaranteed fifty percent chance or higher of getting 
the colour you choose. For A the chances were certainly greater then 
fifty percent, just because half the bag or more have one ball, almost 
fifty percent chance or greater of getting the colour you choose and I 
did not quite evaluated as higher than G because there was no so many 
bag, so I thought my chances maybe were slightly lower. And for H, you 
have at least fifty percent chance or more in half the bags of getting 
the colour you bet on; I priced a little higher than the others, I gave 
a higher value to C because there are more bags so you get more chance 
than with H. 
And then please take I you gave 10 just explain me why. 
I gave less then half value, because I thought that my chance of 
getting the right colour were slightly less than fifty percent. I think 
that was the numbers in such to .. me up 
because I think that there 
were more things to take into consideration. 
And then T and N. To T you gave 9 and to N you gave 17 just explain me 
why. 
TI gave 9 to because I just thought that by drawing a ball and putting 
one in the other bag you possibly have less then 50 percent when you 
draw from the second bag, the second ball would be of the same colour, 
I gave a slightly higher value to N because the chances are slightly 
more than fifty percent, because you have seen some of the balls so you 
can make an educated guess of what colour might be. 
And then R. F. and L; you gave 19 to .. and 12 two the others two. 
L and F, there are at least two bags in which there is a fifty percent 
chance of getting the one you choose and I put the same because there 
are at least fifty percent chance you choose the one you have chosen at 
least in two out of three bags. I gave a slightly higher value out even 
if fifty percent chances are all across in each bag, in each bag there 
is fifty percent chance, so I gave it a slightly higher value because 
whatever bag you choose is going to be fifty percent chance, while in 
the other it depends on what bag you choose. 
And then these, S, Q and P; you gave to S 12, to P 10, and to Q you 
gave 5; just explain me why. 
To SI gave slightly higher value because it is pure chance, since you 
flip a coin, it is a coin toss, so I do not have any decision in it; 
for P, I thought the chances were less than fifty percent because you 
did not know how many balls there are in the bags, so I gave a slightly 
lower value to that. Q you do not have any decision in it it is all up 
to the experimenter and it was not pure chance so I might give a 
slightly less value just in case I do not know; in case the 
experimenter knew or there are too many unknown values so I gave 5 to 
it. 
And then take P and 0, you gave to 0 8, and to P 10. 
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I gave P 10 just because I thought that the chances were less than 
fifty, but because there are more choices it might be slightly higher. 
To E you gave 15 to the other one 8 just explain me why 
To E. I gave 15 because I have guaranteed fifty fifty which one you 
choose, with 0 you do not know how many balls of each colour, while 
with E you do know, in the other one you do not have any idea so I gave 
that one less as a value since you do not know. 
Now this one you gave 13; just explain me why. 
I gave 13, because no matter what the first draw, you still get fifty 
percent chance, no matter what colour she draws out because there are 
still six blacks and six whites. 
And this one Z you gave 12; just explain me why. 
I gave that just slightly lower than Z just because there is one bag in 
which you do not know how many balls, how many of each colour there are 
in it, while with the other two bags you do so, still the probability 
of the second bit is still roughly fifty fifty, so I priced a little 
less because there is one bag in which you do not know how many balls, 
how many of each. 
O. K. Thank you. 
O. K. 
Subject 17 
I just ask you in general which kind of reasoning did you adopted In 
evaluating the lotteries. 
I analysed them and I found they look different, but that from the 
point of view of probability they are the same, and I think that in 
lotteries there is like a fifty percent chance to win. And this is why 
I evaluated all of them half of the price, since the price is 25, I 
evaluated them 12.50. That Is all. 
I will show you some lotteries and then I will ask you why you have 
evaluated the same. 
Take this one and BU and V. You have evaluated the same so just please 
explain me why. 
Take this there are two bags and any bag contains the same number of 
balls, which one is black and one is white. And you have to bet on one 
of the colours and then you choose a bag. And if you said black, yes, 
you have to choose the bag and you can choose the bag with white balls 
or black, so you have a fifty percent of each one. And the same is with 
the colour because if you choose black then If you chose black then the 
bet is on you but it is again a fifty percent chance. 
And this one is exactly the same . Here you choose the bag and here the 
experimenter chooses the bag, but you do not know which bag is which 
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one, so it is again fifty percent chance, I do not know If the 
experimenter can know, but I do not know if It was like this, this one. 
But on your point of you it is again fifty percent even if the 
experimenter knows which bag it is and you do not know and the 
experimenter can help if she knows. 
And B.. 
B is with the coin, the probability of which side of the coin falls 
down again to half, which is fifty percent. It is again the same 
whichever bag you will choose white or.. or on your left side or in 
your right side, I think it is fifty percent in all of them. The 
difference is that there are more bags or less bags but I think they 
are going to the same point. 
Just take N and T you also have evaluated 12 
Again when you draw this ball I think the probability is still fifty 
percent. In this you have still six white balls, I think that it was 
again fifty percent. In the second bag, in the one you have 11, you do 
not know anything about those and you know that they are either black 
or white, you do not know the colours of these balls and there can be 
five blacks and six whites and I mean.. I think you can't judge any I 
think that is still fifty percent because .. 
And this one 
Here you have 12 balls that can be 
not know the number, the best is I 
loose of course as well. 
white or black but because you do 
think to put fifty percent. You can 
And this one which is Z. 
First you ask to bet on one colour and then you draw those balls if you 
are like.. you got three bags the second and the third are like six and 
six which is saying fifty percent and the first one you do not know and 
again I think that is best saying fifty percent. 
And then 0 and P you have evaluated them the same just explain me why. 
Because I do not think that if you consider two bags it changes. You 
got only the information that there is a twelve box balls and they are 
blacks or whites and you are asked to bet on one of the two colours and 
you choose a bag, it does not mean anything, it is just a fifty percent 
that you can choose a bag in which for instance says six plus six and 
here it is just one bag I don't thin k it changes anything that there is 
one bag or two bags. 
0. K. Thank you. 
Subject 18 
I will ask you in general which kind of reasoning did you use and how 
you have evaluated them. 
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I was looking at all the bags and whatever lottery it reduces to white 
or black and you got basically in every lottery a fifty percent chance 
of having the right colour or having the wrong colour. These were 
exactly the same I think. 
Just take this one and.. 
They are just saying the same with other words. 
O. K. I just put letters because it is easier for me to recognize them 
through the tape. I will ask you about some lotteries in particular. 
Then you explain me how you have evaluated them. 
Just take this and this one .. this and that one, which are 
E and U; 
you gave of course the same value, may you explain me why? 
I mean, there are twelve balls and they are equal of each colour so 
you have fifty percent of having the wrong colour or right colour. And 
it is the same but you have .. it is like 
having one bag with 24 balls 
and taking a ball from that it is the same has having a bag with 12 
balls six black and six white and it is just the amount of balls which 
changes, but for the probability it does not chance anything. 
And then these three. 
They are just the same there is two bags one with 12 blacks and the 
other with 12 whites and this one ... it is again the same, I mean 
if 
you choose a colour or if you toss a coin or you take it is fifty 
percent chance. 
And then just look at this one which is 0. 
In one experiment you do not know how many balls from each colour but 
if you do n experiments, a large number, then, you will have six 
blacks and six whites and you are choosing randomly. 
And then this one which is Z. 
In the first bag it is like over here having an experiment in which you 
do not know which colour and the other two bags you know that they are 
fifty percent black and fifty percent white. 
And then this one which is M. 
In each case you have.. because you put the bag back you have fifty 
percent of chance having a white ball and a black ball in the next bag 
so you have fifty percent chance of choosing the right colour from the 
second bag. 
And then these two, T and N. 
I was thinking in the second bag, you will have on average four and 
half balls of each colour, and in the first bag you have you draw three 
balls and it means if you take, for example, hundred of experiments, 
you will have the chance of .... you will have one and half ball of 
each colour, which adds up again to six balls of each colour in total. 
This Is the same you have another five and half balls of each colour 
and when you draw one ball, which is half colour of each it adds again 
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up to six. 
O. K. 
Subject 19 
I just ask you in general which kind of reasoning did you apply in 
evaluating your lotteries. 
It was not my problem; my only concern was that it was a lottery, a 
game of chance, anything can happen, so I was concerned whether I get 
it or not. I enjoyed the process of trying to see if my guess was 
correct or not, and that gave me a pleasure; on the other hand, if I 
get some money I would love it; I am not too concern on how much I get, 
though sometimes if I look at the process and I say If I finally 
succeed I should get a very good amount So I tend to put a higher 
amount on the processes which I think last long so, if I succeed and I 
get a very good amount, eventually, for me, then, I love it; but for 
some of those, sometimes, I think, well, I may loose or gain, so there 
is no point in me putting a higher amount, provided that I get 
something. Although, if you think, this reasoning is very inconsistent 
I have tried to tell you. For me I am not putting my money in, so I do 
not bother with loosing or gaining but I would be excited, as I said, 
if I make a choice and it come to me and it will be fine for me; so the 
prices that I put are not necessarily determined by the reason, by the 
extent of effort put in it, not the effort, the pleasure. 
So I will ask you about some lotteries and and I will ask you why you 
have evaluated in this way. Take this one and this one, E and D, you 
evaluated E 15, and D 12. Just explain me why. 
Yes, by accident, E was the first one I did and I thought .. o. k. it is 25, so I thought to go midway, well if I get 15 out of 25 is 
good. So it is a good minimum. In D, I compare with what I put with E 
and I said well if it is too high I could loose, let me come down a bit 
and give some chance for increase the room of my chance of getting 
something and not loosing completely, so I went down a bit. 
Do you find them different in some way ? 
Not exactly these two in particular, not exactly, because I think 
though it may last shorter, it did not work for me like that I took as 
a pure matter of chance. 
And then I will give you these three B, U and V; you gave 20,18 and 
13; just explains me why. 
I think this one in particular, I thought in the process, I tend 
sometime to get in love with some of the description because even 
thought they sound similar I tent to feel more emotionally attracted 
and I increase the amount because I said, this is a precious think, so 
probably that was one of the reasons why I put 20 for B. As I said, it 
is pure a matter of chance, sometimes the interest in money also 
influences; so not to give too high and loose I tend to come down for 
some of them, so It is purely a question of chance. V 18. Sometimes I 
am influenced by what I put down previously, especially when I am going 
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to put a price near one close to something I have already written; I am 
not putting everything 20 20 20 or 15 15 15 and I ask my self shall I 
go up a bit or shall I go down a bit so these are external influences 
that come from the amount I have listed before. So sometime is not that 
I want to give this price or not but just that I want a variety of my 
choices. So .. 
And now take two these and just tell me if you find them equal or 
different. Anyway you have given different value to them but just tell 
me if you gave these different prices because you wanted variety or 
Just you find that some of them were different. 
As I said I found some of them different, those which I found more 
elaborated I tend to give higher prices, so if there are any 
differences that could be, but as I said I was not consistent with my 
prices as I consider purely as a game of chance; it is not a thing that 
I am actually bargaining for me; a lottery is a game of chance, so it 
is not something that I ask to consider the amount of effort, 
similarity, as so one I think that it depends on luck and no matter how 
much effort you put in it, so the differences are only a question of 
variety as I said, I think so, and not in term of similness I do not 
know if it is a good word. 
And then look at these two and just tell me your feelings about them, 
you gave the same value to them but just give me the feelings you had 
in reading them. 
I think that in these case I consider them equal or very close so I was 
conscious of similarity and so I gave to them the same price .. but 
generally given the chance, I do not think I would stick to that but as 
I said sometimes I consciously compared them and sometimes I did by 
random. 
And now just other two, look at them, you gave very close value, 14 
and 15. 
In this case, it was not because they are similar one, it is very 
elaborate and it took quite a long time to read it but at the end I 
found that the effect following the analysis is the same for both of 
them, so as I said before I classified them consciously in a similar 
range. Elaborateness could give me more money but then again you can 
loose and less elaborateness it costs less but then again if you win is 
a win so it is good so it can be as good as the other one or as bad as 
the other one. 
O. K. And then these three you gave 12,10,15. 
I remember that in the process I found that I gave 15,17 and so on so 
I have to give something less then half and if someone find himself in 
a very critical situation one might accept anything that goes on, so 
even though fifty percent is reasonable, I might go down a bit to forty 
percent if you give yourself the benefit of the doubt. 
And this one Z 
You gave 15, I do not remember which one, but occasionally I picked one 
and I remember I picked something which is similar so I tend to go back 
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to see how much I gave to the previous one and I compare to see if I 
could award the same price to that one, so I presume that must have 
been the reason, probably I was trying to make it close with something 
else. 
Subject 20 
I ask you in general which kind of reasoning did you adopt in 
evaluating your lotteries. 
I like better lotteries where there is always a chance of picking the 
right colour from the bag, the chosen colour from the bag. Among these 
I prefer those which offer a fifty percent chance of winning. When 
there is a chance of picking a bag where the chosen colour does not 
exist, I ordered lotteries according to the probability of the bag with 
the wrong colour. The most preferred Is the one in which probability is 
1 over 11 and the least preferred is the one in which the bag is 1/2. I 
would not like to play lotteries where the proportion of balls in some 
or all the bags is unknown or, and randomly determined. In general the 
higher is the degree of casuality built in the lottery the lesser I 
like to bet on it and I evaluated the lottery three, three two and one 
according to this criterion. 
So I ask you some lotteries in particular; take lottery E and D you 
have evaluated 13 just explain me why. 
The same, because they are exactly the same to me, because if I choose 
D. there are two bags which have six white and six black if I choose 
one bag, it is like the one with one bag six whites and six blacks. 
Then take B, U and V, you gave all of them S. 
Because it does not make any difference to me if I choose the bag, the 
experimenter chooses the bag or it is a coin or the bag is chosen by a 
random device. For me it does not make any difference, so it is why I 
evaluated the same. 
And then take F, A, G and H and F, you have evaluated 5, A you have 
evaluated A 7. G8 and H 9. 
Because here there is the chance of getting... a chance of picking one 
bag in which the colour that you have chosen it does not exist. And in 
this case for me, the most preferred one is the one that has one over 
eleven as chance of getting that bag, and I did prefer the one who has 
the chance of one third, so it is one eleventh, one seventh, one fifth 
and one third, basically even if all these are the same I might end 
with picking up the right or the wrong bag, the bag with the wrong 
colour and I am interested in the probability of picking that bag, I do 
not care about the others. 
And then just take C and I. 
The crazy one. 
You gave to both of them just two; just explain me why. 
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Because here these are ... just a second they are the same ... but there is another one to which I gave two. 
Yes it is here. 
Yes it is because is just that percentage of whites and blacks is not 
known and also it looks also out of me to take the wrong or the right 
bag. The difference between these two is just that the percentage is 
determined randomly in both with different procedure. But they are the 
same to me. 
And then take T and N. 
You gave to both of them 3; just explain me why. 
Again it is just here at least you have one bag in which you have .. at least which has a known percentage of balls of both colours and you 
know that It is half and half, and this is why it is slightly preferred 
to the one in which the colours are completely unknown; here you have a 
chance of picking from a bag in which there is a known percentage of 
the colour, so that is why I is just slightly better to me than the 
other, but not so much still in my evaluation what counts more is that 
there is one bag in which the percentage is unknown. 
Just take L, R and F again. And then you gave to F 5, to L 10 and to R 
15. 
Now because to F 5, because in F there is the bag with balls of one 
colour which I do not like; in R: R is the one I like better because 
you can never pick the wrong bag, in every bag you have a half and half 
percentage of winning and in L you still have .. L is the same as R in 
the sense that you always.. again you necessarily will pick a bag in 
which there is the right colour but the probability of picking that 
colour is lower. 
And just take S. P and Q. and then 0. 
First look and S, P and Q and you have evaluated two all of them 
anyway. Just explain me why. 
The two is because I evaluated two when I do not know the percentage of 
the thing, the percentage of the colour and the thing is that it does 
not matter to me if just you do not know or well if you do not know the 
colour then again, the things is that it does not make any difference 
to me whether I choose the bag the coin chooses it or the experiment 
chooses it; for me it is the same, because in any case I do not know 
the percentage in the bag 
The 0 it is exactly the same for the same reason, it does not matter to 
me .. the other case here ... the outcome when there is one bag is the 
same answer, I cannot improve if there is one bag or two bags to be 
chosen if the two bags are equivalent to these one in this lotteries. 
And then just take Z. 
So this complication does not effect my choice because it is a clear 
complication when the complication is like in Z and in M it affects my 
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choice because it is just so doggy that I would never bet on these two 
so that kind of complication does not affect my choices but this. So I 
evaluated them just because I do not want to play them never; actually 
I could have evaluated them 0. 
But because they were complicated or because they were both complicated 
and unknown. 
Because there is so much, there is so much so much it seems I mean 
obviously the expected value is the same for both but I mean there is 
to much chance built into it chance on chance on chance chance on 
chance that you know I just do not want to play. 
O. K 
Thank you. 
Subject 21 
I ask you in general to explain to me which kind of reasoning did you 
adopt in evaluating your lotteries. 
I reasoned basically from probabilistic terms and what I find to do is 
to give to each game first the first game is a randomly selected number 
between 1 and 25 and you win if it is greater than the value that you 
assigned to the game and then you are going on to the second game which 
is the actual game in itself and then working on the expected value 
.. expected wins of the whole process depending on the value that you 
gave to this game and then optimizing the winning just optimizing the 
expected winnings the expected q; then there are some of the games in 
which you have to take into account well non exact things; so when the 
experimenter was involved you were unsure how they are going actually 
to set up, because it would be possible actually break the game, so I 
was a bit cautious. Some of the highest.. I evaluated one more then 12. 
This is due to the fact that you know some information about how the 
bags were sorted, you knew that there were one more black or two blacks 
and white, three blacks, so I actually increased the expected winnings 
that you have so.. 
I just ask you to look at few lotteries and then I will ask you again 
why you have evaluated them in some way. I just ask you the E and then 
the U one; you have given the same value, just explain me why. 
Well, it is that irrespective of what bag you choose, both have the 
same proportion of blacks and whites six of each, so choosing any of 
the bag you have fifty percent chance of actually getting a white or a 
black, so it is just the same which colour you want bet on, you got 
half half chance of getting it. 
And the U one and E. 
This is the two bags. This one is one E you have six blacks and six 
whites so you have a fifty percent chance of getting the colour that 
you have decided, so I gave 12 pounds, so it seems a fifty fifty 
chance. Well in this one the difference is that you have a fifty fifty 
chance of actually choosing the bag and they are of one colour, once 
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you choose the bags it is pretty down which colour you get, what ever 
comes in the bag, it is a different position choosing a colour because 
choosing a bag in that situation it does not make any difference 
whatsoever. 
And then just take that one and the E one again you have evaluated the 
same just explain me why. 
It is fifty fifty, there are six whites and six blacks in one bag, this 
is because choosing any ball of the bag you do not have the knowledge 
if it is either black or white, so you assign equal probability to 
either of those outcomes, you faithfully choose from a bag but if 
actually the are a fifty fifty... you do not know any information about 
which colour is determined, actually there is an all spectrum that you 
can have, there can be 12 black and going through till one with six 
blacks and six whites In a bag ..... come up to still 
fifty fifty due to 
symmetry, I mean because you can substitute if you have a sample of 13 
possibilities then you can substitutes all blacks for whites etc. and 
if you choose black or white is going to be a fifty fifty, it is 
symmetric. 
And B and E you have evaluated the same. 
In this one you actually choose the bag; it is the bag which determins 
the colour that you get. It is fifty fifty, this is similar but the 
decision of what bag is determined by tossing a coin it is fifty fifty, 
it is random you have a fifty fifty choice it is the sense of 
perception.. 
and them M. 
Basically there are two possibilities two blacks and two whites, well 
three possibilities one black and one white; so the chance is fifty, 
each ball going into the bag has a fifty fifty chance or being black or 
white black or white so is effectively a bag of... it is similar to the 
12 balls in which you do not actually know which colour they are; it is 
identical only there are two, so you still have a fifty fifty; chance 
it would not be the same if the bag contained the bag from which you 
have the drowns off contains 9 black and three whites, so you will have 
more chance in on black so you will bet on black if you knew it and you 
will have a higher expected winnings, but they were six blacks and six 
whites if they were all blacks then you had hundred percent so. 
O. K. thank you. 
Evaluation of the lotteries relevent for the section 111.3.4.1. 
Evaluation of the lotteries U, D, F, A, G, H, C, according to (1.20) 
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where p1s.... spn. 
Lottery U 
U= 
[L1(25,0; 
0,1), 1/2; L2(25,1; 0,0), 1/2) 
V(U) = u(25) f(O) + u(25) [f(1) - f(0)] f(1/2) = u(25) f(1/2). 
Lottery D 
V= 
(L1(25,1/2; 
0,1/2), 1/2; L2(25,1/2; 0,1/20), 1/2) 
V (D) = f(1/2) u(25) +[ f(1/2) - f(1/2) 1 f(1/2) u(25) = f(1/2) u(25). 
Lottery F 
F= 
( 
Ll(25,0; 0,1), 1/3; L2(25,1/2; 0,1/2), 1/3; L3(25,1; 0,0), 1/3 J 
V(F)= u(25) f(O) + u(25) ([f(1/2)-f(0)] f(2/3) + [f(1)-f(1/2)] f(1/3)1= 
= u(25) f(1/2) f(2/3) [ 1-f (1/2)I f(1/3). 
Lottery A 
A=(L1(25,0; 0.1). 1/5; L2(25.3/12,0,9/12), 1/5 ; L3(25,1/2; 0,1/2), 1/5; 
L4(25,9/12; 0,3/12) 1/5; L5(25,1; 0,0)ß 1/5) 
V(A) = u(25) f(0) + u(25) I[f(3/12)- f(0)] f(4/5) + 
If(1/2)-f(3/12)] f(3/5)+[ f(9/12) - f(1/2)] f(2/5), + 
[f(1)-f(9/12)]f(1/5) 
=u(25)[[f(3/12)f(4/5)+[f(1/2)-f(3/12)]f(3/5)+ 
+[f(9/12)-f(1/2)]f(2/5)+[f(1)-f(9/12)]f(1/5)] 
Lottery G 
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G=(L 
1(25.0; 0,1), 1/7; L2 
(25,3/12,0,9/12), 1/7 ; L3(25,5/12; 0.7/12), 1/7; 
L4(25,1/2; 0,1/2), 1/7; L5(25,7/12; 0.5/12), 1/7; L6(25,9/12; 0.3/12), 1/7; 
L7(25.1; 0,0), 1/7 
) 
V(G) = u(25) f(0) + u(25) [[f(3/12) - f(0)] f(6/7) +[ f(5/12) - f(3/121 
f(5/7) +I f(6/12) - f(5/12)) f(4/7) +[ f(7/12) - f(6/12) 1 f(3/7) + 
+[ f(9/12) -f (7/12) 1 f(2/7) +[ f(1) - f(9/12)] f(1/7) _ 
= u(25) (f(3/12) f(6/7) +[ f(5/12) - f(3/12) 
f(5/7) +[ f(6/12) - f(5/12)) f(4/7) +[ f(7/12) - f(6/12) 1 f(3/7) + 
+[ f(9/12) -f (7/12) 1 f(2/7) +[ f(1) - f(9/12)) f(1/7)) 
Lottery H 
H=( L1(25.0; 0.1). 1/11; L2(25,1/12; 0,11/12), 1/11; 
L3(25.2/12; 0,10/12), 1/11; 
L5(25,5/12; 0,7/12), 1/11; 
L7(25,7/12; 0,5/12), 1/11; 
L9(25.10/12; 0.2/12). 1/11; 
L11 (25,1; 0,0), 1/11 J 
L4( 25.3/12; 0.9/12). 1/11; 
L6(25,1/2; 0,1/2), 1/11; 
L8(25,9/12; 0,3/12), 1/11; 
L10 (25,11/12; 0,1/12), 1/11; 
V(H) - u(25) f(O) +u (25) ([ f(1/12) - f(0)] f(10/11) + 
+[ f(2/12) - f(1/12)] f(9/11) +[ f(3/12) -f (2/12)1 f(8/11) + 
+[ f(5/12) - f(3/12)] f(7/11) + [f(1/2)-f(5/12)] f(6/11) + 
+[ f(7/12) - f(6/12)] f(5/11) +[ f(9/12) - f(7/12)] f(4/11)+ 
+[ ((10/12) - f(9/12)] f(3/11) + [f(11/12) - f(10/12)] f(2/11) + 
+[ f(1) - ((11/12)] f(1/11)) - 
u (25) ([ f(1/12) f(10/11) +[ f(2/12) - f(1/12)] f(9/11) + 
+[ f(3/12) -f (2/12)] f(8/11) +[ f(5/12) - f(3/12)] f(7/11) + 
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+ [f(1/2)-f(5/12)1 f(6/11) +[ f(7/12) - f(6/12)] f(5/11) + 
+[ f(9/12) - f(7/12)] f(4/11)+ [ f(10/12) - f(9/12)] f(3/11) + 
+ [f(11/12) - f(10/12)] f(2/11) +[ f(1) - f(11/12)] f(1/11)) 
Lottery C 
C= 
(L1(o; 
o1). 1/13; L2(25,1/12; 0,11/12), 1/13; 
L3(25,2/12; 0,10/12), 1/13 
L5(25,4/12; 0,8/12), 1/13; 
L7 (25,1/2; 0.1/2), 1/13; 
L9(25,8/12; 0,4/12), 1/13; 
L11 (25,10/12; 0,2/12), 1/13; 
L13 (25,1; 0,0), 1/13 ) 
L4(25,3/12; 0,9/12), 1/13; 
L6(25,5/12; 0,7/12), 1/13 
L8(25,7/12; 0,5/12), 1/13; 
L1625,9/12; 0,3/12), 1/13; 
L12(25,11/12; 0,1/12), 1/13; 
V( C) = u(25) f(0) + u(25) ([f(1/12) - f(0)] f(12/13) + 
[f(2/12) - f(1/12)] ((11/13) +[ ((3/12) - f(2/12) ] ((10/13) + 
+[ f(4/12)- f(3/12)1 f(9/13) +[ f(5/12) - f(4/12)] f(8/13) + 
+[ f(6/12) - f(5/12)] f (7/12) +[ f(7/12) - f(6/12)] f (6/13) + 
+[f (8/12) - f(7/12) 1 f(5/13) + [f(9/12) - ((8/12)1 f(4/13) + 
+[ f(10/12) - ((9/12)1 f (3/13) + [f(11/12) - ((10/12)1 ((2/13) + 
+ [((12/12) - f(11/12)] f (1/13) 
= u(25) (((1/12) f(12/13) + [((2/12) - f(1/12)1 ((11/13) + 
+I f(3/12) - ((2/12) 1 f(10/13) +[ f(4/12)- f(3/12)1 ((9/13) + 
[ f(5/12) - ((4/12)1 f(8/13) +[ f(6/12) - ((5/12)] f (7/12) + 
+[ ((7/12) - ((6/12)1 f (6/13) +[f (8/12) - ((7/12) 1 ((5/13) + 
If(9/12) - f(8/12)] f(4/13) +[ ((10/12) - f(9/12)1 f (3/13) + 
+ [f(11/12) - ((10/12)] f(2/13) + [f(12/12) - f(11/12)l f (1/13). 
Taking f(p) = p2 and evaluatind the above lotteries accodrdingly we 
obtain the following values: 
Lottery B and D 
u(25) (1/2)2 (1/2)2= 0.25 u(25) - 25 (Assuming linearity) 
25 . 0.25 = 6.25. 
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Lottery F 
V(F) = u(25) . 0.194 
4.84 
Lottery A 
V(A) = u(25) . 0.175 
4.37 
Lottery G 
V(G) = u(25) . 0.171 4.27 
Lottery H 
V(H) = u(25) 0.169 4.22 
Lottery C 
V(C) = u(25) . 0.160 4 
Table AB. 1 Values of the lotteries used in the experiment for different 
values of t using f(p)= ptand u(l) =1 and u(O) =0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t B F G A H I 
1 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1.5 0.354 0.317 0.302 0.299 0.297 0.296 
2 0.250 0.194 0.175 0.171 0.170 0.168 
2.5 0.177 0.117 0.099 0.096 0.095 0.093 
3 0.125 0.069 0.055 0.053 0.052 0.051 
3.5 0.088 0.041 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 
4 0.063 0.024 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 
4.5 0.044 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
5 0.031 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
5.5 0.022 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
6 0.016 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
6.5 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
7 0.008 0.001 0 0 0 0 
55 
APPENDIX C 
(Chapter IV) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
SELF-INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 
You are about to participate in an experiment concerning decision 
making under risk and uncertainty. The purpose of the experiment 
is to gain insight into certain features of economic behaviour. If 
you follow the instructions carefully you can earn money, but you 
may end up not earning anything, other than the participation fee. You 
will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The mechanism 
according to which you will be paid will be explained at the end of 
these instructions. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the 
other participants. Communication between participants will lead to the 
automatic termination of the session. 
You will be presented with 8 different scenarios regarding the same 
kind of problem. Imagine that you are concerned about the occurrence of 
some event. If this event does occur, you would suffer a loss of 
money. However, you have the opportunity to take some action at some 
monetary cost. If you take this action, should the event occur, the 
loss will be reduced to zero. Each scenario differs according to 
the probability of the potential loss of X10. 
Try to think of each scenario as a real situation. 
For each scenario you will be asked to state the maximum amount you 
are willing to pay to reduce a potential loss to zero. For each 
scenario, you will Indicate your maximum willingness to pay 
through the following auction mechanism. On the screen you will 
see a description of the scenario. Below the description, at the 
bottom of the screen, will be displayed a price which will steadily 
increase. You will indicate your willingness to pay by pressing any 
key when the price reaches the most that you are willing to pay; that 
is, when you want to leave the auction. The last person to drop out 
will acquire the right to reduce the loss to zero and he or she will 
pay the price at which the second-to-last person dropped out. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be given an endowment of 
£10. At the end of the experiment, after you have revealed your price 
for all the eight scenarios, one of the scenarios will be selected 
with a random device and that scenario will be played out for 
real. The player who dropped out last in that scenario pays the 
price of the second-to-last person to drop out and hence he or she 
will be paid £10 less that amount. The other participants will play 
the selected scenario out and they will be paid according to the 
outcome. 
The experiment is organised as follows: 
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Step 1 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given a 
hypothetical example in order to help you become familiar with the 
problem and the auction procedure. 
Step 2 
You will be given the first scenario. You will be allowed a few 
minutes to think about it. 
Step 3 
The auction will take place. You will be asked to press a key when 
the price reaches the most that you are willing to pay; that is when 
you want to leave the auction. 
Step 4 
You will be presented with the other seven situations. 
Step 5 
At the end of the eight sessions a scenario will be selected at random 
and played out for real. A person will be asked to pick a number from 
a bag containing eight tickets numbered from 1 to 8. Each number 
corresponds to one of the scenarios. If number 5 is picked then the 
experimenter will enter that number into the control computer. At 
this point, will be displayed on the screen all the prices at which 
the subjects dropped out from the auction. If you are the last 
person to have dropped out for the selected scenario you will 
have to pay the price at which the second-to-last person 
dropped out and in this way you will acquire the right to reduce 
your loss to zero. Hence the last person to have dropped out from 
the auction for the selected scenario will receive £10 minus the 
price paid to reduce the loss to zero irrespective of the outcome of 
the played scenario. 
Then the selected scenario will be played out for real. 
Step 6 
The scenario selected will be played according to the following 
lottery mechanism: there will be an opaque bag containing 100 balls. 
The number of black balls corresponds to the chances of loss, while 
the number of white balls corresponds to the chances of no loss. The 
proportion of black and white balls will correspond to the various 
probabilities of the potential loss. The selected scenario will be 
played out for each subject separately. Each one of the participants 
will be asked to draw a ball from the bag. After every draw the ball 
will be replaced before the next subject draws another ball. A white 
ball results in no loss, i. e. In a payoff of £10 for the participant 
who drew the ball. A black ball results in a loss of £10, I. e. a 
payoff of LO for the participant who drew the ball. 
The mechanism whereby the lotteries will be played in the 
different scenarios will be explained in greater detail at the end of 
the practice question. Please notice that after a scenario has been 
selected and the lottery corresponding to that scenario has been 
played out, you will be free to check whether the stated 
probability corresponds to the combination of white and black balls 
inside the opaque bag. 
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SELF-PROTECTION EXPERIMENT 
You are about to participate in an experiment concerning decision 
making under risk and uncertainty. The purpose of the experiment 
is to gain insight into certain features of economic behaviour. If 
you follow the instructions carefully you can earn money, but you may 
end up not earning anything, other than the participation fee. You 
will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The mechanism 
according to which you will be paid will be explained at the end of 
these instructions. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the 
other participants. Communication between participants will lead to the 
automatic end of the session. 
You will be presented with 8 different scenarios regarding the same 
kind of problem. 
Imagine that you are concerned about the occurrence of some event. If 
this event does occur you would suffer a loss of money. However, you 
have the opportunity to take some action at some monetary cost. If 
you take this action you will be able to reduce the probability of 
the occurrence of such an event to zero. Each scenario differs 
according to the probability of the occurrence of such an event. 
Try to think of each scenario as a real situation. 
For each scenario you will be asked to state the maximum amount you 
are willing to pay to reduce the probability of the occurrence of such 
an event to zero. 
For each scenario, you will indicate your maximum willingness to 
pay through the following auction mechanism. On the screen you will 
see a description of the scenario. Below the description, at the 
bottom of the screen, will be displayed a price which will steadily 
increase. You will indicate your willingness to pay by pressing any 
key when the price reaches the most that you are willing to pay; that 
is, when you want to leave the auction. The last person to drop out 
will acquire the right to reduce the probability of the loss to zero 
and she or he will pay the price at which, the second-to-last person 
dropped out. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be given an endowment of 
£10. At the end of the experiment, after you have revealed your price 
for all the eight scenarios, one of the scenarios will be selected 
with a random device and that scenario will be played out for 
real. The player who dropped out last in that scenario pays the 
price of the second-to-last person to drop out and hence she or he 
will be paid £10 pounds less that amount. The other participants 
will play the selected scenario out and will be paid according to the 
outcome. 
The experiment is organised as follows: 
Step1 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given a 
hypothetical example in order to help you become familiar with the 
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problem and the auction procedure. 
Step 2 You will be given the first scenario. You will be allowed a few 
minutes to think about it. 
Step 3 
The auction will take place. You be asked to press a key when the 
price reaches the most that you are willing to pay; that is to say when 
you want to leave the auction. 
Step 4 
You will be presented with the other seven situations. 
Step 5 
At the end of the eight sessions a scenario will be selected at random 
and played out for real. A person will be asked to pick a number from a 
bag containing eight tickets numbered from 1 to S. Each number 
corresponds to one of the scenarios. If number 5 is picked then the 
experimenter will enter that number into the control computer. At 
this point, will be displayed on the screen all the prices at which 
each subject dropped out from the auction. If you are the last person 
to have dropped out for the selected scenario you will have to pay the 
price at which the second-to-last person dropped out and in this way 
you will acquire the right to reduce the probability of the occurrence 
of the event to zero. Hence the last person to have dropped out from 
the auction for the selected scenario will receive £10 minus the price 
paid to reduce the probability of the occurrence of the event to zero 
irrespective of the outcome of the played scenario. 
Then the selected scenario will be played out for real. 
Step 6 
The scenario selected will be played in the following way: there will 
be an opaque bag containing 100 balls. The number of black balls 
corresponds to the chances of loss, while the number of white balls 
corresponds to the chances of no loss. The proportion of white and 
black balls will correspond to the various probabilities of the 
occurrence of the event. The selected scenario will be played out for 
each subject separately. Each one of the participants will be asked 
to draw a ball from the bag. After every draw the ball will be 
replaced before the next subject draws another ball. A white ball 
results in no loss, i. e. in a payoff of £10 for the participant who 
drew the ball. A black ball results in a loss of £10, i. e. a payoff of 
-CO for the participant who drew the ball. 
The mechanism whereby the lotteries will be played in the 
different scenarios will be explained In greater detail at the end of 
the practice question. Please notice that after a lottery has been 
played, you will be free to check whether the stated probability 
corresponds to the combination of white and black balls inside the 
opaque bag. 
Example of self-protection scenario: 
Risky scenario 
Assume that there is a risk of 50% that some event occurs. If this 
event occurs you will suffer a loss of £10. 
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You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce the probability of the occurrence 
of such an event to zero. 
You will be asked to press any key when the price reaches the most that 
you are willing to pay; that is when you want to leave the auction. 
Ambiguous scenarios: 
Best estimate 
Assume that there is a potential risk of of the occurrence of some 
event. There is an estimate of the occurrence of this event; an expert, 
hired by a Governmental Agency, estimates that the probability of the 
occurrence of such an event is 50%. However this is the first 
investigation ever carried out and consequently you experience 
considerable uncertainty about the precision of this estimate. If this 
event occurs. you will suffer a loss of £10. 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce the probability of the occurrence 
of such an event to zero. 
Interval probability 
Assume that there is a potential risk of the occurrence of some event. 
There is an estimate of the possible occurrence of this event; an 
expert hired by a Governmental Agency, estimates that the probability 
of the occurrence of such an event can be anywhere between 357. and 659.. 
If this events occur . you will suffer a loss of 410. 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce the probability of the occurrence 
of such an event to zero. 
Set of probability 
Assume that there is a potential risk of the occurrence of some 
event. There is an estimate of the possible occurrence of this event; 
an expert, hired by a Governmental Agency, estimates that the 
probability of the occurrence of such an event can be anywhere 
between 35% and 659.. If this event occurs, you will suffer a loss of 
£10. 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce the probability of the occurrence 
of such an event to zero. 
Example of self-insurance scenario 
Ri. ky scenario 
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Assume that there is a risk of 507. that some event occurs. If this 
event occurs you will suffer a loss of £10. 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce this potential loss to zero. 
Ambiguous scenarios: 
Best estimate 
Assume that there is a potential risk of of the occurrence of some 
event. There is an estimate of the occurrence of this event; an expert, 
hired by a Governmental Agency, estimates that the probability of the 
occurrence of such an event is 50%. However this is the first 
investigation ever carried out and consequently you experience 
considerable uncertainty about the precision of this estimate. If this 
event occurs, you will suffer a loss of £10. 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce this potential loss to zero. 
Interval probability 
Assume that there is a potential risk of the occurrence of some event. 
There is an estimate of the possible occurrence of this event; an 
expert hired by a Governmental Agency, estimates that the probability 
of the occurrence of such an event can be anywhere between 35% and 65%. 
If this events occur , you will suffer a loss of £10. 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce this potential loss to zero. 
Set of probability 
Assume that there is a potential risk of the occurrence of some 
event. There is an estimate of the possible occurrence of this event; 
an expert, hired by a Governmental Agency, estimates that the 
probability of the occurrence of such an event can be anywhere 
between 35% and 657.. If this event occurs, you will suffer a loss of 
110. 
You are now asked to state which is the maximum amount of money that 
you would be willing to pay to reduce this potential loss to zero. 
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Table AC. 1. Risk and ambiguity attitudes for 
the self-protection group 
Probability 0.03 
---- -AA --- -- 
AN 
--- - -- 
AP_ 
-- 
RA 13 2 9 
RN 1 5 2 
RP 2 3 1 
Probability 0.2 
----- 
AA 
----- 
AN 
-----AP ------- 
RA 13 25 
RN 431 
RP 424 
Probability 0.5 
---- -AA -- --- 
AN 
-- - --- 
AP_ 
-- 
RA 11 2 9 
RN 1 4 2 
RP 5 0 4 
AA Ambiguity aversion 
AN Ambiguity neutrality 
AP Ambiguity proneness 
Probability 0.8 
---- - 
AA 
--- -- --AN--- -- --AP --- 
RA 6 2 3 
RN 2 5 1 
RP 14 2 3 
RA Risk aversion 
RN Risk neutrality 
RP Risk proneness 
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Table AC. 2 Self-insurance best estimate 
R3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 
1 2 182 159 652 500 902 
25 20 150 175 506 454 804 
60 16 175 125 290 453 753 
33 75 200 230 490 450 200 
315 105 799 500 499 499 683 
4 41 199 150 502 300 799 
11 11 195 187 451 101 500 
48 50 199 200 201 250 501 
Table AC. 3 Self insurance interval probability 
R3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 
94 100 202 264 500 521 800 
100 151 210 250 351 560 710 
199 175 195 190 199 199 500 
114 157 262 283 413 503 603 
30 50 205 212 510 500 750 
250 202 300 301 351 401 401 
224 206 402 405 385 399 501 
100 101 200 209 400 500 450 
2 40 411 457 356 512 786 
100 149 370 450 530 500 700 
60 70 220 210 500 501 815 
20 36 184 303 615 624 815 
35 21 300 205 600 550 825 
30 25 200 200 500 500 800 
5 105 334 443 600 553 120 
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Table AC. 4 Self-insurance set of probability 
R3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 
30 30 200 200 501 500 803 
35 3 200 200 500 500 800 
31 31 201 201 501 500 801 
101 70 209 203 150 401 224 
154 150 402 377 520 555 652 
25 10 233 240 250 575 705 
19 76 160 175 330 660 825 
140 161 299 332 501 530 701 
91 95 275 425 560 575 765 
6 100 180 301 606 349 707 
2 2 150 150 300 800 950 
1 1 4 5 100 49 500 
1 1 201 205 475 300 697 
1 1 320 531 1 80 2 
36 184 502 531 816 850 907 
Table AC. 5 Self-insurance control group 
A80 
801 
801 
801 
221 
626 
450 
810 
701 
820 
750 
150 
200 
701 
700 
911 
R3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 A80 
1 1 50 50 150 250 400 399 
24 25 303 233 653 555 853 779 
58 100 280 413 613 705 699 718 
199 175 195 190 199 199 500 291 
6 30 150 77 455 403 601 392 
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Table AC. 6 Self-protection best estimate 
r3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 A80 
30 10 170 20 160 500 60 200 
1 1 100 50 350 320 600 650 
30 30 200 203 500 500 800 800 
2 503 950 95 686 999 199 980 
10 35 250 250 549 550 100 699 
75 230 726 575 750 575 700 910 
47 65 185 325 565 375 825 900 
52 56 60 309 410 408 828 824 
Table AC. 7 Self-protection interval probability 
R3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 A80 
91 100 200 300 615 591 809 840 
180 180 350 500 700 600 816 850 
35 49 202 232 511 541 801 821 
106 60 235 355 503 500 202 950 
112 215 509 607 614 706 806 826 
9 25 149 202 510 499 820 800 
63 51 225 199 501 606 800 840 
61 49 200 225 550 625 795 850 
30 25 199 175 751 499 699 811 
30 30 150 150 300 350 700 800 
30 30 200 200 501 500 800 802 
30 30 200 200 501 500 800 803 
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Table AC. 8 Self-protection set of probability 
R3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 A80 
1 1 110 100 200 199 300 505 
30 50 208 275 505 550 774 800 
50 70 210 300 600 500 650 815 
52 60 75 205 531 525 199 599 
51 100 321 429 601 652 903 901 
52 84 325 461 619 588 628 913 
111 100 221 300 430 480 500 451 
177 25 50 375 316 506 512 263 
189 125 275 420 545 457 608 799 
35 52 211 360 500 410 803 751 
100 56 286 300 609 550 849 805 
93 76 236 218 563 528 699 699 
Table AC. 9 Self-protection control group 
R3 A3 R20 A20 R50 A50 R80 A80 
11 10 150 149 631 640 852 871 
320 290 252 318 655 725 850 885 
151 159 450 325 473 500 842 692 
31 31 201 201 501 501 801 801 
106 105 406 405 606 509 607 605 
1 1 49 1 102 302 602 800 
104 120 312 370 513 507 508 2 
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